The Great War is, first and foremost, a contest of economies. To survive a war of attrition and postwar reconstruction, we cannot remain a country with a raw materials-based economy. I spoke about this today at the Business Wisdom Summit. Our path is to export finished products with high added value, develop machine-building and the military-tech sector. Ukraine must claim a worthy place on the global arms market. And we must accelerate, because the window of opportunity won’t stay open for long. Kyrylo Budanov, 16 April 2026.

This week’s update is being written on my first day in Taiwan for a week-long research visit. I look forward to a range of different conversations with different individuals and institutions, as well as a book talk now that my first book, War Transformed, has been released in Chinese. There is one other change for this week; I have not had time to put together my Big Five reading recommendations. My apologies. This will return next week.

The war in Ukraine this week conformed to patterns established early in 2026. Russian forces continued their attempts at generating operational momentum in their spring offensive with only limited success, while Ukrainian defensive operations – particularly drone operations – are hurting the Russians in greater depth behind the frontline. Ukraine and Russia continue their deep aerial strikes, with Russia generating large numbers of Ukrainian civilians killed and wounded, and Ukraine hurting Russian air defence and oil production. Diplomacy has stalled, and that does not appear likely to change while the Iran War absorbs much of the strategic bandwidth of the Trump administration.

In the Iran War, peace talks in Islamabad between U.S. Vice President Vance and Iranian representatives collapsed on 12 April. Trump subsequently declared that he “no longer cared about negotiations” and announced a US naval blockade of Iranian ports. By 16 April, Defence Secretary Hegseth confirmed that more than 10,000 US sailors, marines, and airmen, along with over a dozen warships, were executing the maritime blockade. The U.S. Navy simultaneously began initial operations to re-open the Strait of Hormuz. More recently the New York Times reported that “American military and intelligence officials estimate that, after weeks of war, Iran still has about 40 percent of its arsenal of attack drones and upward of 60 percent of its missile launchers — more than enough to hold shipping in the Strait of Hormuz hostage in the future.” It is hard to see why Iran would give up such leverage cheaply.

The week in the Pacific has seen North Korean ballistic missile launches, further negotiations about Taiwan’s special defence budget, the Balikatan 2026 live-fire exercises and China’s response, Australia’s new defence strategy, and the continued evolution of Japan’s operational footprint in the South China Sea and Philippine Sea.

Welcome to my weekly update on war and strategic competition.

Ukraine

Ukrainian Long-Range Strike Operations: Denying Russia’s Oil Windfall. This week demonstrated again that Ukraine has transformed its long-range strike campaign into a powerful source of strategic leverage against Putin. The campaign’s geographic scope would have been hard to imagine just a couple of years ago. Its economic effects, measured in denied oil export revenue, are becoming difficult for Russia to absorb. And the timing of the current Ukrainian strike campaign momentum is important – it coincides with Moscow’s windfall from the Iran war-driven oil price surge, and the extension of U.S. sanction relief.

In the past 24 hours, Ukraine hit the Novokuybyshevsk refinery, located 1000 km from Ukraine. It is an important asset for the Russian military and provides a large proportion of the Russian army’s fuel requirements.

Another striking operation (pardon the pun) of the last week came on 10 April, when Ukrainian forces struck two drilling platforms in the northern Caspian Sea - the ice-resistant stationary platforms at the V. Graifer and Yuri Korchagin fields. Ukraine’s General Staff stated the platforms served as fuel supply nodes for the Russian occupation army, making them legitimate military targets.

The week also saw Ukrainian drones hit two oil pumping stations in Volgograd and Krasnodar Krai, an oil depot in Tver, the Cherepovets Azot ammonia plant in the Volga region, the Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant in Bashkortostan, and the oil export terminal and refinery at Tuapse on the Black Sea. The cumulative damage to Russia’s export infrastructure, in the final days of March and first two weeks of April, appears to be significant. Open source satellite photography showed Primorsk had lost 40 percent of its storage capacity and Ust-Luga 30 percent. Neither port was handling normal oil shipments as of early April, with Finnish maritime officials reporting tanker arrivals had fallen from a weekly average of 40–50 ships to “individual vessels.”

Reuters estimated that Russia had missed out on 40 percent of its potential oil windfall because Ukraine had destroyed the capacity to export at least 2 million barrels per day. In the context of Brent crude trading at $114 a barrel, that is a significant financial problem for Putin.

Russia’s response to the Ukrainian campaign was to issue a threat to Europe. The Russian Defence Ministry published a list of addresses of European companies involved in drone joint production with Ukraine, and former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev clarified that the list amounted to “a list of potential targets for the Russian armed forces.” The warning came after Germany pledged 300 million euros to Ukraine’s long-range strike capability, Norway committed 560 million euros to drone support, and the Netherlands and Belgium added further hundreds of millions.

Related to Ukraine’s robust and evolving long-range strike capability, President Zelenskyy this week marked Arms Makers’ Day on 15 April by releasing a video showcasing 56 types of Ukrainian-built weapons, including 31 types of drones. His deputy defence minister noted that Russia cannot produce enough air defence systems to protect its vast territory. This is evidence that Ukraine’s strike campaign has found a structural gap in Russia’s air defence system that more investment and more drones and long-range missiles can continue to exploit.

Zelenskyy’s Europe Tour. Zelenskyy’s diplomatic tempo during the week took him to Norway, Germany, and Italy in a sweep of alliance meetings. His messaging was consistent: air defence is Ukraine’s highest priority, the Iran war has complicated Ukraine’s position, and Russia does not deserve any easing of international pressure including oil sanctions.

In Germany on 14 April, Zelenskyy and Chancellor Friedrich Merz agreed to strengthen defence cooperation, particularly in drone warfare, with Berlin committing 300 million euros to Ukraine’s long-range strike capability and pledging 5,000 mid-range attack drones for use against Russian battlefield logistics networks and other targets. In Norway on the same day, a joint defence and security cooperation agreement was signed alongside a Norwegian commitment of 560 million euros in drone support.

In Rome on 15 April, Zelenskyy met Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and announced a “Drone Deal” format. This is a security cooperation model through which Ukraine’s expertise in drone warfare, electronic warfare, and missile defence would be integrated with partner nations’ industrial capacity. Teams from Ukraine and Italy’s Leonardo defence company were tasked with developing a technical plan. Zelenskyy told the joint press conference that Ukrainian drone expertise had become a strategic export, with the Iran war creating new demand for Ukrainian counter-drone knowledge among nations that had found themselves on the receiving end of Iranian-designed systems.

“Air defence is our absolute priority,” Zelenskyy told reporters in Rome. “Almost every day, Russia strikes our cities and communities, our energy facilities, and residential buildings with missiles and drones.” His statement also addressed the peace negotiation deadlock directly: American negotiators, he told German television, appeared to him to be “convinced of Russia’s victory in the war” and he described this as “the only problem” with the current framework.

The previous week Zelenskyy had proposed an Easter ceasefire, offering a trade: Ukraine would stop attacking Russian energy facilities if Russia stopped striking Ukrainian ones. Putin rejected the extension of the 32-hour Easter truce unless Kyiv accepted his terms, an approach that used territorial concessions as the condition. Zelenskyy’s public handling of both the offer and its rejection demonstrated a consistent strategic communication discipline: position Ukraine as the reasonable party, make Moscow’s intransigence visible, and continue building the European coalition that can sustain the war regardless of Washington’s engagement level.

Russian Aerial Attacks. The Russian air campaign against Ukrainian cities during the period under review was not aberrant. It was the continuation of a policy that has now killed more than 15,000 Ukrainian civilians since 2022, according to the United Nations — a policy of deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure and residential areas that, whatever language Russian officials deploy to describe it, constitutes systematic terror.

The worst attack of the past week occurred on the night of 15–16 April. Russia launched 703 weapons - 659 drones and 44 missiles - against Ukrainian cities in its largest aerial attack in almost two weeks. Ukraine’s air defences performed well under pressure: 636 drones and 31 missiles were shot down or neutralised, a 95 percent intercept rate for drones and 70 percent for missiles. But 26 locations were struck. At least 16 people were killed and more than 100 injured across Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia. In Kyiv, four were killed including a 12-year-old boy. In Odesa, nine were killed and 23 injured when a missile struck a high-rise residential building. In Dnipro, three women were killed and around three dozen injured.

“Such attacks cannot be normalised. These are war crimes that must be stopped and their perpetrators held to account,” Ukrainian Foreign Minister Sybiha said on X.

The Easter ceasefire period provided a revealing window into Russia’s attitude toward negotiated humanitarian pauses. Ukraine’s General Staff recorded 10,721 ceasefire violations over the 32-hour period, including 1,567 artillery attacks, 119 assault actions, and 9,035 short-range kamikaze drone attacks. Russia refrained from long-range missile and Shahed attacks during the truce period, but the volume of shorter-range violations made any characterisation of the truce as genuine a difficult case to argue. Russia’s Defence Ministry accused Ukraine of 1,971 violations. Analysts described the truce as ‘smoke and mirrors’, noting it reflected Kremlin narrative management more than genuine pursuit of peace.

With regards to defending against Russian aerial attacks, during the week the Ukrainian Defence Minister issued a social media post that described how private air defence companies were now being integrated into Ukraine’s national air, missile and drone defence system. There are currently 19 companies contributing, and this number is sure to rise. It is a model for air defence – a public/private partnership – which has not been attempted in western nations before. Nonetheless, it is a fascinating development and another Ukrainian innovation we should watch and learn from.

And in a final interesting development this week, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) announced the first shoot down of a Shahed drone by a Ukrainian interceptor drone launched from a mothership drone. The details are contained in the following statement posted on USF social media:

For the first time in the world, an Unmanned Systems Forces interceptor drone launched from an unmanned surface platform has shot down a Shahed UAV. Operators of the naval unmanned systems division within the 412th Nemesis Brigade are carrying out combat missions in the maritime operational zone. This unit achieved the successful interception of a Shahed-type attack drone using an interceptor UAV launched from an unmanned surface vessel. This marks a new level of integration between naval and aerial unmanned capabilities. Using surface drone carriers to deploy interceptor drones expands air defense options and creates an additional layer of protection for Ukrainian cities.

The adaptation battle continues!

War on the Ground. The ground war during the week was characterised by the familiar rhythm of attritional combat: large numbers of tactical engagements, incremental gains and losses measured in hundreds of metres, and Russia’s continued inability to translate local tactical gains into operationally significant advances.

In the Donetsk Oblast, the most significant development came from the DeepState monitoring group’s assessment on 18 April that Russian forces were solidifying positions in Kalynove as a staging point for an advance toward the logistical hub of Kostiantynivka. Russian drone crews redeployed from the Kursk Oblast operations were reported in the area. Russian forces are now able to operate drones deep enough to reach Kostiantynivka itself - a city of 67,000 pre-war residents that is an important Ukrainian logistics node. ISW assessed that Ukrainian forces made advances in the Kostiantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on 12 and 13 April.

On the Sumy front, Ukrainian forces pulled back to prepared lines near Myropilske as Russian forces claimed ground in three villages in the border region. Russian small-group infiltrations continued in northern Sumy Oblast, though a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger cautioned on 13 April that Russian forces “are unable to control large areas of forest” due to frequent Ukrainian counterattacks, and that a near-term seizure of Krasnopillya was “premature.” Zelenskyy warned on 17 April that Russia would likely attempt offensives in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. This signals that Ukrainian intelligence assessments are seeing Russian ground forces assembling on multiple potential axes of advance.

The broader operational picture however displays a slowdown in Russian territorial gains. DeepState reported that Russian forces captured just 133 square kilometres in March 2026 — the lowest monthly total since June 2024. But as I noted last week that figure should not generate premature optimism. Russia has captured enormous amounts of territory since 2022 and holds approximately 20 percent of Ukraine. However, the latest figures do suggest that the combination of deeper Ukrainian drone operations and increased attacks on the Russians, improved defensive preparations, and the diversion of Russian military attention to southern Ukraine is imposing costs on Russia’s spring offensive tempo.

On the Kharkiv axis of advance, ISW’s 14 April assessment noted that Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian radar systems in Belgorod Oblast. This was part of the larger Ukrainian campaign to degrade Russian early warning and targeting capabilities along the northeastern approaches. This campaign reflects a maturation of Ukrainian operational thinking. Ukraine is actively shaping the sensor and intelligence architecture that supports Russian air defence, artillery and aviation.

Diplomatic Negotiations. The diplomatic situation remained largely paralysed during the past week. The core challenge has not changed: Russia insists Ukraine concede approximately 20 percent of its territory, and Ukraine quite rightly refuses. At the same time, the Iran War has consumed Washington’s diplomatic bandwidth. A fourth round of U.S.-brokered trilateral talks on Ukraine that was due this month was postponed.

The Easter ceasefire was the key diplomatic event of the week. Putin announced the 32-hour truce on 9 April after having rejected Zelenskyy’s identical proposal more than a week earlier. Analysts assessed the truce as ‘smoke and mirrors’ aimed at maintaining soft-power links to traditionalist constituencies via Christian Orthodox symbolism and not as a genuine peace signal. After the truce expired, Russia refused to extend it unless Zelenskyy “accepted its terms.”

Zelenskyy’s response to all of this was to accelerate European industrial integration and drone production agreements and to treat American uncertainty not as a crisis but as a planning assumption that requires mitigation.

Strategic Assessment: Ukraine

The week of 12–19 April 2026 shows how Ukraine’s overall strategy – hurt Russia economically through long range strikes, while hurting them on the ground with enhanced drone and defensive operations, and continuing to build diplomatic support in Europe – is continuing to deny Putin his desired objectives for Ukraine. In the fifth year of the war, it is Ukraine’s forces that appear to be gaining in military effectiveness, not Russia’s. This is destroying Putin’s narrative (influential with the Trump administration) that Russian victory is inevitable. Ukraine is destroying any medium to long term prospect for Russian success.

The diplomatic situation is still concerning however. The Iran war has distorted U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve the war in Ukraine, and has created space for continued Russian aggression. Zelenskyy’s European tour has been a strategic response to this. He seeks to build the industrial and political relationships that can sustain Ukraine’s war effort. But ultimately, this is not an enduring solution. A durable end to this war requires a change in Putin’s strategic calculus, and nothing indicates that a change is imminent. We must help Ukraine continue to increase the hurt felt by Putin and Russia to change this.

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign has reached a level of geographic ambition and economic effect that is increasingly difficult for Russia to absorb, even when oil prices are at a high. A series of strikes at 1,000-kilometre ranges are a demonstration of the new era strike system built by Ukrainian industry, western assistance and operational creativity over the last four years. This, combined with the Ukrainian ground forces continued delay of Russian advances during the spring offensive and ongoing tech and tactics innovation, might be the very initial glimmer of turning the corner in this war. Ukraine is acting and performing like it has the strategic momentum in this war, and there is a fair argument that maybe now it does.

The Pacific

North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Launches. The Japanese Prime Minister announced on 19 April that North Korea had launched ballistic missiles. In her social media post, she stated that “at around 06:00 today, what may be multiple ballistic missiles were launched from North Korea. The items that may be ballistic missiles are believed to have already fallen outside Japan’s EEZ, and at present, Japan, the United States, and South Korea are closely coordinating to analyze information.” Both Japanese and South Korean sources reported the launches. The South Koreans have also reportedM that at least one of the missiles may have been submarine launched.

The Iran War and Its Pacific Reverberations. One of the most important dimensions of the Iran conflict for Indo-Pacific security is the systematic observation of modern war by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA is a learning organisation, and is absorbing real-time insights on U.S. military capabilities, operational patterns, and strategic and political decision-making from the most significant American combat operation in a decade.

As I observed in an interview with RFE/RL earlier this month, the U.S. military has demonstrated it remains a very powerful organisation, capable of deploying overwhelming force and conducting sustained precision operations at least from the air and from the sea. That is a lesson Xi Jinping needs to absorb before contemplating any future action across the Taiwan Strait.

PLA-affiliated media outlet China Military Bugle published five formal lessons from the conflict for domestic military audiences: the danger of infiltration by adversary intelligence (’the enemy within’); the catastrophic cost of assuming peace during negotiations (’blind faith in peace’); the decisive logic of superior firepower; the paradox facing authoritarian regimes in modern warfare; and the paramount importance of technological self-reliance. That last lesson directly supports China’s growing domestic defence-industrial capacity. China’s military budget grew 7 percent in 2026 to roughly $277 billion, and its planners are rapidly translating wartime observations into capability investment.

The ISW-AEI China and Taiwan Update for 10 April reported that China has provided material support to Iran in ways carefully calibrated, so China remains beneath the threshold of U.S. retaliation. Multiple shipments of sodium perchlorate, a solid missile propellant precursor, arrived in Iran from China, potentially enabling partial reconstitution of Iran’s missile arsenal. More significantly, China’s commercial satellite company MizarVision, in which the Chinese government holds a minority stake, published AI-assisted satellite imagery showing precise locations of US military assets in Middle East bases. This imagery appears to have been employed by Iran to improve the accuracy of its missile and drone strikes.

The Center for International Maritime Security observed that the Hormuz crisis is stress-testing China’s own maritime strategy and exposing gaps. A key vulnerability for China is chokepoint dependency. Just as Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz paralysed oil flows, so too could an adversary impose similar constraints on Chinese maritime trade. The PLA is watching the Hormuz crisis as a possible dress rehearsal for potential scenarios in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.

Taiwan’s Defence Budget Crisis and Deterrence. Taiwan enters this week facing a paradox. The external threat from the PLA has never been more clear, but Taiwan’s ability to construct a modern military to deter Chinese threats is being hamstrung by political dysfunction. This is becoming a deterrence failure, and Beijing is watching with satisfaction.

The NT$1.25 trillion (approximately US$40 billion) special defence budget proposed by President Lai Ching-te in November 2025, which was blocked from committee review at least ten times by KMT and TPP legislators, remained in limbo this week. The ISW-AEI April 3 China and Taiwan Update assessed that Taiwan’s main opposition parties were preventing Taiwan from acquiring systems critical to modern warfare, and that the legislative deadlock was damaging military readiness.

On 14 April, Legislative Speaker Han Kuo-yu convened a cross-caucus negotiation on the special defence budget, with the DPP version on the agenda. Two days later, the Taipei Times reported that caucus leaders agreed to move the budget negotiations forward, though the KMT’s substantive alternative — capped at NT$380 billion, roughly a third of the administration’s proposal — remained a stark point of division. U.S. Senator Jim Banks met with President Lai this week and delivered a clear message: “When you pass the special budget in the legislature, that is a signal to China, and to the rest of the world, that Taiwan is serious about peace through strength”.

Japan’s Strategic Transformation Continues. Japan’s defence transformation continues at a pace that would have seemed impossible five years ago. The country is on track to become the world’s third-largest defence spender, and is deploying combat troops to the Philippines for the first time since 1945.

Fiscal Year 2026, which commenced this month, is the fourth year of Japan’s five-year 43-trillion-yen Defence Buildup Program. The defence budget for FY2026 totals 9.04 trillion yen ($58 billion), a record high and the fourth consecutive year of record spending. Japan has already effectively achieved the 2 percent of GDP defence spending target — reaching approximately 11 trillion yen when the supplementary budget is included — a target that was set for 2027. The FY2026 budget allocates over 160 billion yen to jointly develop the next-generation Global Combat Air Programme fighter with Britain and Italy, 30 billion yen for hypersonic guided missiles, and 100 billion yen for the layered ‘Shield’ coastal defence system incorporating aerial, surface, and underwater vehicles.

The most significant operational development of the past week for Japan is its deployment of combat forces to the Philippines for Exercise Balikatan 2026 (more on this exercise below). Japan will deploy approximately 1,400 troops and naval assets, marking the first time Japanese combat personnel have set foot on Philippine soil since the Second World War. The exercise will see Japanese forces fire a missile in a ship-sinking exercise in northwestern Philippine waters facing the South China Sea. Analysts at the South China Morning Post characterised Japan’s participation as ‘a big deal’, reflecting how Tokyo is taking a larger role in regional security groupings that could face off with China in contingencies involving the Luzon Strait and northern Philippines.

Exercise Balikatan – Rehearsing the Pacific Coalition. One of the key features of security developments in the Indo-Pacific is the growing construction of a layered deterrence architecture. This includes a mesh of bilateral and mini-lateral agreements, military and humanitarian assistance exercises, and capability-sharing arrangements that complement and reinforce the U.S. alliances in the region.

Exercise Balikatan 2026, being held from 20 April to 8 May is a key element of this mesh of Pacific alliances and partnerships. Over 17,000 troops from seven nations — the Philippines, United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand — are participating in what will be the largest iteration of the annual exercise. Training activities span locations facing the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait. For Japan, the Reciprocal Access Agreement with the Philippines, which entered into force in September 2025, provides the legal framework for this deployment. For all participating nations, Exercise Balikatan 2026 is partially a demonstration that America’s preoccupation with Iran has not diminished the resolve of its Indo-Pacific partners to maintain deterrence in the Pacific.

Australia’s Self-Reliance Strategy. Australia released its 2026 National Defence Strategy and accompanying Integrated Investment Program on 16 April, committing AU$425 billion over a decade in the most ambitious defence investment plan in the country’s history. As I wrote during the week, the new strategy reflects a slight evolution from its 2024 predecessor: it broadens the definition of national defence to encompass civil preparedness, fuel security, and economic security. The strategy, the plan commits an additional AU$14 billion over the next four years and AU$53 billion across the decade, with defence spending projected to rise to 3 percent of GDP in the 2030’s – a slow rise in spending that does not keep pace with the major security changes occurring in the Indo-Pacific.

The 2026 Integrated Investment Program prioritises the following: the nuclear-powered submarine capability under AUKUS; accelerated maritime lethality; expanded long-range strike; integrated air and missile defence; autonomous and uncrewed systems across all domains; counter-UAS for critical infrastructure protection; and resilient multi-orbit satellite communications. Defence Minister Marles emphasised that Australia would focus in 2026 on building greater military self-reliance, while insisting the U.S. alliance remained ‘fundamental’.

But as I and other Australian analysts have noted, the quantity of defence spending will remain in the low 2% range for some years yet, and this is placing increasing pressures on balancing the AUKUS program with retaining a ready Australian Defence Force. The Australian government has little reason for high fives on its new strategy just yet.

Strategic Assessment of Pacific Issues.

The past week has (again) made one thing very clear: the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific is being stress-tested by concurrent crises in ways that are revealing the strengths of different nations and relationships, while also exposing some key vulnerabilities.

On the positive side of things, the U.S. alliance network has demonstrated resilience during a period of American distraction. Japan’s Balikatan deployment, Australia’s NDS announcement, the multilateral presence in Philippine waters are important strategic signals. They represent commitments by nations that have observed, and at least partially absorbed, the lessons of European collective security failure in the early 2020s. These nations appear to have a growing understanding that a failure of deterrence in the Pacific could be much more catastrophic than Europe’s current war and are determined ensure a similar failure is not replicated against China.

The Iran War has exposed the Indo-Pacific’s energy dependence on Middle Eastern supply routes. This is a vulnerability that decades of warning failed to adequately address. China’s systematic learning from Operation Epic Fury may produce a more capable, more informed PLA that will be harder to deter in the 2030s than the force that exists today. The diversion of significant U.S. military assets to the Persian Gulf, including two carrier strike groups, has created a temporary window of reduced conventional deterrence in the Pacific that China has noted.

That concludes my weekly update. I look forward to sharing another update with you next week.

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The week of 5–12 April 2026 brought significant developments across both the Ukraine, Middle East and Pacific theatres, underscoring the interconnected nature of contemporary war, strategic competition, learning and adaptation.

In Ukraine, the war's fifth year produced a formal 32-hour Easter truce that both sides accused each other of violating. President Putin's surprise ceasefire announcement, mirroring a Ukrainian proposal he had previously dismissed, reveals which side faces greater pressure as diplomacy tentatively resumes.

While the war in Iran is temporarily on hold for peace talks, which as of today have not yet yielded a longer term agreement, CENTCOM announced that the U.S. Navy has begun initial operations to re-open the Strait of Hormuz.

In the Pacific, the Iran War has become an intensive learning laboratory for the People's Liberation Army (PLA), offering real-time observation of American military capabilities and limitations. China's integration of satellite intelligence with Iranian precision strike systems, and energy security calculations driven by Strait of Hormuz closure, are also covered in this Pacific update. Meanwhile, Taiwan's opposition parties continue blocking critical drone procurement funding even as the PLA demonstrates new AI-enabled swarm systems.

Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five

Ukraine

First up, welcome home to the latest group of 175 Ukrainian prisoners of war released in the past 24 hours!

Zelenskyy’s Commentary. President Zelenskyy was active in public communication during the week, addressing a range of strategic issues that reflected growing impatience with Russia’s conduct and the international community’s divided attention.

On 5 April, speaking exclusively to The Associated Press in Istanbul, Zelenskyy delivered a frank assessment of how the Iran war was complicating Ukraine’s strategic position. He noted that “we have to recognise that we are not the priority for today.” Zelenskyy also described how he feared a prolonged Middle East war would reduce Patriot missile deliveries to Ukraine, with the already-limited supply set to become “smaller and smaller day by day.”

He also identified a structural tension in Ukraine’s energy strategy: surging oil prices driven by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz were boosting Kremlin oil revenues, directly undermining Kyiv’s effort to make the war financially prohibitive for Russia. ‘Russia gets additional money because of this,’ he said bluntly. His offer to share Ukrainian maritime drone expertise with Gulf states to help secure the strait was, notably, rejected by Trump, who stated that America ‘knows more about drones than anybody.’

Following Putin’s Easter ceasefire announcement on 10 April, Zelensky’s response was measured. He stated on X that Ukraine had “repeatedly stated we are ready for reciprocal steps” and announced Kyiv’s willingness to extend the truce. He also asked that Washington reimpose Russian oil sanctions now that an Iran ceasefire was in effect, accusing Moscow of having “played the Americans again” by using oil market arguments to get sanctions lifted. Zelenskyy also proposed a trilateral leaders’ meeting and warned that the coming spring and summer months would be “quite difficult politically and diplomatically.”

Separately, Zelenskyy accused Russia of providing intelligence to Iran, citing what he described as “irrefutable evidence” that Russia was sharing signals and electronic intelligence with Iran to target U.S. forces deployed in the Middle East. The accusation, while directed at Russia, also challenges the Trump administration to acknowledge that Russia was helping Iran target American service personnel.

Ukraine’s Long-Range Strike Operations: Into the Caspian and Beyond. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continued its geographic expansion this week, carrying the war further into Russia’s energy infrastructure than at any previous point and demonstrating a strike envelope that now reaches over 1,000 kilometres from the front line in multiple directions simultaneously.

The most significant strike of the week was the overnight attack on 10 April against two Lukoil-operated offshore drilling platforms in the northern Caspian Sea. Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed that the ice-resistant stationary platforms at the V. Grayfer and Yuri Korchagin oil fields were struck, about 1,000 kilometres from the front line. The General Staff stated these platforms serve as a vital link in supplying fuel and lubricants to Russian occupation forces. Kyiv Post reported that Presidential Office head Kyrylo Budanov framed the strikes as a negotiating tool, asserting they strengthen Ukraine’s position in future talks with Russia.

Earlier in the week, on 6 April, Ukrainian drones struck the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal at Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, damaging a pipeline, a loading and unloading terminal, and setting four oil product storage tanks on fire. Al Jazeera reported that the strikes came a day after Ukrainian drones hit Russia’s Baltic Sea port of Primorsk and the NORSI oil refinery in Nizhny Novgorod. The CPC pipeline handles about 1% of global oil supplies and around 80% of Kazakhstan’s exports. The Moscow Times noted that Reuters calculations show recent strikes on Russian oil infrastructure have cut Russia’s refining capacity by 17%, or about 1.1 million barrels per day.

President Putin announced a halt to gasoline exports from 1 April. This was a direct consequence of weeks of Ukrainian pressure on Baltic export infrastructure. A week later, Ukrainian drones also struck an oil pumping station in Krasnodar Krai on 9 April and attacked a fuel oil terminal in occupied Crimea. The accumulated economic pressure of the Ukrainian long-range strike campaign, on refinery output, export capacity, and the domestic fuel supply, is beginning to hurt Russia in ways that may hopefully shift Putin’s strategic calculus about the costs and benefits of the war.

Importantly, this long-range strike campaign pressure is being complemented by Ukrainian pressure on Russian ground forces, and the Russian Spring Offensive.

The Ground War. The ground situation this week confirmed the pattern established in March. Russia’s spring offensive has generated some momentum in specific sectors but continues to fall short of demonstrating that Russia is able to seize the remainder of The Donbas in 2026.

The Russia Matters April 8 report card documents a week of advances and Ukrainian counter attacks. Russian forces advanced near Prishchane, Pryvillia, Hryshyne, and Kotlynne, while Ukrainian Defence Forces cleared areas near Rodynske, Nove Shakhove, Stepnohirsk, Novoselivka, Sichneve, and Ambarne. The situation remains one of costly, incremental Russian progress. It is a pattern we have gotten used to in the past four years.

ISW’s 10 April assessment proposed that Russian forces are prioritising offensive operations on the Hulyaipole axis of advance over defending against Ukrainian counterattacks on their Oleksandrivka axis of advance. But the Russian ground forces are not making significant advances west of Hulyaipole despite this prioritisation. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces advanced on the Kupyansk, Slovyansk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole axes during the reporting week.

The Fortress Belt in Eastern Ukraine continues to absorb Russian pressure without yielding significant territorial gain for them. Russian forces continue to employ FAB-3000 guided glide bombs and Lancet loitering munitions on the Slovyansk axis of advance as battlefield air interdiction ahead of any ground assault.

Separately, Russian forces have (again) been accused of using chemical weapons on the frontline. The ISW 5 April assessment described how Russia employs gas grenades in frontline chemical weapons strikes in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that it has documented around 400 instances of Russian forces using ammunition equipped with chemical agents in March 2026 alone, and over 13,000 instances since February 2022. Russian forces frequently use drone-dropped aerosol gas grenades.

Russia declared on 1 April that it had ‘completed the liberation’ of Luhansk Oblast — covering the remaining 0.2% of Ukrainian-held territory there. The substance of this declaration is minimal, but this is a political statement. It is designed by Russia to generate pressure on Ukraine to concede that the trajectory of the battlefield is irreversible – and convince the U.S. administration that this should drive Ukrainian territorial concessions.

Russian Aerial Attacks on Ukraine. Russia’s aerial campaign maintained its record March tempo this week, with the additional and deeply troubling dimension of confirmed chemical weapons use at the tactical level.

In terms of aerial bombardment, the 6 April attack on Odesa stood out for its civilian toll. A Russian drone struck an apartment block in the southern port city, killing two women and a toddler and injuring eleven people, including a pregnant woman and an infant under one year of age. President Zelenskyy reported this week that over the previous week Russia had launched more than 2,800 attack drones, nearly 1,350 guided aerial bombs, and more than 40 missiles of various types. On the night of 2–3 April, Russia had launched 579 aerial attack assets in a combined strike, comprising 10 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, 25 Kh-101 cruise missiles, 2 Iskander-K missiles, and 542 drones, of which Ukrainian air defences destroyed 541.

General Syrskyi: Drones Destroying Russian Forces Faster Than They Can Recruit. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi made several significant public statements during the week, centred on the performance of Ukraine’s unmanned systems forces and the trajectory of attrition against the Russian military.

On 9 April, Syrskyi stated on Telegram that Ukraine’s Defence Forces continue to hold the strategic initiative, and that unmanned systems units are “currently inflicting the most significant and effective damage on Russian troops.” He stated that “for four months in a row, starting from December 2025, our unmanned systems units have neutralised more enemy personnel than Russia recruits to their ranks.” He attributed this performance to the combined effect of domestic unmanned aerial systems production, improved operator skills, and organisational decisions by Ukrainian military command. Syrskyi also confirmed that Ukrainian ground robotic systems increased the number of completed tasks by more than 50% in March compared to February, corroborating the Ministry of Defence data released on 7 April.

Syrskyi also confirmed Russia’s expanding unmanned forces, noting that Russian personnel in unmanned units reached 101,000 by early April and is expected to grow to 165,500 by year’s end. This is an acknowledgement that the drone competition it is a race both sides are running at expanding industrial scale. But despite this rhetoric on the expanding use of drones, people remain a central element of effective military forces, a point made again this week by Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Office of the President of Ukraine.

In his April assessment, Syrskyi described Ukraine’s 2026 military goal as a strategic defensive operation to deplete Russian forces while simultaneously building Ukrainian reserves and creating conditions for future large-scale offensive operations. The pattern of operations on the ground in the past two months appears to partially validate this strategic intention.

9000 UGV Missions in March. This week, the Ukrainian military announced that uncrewed ground vehicles (UGV) had undertaken 9000 separate missions over the month of March 2026. As I noted in my previous weekly update, Ukraine is accelerating the combat deployment of UGVs in 2026, and they are playing an increasing roll in combat operations, in addition to the logistic functions that have fulfilled in the past year. This is another massive learning opportunity for western military organisations. You can read the full story at this link.

Diplomacy: The Easter Ceasefire and Its Implications. The context of the latest ceasefire matters as much as the ceasefire itself. Understanding why Putin announced it, and what Ukraine did with it, provides useful insights about the trajectory of peace negotiations.

On 10 April, Putin announced via the Kremlin a 32-hour ceasefire effective from 16:00 on 11 April through the end of 12 April. CNN reported that the announcement was made without advance consultation with the United States and was not linked to any resumption of trilateral talks. Zelenskyy responded within hours, confirming Ukrainian compliance and offering to extend it. On the evening of the announcement, Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev arrived in the United States to meet Trump administration officials on a Ukraine settlement and broader U.S.-Russia economic cooperation — timing that was clearly not coincidental.

Russia’s bombard-then-offer-truce pattern, which echoes last year’s 30-hour Easter truce, was designed to seize the diplomatic initiative after weeks of Ukrainian diplomatic efforts. Kyiv had proposed the Easter ceasefire for weeks; Moscow dismissed it while continuing attacks, then unilaterally announced the same measure and framed it as a Kremlin initiative. Ukraine has stated that Russia has already violated the ceasefire around 400 times.

A Kyiv visit by Witkoff, Kushner, and Senator Graham, the first time either U.S. envoy would have set foot on Ukrainian soil, remains expected in the days following Easter, according to Reuters reporting on 4 April. Whether this Kyiv visit translates into a fourth round of talks, which stalled after the Geneva round was postponed by the Iran war, remains to be seen. The most recent reporting on the visit, from the Kyiv Independent, casts doubt on whether the visit will proceed.

The Pacific

This week, I have not included a specific section on the Iran War. Rather, I have focused on what China and other Pacific nations might be learning from the Iran War in this section. I explore how the PLA might be using the Iran War as a learning opportunity, Iran-China collaboration and the impact of energy insecurity – a result of the Iran War – on nations across the Pacific.

The Iran War as PLA Learning Laboratory. In a recent article for the terrific blog CIMSEC, Commander Ander S. Heiles, USN explores how “in January 1991, Chinese military officers watched CNN footage of the United States dismantling the Iraqi Army and experienced what one People’s Liberation Army (PLA) analyst later called a “psychological nuclear attack.” Desert Storm displayed every capability the PLA lacked, and China had no choice but to begin remaking its military from the ground up.” He then proposes that nearly four decades later, the classroom for the PLA has re-opened.

The Iran war has become an intensive study object for the PLA, offering real-time observation of how the United States wages modern warfare. Analysis published in early April identifies the key lesson Beijing has extracted: the US military remains formidable, capable of deploying overwhelming force and conducting sustained precision operations from air and sea—but this capability operates within an administration able to fight only one war at a time, with stripped-out decision support mechanisms that would normally flow through the National Security Council.

South China Morning Post reporting emphasizes that while the PLA absorbs lessons about U.S. precision strike capabilities and AI-ISR integration, it is also noting limitations: U.S. interceptors proved 92% effective against Iranian missiles and drones, but American drone warfare has struggled. Iranian drones relying on Chinese components performed relatively well, killing US troops and launching confusing swarms that resulted in Kuwait shooting down three US F-15 fighter jets in a friendly-fire incident. Iranian strikes on soft US-linked targets in the Gulf—housing, fuel depots, logistics hubs, and early warning radar systems—demonstrated vulnerabilities in exquisite platforms that Western militaries have over-indexed.

A recent Foreign Affairs assessment argues that ballistic missiles and drones may not be the decisive offensive weapons many countries, including the Chinese, assumed. They remain effective in campaigns of attrition and coercion, but this is a slow process, not a path to quick victory. For a potential China-Taiwan conflict, the implication challenges the assumption that China could use long-range strikes to severely degrade American air and naval operations. The U.S. may be able to carry out far more effective operations against China than analysts previously thought. Potentially, this might give China reason to refrain from military aggression.

Despite this, the PLA is likely to be feeding observations from the Iran War into its modernization programs and warfighting doctrine. The PLA will be absorbing lessons with particular urgency across AI-enabled warfare, command protection, asset dispersal, infrastructure hardening, and nuclear deterrence.

China-Iran Intelligence and Technology Cooperation. A recent Small Wars Journal analysis documents how access to advanced satellite intelligence, the BeiDou navigation system, modern radar technologies, and electronic warfare expertise may have significantly enhanced Iran’s ability to conduct more precise missile and drone strikes while improving capacity to defend against sophisticated air campaigns.

Intelligence networks, space-based surveillance, navigation systems, and cyber capabilities now operate together to create an integrated architecture that provides the foundation for contemporary precision warfare. Technological partnerships between nations can dramatically alter strategic balance even when one partner is not directly involved in combat operations. TRT World reporting from early April documents surge of highly technical China-origin content explaining how U.S. aircraft could be detected and targeted using relatively low-cost systems, with tutorials gaining millions of views across Chinese and Iranian social media.

The integration of BeiDou navigation into Iranian weapons systems provides alternative to GPS networks controlled by the U.S., which could be degraded or blocked during military conflicts. Iran formally transitioned its military architecture from GPS to China’s BeiDou navigation system in mid-2025 following the June 2025 conflict, according to Defence Security Asia, with Iranian deputy minister Chitsaz stating that GPS disruptions pushed Iran toward the BeiDou alternative. Al Jazeera subsequently reported improved Iranian targeting accuracy attributable to the transition This creates an Iranian version of a modern operational ‘kill chain’ with Chinese satellites providing surveillance and targeting intelligence and Iranian missiles and drones carrying out kinetic strike.

Finally, CNN reported over the weekend that U.S. intelligence has indicated China is preparing to deliver new air defence systems to Iran within the next few weeks. President Trump told CNN that China will have “big problems” if it ships the weapons to Iran.

Of course, none of this should be a surprise.

China has been aiding Russia almost from the beginning of its war against Ukraine, and the 2024 NATO Summit declaration described how “the PRC has become a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine through its so-called “no limits” partnership and its large-scale support for Russia’s defence industrial base.” China has also helped Iran. This article published by the Small Wars Journal explores China-Iran intelligence collaboration, the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission has issued a detailed fact sheet on their economic and intelligence links, the report at this link explores Russian and Chinese military assistance to Iran, and finally, this 2025 report explores China-Iran security cooperation. And, I published my own report that explores the authoritarian learning and adaptation bloc in 2025, called Adaptation War.

Key themes across these reports exploring China-Iran cooperation include the following:

1. Intelligence & Surveillance: BeiDou navigation, satellite intelligence, geospatial data, radar systems (YLC-8B)

2. Dual-Use Technology: Advanced composites, precision tools, guidance components, semiconductors, chemical precursors

3. Supply Chain Obfuscation: Shell companies, transshipment hubs, front companies, shadow fleet

4. Post-Conflict Reconstitution: Rapid rebuilding of missile/drone infrastructure after Israeli strikes

5. Strategic Ambiguity: China provides enabling technology while maintaining public diplomatic neutrality

6. “Axis of Evasion/Upheaval”: Coordinated sanctions circumvention among China, Russia, Iran, North Korea

The reports document a pattern of Chinese technological support that enhances Iranian precision warfare capabilities, and indirectly helps China to ensure American military effort cannot be concentrated in the Pacific, while avoiding direct military intervention by the PLA.

Energy Security and Strategic Reserves. The Iran war fuel crisis has caused immediate volatility in energy markets, with Brent crude surging 10-13% to $80-82 per barrel by early March 2026. Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted 20% of global oil supplies and significant LNG volumes. The International Energy Agency characterized this as the “greatest global energy security challenge in history.” Exports from the Middle East typically flow to Asian countries, with China, India, Japan, and South Korea accounting for 75% of oil and 59% of LNG exports.

China imported 15.8% more oil in January-February 2026, building strategic reserves to approximately 1.2 billion barrels. However, prolonged closure beyond three months would pose a serious test to China’s assumptions about sustainable oil supply disruptions driven by major regional conflict.

Fortune reporting describes how Japan and South Korea have substantial oil stockpiles lasting over 200 days. Other Asian governments are managing fuel stockpiles carefully; Thailand suspended crude exports on 1 March.

China’s Latest Five-Year Plan. Last month, the CCP released its latest version of China’s Five-Year Plan. This version of the plan seeks to achieve “basic socialist modernization” with six main principles centered on “upholding the party’s overall leadership” and “high-quality development.”

This week, Taiwanese analyst K. Tristan Tang released an analysis of the military aspects of the new plan. By comparing the defence components of the 13th through 15th Five-Year Plans and factoring in recent developments in the PLA and China’s defence industry, Tang proposes that:

The latest plan is not just about addressing the many unfinished reforms of the past decade—it also introduces more concrete implementation and supporting measures. Given that much of the PLA’s progress over the past ten years has been achieved despite inefficiencies and uneven reform, if this new plan is implemented more effectively, the pace of capability growth could be significantly more pronounced than before.

It is an excellent analysis, published by the Jamestown Foundation, and I have included the full piece in this week’s Big Five reading recommendations.

PLA Emphasis on AI-Enabled Drone Swarms. The AEI/ISW China & Taiwan Update for 3 April documents the PLA’s increasing emphasis on AI-enabled swarm technology to overwhelm advanced air defences in Taiwan and U.S. military infrastructure during conflict. CCTV released footage on 25 March of the PRC’s ‘Atlas’ drone swarm system conducting training. The Global Times has reported that each Atlas launch vehicle can deploy 48 drones, with a single command vehicle coordinating 96 drones simultaneously. The PRC appears to be emphasising AI-enabled swarming technology to address the vulnerability that mass-produced drones face against sophisticated jamming and electronic warfare.

China Builds a New Island. This year, China has been conducting dredging and land reclamation activity at Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands. This amounts to the first major artificial island-building that the Chinese have undertaken in the South China Sea since 2017. An analysis of this project by the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative finds that:

• The estimated area of reclaimed land at Antelope Reef at roughly 1,490 acres.

• Antelope Reef can now accommodate a 9,000-foot runway of the type China has already constructed at Woody Island, Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef.

• While several features in the Crescent island group have harbors, the lagoon at Antelope Reef would dwarf those. This could allow more coastguard along with large numbers of maritime militia to maintain a presence at the reef.

• Antelope’s size would also enable it to accommodate the robust infrastructure seen at Woody and China’s “big three” outposts (Mischief, Subi, and Fiery Cross) in the Spratlys, including diesel power plants, underground storage facilities, coastal defense emplacements, surface-to-air and anti-ship missile facilities, as well as numerous surveillance and electronic warfare installations.

You can read the full report on China’s project at Antelope Reef at this link.

Taiwan Defence Budget Gridlock and Drone Procurement. Taiwan’s main opposition parties continue preventing Taiwan from acquiring systems critical to modern warfare. The 3 April AEI/ISW assessment emphasizes the DPP government promotes a $40 billion budget to procure 200,000 unmanned systems, fund Taiwan’s domestic arms industry, and develop an integrated air and missile defence network alongside conventional US procurements. Both TPP and KMT versions totalling around $12 billion only fund conventional procurements and omit funding for large-scale drone procurement and IAMD systems.

KMT Chairwoman’s April Beijing Visit. During the week, the leader of Taiwan’s KMT political party visited Beijing and met with Xi Jinping. The Congressional Research Service notes KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s visit to Beijing in April 2026 occurs ahead of President Trump’s planned May summit with Xi. Beijing suspended communication with Taiwan’s government in 2016 after President Lai’s predecessor declined to endorse the ‘1992 Consensus.’ A useful backgrounder on this 1992 consensus can be read here.

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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

In this week’s Big Five, I have included an analysis of the military dimensions of the new Chinese Five-Year Plan, a good piece on Carter Malawian’s views of China’s lessons from the contemporary war in Iran, as well as articles on the U.S. defence industrial base, Ukraine’s technology ecosystem and the U.S. air campaign against Iran.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Boosting PLA Combat Power

In this new analysis by K. Tristan Tang published by the Jamestown Foundation, development of the Chinese military is explored in the wake of the new CCP Five Year plan that was recently released. It is a thorough and very informative analysis. As the author notes, “this iteration adds a section on military governance, in addition to the recurring focus on combat capability and military–civil fusion, and emphasises military theory, military governance, and “spin-on” mechanisms for facilitating the integration of civilian technologies into the PLA.” But there is a caution, as he identifies that “the repeated appearance of policies that have existed for years highlights the limited effectiveness of past reforms.” You can read the full piece at this link.

2. The Iran War’s Real Lessons for China

In this article published by Foreign Affairs, Carter Malkasian examines the recent combat operations against Iran. His key lesson is that the success of high-end Western missile defences against Iranian strikes calls into question the strategic effectiveness of ballistic missiles and drones. In short, they may not be the decisive offensive weapons that many countries thought them to be. As he notes in the article, “the United States may be able to carry out far more effective operations against China than analysts once thought—and this potential could give China good reason to refrain from military aggression for some time.” The full article is available at this link.

3. Ukraine’s Tech Ecosystem: Lessons for the Rest of Us

In this article for The Atlantic Council, Valeriya Ionan explores how Ukraine has transformed its pre-war, moribund defence industry into a new era, innovative technology ecosystem that develops and deploys new systems at pace. As the author notes, “under extreme conditions, Ukraine has built a fast, adaptive, innovation-driven defence ecosystem of the kind that other countries, including larger powers, have been trying to design for years but have struggled to implement due to structural constraints.” The full article is available here.

4. Rebuilding the Arsenal

This week, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments released a new report exploring the transition from peacetime to wartime manufacturing. Called “Arsenal in Transition”, this new study looks the American car industry’s transition to wartime production at the beginning of World War II and how that influenced overall production capacity as demand for military materiel soared. The report also proposes several historical lessons for modern mobilisation planners and examines the feasibility of implementing industrial conversion practices. The full report is available at this link.

5. Assessing U.S. Air Warfare Theory and Doctrine

This week, the Institute for the Study of War published an interesting assessment of how America applied air power in its war against Iran. Given the minimal number of case studies about the application of traditional AirPower during the war in Ukraine, and the overwhelming focus on the rise of drones, this study of conventional AirPower is a welcome complement to the study of drone warfare. Both conventional aircraft and drones are likely to play important roles in future conflicts. You can read the full assessment here.

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[Update] A U.S. Air Force weapons officer whose F-15E had been shot down over Iran was rescued by U.S. Special Operations forces in a night mission that saw U.S. military forces operating deep inside Iran.

In the last few hours, the American president issued yet another social media ultimatum to the Iranian regime. How, and if, he follows through on this threat to “unleash hell” on Iran if it does not open the Strait of Hormuz in 48 hours will be interesting to watch.

In Ukraine this week, Ukrainian forces struck deeper into Russia’s industrial heartland than at any point in the war and revealed that its Mediterranean drone campaign is being run from bases in Libya. Ukraine was also on the receiving end of a 579 drone and missile Russian aerial attack, which was partly answered by a Ukrainian Easter ceasefire proposal - answered by the Russians with continued bombardment. On the ground, Ukrainian forces have continued to hold the line in Donetsk against a Russian spring offensive that has – so far – failed to generate operational momentum.

The war in Iran continues with no clear pathway to de-escalation. Despite the speech by President Trump during the week, a theory of victory beyond “keep smashing until they surrender” has not yet emerged. America is posturing and threatening to put boots on the ground, while Iran continues to lob missiles and drones at military bases, and civil infrastructure, in countries across the Middle East.

In the Pacific, preparations continue for the forthcoming Xi-Trump summit, although given how the war in Iran is progressing, watch for another delay proposed by Trump. The defence budget impasse in Taiwan continues, and Japan deploys more long-range strike weapons to protect its territory and deter expanded Chinese military aggression in the western Pacific.

Welcome to this week’s Big Five.

Ukraine

Ukraine’s Impressive Long-Range Strikes. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian territory reached new geographic and strategic depths during the week. The established pattern for these strikes, with precision drones targeting energy, chemical, and defence industrial nodes, continued to accelerate. Strikes are penetrating over 1,000 kilometres into Russian territory on a near-nightly basis.

The week saw attacks on consecutive nights on Leningrad Oblast’s energy corridor. Ukraine had already struck the Novatek terminal at Ust-Luga and the Kinef refinery at Kirishi, which is one of Russia’s three largest refineries by output at 355,000 barrels per day, in late March. Ust-Luga was struck a second time on 29 March, causing renewed fires at storage and loading infrastructure.

The cumulative effect on Russia’s Baltic export capacity is significant. By late March, Reuters estimated that at least 40% of Russia’s oil shipping capacity had been disrupted, contributing to a Russian government decision to ban gasoline exports from 1 April to 30 September this year, citing reduced refinery output. Gas stations across multiple Russian regions have already run dry.

The Ukrainian strike campaign then shifted south and east. On 2 April, a major fire broke out at the Bashneft-Novoil refinery in Ufa, Bashkortostan, which is approximately 1,400 kilometres from the Ukrainian border, according to Kyiv Post. This was followed on the night of 3-4 April by a multi-drone strike on Tolyatti in Samara Oblast, targeting two major chemical sites: Tolyattikauchuk and KuibyshevAzot. Militarnyi.com reported this was the second strike on these facilities within a month, with the previous attack occurring on 11 March. KuibyshevAzot is a major producer of nitrogen fertilizers and chemical raw materials. Ukrainian drones also struck the seaport of Taganrog and mounted simultaneous attacks on Shahed launch bases in Kursk and Bryansk regions and on a fuel train in occupied Luhansk.

Ukraine’s FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile also featured in some attacks. On 28 March, Flamingo missiles struck an explosives plant in Chapaevsk, Samara Oblast. The Flamingo, with a 3,000 km range, a 1,150 kg warhead, is bringing all of Russia’s European industrial and defence complex within reach. Its operational use is accelerating; from the Votkinsk missile plant in February to the Samara explosives cluster in March.

President Zelensky noted on March 30 that some allied partners had requested a scaling back of energy strikes due to rising global oil prices driven by the Iran war. He offered a reciprocal deal; Ukraine would halt energy strikes if Russia stopped striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Moscow neither acknowledged nor accepted the offer.

Ukraine’s Mediterranean strike operations. The most interesting intelligence story of the week was published on 3 April by French broadcaster RFI. It published an investigation that confirmed Ukraine is conducting a Mediterranean maritime campaign from bases in Libya. One of those operations may have killed a senior Russian intelligence general.

The RFI investigation, confirmed by Euronews, found that over 200 Ukrainian officers and technical specialists are stationed at three sites in western Libya, operating in coordination with the Tripoli government. The primary infrastructure includes a drone launch facility near the Mellitah Oil and Gas Complex in Zawiya, with direct sea access, and a presence at the Air Force Academy in Misrata. A third site at the headquarters of Libya’s 111th Brigade facilitates coordination between Ukrainian and Libyan military officials. This infrastructure has given Ukraine a drone corridor covering the central and western Mediterranean.

It might be described as Ukraine’s Mediterranean drone line!

The 3 March strike that sank the Russian LNG carrier Arctic Metagaz, a sanctioned vessel carrying 62,000 tonnes of LNG to Egypt, was confirmed as a Ukrainian operation using a Magura V5 naval drone. The vessel caught fire and sank in international waters southeast of Malta.

RFI also reported that the December 2025 strike on the shadow fleet tanker Qendil, the first-ever Ukrainian drone attack on a Mediterranean vessel, may also have killed GRU General Andrey Averyanov. Averyanov is widely linked by Western investigators to the Vrbětice ammunition depot explosions in Czechia, as well as other assassination and sabotage operations across Europe. Reporting cited by Nashaniva indicates that around ten senior Russian intelligence officers were aboard the Qendil, travelling disguised as crew. The strike resulted in two deaths and seven injuries. Moscow has not commented officially.

The strategic dimension of Ukraine’s Mediterranean campaign extends well beyond attacking Russian ships. Russia’s shadow fleet, which is estimated at over 3,000 vessels, is the primary mechanism for Moscow to circumvent Western energy sanctions and keep oil revenues flowing to finance its war against Ukraine. While this strike campaign occurs, Ukraine has concurrently been developing next-generation open-ocean naval drones under an agreement with the United Kingdom, encompassing joint production, R&D, and an AI Centre of Excellence in Kyiv. The trajectory of the Mediterranean strike campaign appears to be taking the lessons of Ukraine’s Black Sea naval drone campaign and transforming it into a wider, potentially globe-spanning, maritime interdiction capability.

Russian Strikes Against Ukraine. Russia’s aerial bombardment campaign continued this week. AFP analysis of Ukrainian Air Force data confirmed that Russia fired at least 6,462 long-range drones against Ukraine in March 2026. This is the highest monthly total since the full-scale invasion began, up 28% over February 2026. Ukraine’s air force achieved a near-90% interception rate across the month, the highest since February 2025. The Shahed Tracker feed on X also issued its latest graphs which supports this analysis.

The biggest strike of the week took place on the night of 2-3 April. According to Ukrainian Air Force figures, Russia launched 579 aerial attack assets in a combined strike: 10 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, 25 Kh-101 cruise missiles, 2 Iskander-K cruise missiles, and 542 strike drones from multiple launch sites. Ukrainian air defences destroyed 541 of the 579 targets launched - a 93% interception rate. Eleven missiles and 27 drones got through, striking 20 locations. The attack killed at least four people and injured over 30, damaged residential buildings, a shopping mall in Sumy city centre, a veterinary clinic in Fastiv, and high-rise apartment buildings in Kyiv Oblast. Kharkiv also suffered 37 strikes across two days. Zelensky told Ukrainians that this barrage was Russia’s answer to his Easter ceasefire proposal.

ISW’s 3 April assessment flagged a significant future threat: Russian forces will likely shift their long-range strike campaign toward Ukrainian water supply and logistics targets in Spring and Summer 2026. This represents a new form of strategic coercion, targeting the infrastructure that sustains civilian life and military supply chains simultaneously. The Russian shift to daytime attacks, first documented in the 24 March mass barrage of 948 weapons, has also continued. Russia’s method, exhausting Ukrainian air defences overnight then following with daytime swarms, exploits the finite capacity of any layered air defence system. On 4 April, Russia launched a further 286 drones overnight, sustaining pressure with barely a pause.

The Ground War: Ukraine Holding Firm. On the ground, the key story of this week is the continued pressure of Russia’s spring-summer offensive. Ukraine’s Donetsk Fortress Belt, the 50-kilometre arc of fortified cities from Sloviansk through Kramatorsk to Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka, remains the Russian main effort. Supporting efforts are underway in Luhansk, Kharkiv and southern Ukraine.

Thus far, the Russians have failed to generate any operational momentum with their spring offensive.

The Russia Matters April 1 report card provides useful temporal context: Russia gained 17 square miles in the week of 24-31 March, reversing a period of Ukrainian counteroffensive success in the south. Russian gains for the same period last year were 47 square miles.

On 1 April, Russia’s Defence Ministry declared it had ‘completed the liberation’ of Luhansk Oblast, covering the remaining 0.2% of Ukrainian-held territory there.

On the Pokrovsk axis, fighting continued near Bilytske, Rodynske, Myrnohrad, Hryshyne, and Novyi Donbas, with Russian groupings advancing slowly toward Dobropillia. Ukraine’s 3rd Assault Brigade and Air Assault formations continue to hold the line at significant cost. Russia’s own losses are also accumulating at record rates: Zelensky reported on 4 April, citing British intelligence, that Russian losses in March reached their highest level of the war, with drone strikes alone killing or seriously wounding 33,988 troops in a single month. Russia’s training cycle for assault units has reportedly been reduced from one month to one week to compensate for attrition — a desperate measure that degrades the quality of those being fed into the assault.

In western Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Ukrainian forces have recently advanced. This builds on the Ukrainian counterattacks on the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole axes of advance in late January. These gains continue to impose dilemmas on Russian planning, requiring military commanders to choose between supporting its spring offensive in Donetsk or shoring up its deteriorating positions in the south.

While the Russian spring offensive is probably not achieving the ground it had aimed to so far, it is much too early to call it a failed offensive. There are months of hard fighting ahead, and a range of different scenarios that could play out. While Ukrainian tactical and operational effectiveness has improved along the frontline, there remain multiple vulnerabilities that Russian ground forces might exploit to gain more terrain in the coming months.

The accelerating Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) contribution. Ukraine’s unmanned ground vehicle programme has moved decisively from the experimental phase to industrial deployment. The operational consequences are beginning to reshape frontline dynamics – and provide vital information for the development of new tactics, organisations and training regimes for the Ukrainian ground forces.

Ukraine’s K2 Brigade now commands what military sources and BBC reporting describe as the world’s first dedicated UGV battalion, led by Major Oleksandr Afanasiev. The unit operates wheeled and tracked platforms carrying Kalashnikov machine guns into positions where no infantryman would willingly go.

Other recent examples of the employment of combat UGVs include:

• A 33rd Mechanised Brigade UGV armed with a machine gun ambushed a Russian armoured personnel carrier. Ukrainska Pravda reported that the T-700 Browning UGV carries a 12.7mm M2 and a 7.62mm PKT simultaneously, while the larger Vatag is being developed for a 25mm Bushmaster autocannon.

• One DevDroid TW 12.7 system held a frontline position for 45 consecutive days, reloaded every 48 hours.

• Three Russian soldiers surrendered to a Ukrainian UGV near Lyman in January. This was possibly the first recorded case in warfare of troops capitulating to a remotely piloted ground vehicle.

• As reported by the Kyiv Independent on 4 April, a Zmiy unmanned ground vehicle was deployed by the 12th Special Purpose Brigade ‘Azov’ to approach a fire involving gas canisters in Kramatorsk, handling a situation too dangerous for human firefighters.

The production numbers of UGVs this year are what make this operationally significant. The Modern War Institute assessed that Ukrainian industry delivered 15,000 UGVs to frontline units in 2025, up from 2,000 in 2024. Ukrainian manufacturer Tencore produced over 2,000 UGVs in 2025; it now expects orders for approximately 40,000 units in 2026, with 10–15% armed.

In the 3rd Assault Brigade, UGVs now handle 80% of logistics operations; in the contested cities of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, that figure reaches 90%. Brigadier General Biletsky, commander of the 3rd Army Corps, has assessed that units integrating UGVs could reduce frontline infantry requirements by up to 30% by year’s end. This is critical for a ground force whose frontline average age is now 43–45 and whose manpower deficit is estimated at 300,000.

The multi-mission character of UGVs, including logistics, combat and emergency response, sees them having wide utility. Former Commander-in-Chief and UK Ambassador Valerii Zaluzhnyi has recently spoken publicly about what he believes comes next: AI-powered swarms of aerial, ground, and maritime drones attacking simultaneously from multiple directions. The technical prerequisites are already in development at Ukraine’s frontline workshops.

In related news, Ukraine’s heroic firefighters have now started using UGVs as well. See the story here.

Diplomatic Negotiations. The diplomatic picture over this period was defined by three elements: Ukraine’s attempts to create diplomatic openings; Russia’s continued rejection of any settlement short of capitulation, and signs that the United States may be preparing to re-engage directly from Kyiv.

On 31 March, President Zelensky formally proposed an Easter ceasefire to U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner via online talks that also included NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Senator Lindsey Graham, and Presidential Office head Kyrylo Budanov. Zelensky described the call as ‘positive’ and said the two sides “agreed that teams will remain in close contact over the coming days to strengthen the security guarantees document between Ukraine and the United States.” He asked the American team to relay his Easter truce proposal to Moscow, framing it explicitly: a pause over Orthodox Easter could demonstrate that diplomacy is capable of delivering results.

The Kremlin’s response was delivered both verbally and through action on the battlefield. Russian spokesman Peskov told reporters that Zelensky’s statements contained no “clearly formulated initiative for an Easter ceasefire.” Afterwards, Russia launched 700-plus drones on 1 April. Then a 579-weapon barrage on 2-3 April. Russia has also, according to Zelensky, informed the United States it could seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast within two months. Given the state of Russia’s offensive described above, this claim is implausible. But it (again) reveals Moscow’s preferred theory of victory: manufacture a fake “reality on the ground” to pressure Washington into squeezing Zelenskyy for concessions.

The most significant diplomatic development of the period was reported by Reuters in the past 24 hours. Presidential aide Budanov confirmed that Witkoff, Kushner, and Senator Lindsey Graham are expected to visit Kyiv shortly after Easter. This is the first time either U.S. envoy would have set foot in Ukraine. The talks stalled following the beginning of U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran. A Kyiv visit would represent their resumption.

Zelensky has been consistent in calling for Ukrainian sovereignty to be maintained in any settlement, for security guarantees prior to any deal, and for direct leader-level talks. Whether a Kyiv visit by the U.S. team translates into meaningful diplomatic momentum, or yet another round of managed expectations, remains an important question.

Iran

Trump’s Iran Crusade. In yet another Trumpian rhetorical ramble, the American leader stated that “Remember when I gave Iran ten days to MAKE A DEAL or OPEN UP THE HORMUZ STRAIT. Time is running out - 48 hours before all Hell will reign down on them. Glory be to GOD!” This is hardly the first, and won’t be the last, threat that Trump has made directed at the Iranian regime.

Interestingly, he finished his bleat with the phrase “Glory be to God”. This is a weird and quite unusual way from an American war leader to finish a message in the modern world. Some modern Islamist narratives have reframed western military forces in the Middle East as a persistent, foundational assault on Islamic lands. Watch for the next round of Iranian strategic influence operations to feature narratives about Western crusaders.

Assessing the War So Far. This week I published two articles related to the war in Iran. The first, published by the Lowy Interpreter, was called “A Land War Illusion?” and explores the potential employment of ground forces in the Iran campaign. The second, “After the Fury: War, Allies, and the World America Is Making”, was published here at Futura Doctrina and explores the longer term impact on American alliances and the global security environment of the current war against Iran. Together they comprise an analytical framework for understanding where Operation Epic Fury might be taking America - militarily, strategically, and diplomatically.

My first article explores the possibility of American land operations inside Iran. My central argument is simple and sobering: ground forces can be decisive, but only when employed at scale, against the right mission, with clear political objectives. None of those conditions are obviously present at the moment. Iran is a large, mountainous country with a substantial army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Strait of Hormuz’s 200-kilometre Iranian shoreline means the Americans must protect every inch while the Iranians need only threaten any one of them. Russia is already sharing intelligence with Tehran and would relish the opportunity to help kill American soldiers. In the piece I also draw on J.C. Wylie’s dictum that the ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with a gun: Trump risks breaking not Iran’s will, but his own.

My second piece examines the broader strategic picture following Trump’s 2 April address. The military campaign after 33 days of Operation Epic Fury is quite remarkable: over 12,300 targets struck, Iran’s navy destroyed, Khamenei killed, missile production degraded to zero. But my key argument is that military statistics are insufficient for strategic assessment. The war has strained NATO to its foundations: Spain closed its airspace, Italy denied basing rights, Germany ruled out involvement, and allies across Europe and the Indo-Pacific declined to send warships to the Strait. Trump’s demand for “delayed courage” from allies carries an explicit warning: the era of American security extended as a matter of solidarity, regardless of allied contribution, is over.

Together, my two articles comprise a unified argument: military power unmoored from coherent political objectives, good strategy and alliance management produces strategic outcomes that undermine the original war aims. The war’s three possible trajectories - negotiated settlement, escalation toward land operations, or prolonged de-escalation - all carry significant risk. A crucial question that remains to be answered is whether the world America is engaged in making is the one it actually intends.

The Pacific

Trump-Xi Summit Postponement and Strategic Implications. Beijing never formally confirmed the March dates and has not provided an official response to the delay proposed by President Trump. Chinese sources told CNN the delay could strengthen Beijing’s hand. If the war in Iran continues as it is, with Trump appearing to lose control of the conflict which is threatening global oil supplies and economic growth, it might reveal American weakness. The longer the war continues, the more likely it is that Trump might again delay the summit.

KMT Chairwoman to Meet Xi Ahead of Trump Summit. KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun ‘gladly’ accepted on 30 March an invitation to meet Xi Jinping in Beijing next month, promising to advocate cross-strait peace. Cheng stated that “we want to prove to the people of Taiwan and the entire world that conflict between the two sides of the strait is not inevitable.“ Cheng emphasized she “should also ask Xi Jinping: When is China going to elect its president?” The timing, several weeks before the rescheduled Trump-Xi summit, is an opportunity for Xi to showcase an alternative Taiwanese political view that is more open to cross-strait dialogue.

PLA Operations Around Taiwan. This week, @KTristanTang issued his monthly update on PLA operations around Taiwan. His assessment: “Consistent with the previous month’s assessment, there are no clear indications of a significant degradation in PLA combat readiness despite a further decline in aircraft sortie levels. Joint combat readiness patrols remain frequent, peak activity periods continue to occur, and naval presence is broadly consistent with historical patterns. Notably, both peak-period activity east of Taiwan and routine daily sorties declined, likely reflecting training adjustments rather than reduced readiness.” See more below.

U.S. Senate Delegation Pressures Taiwan on Defense Budget. Four U.S. senators - Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), John Curtis (R-UT), Thom Tillis (R-NC), and Jacky Rosen (D-NV) - arrived in Taiwan on 30 March for a two-day visit pressing for legislative approval of the NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) special defense budget stalled by opposition. President Lai told the delegation the delays stemmed from “political factors” but insisted Taipei’s commitment to self-defence “has not changed in the slightest.” Senator Curtis personally endorsed the special defense budget, stating that “back in Washington, D.C., my colleagues are watching. We want to make sure that as we invest in this part of the world, you are also investing, and that we’re in this together.”

Japan Deploys First Long-Range Strike Capabilities. Japan deployed its first long-range missiles on 31 March, operationalizing upgraded Type-12 land-to-ship missiles at Camp Kengun in Kumamoto prefecture. Defense Minister Koizumi stated “as Japan faces the most severe and complex security environment in the postwar era, it is an extremely important capability to strengthen Japan’s deterrence and responsiveness. It demonstrates Japan’s firm determination and capability to defend itself.”

The upgraded Type-12 missiles have a 1,000-kilometer range—a fivefold extension from the original 200-kilometer range. This range allows the missiles to reach mainland China. Simultaneously, Japan deployed a hypersonic glide vehicle at Camp Fuji west of Tokyo, designed specifically for island defence. More deployments at locations including Hokkaido in the north and Miyazaki in the south are planned by March 2028.

Japan is also planning to deploy US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles (1,600-kilometer range) on the JMSDF destroyer JS Chokai later this year, the first of eight destroyers to be equipped with the missile. This layered capability, with Type-12 missiles for regional strike, hypersonic glide vehicles for island defence, and Tomahawks for extended-range precision, represents Japan’s most significant offensive capability development since the Pacific War.

The missile deployments took place on the day the Trump-Xi summit was originally scheduled, and amid the U.S. Senate delegation’s Taiwan visit. This may not be coincidental. Japan continues to fortify its southwestern islands near the East China Sea while China’s economic and diplomatic coercion intensifies.

PLA Naval Capabilities and Type 055 Air Defense Role. The ODNI’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stated that China likely will not invade Taiwan in 2027 but will continue coercive efforts throughout the Indo-Pacific. The assessment noted China’s strengthening presence in the South China Sea ‘particularly at the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, through persistent military and coast guard patrols and diplomatic and legal actions,’ including establishing a nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal to increase legal cover for aggressive actions against Philippine vessels.

A recent AEI/ISW assessment notes the PLA likely emphasizes the Type 055’s air defense role in light of US military successes in Venezuela and Iran. The Type 055 DDGs may conduct air defense missions against the United States during conflict, though an air defense role would prevent at least some portion of the PLAN’s 10 Type 055s from escorting aircraft carriers during Western Pacific missions, significantly limiting carrier strike group combat power. This creates targetable vulnerabilities; the U.S. can impose dilemmas that could force the PLAN to remain within the first island chain, limiting its interdiction of U.S. support for Taiwan.

The ODNI assessment that China likely will not invade Taiwan in 2027 should not provide too much strategic comfort, however. It assesses only that China probably judges 2027 as premature, not that the overall trajectory has changed.

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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

In this week’s Big Five, I have included a terrific article on Russia’s experiments with its own version of Ukraine’s ‘drone line’, as well as articles on U.S. Navy learning and adaptation, Ukraine’s defence industry, Chinese support for Iran’s drone industry and an update on Iran’s remaining missile launch capacity.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Sharpening Neptune’s Trident

For many years, renowned retired U.S. Marine and academic Frank Hoffman has written about the future of war, and how learning and adaptation are inherent in the military profession. In this new article published by Proceedings, Frank teams with Pat Garrett to explore a range of areas where the U.S. Navy might improve its ability to learn, adapt and win future wars. The article can be read at this link.

2. Europe’s Untapped Arsenal

For some time, at least a couple of years, it has been clear to anyone that looked that Ukraine was building an impressive 21st century defence industry. It has only been with Iran’s use of Shahed drones against its neighbours that many in the Middle East and wider West have now paid attention to very interesting indigenous Ukrainian capabilities, including its unique drone interceptors. This article published by Foreign Affairs provides a useful insight into the development of Ukraine’s new defence industries and how it can help Europe to defend itself. The article is available at this link.

3. Russia’s Drone Line Experiment

Rob Lee and Dmytro Putiata have been covering developments in land combat in Ukraine since the earliest days of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. In their latest collaboration, written for their new substack called “Two Marines”, Rob and Dmytro explore the topic of Russian front line drone operations and how the Russian Army has evolved drone operations in the close and deep battles. It is an excellent, well-informed piece, and can be read at this link.

4. China’s Support for Iranian Drones

This piece, published by the Jamestown Foundation, examines how China has supported Iran’s development and production of the many drones that it has been employing against America, Israel and nations across the Middle East since the start of the war there in late February. As the article notes, “in March 2026, Iran’s drone campaign consumed thousands of expendable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The critical technologies, manufacturing equipment, and components underpinning these platforms trace to the civilian manufacturing ecosystem of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), channeled through private capital acquisition, reverse engineering, and the systematic exploitation of dual-use trade ambiguities.” You can read the full piece at this link.

5. Iran’s Remaining Missile Launch Capability

In this article from CNN, the authors examine the degree to which the U.S.-Israel air campaign has degraded Iran’s long and medium range missile capacity. As the article notes, “roughly half of Iran’s missile launchers are still intact and thousands of one-way attack drones remain in Iran’s arsenal despite the daily pounding by US and Israeli strikes against military targets over the past five weeks, according to recent US intelligence assessments, three sources familiar with the intel told CNN.” You can read the full piece here.

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War, as Clausewitz understood it, is a contest of wills prosecuted through the application of force. While many are absorbed by coverage of the war in Iran, the week of 15–22 March reinforced, again, that the will of Ukraine and Russia remain fundamentally unreconciled. Ukrainian forces are imposing genuine operational dilemmas on the Russian military command, on the ground, at sea and in the air, while Moscow’s diplomatic obstruction continues with barely concealed contempt for any settlement short of Ukrainian capitulation.

In the Pacific, China continues its military build-up and persists with their systemic campaign of coercion against different regional nations. It does so at a time when the key security guarantor for Pacific democracies, the United States, is stuck in another Middle East war and absorbed in a campaign of abuse against allies from which it needs assistance.

And in the Middle East, the question on everyone’s lips is this: will Trump declare victory and withdraw from the war, or escalate it through the commitment of U.S. ground troops in one or more different locations in Iran? In this week’s update, I provide a short assessment of the cases for and against American boots on the ground in Iran.

Welcome to this week’s update and The Big Five.

Ukraine

Ukraine’s Southern Operations: Disrupting the Russian Spring Timetable. The most consequential military development of the past few weeks is not what Russia has done. It is what Ukraine has prevented Russia from doing. The Ukrainian counter attacks in the south, initiated in late January, have now liberated more than 400 square kilometres of previously occupied territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, according to General Staff operations chief Major General Oleksandr Komarenko.

Also this week, the Ukrainian commander-in-chief, General Syrsky, described how the tempo of attacks had increased in recent weeks. At the same time, Ukraine has claimed that Russia suffered 4840 casualties over a three-day period. If accurate, this would be one of the highest daily casualty rates for the Russians since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.

Ukraine’s counterattacks on the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole axes of advance are having cascading effects across the frontline, disrupting Russian preparations for what was intended to be (again) a decisive spring-summer campaign. Russia had hoped that advances toward Hulyaipole would allow it to approach Orikhiv from both east and west simultaneously and therefore bypassing Ukraine’s east-west defensive lines in Zaporizhzhia Oblast without frontal assault. Ukrainian air assault and assault regiment formations have comprehensively disrupted that plan.

The Russian military in Ukraine now faces competing dilemmas. Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction threaten the rear of Russian 5th Combined Arms Army elements pushing west from Hulyaipole, potentially compelling them to shift from offensive to defensive posture. Elements of Russia’s operational reserve have been committed to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks. This is a good indicator that Russian forces are burning through reserves earmarked for spring offensive operations.

The price of this Ukrainian operational success, however, is being paid elsewhere. Ukraine’s ground force resources are not infinite. Meduza’s analysis published on March 19 notes bluntly that the redeployment of Ukrainian units to the south has weakened the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk, allowing Russian forces to launch a new offensive push toward Dobropillia. This is the inherent tension of counteroffensive operations in a resource-constrained environment: you cannot be strong everywhere.

Russian Shaping for its Spring Offensive Operations. On the night of 17 March, Russia appears to have launched the opening salvos of its long-anticipated spring-summer offensive. Euromaidan Press reported that a sudden weather change, which included fog and drizzle across the Dobropillia, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole regions, triggered pre-infiltrated Russian assault groups that had been deployed in forward positions throughout early March. The assumption of the Russian forces was that fog would suppress Ukrainian drones. It did not.

By the end of 17 March, Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces drone units had reportedly killed 292 Russian soldiers and wounded 221 others. Over the following 36 hours, Russian forces suffered an estimated 900 casualties across a 100-kilometre stretch of front without breaking through at any point. The drone operators used ground-based systems that proved capable even in low-visibility conditions. This capability apparently caught Russian planners off guard.

The broader picture of Russian mechanised activity is interesting. An assessment on 20 March by ISW notes that Russian forces are increasingly conducting mechanised assaults in multiple sectors such as the Lyman, Kostiantynivka, and Pokrovsk axes of advance. These are probably reconnaissance-in-force missions ahead of larger Russian spring assaults in the area of its main effort.

The situation around Kostiantynivka is worthy of close attention. Meduza’s analysis describes how Russian forces destroyed a dam near Osykovo on 25 February with a three-tonne guided aerial bomb, flooding a key Ukrainian supply road into the city and forcing Ukrainian units into permanent buildings where they become easier targets. Despite Russian General Staff claims of holding 60 percent of the city, Russian troops remain engaged in urban fighting on its outskirts. Meanwhile, along the Kazennyi Torets valley, a separate Russian grouping has reached the village of Novopavlivka, about 12 kilometres from Druzhkivka, in a push designed to cut off Kostiantynivka from the broader Kramatorsk urban complex.

Ukraine’s Deep Strike Campaign. One of the more significant strategic shifts in the war may currently be playing out not on the ground but in the air over Russia. An analysis in the Kyiv Post this week noted that from February through mid-March 2026, Ukrainian forces conducted at least 110 long-range drone strike missions against Russian targets. More significantly: for the first time in the war, the number of long-range drones Ukraine launched at Russia was on par with — and on some nights exceeded — the number that Russia had launched at Ukraine.

There is an operational logic behind this shift. Ukrainian drone units have been systematically hunting Russian air defence systems, particularly Pantsir, at a pace that Russia’s military-industrial complex cannot match. Ukraine’s SBU Alpha unit claimed to have neutralised approximately half of Russia’s operational Pantsir stockpile in 2025 and early 2026.

The strategic consequences of this aerial campaign are accumulating. Ukraine has continued to hit Russian oil and defence industrial infrastructure, and this has, according to Russia Matters, forced nearly 40 percent of Russia’s oil refining capacity offline at its peak. Ukrainian forces also struck Iskander-M ballistic missile launchers in occupied Crimea and radar stations that support Russian strike operations. This aimed to degrade Russian air defence capabilities and disrupt air defence support to ground forces and their preparations for the spring campaign.

However, Russian drone and missile pressure continues at scale. Each night in the past week the Russians have fired between 100 and 200 drones and missiles at Ukraine. The largest recent attack occurred on the evening of March 13–14. That night, Russia launched a large-scale strike on Ukraine that caused significant civilian casualties in Kyiv. Ukrainian air defences downed 402 drones, one Zircon hypersonic cruise missile, seven Iskander-M ballistic missiles, 25 Kalibr cruise missiles, and 24 Kh-101 cruise missiles in a single engagement.

President Zelensky noted on March 16 that Ukraine is now intercepting Russian drones worth tens of thousands of dollars with systems costing thousands of dollars. The cost asymmetry is a developing strategic advantage for Ukraine, and an important component of any cost imposition strategy against Russia.

Peace Talks: Stumbling Like a Drunk Russian. Peace negotiations this week were defined primarily by Russian intransigence and European diplomatic manoeuvring around the edges. The core dynamic has not changed: Moscow continues to condition any ceasefire on concessions that amount to Ukrainian capitulation.

On 16 March, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that the EU had “completely discredited itself” in the Ukraine peace process, dismissed Ukraine’s readiness for diplomacy, and stated that Russia would continue pursuing its objectives on the ground. Lavrov rejected French and British plans for a Coalition of the Willing deployment as “an occupation force posing a threat to the Russian Federation.” Lavrov continues to reject any negotiated settlement that fails to concede to all of Russia’s territorial demands. This is a position, unchanged throughout the entire war, that makes any near-term ceasefire functionally impossible on terms Ukraine could accept.

The Financial Times, cited by the Kyiv Independent, reported that Russia has rejected attempts by European nations to play a larger role in peace negotiations. The exclusion of Europe from the trilateral US-Ukraine-Russia framework remains a core Russian negotiating objective. It is designed to isolate Ukraine from its most committed supporters and deal directly with a U.S. administration whose peace priorities, as Carnegie Endowment analysts argued, lean toward resolution over quality.

The territorial question remains an irresolvable centrepiece. Russia demands Ukraine surrender the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and formally renounce claims to occupied Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts.

Related to these negotiations was Putin’s offer this week to stop sharing intelligence with Iran if America cut off support for Ukraine. While this was undoubtedly a tempting offer for some in the Trump administration, it was rejected (for now). The Russians called this a fake story. But if Trump gets desperate enough in his war against Iran, who knows what might happen in the future in regard to such an offer from Moscow?

Ukraine War Assessment

In the past month, Ukraine has achieved something quite significant in the south. Ukrainian attacks there have disrupted Russian offensive planning, consumed Russian reserve forces, and demonstrated that Ukrainian combined arms operations can impose genuine operational costs. The blocking of Starlink for Russian forces in early February has been a force multiplier.

But there is also a geographic trade-off in these southern operations. Gains in the south have come at some cost to northern Donetsk, and Russian forces retain the initiative on what is Russia’s main effort on the ground: the envelopment of Ukraine’s fortress belt and the remainder of Donetsk.

The Russian spring-summer offensive has been disrupted but hardly stopped. As Magyar, commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces wrote in an update this week, the Russian spring offensive is “partially uncorked.” The 17 March Russian assault that cost 900 casualties without a breakthrough is a data point. But it is very early days in what will be a long spring and summer campaign season on the ground. Russia continues to accumulate forces, improve its drone and electronic warfare capabilities, and demonstrate a competent operational method.

However Russia’s tactics require enormous manpower and generally result in only small gains (when they are successful). It is not sustainable forever. As Lawrence Freedman wrote this week:

The real problem for Russia (and for that matter Ukraine) is the difficulty of mounting a classical military offensive under contemporary conditions. Even if Russia can keep the flow of recruits getting to the front it will struggle to move forward in numbers and with momentum. This is why the next few months will be important. Putin will only change his stubborn negotiating position when he accepts that his forces are stuck.

The fundamental question for 2026 is whether Ukraine can hold its defensive lines in the east while sustaining its momentum in the south, and whether its partners will sustain the material and political will to support that effort it. What this week suggests is that Ukraine is fighting with considerable sophistication, and Russia’s margin for error is narrowing but not yet exhausted.

The Iran War

The Cases For and Against Boots on the Ground

Wars reveal the limits of military forces. Since 28 February, the United States and Israel have prosecuted a military campaign of extraordinary air and naval power against Iran. They have removed large numbers of senior leaders, degraded Iran’s missile arsenal, destroyed its navy and attacked its nuclear capability. The military results are tactically impressive.

And yet the oldest lesson in strategy keeps surfacing: military success in the air and at sea does not automatically translate into political outcomes on the ground. Iran has not been beaten. The question likely being considered in the Pentagon, Congress and the White House is whether ground forces would ensure that the military campaign achieves a decisive political outcome - or whether it would lead to a larger and more difficult American military commitment to the Middle East with uncertain results.

A paper published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies this week, authored by retired Lieutenant General James Dubik, examines this problem. In it, he writes that:

Our operations in Iran are again teaching that war involves more than fighting. Wars must be fought and waged. Fighting is a necessary part of war, and the U.S. military is very good at it. Our military won every tactical engagement in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. American citizens have every reason to ask, therefore, if we fight so successfully, why did we lose in Vietnam and Afghanistan and why was success in Iraq so limited?

Dubik’s challenge has very real implications for the ongoing campaign in the Middle East. The new Iran War has exposed the divergence between military organisations fighting wars, and nations waging wars. It has revealed the difference between the synchronised lethality of American air and naval power, and the sustained organisational, political, economic, diplomatic and strategic capacity required to convert military effect into durable political outcomes.

Ground troops are a partial answer to filling the fighting-waging gap. But they are not a cost-free one. To that end, I wanted to undertake a short assessment of the cases for and against American ‘boots on the ground’ in Iran.

The Case for a Ground Interventions. The most compelling argument for a deployment of ground forces is irreversibility. Airstrikes can damage Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but only forces on the ground can physically dismantle it, verify its destruction, and prevent reconstitution. In a conflict whose genesis lies in nuclear ambiguity, that distinction matters. Physical presence converts temporary effect into a near permanent fact.

A second argument relates to Iran’s internal political system. The regime’s January 2026 massacre of protesters, which was the largest domestic uprising since the Islamic Revolution, revealed again an Iranian regime that rules through terror alone. Ground forces, carefully deployed with a clear mission and working towards a credible political objective, could serve as both catalyst and guarantor for an Iranian population that has already demonstrated its desire for change. The historical parallels are imperfect, and regime change has become a discredited concept in Washington DC. But it is not an irrational or impossible objective.

Third, the Strait of Hormuz problem is unlikely to be resolved from altitude. Iran’s mining campaign has already spiked global oil prices above $110 a barrel. A ground presence along Iran’s southern coastline, coordinated with air and naval operations, could provide a solution to the world’s most consequential energy chokepoint in ways that air power and naval interdiction alone cannot guarantee.

Fourth, the seizure of a significant Iranian oil refinery site, such as Kharg Island, could offer an important negotiating ‘card’ for the Trump administration. It is strategically important for Iran and a site where much of its refined oil is produced for export. It could be an economic ‘sword of Damocles’ held over the head of the Iranian regime. But it would need to be seized with minimal damage to the oil refining infrastructure. And, it goes without saying, seizing ground and holding ground are two very different things.

The Case Against Boots on the Ground. The counterarguments for boots on the ground are strong. Iran is a nation of nearly 90 million people, across 1.6 million square kilometres of mountainous terrain purpose-built for insurgency, with a Basij and IRGC structure designed precisely to wage protracted irregular warfare against a conventional occupier. The U.S. military could win every tactical engagement in Iran. That, as Dubik reminds us in his article, is exactly the problem.

The political architecture is equally unfavourable. It is difficult to articulate a ground campaign’s purpose, or its exit conditions, without a clearly defined political objective. Wars without clear political endpoints become long term occupations. These become the kind of national sore points that hollow out military forces and national treasuries and fracture civil-military trust.

Regionally, escalation risks are significant. Iranian-backed militias are already striking American assets across the Gulf. A ground incursion into Iran would provide these networks with purpose, propaganda, and more vulnerable targets than aircraft carriers and airfields. A war already stretching across Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gulf could metastasise further.

A ground incursion, even something designed to be a time limited raid, could easily become something far larger and of a much longer duration. Air raids represent one level of commitment. A ground incursion could easily expand in scope and duration. It is far easier to commit troops than to extract them. Even if America did not have other compelling military challenges elsewhere, it is not certain that the strategic return on such an investment in the lives of American ground troops is worth it in Iran.

A ground deployment that becomes a longer-term deployment (even if this is not the original intention) is likely to draw in assets from all the U.S. services and continue the consumption of munitions needed to be stockpiled to deter China or provided to Ukraine. Because of the distraction a protracted ground deployment might cause, and the very high likelihood of more civilian casualties, it may also heighten the fracture in America’s relationships with allies in the Middle East, Europe and beyond.

Finally, at home, America’s political seams are showing. A ground deployment, with its inevitable casualties, an open-ended timeline, and inescapable echoes of Baghdad, Fallujah and Kandahar, would further test public and Congressional tolerance in ways that even the most successful air campaign has not.

The Strategic Verdict. The United States faces the same dilemma it has faced in every war since Korea: how to convert tactical dominance and exquisite military technology into strategic and political success. Dubik offers that fighting and waging are different disciplines, and that America has consistently mastered the former while struggling with the latter. Boots on the ground would not automatically resolve that deficit. In a country like Iran, without a coherent American political strategy for the employment of ground forces, they might deepen it.

The advantages of threatening an American ground intervention are real. Not ruling out boots on the ground is good strategy, and can help achieve strategic deception objectives as well as support negotiations over war termination. The advantages of actually committing boots on the ground are also real but more limited. As my quick assessment finds, the disadvantages could be numerous.

Before any order to deploy ground troops is given, the Trump administration should ponder and answer the questions it has until now avoided: What does victory look like? How long is America prepared to stay? Who governs Iran if the regime falls?

Until those questions have credible answers, America’s ground options for Iran – be they special operations raids, Marine landings or the commitment of conventional army forces - are probably best left in the planning room. This is not because America troops on the ground in Iran is inconceivable, but because the conditions that would make their mission strategically sound do not yet exist.

The Pacific

Summit Delayed. The President of the United States announced on 17 March that he would delay his summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping so he could prioritise the war against Iran. Trump announced that he would delay the summit with Xi by “five or six weeks”. The Trump administration subsequently confirmed that China had agreed to Trump’s request on March 18. No new date for the Trump-Xi summit has been announced. The delay in the Trump-Xi summit will extend the trade dispute between the two countries and delay arms sales to Taiwan.

Japanese PM Visits Washington. This week, the Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi visited Washington DC and met with President Trump. Before the meeting, Japan joined a handful of European nations in issuing a joint statement calling for an “immediate comprehensive moratorium on attacks on civilian infrastructure, including oil and gas installations” and expressing a readiness “to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage through the Strait.”

Japan came out of the meeting well, and the Japanese PM escaped the meeting without any Trumpian abuse. That is the measure of success for such meetings now. There was one uncomfortable moment, however. President Trump joked about Pearl Harbour and used the Japanese surprise attack on 7 December 1941 to explain his decision not to notify American allies ahead of strikes on Iran. As Trump stated:

We didn’t tell anybody about it because we wanted surprise…Who knows better about surprise than Japan, okay? Why didn’t you tell me about Pearl Harbor, okay?

PLA Joint Combat Patrols. This week, K. Tristan Tang published his latest update on Chinese combat patrols around Taiwan. The key finding in his report was as following:

Although PLA aircraft sorties fell to zero on 17 of the past 30 days, joint combat readiness patrols have not declined in frequency or scale, suggesting no significant degradation in overall PLA combat readiness.

China-Japan Strategic Competition. The U.S. Intelligence Community’s Annual Threat Assessment released on 18 March had a useful but short section on China-Japan tensions. The assessment noted that:

China–Japan tensions increased significantly in November 2025 following comments made by Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi describing a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan as a “survival threatening situation” for Japan. In response, China is employing multi-domain coercive pressure that probably will intensify through 2026, aimed both at punishing Japan and deterring other countries from making similar statements about their potential involvement in a Taiwan crisis.

Japan has deployed Type 12 surface-to-ship missiles in Kyushu as a counter-strike capacity against enemy bases. Defense Minister Koizumi announced plans to install missiles on Yonaguni Island (250km from Taiwan) by fiscal 2030. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian stated on 19 March that Takaichi’s remarks “signal Japan’s intention to attempt armed intervention on the Taiwan question, and constitute a threat of force against China.”

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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

In this week’s Big Five, I have included a terrific article on Russia’s prospects in its just-started spring offensive in Ukraine, as well as articles on Chinese cognitive warfare against Taiwan, Iran’s deterrence failure and two new reports on future threats and scenarios. As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Russia’s Next Spring Offensive

In this excellent essay from Sir Lawrence Freedman, the just commenced Russian spring offensive in Ukraine is explored for its likely objectives and outcomes. The prospects for any significant Russian gains are dim, as is a negotiated peace any time soon. As Freedman notes, “Putin has explicitly rejected the idea of stopping the war around the current line of contact. His predicament is that his forces have not achieved enough. They have taken far less territory than expected, wrecking it in the process, at an enormous human and economic cost. Yet still Putin’s whole negotiating approach depends on the proposition that they will eventually succeed.” The full article is available at this link.

2. China’s Cognitive Operations Against Taiwan

The topic of cognitive warfare is an expanding and vigorous debate in defence and national security circles. A range of different articles and reports have been published recently that cover the topic. To this growing literature can be added this new report published by Modern Diplomacy. As the author writes, “there is a form of warfare that leaves no craters, deploys no soldiers, and issues no formal declaration, and yet it may prove more consequential for the future of Taiwan than any military confrontation. Scholars now call it cognitive warfare…It represents the cutting edge of how great powers seek to reshape international order in the 21st century, not through the costly and escalatory use of force, but through the patient, deniable manipulation of what target populations believe.” You can read the full article at this link.

3. The Future Operating Environments

One of the great publications that is periodically released by the British military is their assessment of the future operating environment. These assessments cover an array of topics, including global environment, threat actors, new technologies and a range of different futures that may have an impact on the design, generation and deployment of military forces in the future. The latest version of this publication, Future Operating Environments 2040, has just been released, and can be read here.

4. Iran’s Failure of Deterrence

This is a really interesting exploration, published by Foreign Affairs, of how Iran’s layers of deterrence were gradually peeled back and exposed by Israel and America over the past few years. It offers good lessons for think about modern deterrence, and as the authors note: deterrence cannot be outsourced to proxies; threats, if not credible, risk inviting retaliation; and a latent nuclear program is hardly a substitute for actually having the bomb. The full article can be read at this link.

5. U.S. Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment

This week, the U.S. intelligence community released its 2026 threat assessment. The document’s objective is the “official evaluation of an array of threats to U.S. citizens, the Homeland, and U.S. interests around the world.” It is interesting but hardly a weighty read. You can read it at this link.

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Wars are never simple. Despite the efforts of some governments, war resists the clarity, certainty or the clever narratives supported by AI slop videos we wish to impose on them.

The past week was yet another illustration of this phenomenon. Ukrainian forces achieved some of the most operationally significant gains of the past year, reclaiming a swathe of territory in the south while striking deep into Russia’s military-industrial complex. Diplomacy continued its chaotic and erratic journey.

The Iran War continues under the euphemism of “excursion” used by Trump this week. This reminds us of the “special military operation” description given to the Ukraine full-scale attack by Putin in February 2022, which was a way of camouflaging the reality of the war from the Russian people.

With casualties mounting, a new Iranian blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, and Trump pleading for European and Asian assistance in his latest social media post, hopes of a short war in Iran have ended. The Iranians now control the clock, and they are happy to keep this conflict rolling along until Trump grows weary of it. They can read the polling on Americans’ views about the war just like anyone else. Welcome to the longer, non-excursion war with Iran.

In the Pacific, Taiwan's Legislative Yuan paralysis on defence spending continues, and the U.S. has deployed U.S. Marines from Japan, and U.S. THAAD missile defence systems from Korea, to the Middle East. There has been a curious lack of air incursions around Taiwan by the PLA, and more pledges from the Japanese PM to increase defence capabilities.

Welcome to my weekly update.

Ukraine

The Ground War: Ukraine Seizes the Initiative in the South. The most important battlefield development of the past week, and perhaps for the past year, was Ukraine’s near-complete liberation of occupied territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. On 10 March, Major General Oleksandr Komarenko, head of the Main Operational Directorate of Ukraine’s General Staff, confirmed to RBC-Ukraine that more than 400 square kilometres of territory had been recaptured since the start of the Oleksandrivka axis operation in late January 2026. Three small settlements remain to be cleared.

The operation was a deliberate, planned series of attacks. Ukrainian forces conducted mutually supporting advances towards Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka, advancing 10–12 kilometres on each axis. Key contributors to Ukrainian successes included dispersed Russian positions, winter weather suppressing Russian drone operations, and the disruptions to Russian battlefield communications by the throttling of Telegram and Starlink. The operation had mutually supporting objectives. At the tactical level, the aim was to push Russian forces out of Dnipropetrovsk. Operationally, it was designed to pre-empt Russia’s anticipated spring offensive.

According to UNITED24 Media and ISW, the operation appears to have resulted in Russian forces postponing their planned offensives, to redeploy troops from other sectors, and reinforce several areas in their defensive scheme. If Russia’s spring-summer offensive planning has indeed been disrupted before it commenced is a significant achievement.

Across the rest of the frontline, the pattern remained mixed but not unfavourable to Ukraine. Russia Matters’ March 11 Report Card found that during the week of 3–10 March, Russian forces actually lost 30 square miles of Ukrainian territory, contrasting sharply with the gain of 25 square miles in the preceding week. Russian advances continued near Pokrovsk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, while Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk and in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

Russian Air Strikes. The operational tempo of Russian air attacks remained constant throughout the week. This is the relentless, attritional tempo of a Russian campaign that has learned it cannot win through ground manoeuvre and instead attempts to grind Ukrainian society and infrastructure into submission while manipulating Trump’s peace negotiators to take a favourable stance towards Russia.

Ukraine Striking Deep. On the evening of 10 March, Ukraine conducted what may be one of the most consequential precision strikes of the war.

Seven Storm Shadow cruise missiles struck the Kremniy El microelectronics plant in Bryansk, Russia. Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed the strike and released footage of the main production workshop being destroyed. President Zelenskyy described it as a strike on “the factory that manufactures control systems for all types of missiles of the Russian Federation.”

According to UNITED24 Media’s detailed analysis, Kremniy El is Russia’s second-largest microelectronics manufacturer. The factory produces more than 1,200 types of electronic components, including the semiconductors and integrated microchips that serve as the ‘brains and nervous system’ of Russia’s high-precision weapons. Its components are used in Iskander ballistic missiles, the Topol-M and Bulava strategic missiles, the S-300 and S-400 air defence systems, Pantsir air defence platforms, and the Izdeliye 30 cruise missile. Around 90 percent of its output goes directly to the Russian defence ministry.

The strike was qualitatively different from earlier drone attacks on the same facility. Seven cruise missiles struck the main production workshop with greater precision than earlier strikes, which used smaller drones with smaller warheads. CyberBoroshno OSINT analysts confirmed that the central building was destroyed. The extent of the damage indicates production at the plant has been completely halted. A Ukrainian drone from the 413th Regiment of Unmanned Systems Forces conducted reconnaissance over the plant during and after the strike — without interference.

Euromaidan Press assessed that the strike will disrupt production of new Iskander ballistic missile systems in the short term, reduce the quality and availability of missiles across multiple Russian weapons platforms, and complicate Russia’s ability to assemble guidance systems using imported components. Russia’s domestic microelectronics sector has been under pressure since Western sanctions cut off most legitimate imports in 2022. Kremniy El was the backstop of that domestic capability. It has now been significantly degraded.

Maritime Strike: Russian Logistics in Ukraine’s Crosshairs. In the past week, Ukrainian military intelligence executed another significant operation against Russia’s military logistics network. This time the target was the Kerch Strait ferry route. It has become critical to Russian supply chains since earlier Ukrainian strikes forced key military cargoes off the Kerch Bridge.

According to Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence directorate (HUR), specialists from the Active Operations Department struck two Russian military vessels on the night of 13–14 March. The railway ferry Slavyanin was disabled and the vessel Avangard was damaged. Both ships were described as ‘key elements’ of the Kerch ferry service and played ‘one of the key roles’ in Russia’s maritime military logistics, transporting weapons, military equipment, and ammunition.

As The Maritime Executive has previously assessed, the Slavyanin was the last railcar-capable cargo vessel on the Kerch Strait crossing — a critical bottleneck in Russia’s munitions supply chain to occupied Crimea and eastern Ukraine. After repeated Ukrainian strikes on the Kerch Bridge, Russia had diverted its most hazardous military cargoes onto the ferry route to reduce the risk of catastrophic secondary explosions. Destroying that Russian workaround is an important achievement for the Ukrainians.

The same operation by the Ukrainians also hit infrastructure at Port Kavkaz in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai. This is one of Russia’s largest passenger and ferry facilities. Ukrainian forces separately struck the Maykop airfield in the Republic of Adygea and the Afipsky oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai on the same date.

Cumulative Strike Effect. We continue to see the Ukrainians hone their ability to strike Russian targets of strategic importance in depth with weapons that have larger warheads and ability to penetrate the defense Russian air, missile and drone defences. The Ukrainian targeting of Russia’s strategic and operational logistics system has a flow-on impact on Russian frontline operations. This appears to be a high priority for Ukraine’s strategic strike capabilities at present. It strips away logistic support layer by layer, facility by facility while Ukrainian tactical forces slowly but surely increase the number of Russian frontline casualties.

There are three mutually supporting aims to these strikes. First, reduce the pressure on Ukrainian frontline forces and on its cities and infrastructure. Second, reinforce morale in Ukraine by showing that despite the hurt imposed on Ukraine, Russia is now suffering much more and can’t sustain its current effort. And third, demonstrate to the Trump administration that Russian victory now is impossible and hope that Trump will begin to put more pressure on Putin, and less on Ukraine, in peace talks.

And that leads me to the next element of the Ukraine update: diplomacy.

The Diplomatic Maze. The diplomatic track remained active this week. However, it was more an achievement in choreography than a genuine step forward towards peace.

The main diplomatic event of the past week was the Trump–Putin phone call of 9 March — their first since December 2025. Meduza reported that the hour-long call, initiated by Washington, focused primarily on the Iran conflict but also covered Ukraine. Trump told reporters afterwards he had ‘a very good call with Putin” and that

He wants to be helpful [with Iran]…I told him you can be more helpful by ending the war in Ukraine.

On 11 March, U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and White House Senior Advisor Josh Gruenbaum met with Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev in Florida. The Kyiv Independent reported that the meeting came as Washington was also considering easing sanctions on Russian oil to address the global energy price spike caused by the Iran war. The readout was characteristically unhelpful: the teams “discussed a variety of topics and agreed to stay in touch.”

The more substantive development from these bilateral contacts was the rescheduling of trilateral talks. Euromaidan Press reported that the fourth round of Ukraine-US-Russia trilateral negotiations has been deferred to 16–22 March at the US’s request.

Russia is also attempting to exploit the new Iran War to weaken Western support for Ukraine. ISW noted during the week that Kremlin officials have been using U.S. military operations against Iran to criticise Washington, and to discredit the legitimacy of U.S.-led mediation in the Ukraine peace talks. If Russia can persuade Ukraine’s European partners that the U.S. is an unreliable broker, it provides the opportunity for a more Russia-favourable settlement architecture.

Ukraine Assessment. The week of 8–15 March 2026 raises an interesting question: has Ukraine seized the strategic initiative?

On the ground along the frontline and in its deep strike operations, Ukraine is performing well. The liberation of nearly all of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, the destruction of the Kremniy El microchip plant, the disabling of the Slavyanin ferry, and the continuing advances in the south represent a week of strategic achievement. Ukrainian forces are demonstrating the capacity to exploit opportunities to outmanoeuvre, outthink, and out fight Russian forces on selected axes of advance.

The decision to conduct a pre-emptive offensive to disrupt Russia’s spring plans, albeit on what is likely to be a Russian secondary effort in the South, rather than wait for the now predictable yearly Russian spring offensive, reflects a military organization that is growing in its tactical, operational and strategic effectiveness. How Ukraine deals with Russia’s main effort, to envelop the fortress cities in the east, remains to be seen.

On the diplomatic front, the picture is deeply opaque. The Trump–Putin phone call, the Witkoff–Dmitriev meeting in Florida, the rescheduling of trilateral talks all indicate that peace is no closer now that it was at any time during the war. Putin continues to stick with his maximalist goals for the war and for peace negotiations.

To make things worse, Trump continues to rage about President Zelenskyy and compliment Putin on American TV. During an interview with NBC this week, Trump noted that:

I’m surprised that Zelenskyy doesn’t want to make a deal. Tell Zelenskyy to make a deal because Putin’s willing to make a deal…Zelenskyy is far more difficult to make a deal with.

This at a time when Ukraine is helping American military units to defend against Iranian drones.

The Iran war appears to have given Putin a temporary reprieve from American diplomatic pressure. It is using that reprieve, and the relaxation of oil sanctions, to re-posture itself in negotiations, assist Iran to draw out the conflict there and partially replenish its coffers. All of this should have been predictable by the intelligence, military and other resources available to the Trump administration before it launched its attacks against Iran.

So, to answer the question I posed up front, the best answer I can give is “possibly”.

Ukraine’s task in the weeks ahead is to maintain battlefield pressure, increase Russian casualties, ensure the Dnipropetrovsk gains are consolidated before Russia can reconstitute its forces in that sector, maintain European support (despite the efforts of Hungary) and convince Trump that Russia – in its peace negotiations and assistance to Iran – is not a trustworthy interlocutor. None of this is easy.

The Iran War

As I did last week, I will focus on a few key graphics in the Iran War update. I will continue to provide other updates on this conflict during the coming week and on my social media feeds.

Perhaps the most interesting development in the past week was President Trump’s recent social media post, which is shown below. The key phrase is the following:

Hopefully China, France, Japan, South Korea, the UK and others, that are affected by this artificial constraint, will send ships to the area so that the Hormuz Strait will no longer be a threat by a Nation that has been totally decapitated.

There is an entire PhD to be written on this one post by someone down the track. So let’s dig into it.

First, Trump describes Iran as “a Nation that has been totally decapitated”. If it has been decapitated, why is the regime still in place? And how can they pose a threat that now requires other nations to help America?

Second, the Iranian threat to the shipping in the Strait of Hormuz is not an “artificial constraint”. It is a very real thing. Just ask the crews, owners and insurers of the many civilian ships hit by Iranian missiles and drones in the past week or so (see below). And those of us everywhere else paying higher gas prices.

Third, “shooting ships out of the water” just makes no sense. A minor thing, I know, but the whole aim of shooting at ships is to put them under the water, not out of it! I am sure Tom Shugart can provide a better analysis of this than me.

Fourth, all those countries Trump is pleading to help him are also countries he has spent the past year deriding and insulting. This includes the Royal Navy just a few days ago, where Trump wrote that “we don’t need people that join wars after we have already won them”. There is an old term about chickens coming home to roost I seem to remember. And has the war been already won?

Finally, and perhaps worst of all, is an American president using the term “hopefully” for action in war. Even the most junior military officer is taught that “hope is not a valid course of action” in every planning activity. For Trump to use this term indicates that he is no longer the one with the strategic initiative in this war.

The next info-graph is the latest update from the Ministry of Defence in UAE. It shows the cumulative total of drones and missiles that have been fired at the nation, and the number for the past 24 hours. Of note, the daily total is way down. Also, interception rates are no longer published. Given the enormous expenditure of exquisite munitions like Patriot and AMRAAMs in the past two weeks, perhaps missile stocks are getting low and interception rates are declining.

The Pacific

Taiwan’s Defense Budget Gridlock: Institutional Paralysis. The Legislative Yuan’s protracted battle over President Lai Ching-te’s NT$1.25 trillion ($40 billion) special defense budget entered a critical phase during the period. On 6 March, the legislature sent three competing budget proposals to committee: the Executive Yuan’s eight-year comprehensive plan, the Kuomintang’s NT$380 billion counterproposal, and the Taiwan People’s Party’s NT$400 billion version. The opposition versions, less than a third of the administration’s request, omit critical capabilities including the T-Dome multilayered air defense system, 200,000 drones for distributed operations, and funding for domestic defense-industrial partnerships.

President Lai’s 15 March statement at a Taiwan Thinktank forum framed the budget in explicitly transactional terms aligned with Trump administration priorities. Taiwan can afford it, Lai argued, given economic growth at its fastest pace in 15 years driven by AI semiconductor demand. He emphasized burden-sharing imperatives from the U.S. National Security Strategy, positioning defense spending not merely as security investment but as economic and industrial development.

China’s Defense Budget and Strategic Patience. The PRC Ministry of Finance’s proposed 2026 defense budget of approximately $278 billion during the Two Sessions legislative meeting represents a 7 percent increase compared to 2025—slightly lower than the 7.2 percent yearly increases observed over the previous three years. Yet this proportional increase relative to China’s 4.5-5 percent GDP growth target—the lowest since 1991—demonstrates sustained prioritization of military modernization despite economic headwinds. The steady defense budget growth occurs as allies grapple with legislative obstacles (Taiwan), fiscal constraints (Japan’s struggle to reach 2 percent GDP), and political transitions (South Korea).

The near-complete cessation of PLAAF activity near Taiwan since 27 February, after years of near-daily incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ, represents tactical adaptation rather than strategic retreat. The pause has been interpreted by different analysts to indicate integration of lessons learned from sustained grey-zone operations, maintenance cycles following intensive activity, or deliberate signalling timed to Taiwan’s budget paralysis.

However, I think that K. Tristan Tang from the Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative provides the best analysis and most likely reason in a recent post (and articles in different publications). His assessment is that the temporary drop off in aerial incursions (which have now recommenced) is that the decline in aircraft sorties is a result of the PLA’s efforts to refine its joint training models and tempo. He writes that:

After the major organizational reforms in 2015–2016, Xi Jinping announced a new round of military training reform in November 2020. The plan called for sequential reforms in basic training, combined-arms training, and eventually joint training. In June 2023, the PLA held an onsite conference on basic training, and in October 2024 another onsite conference on combined training. These conferences are important because they signal that the PLA believes it has finished exploring a new training model and can begin implementing it more broadly across the force. In other words, they set the direction for reform, but they do not mean the reform is complete. This means the PLA is now likely focusing on the next phase—exploring new models of joint operations training.

Several PLA official reports released in January this year indicate that units across the PLA are actively intensifying experimentation with joint training, and that these efforts have already been underway for some time. From a longer-term perspective, the PLA likely began shifting greater attention toward this phase of reform in the second half of 2025. As a result, PLA air and naval activity around Taiwan had already started to show a gradual decline during that period. In that sense, the near-zero sortie counts seen on some days since February should be viewed as an extreme manifestation of a longer-term trend, rather than a sudden development.

The available evidence suggests that ongoing military training reform—particularly the transition toward joint training—may be the more plausible explanation for the recent decline in aircraft sorties around Taiwan.

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This week, I published two articles.

First, I published an article at the Lowy Interpreter which examined what military institutions might learn from the rapid learning and adaptation cycle of F1 racing teams. You can read that article here.

Next, I published a piece yesterday that explored what the Iran War, and shortfalls in drone interception capabilities, reveals about learning and adaptation in western military institutions. You can read it here.

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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

In this week’s Big Five, I have included a terrific article on how the Iran War will impact on American military force posture in the Pacific. There are also articles on Russian cognitive warfare in Europe, an examination of the lessons from Iran for the Pacific theatre, the application of AI in military operations and the professional development of military officers.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. The Iran War and U.S. Force Posture in the Pacific

The most recent U.S. National Defense Strategy made deterring Chinese military aggression against the First Island Chain the highest priority for military forces after homeland defence. The current war in Iran appears to be in the process of compromising that objective through the expenditure of precious munitions, redeploying forces from the Pacific to the Middle East, and revealing to the CCP a political decision-making process in Washington DC that, at best, could be described as sub-optimal. In this article from The Diplomat, several important questions are posed related to the war in Iran. Will China seize the opportunity to make a move on Taiwan while the United States is dragged down in the Middle East? Did the United States have a strategic plan when it started the war against Iran? What will U.S. relative capabilities be when the war is over? A timely and important piece, you can read it at this link.

2. Learning from Iran for Contingencies in Asia

This article, published at RUSI, examines how the current Strait of Hormuz shipping crisis can inform us about a potential future crisis in the Taiwan Strait. As the author notes, “the current crisis should serve as a reminder of the extent to which the world relies on the global shipping ecosystem. Based on the response so far, those charged with international security do not understand the industry well enough to know how to protect it in the context of armed conflict. There is still time before a second perhaps more catastrophic case breaks out in East Asia.” You can read the article here.

3. Russia’s Cognitive Assault on Europe

The concept of Cognitive Warfare is receiving a lot of attention lately. In this new article for Small War Journal, the author examines Russia’s application of Cognitive Warfare to target European citizens in order to aid degrade their willingness to Ukraine. It is doing so through the use of high-volume, multi-source disinformation to inject pro-Russian messaging into democratic discourse. The article includes a case study of Rheinmetall’s cancelled factory in Germany to illuminate how these Russian talking points can result in tangible strategic effects. You can read the full article at this link.

4. AI, War and the Iran Campaign

In this piece, the author explores the use of AI by the American military in its current military campaign against Iran. As the author notes, “historical lessons ranging from Vietnam to Iraq illustrate that more advanced technologies do not automatically lead to military victory. Moreover, as scholars have noted, speed itself can lead to mismatch between tactical gains and strategic goals. As the United States further integrates increasingly capable AI systems into operational practices, these historical lessons should remain clear.” You can read the article here.

5. The Military as a Profession Through the Clausewitzian Trinity

This article explores how the Clausewitzian trinity can be applied to developing military leaders for an era of greater strategic uncertainty. As the author notes, “managing chance incorporates elements of reducing uncertainty and applying creativity as individuals develop coup d’oeil…This article contrasts these ideas against the various roles assigned to civil-military forces in the Clausewitzian trinity to emphasize professionalism in developing military leaders.” The article is available to read at this link.

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The week of 2–8 March 2026 continued to show that the war in Ukraine has a level of dynamism that is not reflective of the ‘frozen conflict’ narratives popular in some areas. On the frontline, Ukrainian ground forces demonstrated a quiet resurgence while continuing to hold the line against the Russian offensive machine. Long range strike forces executed one of the most operationally significant maritime strikes of the war.

Diplomacy collapsed under the weight of a new Middle East war. 300 Ukrainian prisoners of war returned home, and, President Zelenskyy visited his frontline soldiers again - something Putin has shown no inclination to do, and no courage to do, in the past four years.

In the Pacific, Taiwan is focussed on integrating its defences within a larger First Island Chain defensive strategy, and China halted its aerial incursions into Taiwan’s airspace for a week.

Welcome to this week’s update and Big Five!

Ukraine

Interceptor Drones and the Systemic Learning Deficit in Western Military Institutions. This week revealed fully just how poor western and Middle East military institutions have been at learning from the war in Ukraine. I have written several times about how western military organisations have shown a lack of humility in learning from Ukraine, but the past week has provided the best evidence yet of that phenomenon.

Therefore, it was an extraordinary development this week when the United States formally asked Ukraine for help defeating Iranian drones. When the U.S. and Israel launched their attack on Iran on 28 February, Iran responded with a barrage that included over 500 ballistic missiles and approximately 2,000 unmanned aerial systems in the first five days, according to US Central Command. American air defences — designed for the threat environments of the late 20th century — struggled with the volume of cheap, slow-moving Shahed-type drones. A strike in Kuwait killed six American servicemembers. Drone strikes damaged the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. The Washington Post reported on 5 March that both the United States and its Middle Eastern allies had approached Ukraine seeking expertise and practical support in countering Iranian drones.

Zelenskyy responded shrewdly. He confirmed that Ukraine would provide assistance, directed officials to present options, and announced that Ukrainian specialists and technology would be deployed to the region. He then offered a proposition that was equal parts pragmatic and diplomatically elegant: Kyiv offered to send its best drone interceptors to the Gulf — in exchange for Patriot air defence missiles. ‘It is an equal exchange,’ Zelenskyy said.

The irony is huge. Ukraine has been defending itself against Shahed drones since 2022. Russia initially imported them from Iran; Iran has since supplied an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 of the weapons to Moscow, with Russia also producing modified variants (the Geran) domestically. Ukraine has built a layered, cost-effective counter-drone architecture over four years of trial and error. For at least a year, Ukraine has employed low-cost drone interceptors, which are an order of magnitude cheaper than Shaheds, as part of this air defence system. It is exactly what the United States and some of its partners lack in the Gulf. CNN reported on 7 March that the US had also decided to deploy its Merops anti-drone system — proven in combat against Russian drones in Poland and Romania — to the Middle East, citing lessons learned from the Ukrainian theatre.

This was a highly predictable threat from Iran which was not paid sufficient respect by the Americans and others, and as a result, they were unprepared. But at least the U.S. military demonstrated some capacity for learning by using Shahed copies (the LUCAS drones) against Iran. The situation is much worse in other countries (particularly Australia), where these has been a systemic effort to downplay or ignore learning from Ukraine. It is an example of a systemic learning deficit in western military organisations which has bitten America and countries in the Middle East.

Just in case we are led to believe that the drone interceptors are the only example of a lack of learning, there was another good example of this systemic learning deficit during the week. A British politician visiting Ukraine tweeted from a previously undeclared maintenance site for British military equipment. For four years, both Ukraine and Russia have employed simple and widely available geolocation from social media posts (and images / videos in those posts) to prime their targeting process. How had they not learned this? As a result, it is highly likely the Russians will target this location, and more lives might be put at threat. At the minimum, the site will have be relocated.

In conclusion, ignoring lessons of modern wars - in an era when war has never been more visible - will hurt you at some point. America and Middle East nations found this out the hard way during the week. What other nations out there have also engaged in willing ignorance of what Ukraine can teach us?

Ukraine Armed Forces Strategic Research Priorities 2026. This week, the Ukrainian Armed Forces released its research priorities for the coming year. The briefing provided a look back at 2025, noting that:

The main change in 2025 is the transition from chaotic developments to a holistic state system…Last year, the Armed Forces of Ukraine completed the formation of a holistic system that allows them to respond instantly to the challenges of war. The key principle is feedback.

The key priorities for research funding (and percentage of research funding received) in 2025 were:

• UAV – 28%.

• Robotic systems (RCS) – 15%.

• Communication and information protection – 11%.

• Electronic warfare and countermeasure systems – 8%.

This year, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will focus on four strategic areas:

1. Improvement of the innovation management system.

2. Scaling of research activities.

3. Deep implementation of Artificial Intelligence technologies.

4. Further development and integration of unmanned systems in all branches of troops.

Reckoning in the South: The Ground War. This week Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief, General Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces captured more territory in February 2026 than Russian forces were able to seize during the same period. This represents the best relative territorial performance for Ukraine’s ground force since the Kursk operation in August 2024. He described it as having survived a ‘difficult battle of the winter.’

This matters because the pattern of Russian winter advances has been consistent (and often demoralising) in the past couple of years. The Ukrainian gains have broken that pattern, at least for 2026. According to Russia Matters, which cross-references ISW data, Russian forces gained just 46 square miles of Ukrainian territory in the period from 3 February to 3 March 2026 compared with 123 square miles in the previous four-week period. Russian monthly gains of Ukrainian territory have nearly collapsed from their late-2025 peak.

The most consequential Ukrainian gains occurred in the south — in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. ISW’s assessment of 6 March assessed that Ukrainian forces have liberated 244 square kilometres in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions since 1 January 2026, while Russian forces seized 115 square kilometres in the same region and time period. This is a net Ukrainian gain of nearly 130 square kilometres on this axis of advance. Ukrainian forces cleared Russian positions west of the Haichur River and likely liberated the settlements of Ternuvate and Kosivtseve.

Along the northern and eastern regions of the frontline, the picture was mixed. ISW’s daily assessments throughout the week tracked Ukrainian advances in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Kupiansk, while Russian forces continued to press their advance on the Pokrovsk and in the Slovyansk axes of advance. The grinding combat on the ground in Donetsk continues.

Long Range Strike. Russia has probably failed to achieve the objectives it set for its Winter 2025–2026 long-range missile and drone campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This assessment is supported by an ISW report from the week, which also noted that the Russian military command ‘continues to operate in an alternate reality, setting wildly unrealistic deadlines that do not match Russia’s actual battlefield capabilities.’

President Zelenskyy also warned this week that Russia intends to shift its strike campaign toward Ukrainian logistics and water infrastructure as spring arrives — a potentially significant escalation that could threaten civilian supply chains and Ukraine’s ability to sustain frontline forces. He issued that warning in ISW’s 2 March assessment, and Ukrainian authorities have since been taking steps to harden railway junctions and water facilities against attack.

The most significant long range strike event of the week occurred on 2 March, when Ukrainian forces executed a large-scale drone strike against the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s primary operating base at Novorossiysk. It was a complex, large-scale attack of a type we must all learn from.

According to Ukrainska Pravda, citing sources within the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), the operation involved approximately 200 aerial and maritime drones, coordinated across multiple Ukrainian agencies including Special Operations Forces, the State Border Guard Service, Defence Intelligence, and the Unmanned Systems Forces. The Ukrainians claim to have hit Russian naval vessels, air defence systems, as well as energy infrastructure at the Sheskharis oil terminal.

The key strike was against the frigate Admiral Essen, which is a Burevestnik-class warship carrying eight Kalibr cruise missiles. UNITED24 Media reported that the frigate’s midsection superstructure was hit, triggering an 18-hour fire. The SSU stated that: ‘The ship sustained critical damage that significantly limits its ability to use Kalibr cruise missiles. At present, the frigate cannot carry out strikes on the territory of Ukraine.’

This is a good outcome. The Admiral Essen has been a persistent source of Kalibr strikes against Ukrainian cities since 2022. Its effective removal from the Russian strike fleet — even temporarily — has operational consequences. The same strike also damaged the minesweeper Valentin Pikul, the anti-submarine corvettes Yeysk and Kasimov, hit a guidance radar from an S-300PMU-2 air defence system, and set fire to six of seven oil loading arms at the Sheskharis terminal.

Later in the week, the Ukrainians hit a key Russian Shahed drone hub near Donetsk Airport. The site was used to store, prepare, and launch strike UAVs against Ukraine.

The broader strategic significance of these strikes is that another Russian Black Sea Fleet refuge is no longer a safe harbour for the Russian Navy. Ukraine’s ability to strike deep into Russian rear areas with significant air, missile and drone defences by using complex multi-domain drone swarms represents one of the most important military developments of this war. The Ukrainian long range strike capability, something I have written about for three and a half years, continues to mature.

And it offers many insights for other military institutions – if they are willing and humble enough to learn.

Diplomacy Interrupted. The diplomatic track of the Ukraine War, which had been dragging on with little progress across the Coalition of the Willing summit in Paris in January and three rounds of US-brokered talks, came to an abrupt halt this week as the war against Iran commenced.

A fourth round of trilateral talks between Ukrainian, Russian, and American representatives had been scheduled for 5–6 March in Abu Dhabi. Bloomberg reported on 5 March that Zelenskyy formally confirmed the talks were postponed indefinitely. “For now, because of the situation with Iran, the necessary signals for a trilateral meeting haven’t come yet. As soon as the security situation and the broader political context allow us to resume the trilateral diplomatic work, it will be done.”

The venue for the talks was part of the problem. The UAE, which had hosted two prior rounds of talks, had largely closed its airspace as Iranian ballistic missiles and drones targeted Gulf states. Indeed, as I write this, another strike against the Dubai airport occurred. Modern Diplomacy reported this week that Ukrainian officials were exploring alternative venues for the talks, including Turkey and Switzerland, both of which have previously hosted negotiations related to the conflict. But the deeper problem with the talks now is not geography — it is political bandwidth.

The Trump administration, which had been the primary diplomatic driver of the Ukraine peace process, is now absorbed by its war against Iran. American attention, American assets, and American political capital have been redirected. Zelenskyy was direct about the risk: speaking to Novaya Gazeta Europe, he warned that a prolonged U.S.-Iran war could deprive Ukraine of key air defence systems it needs to intercept Russian missiles, as Washington would prioritise supplying the Middle East with Patriots and other interceptors.

The Kremlin quickly exploited the disruption. ISW’s 5 March assessment noted that Kremlin officials are ‘using the escalation in the Middle East to set conditions to blame the United States for any future failures in negotiations for a peace in Ukraine.’ Russian officials are working to rhetorically place Russia and the United States in opposition, attempting to discredit U.S.-led mediation efforts by painting Washington as an aggressive power unfit to serve as a neutral broker.

Peace in 2026 is looking even more unlikely – and I began the year with low hopes for this.

Strategic Assessment. Ukraine is performing better on the battlefield than the narrative of inevitable victory from Russia describes. As I noted in a piece this week, strategic narratives are not strategy. Russia, likely to launch its spring offensives soon, will be doing so having failed to achieve its strategic objectives for winter. Diplomacy, interrupted by the war in Iran and a global security environment that is changing rapidly, is unlikely make significant progress in the short term.

Three conclusions are worth noting.

First, Ukrainian military performance is holding up and in some areas improving. The Novorossiysk strike, and the counter attacks in the south (now largely halted because of clearer weather) all point to a force that is learning, adapting, and finding ways to strike the Russians in new ways. This is an army that continues to take punches but remains standing and continues hitting back. We can learn from that.

Second, the diplomatic window is narrowing. The Iran War has not killed the Ukraine peace process, but it has disrupted it at a critical point. Russia still shows no signs of genuine compromise on the territorial question that is the heart of any potential settlement, however. The United States remains a crucial broker but is currently otherwise occupied.

Finally, the new Iran War shows that Ukraine’s hard-won expertise has global strategic value. Kyiv is leveraging it intelligently to extract air defence resources from Middle East nations, and to maintain its relevance in a Washington increasingly consumed by a different war. Whether this translates into meaningful gains — Patriot systems, continued military support, sustained American diplomatic engagement — remains to be seen.

The Middle East

Because I have published a few articles on this topic throughout the week, I will focus on the statistics of the war for this section of the update. The first is an update from the UAE Ministry of Defence (as at 7 March) that covers the drone and missiles strikes against the country since the start of the new Iran War.

Next, is the update from Saudi Arabia that contains similar data. Attacks on Saudi Arabia are an order of magnitude lower than those in UAE. However, just a few well placed drones and missiles hitting oil production facilities can reverberate around the world.

Finally, the latest info-graphic from The Institute for the Study of War covering where U.S. and Israeli forces have conducted strikes against Iran in the past 24 hours.

The Pacific

First Island Chain Integration Strategy. Taiwan Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung’s interview with The Japan Times articulated a diplomatic strategy acknowledging changed strategic circumstances. Lin argued that effectively deterring China’s expansion into the Pacific requires embedding Taiwan more fully into Indo-Pacific security frameworks, particularly with First Island Chain partners. This represents not just political announcements but recognition that Taipei cannot rely solely on bilateral U.S. security commitments given contemporary American strategic ambiguity.

Foreign Minister Lin called for enhanced cooperation in intelligence-sharing, joint exercises, defense-industry tie-ups, data links, and dealing with hybrid threats such as China’s grey-zone activities. The emphasis on mini-lateral frameworks reflects Taiwan’s assessment that distributed deterrence through multiple partnership nodes offers greater resilience than dependence on a single alliance relationship.

Yet this strategy confronts structural constraints: Taiwan lacks formal diplomatic recognition from most First Island Chain states, limiting the depth and transparency of security cooperation.

China’s Low Tempo Air Operations Around Taiwan. This week, PLA aircraft activity near Taiwan showed a fascinating pattern. After an eight-day absence of detected flights—the longest such stretch since systematic tracking began—Chinese military aircraft resumed operations on 7 March. The pause has generated speculation about causes ranging from mechanical maintenance cycles to deliberate strategic signalling. Taiwan’s Defense Minister Wellington Koo cautioned legislators that absence of air incursions should not imply absence of PLA activity, noting that sea-based operations continued without pause.

An analysis of this lack of PLA aerial activity by the Taiwan Security Monitor noted that:

This pause naturally sparked speculation, however many popular theories are as of yet unsupported by observable patterns and regional events. Observers have forwarded several possible explanations, to include the ongoing operations in Iran, the upcoming summit between President Trump and Xi, an inability to operate routinely following a series of major officer purges, and domestic politics in Taiwan.

You can read their full analysis on this pause (which is now over) at this link.

Monthly Update on PLA Air and Maritime Maneuvers Around Taiwan. During the week, @KTristanTang released his latest monthly update on Chinese activity around Taiwan. His conclusion: “PLA air and maritime activity around Taiwan has declined, but this does not necessarily imply that combat readiness has been seriously weakened by the recent purges. Rather, it appears to reflect a shift in training planning toward exploring joint operational modes.”

Middle Power Security and Carney’s Asia-Pacific Visit. This week the Canadian Prime Minister visited the Pacific region, including stops in Australia, India and Japan. Pitching a middle power approach to regional security, he seeks to address the fundamental question confronting Pacific security affairs. Is a network of distributed, minilateral security agreements a viable substitute for weakened bilateral alliance credibility. Manila, Tokyo, Canberra, and Taipei are building networked relationships precisely because long-standing hub-and-spoke arrangements in the region, of which America is a critical component, appear insufficient.

Yet networked resilience of the type discussed this week depends on each nations’ individual capability and collective coordination. The transition from American-guaranteed stability to a more distributed form of deterrence against Chinese aggression will either produce more robust security or dangerous gaps. This week suggests allies and partners understand the challenge, but have not yet invested in solving it.

Japan’s defence spending has doubled from 1% to 2% of GDP, and the current Japanese PM is looking at further enhancements to the budget as well as constitutional change. Unfortunately, few other countries in the region, including Canada or Australia, have shown an inclination to drastically increase defence spending or a willingness to take more strategic risk in seeking to deter China.

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This week, I published a couple of articles on Futura Doctrina.

First, I published an article on 2 March which examined initial insights and questions from the initial phase of the new U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran. You can read that article here.

Next, I published a piece yesterday that explored what Putin and Xi might be learning from the war in Iran. Called Selective Belligerence and Unconditional Surrender, you can read this article at the following link.

*******

It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

In this week’s Big Five, I have included an excellent new report from RAND that examines Chinese perspectives on the military applications of AI. There are also articles on how the Chinese leader might approach his upcoming summit with President Trump, insights into how AI will impact on army officers and a good piece of FICINT from Peter Singer and August Cole.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. PLA Perspectives on AI

In this new report from RAND, the authors explore integration into the PLA from the perspective of Chinese military leaders. The review indicates that the PLA will use AI to enhance its kill chains by strengthening joint AI integration, multi-agent collaboration, and improved, secure data transmission. There is also examination of the use of AI in military logistics. Finally, the authors propose several targetable vulnerabilities in the PLA approach to AI implementation. You can read the full report at this link.

2. Will China Overplay Its Hand?

In this article published by Foreign Affairs, the author examines how the Chinese leader might approach the forthcoming summit with President Trump. The author notes that “the most significant factor that will shape the upcoming Trump-Xi meetings will be Beijing’s perception of its own apparent success in 2025 in responding to U.S. threats with resolute counterthreats…Many Chinese experts believe that Beijing, unlike other capitals subjected to Trump’s threats, managed to back Washington into a corner and that this outcome signaled China’s arrival as a global power on par with the United States.” How this will influence the coming summit remains to be seen. You can read the full article here.

3. Effects of Private Quantum Encryption

Peter Singer and August Cole have been working with Defense One this year to produce a series of short stories that examine key national security and military issues. This FICINT (fictional intelligence) is designed to be an accessible yet thought-provoking means to drive conversions in government and beyond about the impacts of new technologies on national security and societies more broadly. The latest story, The Quantum Curtain, has just been published and can be read at this link.

4. The Impact of AI on Army Officers

A new report was released by the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP) that explores the impact of AI on Army officers and the army profession more generally. As the author of the report notes, “these changes will affect not only which jobs warfighters perform, but how they perform them, requiring the U.S. military to rethink how it organizes, trains, and equips its future workforce, as well as how it designs its forces.” You can read the full report at this link.

5. Responsible Procurement of AI in Military Institutions

This report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) explores the intersection of military procurement and responsible use of military AI. The authors propose that procurement process can be a mechanism for states to implement political commitments and legal obligations, and therefore, also a mechanism for implementing responsible use of AI in military institutions. You can read their full report here.

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Another week in the Ukraine war has passed, and it is almost four years since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022. Russian forces continue their methodical operations on the ground in Ukraine, in the skies over the frontline and Ukraine’s cities, and in the minds of western politicians and civilians.

Meanwhile, in Geneva, discussion about the war’s political and military dimensions and the achievement of a viable and enduring peace continue to show little progress.

But as many ponder the meaning and lessons of four years of large-scale war in Ukraine, another war is possible in the Middle East in the coming days. President Trump has directed a large-scale build up of American forces in the region. Whether these forces will be used or not, and what the political and strategic objectives of their operations might be, remains to be seen.

Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five.

The Geneva Diplomatic Theatre. As the war approaches the fourth year since Russia’s full-scale invasion, another round of trilateral talks in Geneva on 17-18 February produced a now familiar combination of modest procedural progress and substantive deadlock. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy described the outcome as mixed: “progress has been made, but for now, positions differ because the negotiations were difficult.” This diplomatic and increasingly common description of talks barely masks the reality that Russia still demonstrates zero willingness to moderate its maximalist demands for this war.

There was more progress with the military track of talks however. As President Zelenskyy stated:

All three sides acknowledged that a ceasefire, if there is to be an end to the war, and thus the monitoring of the ceasefire will be led primarily by the Americans. They will chair this track.

The military subgroup “basically agreed on pretty much everything” regarding ceasefire monitoring mechanics. This represents procedural advancement—agreement on how a ceasefire would be monitored if one were agreed—but says nothing about whether the political will exists to reach agreement on what would be monitored or who would do it.

As noted above, on the political track, positions remain irreconcilable. Russian chief negotiator Vladimir Medinsky described talks as “difficult but businesslike,” while Ukrainian delegation head Rustem Umerov emphasized the need to “prepare a real, not formal, basis” for presidential-level decisions. The gap between these formulations remains large. Russia describes talks as businesslike transactions, while Ukraine emphasizes the need for substantive rather than cosmetic agreement.

The territorial issue remains a critical impasse. Russia demands Ukrainian withdrawal from remaining areas of Donetsk oblast that Moscow’s forces haven’t captured. This represents about 20% of the region. Over the weekend, President Zelenskyy has ruled out the withdrawal of Ukrainian ground forces from the eastern Donbas as part of a potential peace agreement with Russia.

Economic issues have also contributed to the outcomes of peace talks so far. As noted in a recent assessment, Putin’s unwillingness to compromise in negotiations is a result of “his belief that the Russian economy can continue to support a protracted war.” The question is whether this belief is accurate or delusional. Economic pressures are mounting despite surface stability. However, economic measures alone are not going to change Putin’s strategic calculus with regards to the war in Ukraine. As a recent report from RUSI notes:

The history of war offers few examples of conflicts ended by economic pain alone. Where economic pressure has mattered, it has done so indirectly, by reshaping military capacity, elite incentives or regime stability.

The timing of Russian attacks with their strategic drone and missile attacks against Ukrainian cities underscores Moscow’s negotiating posture. As the image below indicates, Russia has kept up a baseline of continuous pressure through aerial attacks, with periodic pulses using 400-600 drones and missiles. The attacks don’t feature random timing but are deliberate signalling: Russia negotiates from a position of ongoing military pressure, not genuine commitment to de-escalation or peace.

The Energy War Continues. Russia’s systematic campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure continued during the reporting period. Russia Matters reports that “every power plant in Ukraine has been damaged by Russian attacks, according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s February 2026 estimate.” At one point, approximately half of Kyiv’s 12,000 apartment buildings lost heating. The human toll continues to rise. On 12 February, an attack on Kramatorsk killed a mother and 11-year-old daughter and wounded 16 others.

The strategic calculus of Putin with regards to these attacks has not changed since they began in 2022. He seeks the degradation of Ukraine’s capacity to sustain modern society and to create the conditions to erode the civilian will to resist. This strategy is yet to see any meaningful success in degrading Ukrainian will to resist Russia’s invasion, but Russia continues with increasing intensity anyway.

The Russian theory of the case is that while it may not have worked yet, a few more big pushes might work. We have seen this logic before in war, and it never ends well. The disconnect between Russian strategy and demonstrated Ukrainian resilience suggests – again – that Putin’s decision-making remains fundamentally detached from battlefield reality.

The Ground War. Ukrainian Counterattacks. The past week witnessed what has been a somewhat rare tactical development on of the frontline in recent times: Ukrainian forces liberated nearly 300 square kilometres so far this month. This represents the most land retaken by Ukrainian forces in such a concentrated period since 2023.

The geographic focus of Ukrainian gains centered on the Zaporizhzhia oblast, specifically the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions. According to Russia Matters’ analysis of ISW data for 10-17 February, Russian forces actually lost 19 square miles of Ukrainian territory—slightly less than the area of Manhattan Island. This represents a dramatic reversal from preceding weeks when Russian forces maintained consistent offensive momentum.

The catalyst for these recent Ukrainian counter attacks was the Starlink shutdown for Russian forces in Ukraine. AFP reporting indicates that Ukrainian forces “took advantage of a Starlink shutdown for Russian forces” to conduct these operations.

The tactical impacts of the past couple of days may take some time to assess fully. While Ukraine has taken back territory, and degraded Russian drone forces that have built operational command and control models around Starlink communications, this is unlikely to change the overall trajectory of the war. But it has complicated Russian planning for Spring offensive operations in the south and potentially drawn Russian reserves from elsewhere. Both of these are good, if short term, impacts for Ukraine.

It is worth noting that in the east, Russia continues its efforts to execute an operational double envelopment of the fortress belt. While this is moving slowly, it still continues to be Russia’s main effort in the east. However, given the very slow rates of advance, the chances of Russia seizing this ground in 2026 are low.

Russian Manpower Mobilization Pressures. In an assessment published on 18 February, the Institute for the Study of War provided insight into Russian force generation challenges:

Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely setting informational conditions to restart limited, rolling involuntary reserve call-ups as Russia appears to be struggling to replace its losses in Ukraine with existing force generation mechanisms.” This represents significant shift. Putin aims to use limited call-ups “to maintain Russia’s loss rates and the current tempo of offensive operations—not to significantly build up the Russian force grouping fighting in Ukraine.

A report in Euronews this week described how Putin was considering an involuntary reserve call-up to sustain Russian ground offensive operations in Ukraine. This indicates that the model employed by the Russians since 2022 – emptying jails and offering huge recruitment bonuses – is reaching the end of its sustainable life. A new model for continuous provision of warm bodies is required to backfill the 1000 casualties a day that Russia is suffering in Ukraine.

The quality of Russian personnel also continues to decline. Leaked messages from a senior Russian general documented on February 19 revealed concerns about weaknesses in the training of soldiers and officers in the Russian Army. He also admitted to the systematic abuse of Ukrainian POWs, including sharing photographs of severed human ears. This adds to years of evidence about Russian war crimes, its systemic nature and how Russian commanders view it as integral part of Russian military operations.

Russian Mothership Drone Adaptation. The Russians have shown throughout the war that they can act as both fast followers of Ukrainian innovation and be innovators in their own right. The Russians developed a ‘first mover’ advantage with their fibre-optic controlled drones and have continued to develop these. Their deployment of large quantities of Iranian drones – which are cheaper that Russian missiles – has continued to evolve. As the recent issue of the Snake Island Institute’s technology publication reveals, the Russians are continuing to evolve their Shahed / Geran drones.

This week, ISW reported that “Russian forces have reportedly adapted their Geran-2 drones to be ‘mothership’ drones that carry first-person view (FPV) drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear.” This represents significant tactical innovation. Geran-2 platforms, essentially Iranian Shahed-136 drones produced under license, now serve as carriers for smaller FPV drones, extending their operational range and complicating Ukrainian air defence.

The mothership concept allows the Russians to deploy smaller drones from platforms already penetrating Ukrainian airspace, creating multi-layered threats that stress air defence systems. Ukrainian forces must simultaneously track and engage larger carrier platforms while also addressing dispersed FPV threats.

The Last Week and the Next Year: An Assessment

The past week was characterized by continued Russian pressure which combines attacks on the ground and from the air, significant Ukrainian tactical successes in the south, an ongoing diplomatic stalemate, and evolving technological competition. Indeed, as I write this update, Kyiv is under attack again from a mix of Russian drones and ballistic missiles.

As I wrote last week, the Starlink shutdown disruption’s effects on Russian military operations will prove temporary. The Russians are already developing work arounds, but a systemic solution is likely to take weeks or months. The Ukrainian forces’ rapid exploitation of the window of opportunity created by Russian communications disruption shows impressive operational agility.

The Ukrainian counter attacks in Zaporizhzhia, while tactically important, do not fundamentally alter the strategic direction of the war. Russian forces retain initiative in most sectors, continue advancing, albeit at glacial pace, and maintain the capacity to inflict severe infrastructure damage. Ukrainian forces demonstrate superior tactical proficiency and capacity to exploit Russian vulnerabilities when opportunities arise. But they currently lack the quantity of assault formations for sustained offensive operations across broad areas.

The Geneva talks were another exercise in procedure but showed no substantive movement on territorial or security guarantee issues. Russia maintains maximalist demands while Ukraine shows willingness to compromise that Moscow interprets as weakness rather than good faith. The asymmetry is stark: Ukraine seeks genuine negotiated settlement while Russia seeks Ukrainian capitulation dressed in diplomatic language. As President Zelenskyy wrote this week:

We are ready for real compromises. But not compromises at the cost of our independence and sovereignty. We are ready to speak about compromises with the United States. But not to get ultimatums from the Russians again and again.

The reports that President Zelenskyy directed planning for three more years of war (which was disputed by the office of the President) is indicative of Ukraine’s confidence in a suitable outcome for peace talks in the short term. It is also smart strategy. The Russians must understand that Ukraine has the will to continue fighting.

Russia’s mobilization challenges indicate force generation mechanisms are stressed despite official optimism about being able to fight on indefinitely from the Russian government. Putin’s possible move toward limited involuntary reserve call-ups suggests the volunteer/contract system cannot sustain current casualty rates. However, Russia’s authoritarian system can impose costs on its population that democratic systems cannot, creating a different ‘tolerance’ for casualties. The economic pressures are real but Russia’s mobilized war economy can sustain operations for some time if political will holds.

The energy infrastructure campaign is a key element of Russia’s theory of victory: systematic destruction of Ukraine’s capacity to sustain modern industrial society will eventually break civilian will. This theory has failed repeatedly but Russia persists with increasing intensity. The strategy inflicts genuine suffering—millions without heat and power in subzero temperatures—but Ukrainian polling shows no indication of eroding support for resistance. The disconnect between Russian strategic assumptions and reality is profound.

As we approach the fourth anniversary of Russia commencing its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, only one possible conclusion is possible: the Ukraine War will continue through spring 2026 and very likely beyond that.

No diplomatic breakthrough is imminent despite pressure from President Trump for progress before summer and the campaign season for the United States’ 2026 mid-term elections. The military situation remains tactically dynamic but without significant operational or strategic break throughs that might presage a wider collapse in military capacity by Ukraine or Russia. Ukraine’s recent tactical successes in Zaporizhzhia show that opportunities exist, but exploiting them requires resources, timing, and Russian mistakes. Manufacturing such opportunities more consistently and having the right forces in the right place at the optimal time to exploit them will require ongoing conceptual and organisational innovation.

This is no mystery: we have seen similar deadlocks in previous wars, and these deadlocks have always been broken by just three means. First, a significant transformation of a trilogy of military endeavours: operational doctrine, organisational reform and clever absorption of technology. Second, a collapse in political will, which can be driven by battlefield reverses, widespread dissatisfaction by citizens or massive pressure from allies. Third, a combination of the two. Short of these events, 2026 is likely to see more fighting, more destruction and more bloodshed.

For Russia, strategy remains centred on the political and cognitive warfare components, supported by military and sabotage operations. Putin has largely convinced the Trump administration that Russian victory is inevitable (which is highly contestable and discussed in this podcast), and this has led to most of the pressure from the Trump administration being directed at Kyiv. Thus, for Putin, the way ahead is to continue claiming small amounts of territory as major victories and destroy Ukrainian civil infrastructure in order to reinforce the inevitable victory narrative.

For Ukraine, their strategy moving forward is focussed on maintaining domestic unity; building indigenous defence production; stabilising the front line with an evolving mix of human-machine teams and higher level C2 reforms; enduring the Russian aerial attacks; sustaining and building support from Europe; and keeping Trump and his negotiating team on side. How long the domestic will and resources can hold out remains to be seen.

Looking beyond the weekly wrap up, in a couple of days we will commemorate the fourth anniversary of Russia’s brutal full-scale assault on Ukraine. It reminds us to reflect on the value of the liberties possessed by citizens in democratic nations. While recent American strategic documents appear to have minimised the values that democracies have sought to protect since 1945, Ukraine has shown us how we must do so. Valuing our systems, while acknowledging their flaws, and protecting them is not a transaction. It is a profound purpose, handed down to us by our forebears who fought so hard to establish and protect our freedoms.

While we might debate the respective strategies of Ukraine and Russia for 2026, the potential outcomes of diplomatic initiatives and the human and financial resources required for the coming year, ultimately, we must return to why this war is being fought. It is being fought because it is the most compelling example of good versus evil since the defeat of the Nazi’s in 1945.

This is a war where a free people determined that they would not permit the forces of dark authoritarianism to overwhelm their history, their culture, their freedoms and their future prosperity. With the forces of brutal techno-authoritarianism now on the march in Europe and Asia, the dedication to purpose shown by the Ukrainians should be something we can all embrace.

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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

In this week’s Big Five, I have included an excellent new report from The Guardian that examines the interaction of intelligence and politics in the lead up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. There is also an update on the progress of forming corps in the Ukrainian ground forces, reforming littoral operations, how the war is coming home to Russia, and China’s United Front operations.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. A War Foretold

This week, The Guardian published a detailed expose of how intelligence services performed in the lead up to the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It contrasts the posture of intelligence agencies in Ukraine, Europe and America and examines how political leaders responded to the intelligence briefings about Russian invasion preparations. You can read the full article here.

2. Harnessing the People

In this report, the author examines how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has created a global network of individuals and organizations as part of its united front system. Through these groups and individuals, the CCP’s seeks to influence political decision-making by conditioning stakeholders to consider Beijing’s interests and sensitivities. This is a comprehensive and interesting report, and can be read at this link.

3. Reforming Ukrainian Military Command and Control

Journalist for the Kyiv Independent, Francis Farrell, has offered penetrating analysis of the war and the performance of Ukraine’s armed forces since the beginning of the war. In his latest analysis, Francis explores the command and control changes implemented by the Commander-in Chief, particularly the formation of multiple corps. As a journalist with great links in the Ukrainian military and who makes multiple unit and frontline visits during each year, this analysis is a valuable contribution to how Ukrainian military institution is learning and adapting its operational command and control. The article is available at this link.

4. Rethinking Littoral Manoeuvre

In this latest report from the Australian Army Research Centre, the author proposes that a comprehensive conceptual re‑evaluation is needed about how the Australian Army operates in the littoral environment. He argues that the Army must no longer view itself as a land‑focused force that is occasionally projected by sea, but rather as an indispensable contributor to sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection. You can read the full report at this link.

5. The War is Coming Home to Russia

In this new commentary published by RAND, author John Tefft explores the growing domestic impacts of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Examining issues such as crime rates, declining population, economic hardship, repression and corruption, Tefft notes that “whatever the outcome of Russia's war in Ukraine, the changes it has produced within Russia are likely to be profound and harmful. The long-term costs for the Russian economy will be enormous.” You can read the full piece at this link.

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Another week in the Ukraine war has passed, and as we approach four years since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, the patterns of conflict on the ground, in the air and in the info-sphere remains drearily familiar. Russian forces continue their methodical, but very costly advances on the ground in eastern Ukraine despite the shutdown of Starlink this week.

At the same time Russia continues to attack Ukraine’s critical infrastructure through its long-range aerial bombardment campaign. Meanwhile, in Munich, discussion about the war and diplomatic efforts move forward at a glacial pace.

In the Pacific, a stunning electoral victory by the incumbent Japanese prime minister resets the politics of the region and demonstrates to China that democracies in the western Pacific are not meekly rolling over to some form of future Chinese hegemony.

Welcome to this week’s Big Five.

Ukraine

Munich and Diplomacy. The week saw limited developments in the diplomatic realm. Despite the Ukrainian cooperation with American negotiators, and their indicated willingness to negotiate a war termination agreement, talks have been less about genuine progress toward peace and more about political theatre (especially from Russia).

In the past week, many media outlets reported that President Zelenskyy might announce plans for presidential elections and a referendum on a peace deal on 24 February—the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion. The Financial Times reported that both votes could be held by 15 May, with Ukraine potentially risking loss of proposed US security guarantees if it failed to meet this deadline.

However, Zelenskyy denied these reports, stating he heard about the plan “for the first time” from the Financial Times. He reiterated that elections would occur when there are “all relevant security guarantees” and emphasized that voting requires a ceasefire. Zelenskyy was quoted by the BBC stating that:

Elections could be held in the next 60 to 90 days if security for the vote was guaranteed with the help of the US and other allies

The Trump administration is demanding that both the election and referendum be completed by mid-May, threatening withdrawal of security guarantees otherwise. Yet holding elections under martial law and amid active combat operations presents enormous logistical and security challenges. Ukrainian civil society organisations have noted that Ukraine’s current law prohibits referendums during martial law. As I noted in my previous update on this topic, it would be impossible to ensure the participation in elections of the millions of Ukrainians displaced overseas, and military personnel serving on the frontline.

At the 2026 Munich Security Conference, Zelenskyy reiterated Ukraine’s position. Acknowledging “a little bit” of pressure after Trump called for accelerating peace talks on Friday, he also called for a recognition of the core issue with peace talks and the war itself: Putin is not interested in peace. As Zelenskyy noted:

Putin is no longer interested in anything else. Putin does not live like ordinary people. He does not walk the streets…He cannot imagine life without power or after power. Normal things do not interest him. Putin “consults” more with Tsar Peter and Empress Catherine about territorial gains than with any living person about real life. Can you imagine Putin without war? Be honest. Right now, his focus is on Ukraine. And no one in Ukraine believes he will ever let our people go. But he will not let other European nations go either – because he cannot let go of the very idea of war.

Zelenskyy at Munich also described one of Ukraine key strategic goals for the war in 2026. Reiterating recent comments by his Defence Minister, Zelenskyy described how:

Every month, Russia mobilizes about 40,000 people. A little bit more – 42-43 sometimes. Not all of them reach the front line. So overall, the size of the Russian contingent in Ukraine is not growing this year. For our army, the mission is clear – to destroy more Russian occupiers, because they are occupiers. The goal is specific: at least 50,000 per month. Even for Russia, that would be serious. I’m sure. And it would affect Putin’s decisions.

In this recent post, I described why killing more Russians is an important part of Ukraine’s strategic approach to the war. It is not a strategy in itself, but an important ‘way’ to achieve its desired strategic ‘ends’. Demonstrating strength and the ability to cause suffering to Russia is crucial to Ukraine’s war effort. It is what will hopefully, eventually bring Putin to the negotiating table for serious negotiations. As Zelenskyy described it:

Please remember the moment when Russia began to take diplomacy most seriously in these 4 years. It was when our deep strikes against Russian oil refineries began to work – and when everyone started talking about Tomahawks. That shows exactly how to deal with Russia – and what Russia actually hears. It hears strength. The stronger we are, the more realistic peace becomes.

The substantive negotiating positions of Ukraine and Russia remain far apart. As talks get underway in Geneva again in the coming week, it is difficult to see any form of resolution on the horizon.

StarkLink Disconnects for Russia. One of the things that has transformed Ukraine’s ability to defend itself over the past four years has been the proliferation of StarLink terminals down to the lowest levels of command. It has enabled what I have described as the extreme democratisation of command and control in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Unfortunately, the Russians watch the Ukrainians closely, and when they see the Ukrainians succeed at something, become ‘fast followers’. This has been the case for some time in Ukraine, with Russians accessing the satellite network with ‘grey’ or black market StarLink terminals. This has allowed the Russians to use StarLink to control drones and undertake deeper strikes along the front line.

In the past week, StarLink connections for the Russians were severed and it has had an impact on the frontline.

A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that the number of Russian drone strikes against the Ukrainian rear, including with Starlink-enabled fixed-wing drones, has decreased since SpaceX shut down Russian access to Starlink in Ukraine. This frontline disruption has had measurable battlefield effects, particularly impacting Russian battlefield air interdiction efforts.

Russian drone forces have recently been focussing on deep strike operations, aiming to interdict Ukrainian logistics, artillery and headquarters well behind the frontline. This StarLink shutdown will hinder these efforts, although it is unlikely to shut them down totally.

Stefan Korshak has written in his latest (and always excellent) update on the war:

The biggest tactical effect of the shut-down for the Russians appears to be with UGVs (ground robots) because those things use Starlink almost without exception and now the Russian ones have stopped. Since the primary use of UGVs by both sides is carrying supply forward and wounded rearward in drone-dense sectors, it is safe to assume that things got worse for Russian infantry stuck out in some accumulation position or a Russian infantryman wounded and needing evacuation.

While the cutoff of StarLink for Russian forces in Ukraine is currently to our advantage, there is a useful lesson here. What is to stop private companies withholding essential services – communications, OSINT, logistics, etc – from friendly military forces in future conflicts? StarLink was turned off for Ukraine during an attack on Crimea early in the war. There is no reason why it cannot happen again.

One of the biggest impacts of the StarLink shutoff has been observed in ground operations in Zaporizhzhia.

The Ground War. While the Russian main effort on the ground remains focused on offensive operations in the Pokrovsk region, and the capture of the entire Donbas, significant developments emerged in Zaporizhzhia in the past week. Ukrainian forces launched multiple tactical counter attacks to take advantage of the degradation in Russian tactical communications as a result of the StarLink blackout.

Ukrainian ground forces were able to liberate territory near Hulyaipole, as well as the village of Ternuvate and near Borova. These are useful gains, but in the context of the southern Russian campaign, are unlikely to spoil expected Russian attacks here in the Spring. Nor are these Ukrainian gains going to change the overall trajectory of the ground war.

The battle for Pokrovsk continues to be Russia’s main effort in the east. According to reports from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Center for Defence Strategies this week, Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations to seize the town and collapse the Ukrainian pocket, though their advance has slowed considerably from the breakneck pace of late 2025.

President Zelenskyy revealed at the Munich Security Conference that Russian forces are losing an average of 156 soldiers for every square kilometre of Ukrainian territory they capture. The regular update by the British intelligence community was released this week. It shows that Russian casualties in December 2025 were 35,000 and in January were 31,000.

Despite these catastrophic losses, Russian forces continue to advance, albeit at rates that would have been considered glacially slow in any previous conflict. The recent report released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies assessed that Russia’s advance in Pokrovsk has been slower than the Allied forces during the Battle of the Somme. While these are different eras, the Russian pace of advance is only sustainable if it wears down Ukrainian and European resolve at the same time it wears down the size of the Russian military. That no longer appears to be the case.

The picture on the ground is indicative of Ukrainian resilience and vulnerabilities. On 8 February, Ukrainian forces successfully repelled a large-scale Russian breakthrough attempt by mobile assault groups near Pokrovsk, destroying an entire assault company. This demonstrated the continuing effectiveness of Ukraine’s sensor-to-shooter networks when conditions permit.

But the broader strategic reality remains challenging. In northern sectors, Russian ground forces sustain pressure in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, with the Russian Ministry of Defense claiming liberation of Chuhunovka in Kharkiv region and Sidorovka in Sumy region during the week.

Russian forces continued to press on the northern and southern wings of their double envelopment of the fortress belt cities in the east. They also made small progress within Pokrovsk city itself. In the past month, Russian forces gained 182 square miles. This was more than double the 79 square miles gained in the previous four-week period.

Four Years Since the Full-Scale Invasion: An Assessment

Three strategic realities, which I think have been in evidence for some time, were reinforced by the events of the past week. They are worth pondering as we approach the four year mark of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

First, Russia has abandoned any pretense of military efficiency in favour of pure attrition. It is betting that have a superior mobilization capacity relative to Ukraine’s will eventually exhaust Ukrainian resistance. Given the challenges of mobilising manpower in Ukraine, and the lack of conscription for 18-25 year olds, this is a reasonable wager by the Russians. This has been a key driver of Ukraine’s decision to significantly increase their monthly kill targets for Russians in 2026.

Second, the systematic targeting of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, particularly substations supporting nuclear facilities, represents the continuation of a strategy (first initiated at the end of 2022) to make Ukrainian territory ungovernable while maintaining plausible deniability about direct nuclear targeting. But thus far, this multi-winter campaign executed by the Russians has failed to break Ukraine’s will. Nor has it forced any political or military accommodations from the Ukrainians. At some point in 2026, Putin will have to reckon with the failure of his strategic bombing campaign against Ukraine’s cities to shift Ukraine’s political posture, and the slow-rolling military failure that is Russia’s extraordinarily bloody ground campaign.

Third, the diplomatic theatre increasingly resembles a choreographed performance designed to satisfy domestic political requirements in Washington DC rather than any genuine pathway to a sustainable or just peace. Further, it is being used by Putin to continue dragging out the war until he can achieve something - anything – that he might be able to present to Russians as a ‘victory’. As I wrote recently, Putin is nowhere close to that being the case, he cannot afford the war to end yet. He will use negotiations and cognitive warfare against Americans and Europeans to corrode support for Ukraine and increase pressure on Zelenskyy’s administration to accept a deal that gives away territory in exchange for no security guarantees.

For Ukraine’s international supporters, the key question remains whether they can sustain assistance at levels required to offset Russia’s willingness to accept catastrophic losses at least until 2030. The Ramstein meeting held this week included important contributions from multiple nations. In total, 38 billion dollars in military commitments were made. This included:

• UK — £500 million for air defence, £150 million to buying US equipment for Ukraine immediately (PURL). Total for Britain this year:  £3 billion.

• Germany — €1 billion for the purchase of drones for Ukraine, financing to integrated air defense over Ukrainian cities, financing to drone assault units. Total for Germany this year: €11.5 billion.

• Norway — $7 billion promised in 2026, of which $1.4 billion for drones, $700 million for air defense, $200 million for artillery, $125 million for PURL.

• Netherlands — Pledged 0.25% of GDP, about €2.95 billion. Short term €90 million to PURL.

• Belgium — €1 billion promised for 2026, no short-term figure

• Sweden — €1.2 billion in aid, €100 million to PURL. Commitment for 2026 — €3.7 billion.

• Denmark — Commitment to $2 billion in total in 2026.

• Spain — Commitment to $1.2 billion in 2026.

• Canada — $50 million to Ukraine production of arms, $45 million for medical support.

As this demonstrates, Russia’s efforts over the past four years to degrade European support for Ukraine has failed. The Europeans have not only reinvigorated their alliance but their defence industry and are pushing back against Russian aggression in Ukraine, the Baltic and elsewhere. The step up in European support for Ukraine has ensured that, as the Kiel Institute notes:

The total volume of aid allocated to Ukraine remained relatively stable in 2025… European military aid rose by 67 percent above the 2022–2024 average, while non-military aid increased by 59 percent.

This step up in support also provides the foundations for a significant military deterrent against Russian aggression elsewhere in Europe. Unlike in 2022, Europe is now awake to Russia’s aspirations and has the capacity to push back. Whether it will continue building the political will and consensus to do so remains to be seen.

Europe must also continue to work on the relationship with the United States of America. Regardless of the careless statements about Europe that emerge from Washington DC at times, this is a relationship that is crucial to both sides. And it is a relationship crucial to the trajectory of the war in Ukraine. As Marco Rubio noted in his speech at Munich:

President Trump demands seriousness and reciprocity from our friends here in Europe. The reason why, my friends, is because we care deeply. We care deeply about your future and ours. And if at times we disagree, our disagreements come from our profound sense of concern about a Europe with which we are connected – not just economically, not just militarily. We are connected spiritually and we are connected culturally. We want Europe to be strong. We believe that Europe must survive, because the two great wars of the last century serve for us as history’s constant reminder that ultimately, our destiny is and will always be intertwined with yours.

The brutal calculus of the past four-years will continue into 2026 unless there is a significant breakthrough in technology, tactics or strategy that changes the deep, close and rear aspects of the overall battlefield dynamic. The only other thing that might significantly change the trajectory of the war is if there is a significant shift in political will in Kyiv or Moscow.

Russia can sustain offensive operations for years if it maintains its current mobilisation and prevents Ukraine from increasing monthly casualty rates. Ukrainian tactical excellence can impose high costs on Russia but cannot fully offset the asymmetry in personnel and industrial capacity.

The coming weeks will see continued Russian pressure in the Pokrovsk area and preparations for the spring offensive operations designed to capture the remainder of the Donbas by Russian forces. Supporting Russian efforts, to draw off Ukrainian strategic reserves, maintain the fiction of Russia’s inevitable victory and seize small parcels of terrain, will continue in southern and northeastern Ukraine. What seems certain to me is that short of some fundamental shift in the military balance or a significant expansion in Western military and economic support, the war between Ukraine and Russia will continue despite the artificial diplomatic deadlines that periodically emerge from Washington DC.

The preference by the Trump administration for Ukraine to make territorial concessions is unlikely to be guarantor of a long-term, stable war termination agreement. As Zelenskyy noted in his speech in Munich this week, “it would be an illusion to believe that this war can now be reliably ended by dividing Ukraine — just as it was an illusion to believe that sacrificing Czechoslovakia would save Europe from a greater war.”

A different solution is required if there is to be a durable and just solution to this war. But at this time, it is hard to image what that solution might be.

The Pacific

Japan’s Returned PM. Sanae Takaichi's landslide electoral victory in the past week represents a transformative moment for Japanese domestic politics. It also has implication for the western Pacific security architecture. Takaichi’s LDP secured 316 seats, achieving a two-thirds supermajority. This was the party's largest victory in its seventy-one-year history.

The election outcome heralds what might be Japan's most dramatic strategic pivot since the Cold War. Takaichi has recently abandoned Tokyo's ambiguity on Taiwanese security, stating that a Chinese attack on the island could trigger a military response from Japan. This provoked Chinese retaliation through canceled flights and military patrols. But it does align Japan more closely with America’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

Takaichi has pledged to revise Japan's National Defense Strategy and hinted at reworking policies on nuclear weapons. She has suggested that potential constitutional amendments that could transform Japan from a pacifist nation into a conventional military power. Her supermajority provides the parliamentary authority to override opposition vetoes and potentially initiate constitutional referendums.

Takaichi's relationship with President Trump provides significant diplomatic leverage. The U.S. president celebrated her victory, and the Japanese PM will be hoping to establish a personal rapport reminiscent of the Trump-Abe relationship. As an assessment from The Brookings Institution describes it:

The American president broke protocol in endorsing Takaichi on the eve of the election. Yet this provides no guarantee that Trump will have Takaichi’s back when he meets with Xi, especially given Trump’s penchant for subordinating allied interests to his great powers’ dealings.

Another assessment, this one from Chatham House, notes that:

Many Asian governments will welcome Takaichi’s victory – if she can use her unprecedented parliamentary majority to strengthen Japan’s economy, security and global role. Asia’s leaders do not want to see their region dominated by Beijing or at the mercy of Washington’s will. They see a resurgent Japan as a key partner to bring balance to the world’s most consequential continent.

Takaichi now has a mandate to bring forth lasting change in both domestic and international policy in Japan. She has promised to cut taxes, increase defence spending (she has already delivered on this but other increases might be coming) and revise Japan’s pacifist, post-Second World War constitution, which constrains the military.

An economically and militarily strong Japan can play an important role in pushing back against Chinese coercion and aggression in the region. It has strong ties with nations such as The Philippines, Australia, Taiwan, and of course America. We should expect Takaichi to further develop these relationships.

Xi hates a strong Japan, almost as much as he hates democratic nations forming alliances and strategic partnerships to push back against China’s hegemonic objectives. In the wake of Takaichi’s re-election, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman had the following to say:

The lessons of history are still fresh in memory and should not be left behind. We urge those running the Japanese government to take seriously rather than brush aside the concerns of the international community, follow the path of peaceful development rather than return to militarism, and abide by the four political documents between China and Japan rather than go back on commitments made. If Japan’s far-right forces miscalculate and act recklessly, they will be met by resistance from the Japanese people and serious backlash from the international community.

It will be an interesting 2026 in North Asia.

Taiwan Defence Budget Blues. In Taipei, domestic politics threaten to undermine deterrence against Chinese aggression at the worst possible moment. The opposition-controlled legislature is advancing a counterproposal that would slash President Lai Ching-te’s eight-year, $40 billion special defense budget by nearly 70%. The cuts would eliminate procurement of 200,000 drones, the T-Dome multilayered air defence system designed to counter Chinese missile threats, tactical mission network software, AH-1W helicopter parts, Harpoon missile support, and funding for local defence-industrial partnerships—precisely the asymmetric capabilities Taiwan needs most.

In Washington DC, U.S. Senator Roger Wicker, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, publicly expressed disappointment with the dramatic budget reduction, while Senators Jim Risch and Jeanne Shaheen urged Taiwan’s party leaders to “expeditiously approve vital investments.” The timing is particularly inopportune. Despite President Trump signing $1.4 billion in Taiwan defence funding as part of the 2026 Consolidated Appropriations Act, America also expects clear funding commitments from Taipei for its defence.

*******

This week, a couple of articles were published at Futura Doctrina.

First, I published an important article written by Dr Frank Hoffman. An esteemed military intellectual who has written on hybrid war, adaptation and the impact of technology on concepts and human systems, Frank has produced a superb examination of AI and its impact on critical thinking in military institutions. You can read the article at this link.

Next, I published a piece at the Lowy Interpreter that examines the forthcoming Australian National Defence Strategy, and why building the peacetime foundations for wartime adaptation must be an important component for the new strategy. You can read that article here.

Finally, while not exactly in the ‘published’ category, this week I submitted the manuscript for my sequel to my first novel, White Sun War. Set two years after the events of the first book, the new story explores a larger war in the Pacific which again features America, China and their respective allies. It covers a range of contemporary military and national security issues, including strategic reconstitution and mobilisation, integration of technology and human military personnel, cognitive warfare, balancing crewed and uncrewed systems, AI in war, as well as crucial topics such as dealing with surprise and uncertainty, and the centrality of good leadership. I expect to have more to say on this in the coming months.

*******

It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

In this week’s Big Five, I have included an excellent new report from Katryna Bondar on how AI is driving change in Russian military command and control systems. There is also a report on Chinese military purges, an exploration of the costs of a war over Taiwan, a public intelligence report from Estonian intelligence on the war in Ukraine and eastern European security, as well as a good report in The Atlantic which features a long interview with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. AI and Russia’s Evolving Command and Control

Kateryna Bondar, from CSIS, has produced a series of excellent reports related to the war in Ukraine. These reports have examined the applications of AI, new generations of autonomous systems, command and control as well as defence industrial challenges. In her latest report, she explores how Russia is transforming how it executes military C2 to take account of the opportunities provided by AI. You can read the full article here.

2. The 10 Trillion Dollar War

This week, Bloomberg published modelling that examined various scenarios related to conflict between China and America in the Pacific. Cross-strait invasions, blockades as well as other less violent options were explored in the five scenarios featured in the article. As the article finds, “in the most extreme case, a US-China conflict over Taiwan would cost the global economy about $10.6 trillion… damage would be global. Taiwan’s economy would be decimated. We estimate China’s GDP would fall by 11% and the US’s by 6.6% in the first year.” You can read the full report at this link.

3. An Interview with Zelenskyy

In this piece, published by The Atlantic, Ukrainian president Zelenskyy provides an in-depth interview which focuses primarily on peace talks. It also covers topics such as America’s interests in the war, Russian casualties, elections in Ukraine and Ukraine-America relations. You can read the interview at this link.

4. China’s Military: Flourishing Despite Purges

In this new report, published by the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard, scholar Andrew Erickson examines the impact of the ongoing purges at the top of the People’s Liberation Army in China. As Erickson notes, “personnel purges coexist with, and may even facilitate, accelerating PLA capability development. In today’s China, multiple things are true at once. Fixating on “tree” removal risks missing flourishing “forest” growth.” You can read the full report here.

5. Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service report 2026

In this latest public report from the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, assessments are made about Russian aggression towards Estonia as well as its short and medium term objectives in Ukraine. As the report notes, “we see that Russia is setting long-term operational objectives in its war against Ukraine. This confirms that the recent uptick in peace-talk rhetoric is merely a tactic to buy time. Moscow has no intention of ending the war in Ukraine until its objectives are achieved or the conditions are favourable for doing so.” You can read the full article here.

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It has been another fascinating week observing international and military affairs.

Fighting continues along the length of the front line, with the Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief, General Syrskyi stating this week that Ukrainian forces were conducting operations along the length of the 1200km long frontline.

Russia conducted very large attacks on Ukraine on the evenings of 3 February (521 missiles and drones) and 7 February (447 missiles and drones). Because of the increasing penetration of Russian drones and missiles that are attacking Ukrainian infrastructure, President Zelenskyy has directed a shakeup of Ukraine’s air and missile defence system. As he stated on 6 February:

The short-range air defense component – focused on countering attack drones – must operate far more effectively and prevent the problems we are currently facing.

Finally this week, Ukraine hit a Russian factory that produces fuel for its cruise missiles, and Elon Musk also turned off Starlink for Russian frontline forces in Ukraine.

In my update this week, I have again decided to write about a single topic. This week the focus is on whether the American negotiating team is rushing to failure in wanting a March or June deadline for a peace deal. I hope it proves informative.

Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five.

Ukraine

Peace: Rushing to Failure?

Reports have emerged that the American team negotiating the Ukraine peace deal want to fast track a ceasefire and peace deal. Reuters has reported several sources have informed it that the United States would like to see a deal next month, and that this is followed by a Ukrainian national referendum on the issue. This would then be followed by national elections. Separately, President Zelenskyy has told reporters that the Trump administration want to end the war by June.

Why might the Trump administration want to fast-track a peace deal? There are several reasons.

First, Trump wants to deliver on his election promise to end the war in Ukraine and ‘end the killing.’ Every politician wants to at least try and deliver on election promises. The promise to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours was a prominent and oft-repeated promise by Trump in the lead up to the 2024 presidential elections. His desire to do so appears genuine, even if that means Ukraine is forced into a very unfavourable deal.

Second, Trump and his supporters see economic opportunities in Russia, which a peace deal might enable. The potential of reinvigorated economic relations between America and Russia has been raised by Trump on multiple occasions since his re-election. Putin has pitched opportunities for joint economic projects to lure Trump into an improved relationship with Trump, including one for Arctic development in 2025. Putin also appointed the head of Russia’s Direct Investment Fund, Kirill Dmitriev, to lead peace negotiations with the Trump negotiating team. Most recently, Ukraine has claimed that Putin has pitched an almost irresistible 12 trillion dollar deal with America, should there be a peace agreement.

Third, the Trump administration probably feels it has sufficient leverage now over the Ukrainian government to force them to accept a deal that is unfavourable for the Ukrainian people. While military aid has been curtailed over the past year, the United States still provides intelligence and training to the Ukrainians, and also sells weapons to European nations so this can then be provided as aid to Ukraine. But as Ukrainian and European defence capacity expands, this leverage will decline. And, even if the Trump administration does have leverage now, it may not be sufficient to strong arm Ukraine into a deal that sees its security and prosperity compromised in the long term.

Fourth, the Ukraine issue is something that Trump, Vance and others probably want off the table before the mid-term elections this year. This is strongly hinted at in the Reuters article, where one source describes how "the Americans are in a hurry." From a political perspective, this is understandable. Given the issues with ICE and the declining job approval numbers for the Trump administration, a focus on domestic issues for the mid-term elections is does make sense from a certain point of view. But to do so in a way that might compromise Ukraine’s chances of a sovereign, prosperous nation is strategically and morally problematic.

Fifth, some in the Pentagon and the wider American strategic community want to focus on just one thing: hemispheric defence. Others in the administration want to do both hemispheric dominance and strategic competition. As the recent National Defense Strategy, and frequent statements by administration officials make clear, Ukraine is now seen as primarily a European problem. The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that:

Fortunately, our NATO allies are substantially more powerful than Russia…Our NATO allies are therefore strongly positioned to take primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense, with critical but more limited U.S. support. This includes taking the lead in supporting Ukraine’s defense.

Finally, one of the most important foundations for Trump’s desire to remove this issue from the administration’s agenda is that he and some others in his administration don’t see Russia as a threat to the United States. There is decades of evidence that counters this view. The 2022 version of the NDS describes Russia as “an acute threat”, and the 2018 NDS described Russia as a nation that seeks to “shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.”

But facts and evidence play no role in the view of Russia by the some members of the current U.S. administration. The new U.S. National Defence Strategy is evidence of this. In it, China is an economic competitor and Russia is a problem for Europe. Or, as the 2026 NDS describes it: “a persistent but manageable threat to NATO’s eastern members.”

Therefore there many reasons why the U.S. administration and their Ukraine negotiations team might be seeking to rush along peace talks. But despite this desperate ‘wanting’ by Trump and others to get a peace deal in the next few months, there are a variety of risks involved in a rushed peace process, which significantly outweigh any benefits of such a deal.

First, will European nations be ready to step up and provide the deterrent capabilities - and rapid military responses - should Russia almost inevitably break the terms of any peace deal? Europe has come some way since 2022 in its thinking and resourcing for Ukraine and European defence. But whether it has the capacity and willingness to step into the hot zone in the event of a Russian attack on Ukraine after a ceasefire in the next couple of months must be highly debatable.

Second, Putin and the Russians over the course of the past year have shown zero inclination to change their strategic demands of the Ukrainians. Putin’s objectives -to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty, its foreign economic and security partnerships and any capacity to realise its full potential as a prosperous young democracy - remain undiminished. Thus, both Ukraine and Russia are still some distance apart in achieving compromise.

Third, Putin cannot afford peace right now. He has fundamentally reshaped his nation as one that is engaged in a long term struggle against Ukraine and its western supporters. To declare victory now, when Russia is not anywhere close to such a victory, could be quite difficult - if not fatal - for Putin. I explored this topic in my last Big Five post one week ago.

Fourth, a short term peace deal will probably not allow for a resolution of issues related to Russian occupied territory, the return of kidnapped children and the rights of Ukrainians in those territories. Every minute that Russia occupies Ukrainian terrority, it is removing Ukrainian history, culture and governance. Russia is changing education, forcefully pressing Ukrainians into Russian military service, kidnapping children and exploiting Ukraines mineral and agricultural wealth. These issues will take time to resolve, and a rushed peace deal is unlikely to provide an enduring solution, despite the urgency of returning Ukrainian territory back to Ukrainian government control.

Fifth, in a rush to get some kind of Russian agreement, Ukraine may be forced to give up hopes of bringing war criminals to justice. The issue of justice, one that is important to Ukraine as well as those who believe in international law, has not been mentioned in the scope of peace negotiations so far. If it is ignored, or short-shifted in a rushed peace deal, it provides one of the foundations for future conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

Sixth, organising and conducting a national referendum and national elections in Ukraine within months is a significant security and logistical challenge. The logistics of an election under wartime conditions, even if there is a ceasefire, will be difficult with millions of displaced Ukrainians inside Ukraine and hundreds of thousands of soldiers still serving on the front line to guarantee the peace. The issue of Ukrainians displaced outside their nation is also a significant one - provision must be made for these people, who were forced to leave Ukraine, to participate in the referendum and national elections. To suggest this might be achieved in a satisfactory manner on top of every other economic, societal, military and diplomatic challenge Ukraine has right now is to probably believe in miracles. Although, to be fair, Ukraine has shown the world in the past four years it is capable of achieving miracles.

Finally, there is no conceivable future where Putin keeps his word about any peace deal achieved in the coming weeks or months. He and his forces have ignored multiple agreements reached during this war, as well as truce agreements related to the war in Ukraine that Russia began in 2014. Easter and Christmas ceasefire agreements have been routinely ignored by the Russians. And of course, the 2014 aggression by Russia broke the arrangements that were agreed to in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Beyond Ukraine, Putin broke the 2008 French-brokered ceasefire in Georgia, and broke the 1996 peace agreement in the wake of the first Chechen War.

To seriously think that Putin can be trusted to keep any ceasefire negotiated at this point of the war, when he cannot afford a peace deal if he wants to avoid political turmoil and angry veterans at home, strains credibility. If we squint a lot, and pretend Putin has the slightest bit of human empathy, he might be able to restrain his impulses for a short time. But given his delusions of empire, and his need to portray Russia as “a winning country” to his own people, it is inevitable that Russia would recommence military operations against Ukraine. He is not going to change his essential nature.

Therefore, rushing to a peace deal in the coming weeks because of Trump administration imperatives rather than seriously taking account of the political and military realities on the ground in Ukraine and Russia, is a very significant risk to Ukraine and America.

Rushing to a hastily agreed peace treaty could see Putin looking for an opportunity to make America look weak. Putin understands that even if he breaks a ceasefire, it is unlikely that Trump would want to use American military forces, or boots on the ground, to re-establish the peace. This is even more so the case in a mid-term elections year.

But the greatest risk of a rushed peace deal, one that is pushed through because of strategic impatience in the White House, is to compromise Ukraine’s future. A rushed process will result in a sub-optimal peace agreement that hurts Ukraine. It would hurt its ability to defend itself, and would hurt its ability to continue building the prosperous society it established after the Cold War. And, it abandons those Ukrainians who have found themselves occupied by Russia, and subject to constant terror by Putin’s brutal security services.

The Ukrainians want peace more than any other people. But as all the recent polling conducted in Ukraine has indicated, including the latest survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology finds, 52% of respondents categorically rejected any proposal to transfer the entire Donbas to Russian control in exchange for security guarantees. Ukrainians desperately want peace, but not at any price.

As the saying goes, “if you want it bad, you get it bad.”

If the impulse for a real peace and to stop the killing is truly felt by the U.S. President, he should ensure that it is done right the first time, even if it takes a little longer than the March / June deadlines.

*******

It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

In this week’s Big Five, I have included an excellent piece that explores the application of AI to military command and staff processes, while offering cautionary advice about ‘contacting out’ too much of military command functions to machines. There is a report about PLA activities in 2025, a link to the latest Snake Island Institute technology update, America’s new arms transfer policy, and finally, a good report on lessons from Ukraine for European nations.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. AI Command and Staff

In this article from the winter edition of Military Strategy Magazine, the authors explore the applications of AI in the command and staff processes of military institutions. Unlike many articles that explore AI in a military context, this is written by two senior military personnel with deep expertise in military planning and staff processes, which lends it a high degree of credibility. As they write in the article, “AI may assist with the science of control, but it cannot assume the art of command…In the frenzy of using machine augmentation to make better decisions faster, military leaders and planners cannot lose sight of their role in the command process.” You can read this article at this link.

2. Tracking Increased PLA Tempo in 2025

In this article published by the CSIS China Power project, the author use a variety of open source data to assess the level of PLA activity in the western Pacific during the 2025 calendar year. They explore air and sea activity around Taiwan, the vicinity of Japan, in the South China Sea, joint exercises with Russia as well as their increasing deployments out into the Pacific beyond the first island chain. You can read the full report at this link.

3. Snake Island Institute - Defence Tech Monthly

The Ukrainian think tank - the Snake Island Institute - issues a monthly update on technological developments and trends in the Ukraine war, and the implications of these for the general trajectory of the conflict. This month’s edition covers a wide variety of topics, including the implications of denying Starlink capability to Russian forces, Ukraine’s deep strike campaign, the Dataroom initiative and the ongoing evolution by Russia of its Geran family of drones. The publication is available at this link.

4. New U.S. Arms Transfer Strategy

This week, the Trump administration released an executive order that detailed a ‘new’ arms strategy which was described as an “America First Arms Strategy”. There are a couple of good ideas, as well as lots of existing ideas and policy. The core ideas are to rebuild American defence industry with arms sales overseas, and to prioritise the transfer of American military equipment and weapons to those nations that invest more in defending themselves. The full document is available to read at this link.

5. Lessons from the Jungle

In this new report from The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, a new assessment of lessons from Ukraine is provided. For long time followers of the conflict, there is nothing particularly new here. That said, the report provides a useful compilation of relevant lessons in one place. You can read the report at this link.

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It has been another fascinating week to be an observer of international and military affairs.

Ukraine has agreed to an energy truce, which sees them holding off on attacking Russian energy infrastructure. But this has not halted Russian attacks on other civilian infrastructure including a civil train service in Kharkiv. Concurrently, peace negotiations are occurring, although they show little progress.

In the Pacific, China continues its campaign of aggression against Taiwan in the skies, at sea and in the information domain. At the same time, Taiwan launched its first indigenous submarine and announced changes to its integration of professional and conscripted soldiers.

In my Ukraine update this week, I have opted for a single, longer op-ed that is focused on why Putin is unlikely to agree to a peace deal in the short term, and therefore why the current round of talks are unlikely to gain much traction. I hope it proves informative.

Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five.

Ukraine

Another Round of Peace Talks. There is one message that we should take away from the current round of talks to end the war in Ukraine: Putin does not want the war to end right now.

Peace talks for the war in Ukraine continue to drag out. U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, along with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Jared Kushner, and senior advisor to the U.S. President’s Board of Peace Josh Gruenbaum met with Russia’s lead negotiator Kirill Dmitriev in Miami on 31 January. These talks, like all previous discussions, were described as “productive” and “constructive.” In a social media post, Witkoff stated that:

We are encouraged by this meeting that Russia is working toward securing peace in Ukraine and is grateful for @POTUS’s critical leadership in seeking a durable and lasting peace.

The United States negotiating team is also planning to meet again with Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Abu Dhabi on the first of February.

These latest discussions are being held against the backdrop of a truce on strikes against energy facilities. At least Ukraine is sticking to this arrangement. There is no word from Russia about whether they intend doing so.

Besides this ‘energy truce’, and an exchange of fallen soldiers this week, very little else has emerged from the recent talks designed to end the current war in Ukraine. There is a very simple reason why there has been so little progress.

There is no way that the Russian president can afford to end the war now.

This is despite the fact that the war has been a catastrophe for Russia. It has suffered over 1.2 million casualties (although the true figure is unlikely to ever be fully established). It has used up a large proportion of its Cold War legacy stocks of munitions and equipment, something that is unlikely to ever be replenished. Its economy is in trouble, it has used up much of its treasury reserves, and it has become a vassal state of China. Russia has also seen the emigration of 1.3 million citizens since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, exacerbating its pre-existing demography challenges.

And Russia has achieved none of its political objectives for Ukraine that Putin discussed in his speeches on the eve of the full-scale invasion:

• Ukraine has not been subjugated, and remains a free, vibrant democracy.

• Ukraine’s military has not been destroyed; indeed it is bigger and vastly more capable.

• Russian territory is less secure; Ukraine is able to conduct long-range strikes on targets deep inside Russia at will.

• The NATO alliance has been reinvigorated and Europe has begun to reorient itself on the Russia threat.

• Russia’s reputation as a world power - or even as a middling power - has been degraded.

• The Russian military has shown itself to be marginally effective in military affairs, while showing it is highly effective at looting, raping, murdering civilians and POWs, and destroying civil infrastructure and Ukrainian cultural treasures. And while the Russian military has learned to learn better, it has only improved its performance from ‘abysmal’ to just plain old ‘barely adequate’ over a four year period.

If this was the United States four years after its 2003 invasion of Iraq, we would call this out clearly as “losing the war”.

And what has Russia recieved in return?

Well, in February 2022 before it commenced its full-scale invasion, Russia occupied about 9% of Ukraine, including Crimea and areas of the Donbas. Since that time, it has seized around another 12% of Ukraine. According to the figures published by the Institute for the Study of War, that equates to just over 45 700 square miles captures in four years of war, or over the 1438 days of the war, about 31 square miles per day. This has come at the cost, on average, of over 850 casualties for every single day of the war.

By comparison, the United States (with a population 2.4 times the size of Russia’s) suffered an average of 24 casualties per day in 2004, the worst year for American casualties of the Iraq War.

In short, Putin has almost nothing to show for the massive costs of the war. Accepting a negotiated settlement now, where he cannot claim a clear ‘win’ for Russia and for the Russian people, would be a big problem domestically for Putin. Over the past four years, Putin has transformed Russia into a ‘war’ nation, changing school curricula, domestic media, defence industry, trading parters and other national endeavours to re-jig Russia for a long, drawn out war effort. He has to show to his people some kind of return on that investment, which at present, he cannot.

Additionally, he would also have a major challenge with the return home of hundreds of thousands of veterans, many of whom will be angry that they were not permitted to ‘fight on to victory’. Russian politicians know well what occurs when losing armies return home: political strife. Neither Putin nor his ruling clique of billionaires want that. As one recent article on this subject notes:

The Kremlin is beginning to worry about the problems with returning veterans of the war in Ukraine but does not yet have a clear idea about what to do.

On the flip side, Putin also knows that taking the rest of the Donbas by force will probably take all of 2026 (at least) and will result in another half a million casualties. And, the higher his casualties go, the less believable his strategic narrative of ‘inevitable victory’ becomes.

But, this is better for Putin than the alternative I have described above.

Therefore, Putin has continued to set the bar very high for any ceasefire: the ceding of the entirety of the Donbas to Russia, keeping Ukraine’s territory of Crimea, political accommodations from the Ukrainian government, no NATO and no foreign forces in Ukraine. Putin knows that together these are unacceptable to Ukraine and Europe, and thus, he can keep fighting. He is deliberately sabotaging negotiations so the fighting can continue.

Putin’s big problem is the President of the United States. He can’t afford to arbitrarily dismiss the American negotiations team because Putin knows that Trump is inclined to help Russia if possible. And he knows the best chance of an outcome favourable to Russia is through keeping Trump on side. At the same time, Putin knows that when he has rebuffed Trump in 2025, he has suffered few consequences.

Somehow, through peace talks, back channel discussions with Trump’s representatives, terror bombing in Ukraine, misinformation and subversion in Ukraine and Europe in 2026, Putin will be hoping to have the U.S. administration strong-arm Ukraine into an agreement favourable to Russia.

But here’s the thing with that plan. It might result in a ceasefire for a short time. But, neither party is likely to be satisfied with the solution for long. And here is where understanding Clausewitz really matters. As he writes in Chapter 1 of On War:

Even the final decision of a whole War is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered State often sees in it only a passing evil.

We know from Russia’s behaviour in the past quarter century that it has rarely signed a peace agreement that it has abided by. Any ceasefire negotiated in 2026 (if that is possible) will not settle the war. There is too much enmity, and too much disputed terrain and political ideology now between Ukraine and Russia to see any peace agreement as anything other than a temporary cessation of hostilities.

In conclusion, we should keep our expectations low for this round of peace talks, and those that follow in the short term. Neither side believes they are losing, and both believe they are capable of negotiating a better deal than those currently on the table.

The fighting and the dying - on the battlefield and by civilians in the cities across Ukraine - will continue.

The Pacific

New Taiwan-U.S. Headquarters. The countdown clock in Taiwan steadily ticks down the seconds, days, weeks and months until 1 January 2027. That is the year that China’s President Xi has given his military forces to be ready for militarily action against Taiwan to absorb the prosperous island democracy into the mainland Communist morass.

This week, it was revealed that the United States and Taiwan have created at Joint Fires Coordination Centre and that it has been operating since 2025. This would probably replicate the current set up for U.S. support to Ukrainian strike operations: the U.S. provides intelligence and mensuration data to the Taiwanese forces that would conduct medium and long-range strikes. The joint coordination centre provides a strategic capacity to integrate the ‘deep operations’ of all the Taiwanese military services, as well as provide them access to world’s best practice in targeting doctrine and practice.

I would expect that the establishment of this joint fires centre would also have implications for Taiwan’s military training and education. If Taiwan is to effectively employ American assistance for its medium and long-range fires, employing the latest NATO joint targeting doctrine would make a lot of sense. This in turn would require aligning Taiwanese targeting and fires training with the doctrine.

While it is tempting to compare the new U.S.-Taiwan arrangement to the U.S.-Korea structures, I don’t think this is useful. In Korea, the U.S. is part of the UN force that is - technically - still at war with North Korea. It maintains ground and air forces in Korea as part of a strategic deterrent to North Korean aggression, and as a first response to any efforts by North Korea to break the armistice. Almost none of these circumstances exist in Taiwan. As such, American arrangements with Ukraine are probably a better comparison for the U.S.-Taiwan joint fires coordination centre.

One final thing, and it is a little doctrinaire. Joint operations generally refers to the integration of different services from a single nation. Where two or more nations are working together, this is described as ‘combined’ operations. Anyway, I just thought that was worth mentioning!

Taiwan Conscripts to Regular Brigades. According to a report in the Taipei Times this week, conscript forces in Taiwan will now be integrated into regular force brigades for training and in wartime. Under the new combined arms brigades (of which seven were just established), conscripts will be formed into battalions which will then become integral force elements of the combined arms brigades. When mobilisation exercises take place, these conscripts will report as part of the combined arms brigades.

From my perspective, this makes a lot of sense. Exposing new, inexperienced soldiers to their more experienced, professional colleagues will result in an uplift of professional competence in the conscript force. It also exposes the professional force to people with different ways to making decisions, and who possess different forms of creativity and innovation.

A Comment on PLA Purges. I have seen a lot of commentary on the impact of President’s Xi’s removal of two senior members of the PLA, one of whom was a member of the CMC. These are important, and we can never assume that removing senior military leaders isn’t noticed by everyone below them. It can and does have an impact on the behaviour of more junior military personnel.

But let’s not forget that even in democracies, senior military personnel are rotated regularly. Indeed, military organisations are specifically designed to lose people and for leaders to step up. In every military that I am aware of, the annual posting cycle changes around 40-50% of leaders at every single level of the force every single year. And in many cases, changing leaders can be a positive step with even better leaders replacing the old one.

So, let’s take a breath on predicting that China can’t invade Taiwan or that the PLA will be much less effective because a couple of General get sacked. There is no basis for this. Indeed, it could mean that Xi wants to move even faster with military transformation. The PLA has a lot of Generals that can step up to replace the two most recently removed Generals.

No one is saying the U.S. military can’t do its job, and it has removed even more senior military officers since January 2025 than China has!

*******

It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

In this week’s Big Five, I have included an examination of changes required for leadership development in military institutions due to the opportunities and challenges of AI. There are articles about Japan’s growing defence capabilities, the reason why economic sanctions are unlikely to result in Russia ending its war against Ukraine, as well articles on the costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the narrative war around China’s exercise Justice Mission in late 2025.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Leaders Need to Think Fast, Slow, and Augmented

This is an excellent article from Frank Hoffman, published in Proceedings. Building on the concept of System 1 and 2 thinking, described in Daniel Kahneman’s book, Thinking Fast and Slow, Hoffman proposes that there is now a System 3 thinking. This is decision-making that is supported by the application of AI, and that it is now an integral ‘system’ like System 1 and 2 thinking. He also cautions that “AI should enhance a commander’s intuition, not displace it. Assistance should not lead to an abdication of agency or decision, and a collaborator should not become a crutch that obviates the necessity of human creative and novel thinking.” You can read the full article here.

2. Winning the Story of Justice Mission 2025

Violence and influence have always been two sides of the same coin with regards to war. Winning the story of a war is as important as winning the war itself. The same now apparently applies to large scale military exercises. The large-scale, yet short notice, Chinese military exercise around Taiwan at the end of 2025 was accompanied by a robust misinformation campaign. A plethora of posters, videos and social media posts amplified what the PLA was doing, and why it felt justified in doing so. In this article from the Taiwan Security Monitor, the author explores how China sought to win the story of Justice Mission and what lessons can be drawn from this.

3. Why Economic Pain Won’t Stop Russia’s War

In this article, Dr Richard Connolly at RUSI, takes on the proposition that economic sanctions can be employed as a substitute for military force in order to achieve political outcomes. As he argues in this piece, “wars are rarely abandoned because they become expensive. They are more often terminated when states are defeated militarily, when ruling coalitions fracture, or when regimes themselves collapse. Economic pressure, where it matters, tends to operate through these channels rather than through persuasion alone. The experience of Russia today fits this broader pattern.” The full piece can be read at this link.

4. Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine

In this article, published by CSIS, the authors examine the massive casualties suffered by the Russians over the past four years, and the relatively small return on this investment they have achieved. The implications: “Despite Russian challenges, the great irony is that the United States and Europe have failed to fully wield the economic or military cudgels. Without greater pain, Putin will drag the talks out and keep fighting—even if it means millions of Russian and Ukrainian casualties.” The full piece is available at this link.

5. Japan Can’t Go It Alone

In this new article from Foreign Affairs, the authors argue that despite the very significant increase in defence spending and capability being undertaken by the Japanese government, America should not see this as a sign to decrease its military presence or support in the western Pacific. As the author’s propose, “Tokyo has done the hard part. Now it is time for Washington to step up. If it doesn’t, it will prove Beijing right—that the United States’ alliances are temporary, its promises are hollow, and its power is in decline.” You can read the full article at this link.

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First up, my apologies for not getting an update published last week. I had a good excuse. I was in New Zealand visiting family and celebrating a relative’s 90th birthday.

The past week has seen an array of events that are indicative of the tumultuous, post-Pax Americana era we are living through. The current chaos, emblematic of the interregnum between the post World War Two order and a new global order yet to form, will probably continue for some time to come.

The threats against Greenland and Trump’s subsequent backdown, Iran’s ruthless suppression of protests and dissent without consequences, China’s normalisation of military aggression and economic coercion against its neighbours while most democracies continue to debate whether they can spend more on defence is the context against which we will all live our lives in the coming years - and possibly longer.

Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five.

And for all those who celebrate it, happy Australia Day tomorrow!

Ukraine

Davos Don Deterred? After an aborted flight to Davos, the U.S. President finally arrived to mingle with Prime Ministers, Presidents, billionaires and wannabes at Davos, and gave a much anticipated speech. While there were no big surprises from the speech, it contained some key themes which confirm the Trump administration’s view of the world and America’s place in that world:

• America is treated unfairly by NATO. The exact quote was “The US is treated very unfairly by NATO. We give so much and we get so little in return.” Which is true if you don’t count decades of peace and stability in Europe, massive two-way trade that has enriched America, European support for America’s war in Afghanistan and the large numbers of casualties European nations suffered, enacting NATO Article 5 on 9/11, etc. While Europeans have underspent on defence for a while, this sense of unfairness from Trump is without any foundation.

• America needs to own Greenland. This is a specious argument, and totally without factual basis. The U.S. military is permitted to do pretty much whatever it needs to do in Greenland for the defence of the American homeland and support the defence of sea and air lanes between North America and Europe.

• More criticism of Europe. This is one of the foundations of Trump’s administration. No surprises here.

• Chinese windmills in Europe. This is where the speech veered into ‘strange and uncomfortable’ territory. The exact quote: “One thing I’ve noticed is that the more windmills a country has, the more money that country loses and the worse that country is doing.” Interestingly, installation of wind turbines in the United States is expected to surge in 2026.

Fortunately however, it appears that the quick action by Europe to deploy small military forces to Greenland, and to use diplomacy and other means, has led the American president to back down, at least for now, in his threats of force to take Greenland. That said, he only undertook to not use ‘excessive force’.

Trump also met with Ukraine’s president at Davos. Both sides described it as a good meeting. However, key documents that were to provide the foundation for Ukraine-America agreements on post-war security and reconstruction were not signed as expected.

Zelenskyy Critiques Europe. To wrap up Davos events, the Ukrainian president gave a speech at Davos that not only exhorted Europe to action but roundly criticised them for not acting quickly enough to support Ukraine or deter Russian aggression. As Zelenskyy stated in his speech:

Just last year, here in Davos, I ended my speech with the words: “Europe needs to know how to defend itself.” A year has passed – and nothing has changed.

While Zelenskyy’s frustration is understandable, Europe has changed significantly over the course of the war, and has increased its military, economic and intelligence support to Ukraine. Does Europe need to make decisions faster? Absolutely. Is Zelenskyy’s speech the road to achieving this? I am not sure. But I don’t think Zelenskyy would have said these words if he felt there were other methods left to get European nations moving more quickly.

Finally, while at Davos Zelenskyy also made entertaining comments about Greenland and Russian ships. He stated that:

If Russian warships are sailing freely around Greenland, Ukraine can help – we have the expertise and weapons to ensure not one of those ships remains. They can sink near Greenland just as they do near Crimea. No problem – we have the tools and people. If we were asked, and if Ukraine were in NATO – but we are not – we would solve this problem with the Russian ships.

Who says you can’t be a wartime president and not have a sense of humour. You can watch the video below:

Ukraine Peace Talks. A second round of trilateral discussions between Ukraine, America and Russia on a war termination agreement concluded in the past 24 hours. Zelenskyy issued a statement on the talks which included the following comments:

This was the first format of this kind in quite some time: two days of trilateral meetings. A lot was discussed, and it is important that the conversations were constructive…The central focus of the discussions was the possible parameters for ending the war. I highly value the understanding of the need for American monitoring and oversight of the process of ending the war and ensuring genuine security.

The American side raised the issue of potential formats for formalizing the parameters for ending the war, as well as the security conditions required to achieve this. As a result of the meetings held over these days, all sides agreed to report back in their capitals on each aspect of the negotiations and to coordinate further steps with their leaders. The military representatives identified a list of issues for a potential next meeting. Provided there is readiness to move forward – and Ukraine is ready – further meetings will take place, potentially as early as next week.

At first glance, this doesn't appear to offer much progress. But, at least all sides are now talking which provides the foundations for more talks to end the war. However whether this format can produce an enduring solution, rather than a temporary ceasefire, remains to be seen.

The uncertainty in whether this trilateral format will result in any breakthroughs is largely due to the conduct of Russia. The Russians have not changed their position at all. They have demanded the same territorial concessions that they began the war with. And given the language in the new U.S. National Defense Strategy about Russia (which describes Russia as a “persistent but manageable threat to NATO’s eastern members”), and Trump’s unwillingness to really want to hurt or coerce Russia, Putin clearly believes he can continue with this line of demands for some time to come.

Ukraine’s New Defence Minister: Increasing Russian Casualties. This week, Ukraine’s new Defence Minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, gave a wide ranging interview about what he sees as his main objectives in the coming year. He kept it simple; there are two over-arching goals he seeks to achieve in 2026.

The first is to reform the management of the Defence Ministry. As someone who has led innovation in government and the private sector, seen from the outside the corruption scandals in the Defence Ministry during the war, and was responsible for the creation of Brave1, this is a laudable goal. Fedorov stated in the interview that:

We want to change the paradigm that the Ministry of Defense is only about procurement and supply. It is also about civilian oversight and coordination. We need the right dialogue and the right synchronization. We must set the right tasks. A system without them begins to fail. That is why management is the first priority. Management must be built around those capable of achieving defined goals. If people don't demonstrate measurable results, they can't remain in the system.

The second strategic objective set by Fedorov was that in 2026, Ukraine seeks to drastically increase the casualties that it imposes on Russian forces. As he stated in his interview:

The second strategic objective is to kill 50,000 Russians per month. Last month, 35,000 were killed; all these losses are verified on video. If we reach 50,000, we will see what happens to the enemy. They view people as a resource, and shortages are already evident.

To provide context for these comments, cumulative Russian casualties in the war currently stand at around 1.1-1.2 million. The British Defence Intelligence regular update on this issue on 15 January 2026 published a figure of 1.213 million Russian casualties.

President Zelenskyy periodically releases casualty estimates and other nations have offered estimates of Ukrainian military casualties (many civilians have also been killed and wounded by Russia). These estimates sit around the 4-500 thousand figure.

Thus, there is currently a 1:2.5 casualty ratio. With Ukraine fighting a country with four times its population, and Russia is willing to sustain higher casualty rates, this is a pathway to doom for Ukraine. Thus, Ukraine needs to change this ratio, and that is the core of Defence Minister Federov’s mission in 2026.

Killing more Russians would have impacts at multiple levels of this war:

• At the tactical level, it compounds their reinforcement problem, hurts rotation plans for units, and should force them to consolidate the number of axes of advance they can sustain over time.

• At the operational level, it could force the Russians to focus primarily on one front rather than four they currently sustain across Ukraine (north, north east, south east and south).

• Strategically and politically, it degrades Putin’s narrative of inevitable victory. This narrative becomes untenable for Russia if casualties in 2026 increase to the degree Fedorov has proposed. Increasing Russia’s casualties also demonstrates that Ukraine is willing to step up its efforts to win, and therefore so should Europe and other supporters of Ukraine.

Linked to this will have to be reforms to recruiting and mobilisation. In the past two weeks, the new Defence Minister described how the Ukrainian military was faced with 200,000 troop desertions and draft-dodging by around 2 million people.

The personnel challenge - recruiting and training people of sufficient numbers and getting them to the right units at the right time - is a challenge for any military institution in peace and war. And Ukraine has significant demographic challenges. But, the fact remains. Ukraine needs to address this challenge in 2026. While drones in the air and on the ground help, they can never fully replace humans in many battlefield functions.

In a recent analysis of Ukraine’s manpower challenges for the Kyiv Independent, journalist Francis Farrell wrote that:

The strain on the army is being felt in the form of larger and larger weak points opening along the front line, while sectors that for years had been locked down with a stable defense are now becoming the sites of fresh Russian advances.

Since the hectic first hours of the full-scale war, Ukraine’s key advantage over Russia has always been its people. Now, the manpower question will likely make or break this fight.

This is an enormously challenging issue from political and societal perspectives. While it needs to be addressed, a solution in the coming year will be difficult to achieve.

Russia’s Aerial Strike Campaign. Russia conducted large strikes again this week against multiple targets in Ukraine. Key targets were parts of the energy production and distribution network, although civilian targets were also struck. One of the largest strikes occurred on the evening before the latest round of peace talks. This strike, employing nearly 400 drones and missiles, resulted in power cuts to nearly 80% of Ukraine.

The Pacific

Another Two Bite the Dust. The PLA Purges continue, with two more senior military personnel placed under investigation this week. China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Joint Staff Department Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli were reportedly being investigated by the CCP for suspected “serious violations of discipline and law.”

Zhang is the most senior Vice Chairman on the CMC and is essentially President Xi’s number two. Zhang’s removal is notable because he is a war veteran, the son of a founding PLA general and was seen as one of Xi’s longest-serving allies in uniform. As one report noted, “Zhang had widely been seen as politically secure - even untouchable - within the armed forces.”

Liu, under the military structural reforms carried out in the past decade, now commands PLA operations and the activities of its joint theatre commands.

A post by China analyst Lyle Morris highlighted the reasons for their investigation that was published in the PLA Daily:

Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, as senior cadres of the Party and the military, seriously betrayed the trust and expectations of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, severely trampled on and undermined the Chairman of the Central Military Commission's responsibility system, seriously fostered political and corruption problems that undermined the Party's absolute leadership over the military and threatened the Party's ruling foundation, seriously damaged the image and prestige of the Central Military Commission, and severely impacted the political and ideological foundation for unity and progress among all officers and soldiers. They caused immense damage to the military's political building, political ecology, and combat effectiveness, and had an extremely negative impact on the Party, the country, and the military.

In a piece for FT, analyst K. Tristan Tang notes that: “the investigations probably reflected concerns over slow progress in building combat capability and inefficient use of defence resources under their leadership.” And in a separate analysis for the Jamestown Foundation, Tang describes the impact of such purges:

The past year has seen significant personnel changes within both the CMC and the Eastern Theater Command. These purges likely disrupted operational patterns and reduced the intensity of gray-zone coercion.

There are some interesting conspiracy theories going around about Zhang in particular. I won’t repeat them here. But there are sure to be more detailed analyses of subject in the coming week.

The removal of these two officers could indicate a few different things going on in Xi’s mind. First, he probably still has trust issues with the PLA and is concerned over whether it is sufficiently loyal to him. This loyalty would be even more important if the event of a Taiwan military campaign, especially if it does not go well and the legitimacy of the CCP is called into question.

Another concern of Xi’s which has been raised by some China analysts is that he has done this because reforms in the PLA are not moving fast enough. Given the speed at which the global security environment is moving, and the growing concerns that the Trump administration may not be willing to defend Taiwan, Xi is probably keen to ensure that it is capable of exploiting any window of opportunity to strike Taiwan in the coming year or two.

Might Xi see 2026 as the year of decision with the regards to Taiwan?

The Pacific and the New U.S. National Defense Strategy. On Friday night, Washington DC time, the Pentagon released its new National Defense Strategy (NDS).

Related to China, the document notes that "although we are and will remain engaged in Europe, we must—and will—prioritize defending the U.S. Homeland and deterring China." It also states the following:

The NSS directs DoW to maintain a favorable balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific. Not for purposes of dominating, humiliating, or strangling China. To the contrary, our goal is far more scoped and reasonable than that: It is simply to ensure that neither China nor anyone else can dominate us or our allies.

The part of the new NDS that covers increasing burden sharing with allies (Line of Effort 4) does not have a specific section on the Asia-Pacific region (except the Korean peninsula). Taiwan is not mentioned at all in the document. In doing this, the strategy avoids any discussion about the defence of Taiwan and keeps Trump’s options open with Xi.

While the document commits to erecting "a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain”, whether this chain includes Taiwan remains uncertain.

The strategy also avoids getting into any fights with Asia-Pacific allies on their defence spending. This is a different approach to the administration’s relations with Europe. I think this is a shame - too many of us continue to shirk our responsibilities. Yes, that includes Australia.

As I noted in my initial assessment of the document, it is hard to know exactly where the Trump administration is headed with China. The document states that America desires "a decent peace." Fair enough. It also states America does not want confrontation.

The challenge however is that China is already on a war footing with America and its allies. The CCP has been executing large-scale cognitive warfare and massive industrial espionage against America and its allies for two decades. These are not mentioned at all in the document.

Japanese To Exercise Near Taiwan. This week, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) announced dates for its annual "Iron Fist" exercises in Okinawa. The exercise will be conducted from 11 February until 9 March 2026. It is a bilateral exercise, and will feature the participation of approximately 1,550 JGSDF as well as forces from the U.S. Marine Corps, including marines from the 31st MEU. The training will incorporate joint air assault and amphibious warfare activities on Okinawa, Tanegashima and/or Amamioshima Islands.

*******

It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

In this week’s Big Five, I have included a couple of articles that review the changing role of America in the global security architecture as well as how the world is responding to these changes. There is a good piece on China’s anti-alliance strategy and an assessment of China’s warfighting capacity. Finally, there is an article which explores the appointment of the new Ukrainian defence minister.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. The Great Self-Immolation

In this piece, the author proposes that “someday, similarly, we will tell our children about the month of January 2026 in world politics, and they will not be able to fathom what we did to ourselves”. It is a sombre and apt description of how the era of Pax Americana ended, and how we now exist on an ocean of uncertainty until a new global security architecture emerges. You can read the article here.

2. The World Is Hedging Its Bets

In this piece, Hal Brands examines how different nations are responding to the rapid and ongoing changes in the global security environment. As he notes in his article, “Trump, for his part, punishes those that defy him. He has demanded that allies buy more US weapons while pledging to sanction those who seek to limit dependence on the dollar. The world will enter an age of terrible instability if new security, economic and political structures don’t arise before the old ones are hollowed out. For that reason, the hedging will intensify in 2026.” You can read the full article at this link.

3. China’s Anti-Alliance Strategy

In this piece, the authors examine how China is executing a global strategy to break down alliances which it sees as hostile to its national interests. Most importantly, it is focussed on America’s alliances. As the authors note: “China’s strategy does not aim at dramatic alliance rupture. More attainable — and more valuable —outcomes include hesitation, fragmentation, and drift.” The full article is available to read here at War on the Rocks.

4. Why Federov is Ukraine’s New Defence Minister

In this opinion piece from the Kyiv Post, the authors examine why it is has been a good decision to install Mykhailo Fedorov as Ukraine’s new defence minister. Just 34 years old, Federov has already had a successful tenure as a minister in Zelenskyy’s government and maintains a high level of public trust. But as the authors note, there are challenges ahead: “Fedorov’s challenge is execution. Can Ukraine’s improvised wartime innovation survive contact with peacetime bureaucracy? Can transparency initiatives withstand the pressures of a grinding attritional war?” You can read the full article here.

5. Chinese Fighting Power

This article has an interesting thesis about Chinese warfighting capacity. My sense, and this is gut feel only, is that there might be something to this. The Chinese ethos of ‘winning without fighting’ must have an impact on their willingness and ability to do so. Are they really able to accept mass casualties over time? I could be wrong, but I think this is an interesting argument worth pursuing with experts in Chinese political culture and society rather than just military experts. You can read the full article at this link.

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The past week has seen surge in strategically important events.

The civil strife in Iran, the raid on Venezuela, the threats against Mexico, Cuba and Greenland, the desperate European diplomacy to deter a Trump administration move against Greenland, as well as a Russian IRBM attack on Ukraine and China’s efforts in the wake of the Venezuela operation to portray itself as a credible geostrategic leader. We live in interesting times.

Welcome to my first weekly update and Big Five for 2026!

Ukraine

The Oreshnik Attack. Both Ukrainian and Russian officials have now confirmed that Russia did indeed launch an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike against Lviv on the evening of 8-9 January 2026. It is only the second time the Russians have employed this missile during the war.

The Oreshnik missile has a range of up to 5,500 kilometres and can mount both single or multiple conventional and nuclear warheads. Travelling at speeds over 12,000 kilometres per hour, this is a missile which very few defence systems can intercept. The excellent Missile Matters Substack had a good feature on this missile back in November 2024, which you can read here. More recently, the United24 website also has an in-depth review of the missile and its capabilities, and that can be read at this link.

A central reason for the deployment of the Russian Oreshnik to Belarus, and its use against a civilian infrastructure target in Lviv, is to demonstrate that Russia remains a nuclear-armed, world power. In this guise, it is a psychological weapon – an instrument of Putin’s cognitive war against Ukraine and the West – rather than a weapon of mass physical destruction.

As I wrote earlier this week, Putin has had a bad couple of weeks in regard to Russia’s position in the world. The raid on Venezuela, which showed how little Russia was able help those it expressed support for, the boarding the Bella 1 in the Atlantic, the ongoing Ukrainian strikes against his oil and military infrastructure, and the gathering momentum behind a peace deal that does not favour Russia all combine to drive Putin to use the missile as a message to Washington and Europe. Whether the message is heard and heeded is another issue.

As a result of the strike, a UN Security Council meeting was called and this will be held on Monday, New York Time. Noting Russia is a member of the Security Council (and it is the UN after all), we should not hold our breaths for any significant outcome from this forum. The UN has done nothing to moderate Russia’s brutal behaviour in Ukraine for the past four years – why would it start now?

In the most recent update on this issue, President Trump finally made a comment about Russia in the wake of the Oreshnik attack. His stated the following:

Putin is not afraid of Europe. He’s afraid of the United States of America as led by me. There’s no fear of Europe.

This follows the clear messaging of the recent U.S. National Security Strategy on European defence and security and aligns with the Trump administrations’ growing library of anti-European narratives. It goes without saying, this is hardly the kind of rebuke for Putin’s use of the Oreshnik IRBM that should have been provided by Trump – or any American administration.

To wrap up this update on the Oreshnik strike against Lviv, I would like to reinforce my conclusions about the attack from my recent article on this topic:

The employment of an Oreshnik missile overnight against a target near Lviv makes enormous strategic sense to Putin. Their use is the sign of a fearful, worried leader and not one that is confident and anticipating victory. It is not the first time he has done so as part of Russia’s ongoing cognitive war against democracies. It is unlikely to be the last.

Paris Peace Negotiations. Over several days in the past week, diplomatic activity designed to achieve a war termination agreement for the war in Ukraine was focussed on meetings in Paris. In attendance were European leaders as well as Ukrainian President Zelenskyy. The Trump administration and Russia also dispatched representatives to the meetings.

One of the meetings in Paris was a gathering of the Coalition of the Willing, along with Ukraine and the United States. The outcome of this meeting was a reaffirmation of the need for a shared approach to ensuring lasting peace and security in Ukraine. Further steps were endorsed including the provision of military assistance and long-term military training, and the establishment of a US/Ukraine/Coalition coordination cell at the Coalition Operational Headquarters in Paris.

Several other core elements of the path forward were agreed at the meeting:

• Coalition of the Willing members expressed their readiness to enact a range political and legal commitments once a ceasefire is achieved. This includes establishment of a monitoring and verification framework, and the formation of a body to review ceasefire violations.

• Coalition of the Willing members also agreed to support Ukraine if there were future acts aggression carried out by Russia. The agreed upon measures include the same ones being employed at present: military, training, logistics, intelligence, diplomatic and economic measures.

• The Coalition of the Willing agreed to continue their current support and implement a long-term military assistance program for the Ukrainian military. This will include an array of measures, which includes weapons procurement, and defensive packages.

• Finally, they agreed upon the establishment of a “multinational force for Ukraine” to assist Ukraine to rebuild its military capacity and provide air, maritime, and land deterrence after a ceasefire. It will be “European-led, with the involvement also of non-European members of the Coalition, and the proposed support of the US.” In 10 January announcement, the British government has announced funding to begin preparing their ground forces for a deployment to Ukraine.

In the wake of the meeting, the British and French signed a statement of intent with the Ukrainians for the establishment and deployment of forces to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal. As the British Prime Minister stated after the Coalition of the Willing meeting:

Alongside President Zelenskyy and President Macron, we went even further today. We signed a Declaration of Intent on the deployment of forces to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal. This is a vital part of our iron-cast commitment to stand with Ukraine for the long term. It paves the way for the legal framework under which British, French and partner forces could operate on Ukrainian soil.

After the meeting on the 6^th of January, a Paris Declaration was issued. The full declaration can be read at this link.

The Ground War. Against the background of all the distractions being created by the Trump administration in Venezuela, Greenland, Mexico, the high seas and elsewhere, it is easy for some to forget that hundreds of thousands of troops continue to man the trenches and other frontline positions in Ukraine, defending their homeland – and Europe – from the ravages of a new age barbarian monster from Moscow.

In the North, Ukrainian forces continue to hold ground, but the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces has made just small gains in the past week. In the eastern regions of Ukraine, Russian forces continue their offensive operations on the Lyptsi, Vovchansk and Kupiansk axes of advance: gains on these axes by the Russians in the past week have been minor.

Russian operations in the Donbas region, their operational main effort, continue to focus on the capture of Pokrovsk (still), Kostyantynivka as well as a supporting axis of advance to the west from the Slovyansk area. The Russian appear to be continuing with two double envelopment operations here. One is a small envelopment of the Kostyantynivka area. The other is an operational double envelopment with an objective of securing most of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, including the fortress belt cities still held by Ukraine.

In the south, the Russians continue to place emphasis on a supporting effort, particularly in Zaporizhia. Only minor gains have been made in the past week through small infiltration missions. Concurrently, the repulsive Russian drone safari in Kherson continues.

Russian gains of Ukrainian territory have been at their lowest in the past month for some time, and well below the monthly averages of the past 6-9 months. Clearly the weather has an impact, but with Russia now seeking to advance concurrently in the south, east and north, might their aim to gain as much ground as possible before Putin is forced into a peace deal be bigger than their resources allow.

The Russians on the ground in the past four years have generally had more success when they focus on a single main effort and undertake economy of force operations elsewhere. While Russia appears to be able to continue generating forces, it cannot sustain 1000 casualties per day forever. And an army forced to employ horse-mounted infantry in the 21^st century is not one that is demonstrating high levels of military effectiveness or innovation. They are showing a high level of desperation though.

At some point in 2026, Putin may be forced into making an uncomfortable decision because his forces can no longer advance, and he cannot sustain the myth of Russian inevitable victory with his supporters in China and Washington DC.

The Pacific

China’s Continued Grasp for Global Leadership. After the American raid on Venezuela which captured former President Maduro, the Chinese Communist Party is going all out to criticise America and to posture itself as the one big reliable strategic player that everyone, especially the global south, can rely upon.

On 6 January, the spokesperson for the Chinese foreign affairs ministry noted that:

Military means are not the solution to problems, and the indiscriminate use of force will only lead to greater crises.

And on 9 January, the Chinese foreign affairs ministry stated that:

China attaches importance to its relations with Venezuela and maintains sound communication and cooperation with the Venezuelan government. China will continue to firmly support Venezuela in upholding its sovereignty, dignity, national security and lawful rights and interests. No matter what political changes may take place in Venezuela, it will not change China’s will of deepening practical cooperation in various fields with Venezuela and promoting common development.

We would all love to think that China will practice what it preaches with regards to its statement that “military means are not the solution to problems”. But the massive growth in its military, its accelerating use of military coercion and aggression against neighbours, as well as its major joint exercises around Taiwan in the past three years demonstrate just how hollow and hypocritical the Xi regime is.

Trump Talks Taiwan (Briefly). In an interview with journalists from the New York Times this week, President Trump briefly discussed the future of Taiwan. During the interview, Trump stated that:

He [Xi] considers it to be a part of China, and that’s up to him what he’s going to be doing, but I’ve expressed to him that I would be very unhappy if he did that, and I don’t think he’ll do that. I hope he doesn’t do that.

This aligns with the statement in the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy on Taiwan:

Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority. We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain.

Whether that means American military forces would be directed by Trump to intervene in the event of a Chinese blockade, invasion, fire strike or other type of attack on Taiwan remains to be seen.

Justice Mission Analysis. In the past 24 hours, an excellent analysis of the PLA’s Exercise Justic Mission at the end of 2025 was published by K. Tristian Tang in the Jamestown Foundations China Brief. The exercise, announced at short notice on 29 December in the wake of the Trump-Zelenskyy meeting at Mar-a-Lago, saw the deployment of joint forces – under the PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command – to exercises boxes that surrounded Taiwan. The air and naval activities were accompanied by live fire training as well as a surge in cyber-attacks against Taiwan by China.

In Tang’s report, several key conclusions are reached by the author:

• The PLA military exercise in late December 2025 was conducted with force scale and deployment locations broadly similar to previous drills.

• The exercise signaled an effort by the Eastern Theatre Command to sustain year-round readiness, likely in response to Xi Jinping’s directive to achieve the capability to conduct operations against Taiwan by 2027.

• Compared to earlier exercises, this drill advanced invasion-related rehearsals, including scenarios involving the seizure of the Penghu Islands and parts of eastern Taiwan.

• Although China displayed a degree of restraint during this exercise, it also suggested that a future operation without such restraint could carry far more serious consequences, which would likely include significant disruption to air and maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Channel.

Complementing this report, Tang this week also released an assessment of China’s 2025 military and maritime activity around Taiwan in 2025. It shows uniform increases in PLA activity around Taiwan.

The 2025 statistics above adds evidence to the case that the PLA is constantly honing its ability to plan and rapidly launch integrated joint operations in the western Pacific. While Taiwan may be the particular focus for now, the skills being developed by the Eastern Theatre Command, as well as the Southern Theatre Command, will be applicable for a wide range of other contingencies where China wishes to employ military coercion and force to achieve its geopolitical objectives.

*******

It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings, my final list for 2025.

In this week’s Big Five, I have included a good piece exploring the impact of AI-supported decision-making on the audacity and authority of military commanders. There are also good articles on the development of Chinese and Russian aerospace capabilities, the gamification of killing, and an exploration of how China is using civil shipping to augment its naval amphibious lift capacity. Finally, I have included an article on horse-mounted operations being conducted by the Russians in Ukraine.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. The End of Audacity

War is ultimately a human endeavour. It relies on perseverance, individual and group endurance, creativity and sacrifice. It also demands audacity, those high-risk decisions which – if based on the right assumptions and executed well – can lead to battle- or war-winning outcomes. In this article from the Modern War Institute, the authors pitch the idea that in the growing use of AI for decision-support, there is a risk that military commanders might lose the “willingness to make bold, high-risk decisions in the moment, especially if AI recommends otherwise.” It is a thoughtful piece, and available to read at this link.

2. Flooding the Zone

The China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College issues a stream of high quality reports on Chinese naval and maritime power. This week, a new report was released that explores how China is experimenting with a range of different civil vessels to supplement the PLA Navy’s amphibious fleet. As the authors note, “if the PLA develops the ability to coordinate and employ significant numbers of civilian LCTs to transport forces directly onto Taiwan beaches, it could significantly improve its over the-shore assault capacities and logistics capabilities.” You can read the report at this link.

3. Chinese and Russian Airpower

This article, authored by Justin Bronk and published by RUSI, explores Russian and Chinese air capabilities. It is not a first principles examination of their aerospace forces but instead, as the author notes, a review of “the ways in which the threat posed to Western air power capabilities by Russian and Chinese forces respectively has changed over the five years since 2020.” As usual, this is a well-researched and written report from RUSI, and can be read in full at this link.

4. Horse-Mounted 21^st Century Infantry

This article provides an example of how not all adaptation is good adaptation. The Russians, over the course of the past four years, have demonstrated the ability to learn how to learn better. Their tactical and strategic adaptation systems have improved, and they are able to share lessons quickly across the frontline – and with their fellow authoritarians. But not all adaptation is successful, or necessarily even a good idea. These horse operations are an example of that. Not only are the horses likely to evade detection by the Ukrainians, or move at a speed to outrun drones, this is pure animal cruelty and bastardry by the Russians. You can read the article at this link.

5. Gamification of War

Over the past 18 months, the Armed Forces of Ukraine introduced a points system – ePoints - that allocates points for the destruction of Russian soldiers and weapon systems to Ukrainian combat units. They can use these points to procure different drones and other forms of equipment. But even before this, social media had allowed insights into the gory details of battlefield killing – at scale – that has been rarely available before. In this piece, the author explores the accelerating gamification of war, noting that “gamification in Ukraine is less a curiosity than a diagnostic window into how contemporary wars are organized and fought…for commanders, planners, and donors, the practical task is to test whether the behaviours rewarded by points schemes genuinely serve operational aims, and to keep sight of the labour and risk that the metrics struggle to see.” The full article is available here.

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This has been an extraordinary week in the life of my country. We have witnessed the targeting of innocent Jewish families celebrating Hanukkah, the biggest gun massacre in nearly three decades and a government that has had to be dragged kicking and screaming into recognising the corrosive evil of anti-semitism in Australia.

But beyond the shores of my homeland, peace negotiations have dragged on and are yet to find a solution to the war in Ukraine. Russia has continued to launch massed aerial and ground attacks, while Ukraine has targeted Russia’s shadow fleet in the Mediterranean. Putin’s ground campaign is going worse than normal. While he made minor territorial gains this week, the failure to take Pokrovsk and Russian forces defeat in the Battle of Kupiansk show his narrative of ‘inevitable victory’ remains a hollow claim.

In the Pacific, China’s ongoing bullying of its neighbours continues, as does its aggressive military actions around Japan and Taiwan. But, the recent U.S. National Security Strategy and the just-signed National Defense Authorisation Act indicate that for now, America will continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with its Pacific allies and partners.

Welcome to my final weekly round up of war and great power competition, and Big Five reading recommendations, for 2025!

Australia’s Failure of Leadership

As an Australian, there is really only one place I can begin this week’s update: the massacre of Jewish Australians at a family, peaceful celebration of the first night of Hanukkah at Bondi Beach last week.

It is just over a week now since the deliberate, anti-Semitic massacre of peaceful Jewish Australians celebrating the first night of Hanukkah at Bondi Beach. This was a strategic surprise, shocking to Australians and to many around the world.

I must state this up front: I feel a deep sense of personal failure that this occured. We, collectively as Australians, stood by while anti-Semitism grew in this country, the Palestinian lobby cowed the government and some universities into passivity, and our fellow Jewish Australian citizens increasingly lived in fear. All of us own some of this.

In thinking about the massacre, and the shock it has caused, I think it is worth reflecting upon a section of Roberta Wohlstetter’s book on the December 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision: “Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing...It includes the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion – which is usually too late.”

There will undoubtedly be inquiries which will discover multiple levels of intelligence, government and societal failure. But the most fundamental and profound failure has been a failure of leadership. This is not a political statement: it is a statement backed up by the facts.

Since 7 October 2023, the current Australian Government, led by Prime Minister Albanese, has sought to avoid tough conversations about anti-Semitism in this country. He has provided no leadership in attempting to fend off anti-semitism. His foreign minister, Penny Wong, even visited Israel in the wake of the Hamas Massacre of October 2023, but instead of visiting the kibbutzim where hundreds of murders occurred, visited the West Bank instead to proclaim the government’s support for a Palestinian state.

Over the past two years, mass protests where placards and chants of “from the river to the sea” and even more repugnant anti-Jewish messages were employed, have been permitted to occur unchecked. At the same time, the Australian Jewish community has had to live a fortress lifestyle, with enhanced security and greatly increased abuse. The federal government, despite growing please for action by the Jewish community, stood by.

Time magazine has published a timeline of anti-jewish attacks since 2023, which you can read here.

John Lee, an Australian academic and strategist described the situation in a recent article for the Hudson Institute:

Days after the October 7, 2023 attacks, the Israeli flag was beamed onto the architectural sails of the Sydney Opera House to offer support for Israelis. On that very evening, pro-Palestinian protesters marched to the Opera House chanting slogans such as “F— the Jews” and “F— Israel,” denying Jewish Australian Jewish mourners their opportunity to grieve together in a public place. The state government in New South Wales tolerated the protest on the basis that it was more dangerous to public peace to prevent the pro-Palestinian march.

Those early responses set the standard for what has been permitted since. There have been almost weekly protests permitted by state governments and police forces in major cities that involve not just pro-Palestinian chants of ‘From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free,” but at times the burning of Australian and Israeli flags, placards with images of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and symbols of Hamas, even though it has been listed as a terrorist group by the Australian government since 2003.

However, there was a further insidious role played by Australia’s elites in the legitimization of hostility towards Jews and Israel. From Albanese to provincial and community leaders, Islamophobia was elevated alongside antisemitism as an evil of equal standing and prevalence, despite the threats and intimidation being against Jewish rather than Muslim Australians.

Even in the wake of the massacre, the Prime Minister’s first instinct was to focus on gun control and not the root evil - anti-Semitism. There were some reports that he had to be forced to discuss the issue by state premiers at a national cabinet meeting after the Bondi massacre.

The government has belatedly announced it will adopt the 2024 Plan to Combat Antisemitism and will work through the implementation of the 13 recommendations in consultation with the Jewish Australian community.

Australians have much to atone for given the events of last week. We all own part of the reason the massacre occurred and we all need to be part of the solution.

But, ultimately, we also require good political leadership - and leaders with moral courage - to rebuild societal cohesion and resist the evils of anti-semitism in this country. We must all demand this through the ballot box, not just hope for it.

During army officer training, a core leadership theme we were taught that the only thing worse than bad leadership is the absence of leadership; that bad decisions are better than no decisions. The evidence of the past few years shows that the current government isn’t making bad leadership decisions - it is has avoided tough decisions and has not lead on this issue at all.

This country, and Jewish Australians, deserve so much better from their politicians than the cowardly avoidance of tough decisions and the absence of leadership from the federal government that has led us all to this point.

Ukraine

Putin Rebuffs Peace. This week, Russia’s president rebuffed those who think there will be a short-term outcome from the ongoing peace process. Putin made very clear in a speech this week that he has retained his maximalist claims. In a speech to Defence Ministry Board on 17 December, Putin stated that:

The goals of the special military operation will undoubtedly be achieved. We would prefer to accomplish this and address the root causes of the conflict through diplomatic means. However, if the opposing side and its foreign patrons refuse to engage in substantive dialogue, Russia will achieve the liberation of its historical lands by military means. The task of creating and expanding a security buffer zone will also be carried out consistently.

Further, in a 19 December address, Putin outlined his willingness to continue the war in order to achieve his unchanged maximalist goals. The Institute for the Study of War reported on this latter speech as follows:

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19 to reaffirm his commitment to achieving his full war aims in Ukraine. Putin stated that Russia is ready and willing to end the war based on the principles he outlined during his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Putin used that speech to lay out his conditions to agree to a ceasefire and only then start negotiations: Ukraine’s complete withdrawal from all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Ukraine’s abandonment of its NATO membership aspirations.Putin stated in this 2024 speech that Russia’s “fundamental” position calls for Ukraine’s neutral status, demilitarization (the Russian demand for limits on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself), and denazification (the Russian demand for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government).

That a peace agreement is yet to be agreed should not surprise us. The maximalist goals of Putin, with which he commenced the 2022 full-scale invasion, remain his guiding policy for this war. He has shown absolutely no inclination to change this policy, and the Trump administration has all but encouraged him to retain these goals with their behaviour throughout 2025.

The Vietnam Peace Accords might offer us an insight into how long and tortuous a path to peace in Ukraine might be. The talks, which began in the wake of the 1968 Tet Offensive, gained momentum when U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger commenced secret negotiations in 1969 with the North Vietnamese representative. Le Duc Tho. The negotiations then continued, facing numerous challenges and setbacks, through to October 1972 when a tentative agreement was reached. However this agreement was delayed because of objections put forward by the President of South Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thieu. Eventually, an accord was finalised in January 1973.

The accords, comprising nine chapters, twenty-three articles, and provisions for a cease-fire and withdrawal of U.S. troops, failed to secure a lasting piece however. North Vietnam continued its military conquests against the background of the Watergate scandal and the U.S. Congressional cut off of funding for the war. Ultimately, the North Vietnamese military campaign led to the fall of South Vietnam in April 1975, and as a result, the reunification of Vietnam under communist control.

Back to the present.

The latest Ukraine peace talks that concluded in Miami have not resulted in any agreements. One participant described the meeting as follows:

Privately, people familiar with the discussions acknowledged the talks underscored just how far apart Moscow remains – and how deliberately Russia is working to widen gaps between Washington and its European allies…Russia’s red lines didn’t move an inch.

On the bright side, there was good unity between America and Ukraine demonstrated during the talks and in its aftermath.

On the downside, the American lead for Ukraine peace negotiations tweeted the following at the conclusion of his three paragraph summary of the Miami meetings:

Russia remains fully committed to achieving peace in Ukraine. Russia highly values the efforts and support of the United States to resolve the Ukrainian conflict and re-establish global security.

This is a pretty amazing and gullible statement from the U.S. representative. In what world has Putin demonstrated a “commitment to achieving peace” in Ukraine? This, again, demonstrates again just how clueless this guy is. And it shows exactly why Putin thinks he has the Trump administration just where he wants them.

Of course, the Vice-President of the United States, who is not a participant in the peace talks, could not help himself in trying to make a contribution as well. Speaking in Phoenix, Arizona, he again criticised America’s aid to Ukraine when he stated that:

We help older Americans in retirement, including by ending taxes on Social Security, because we believe in honoring your father and mother rather than shipping all of their money off to Ukraine.

So helpful.

In short, nothing has emerged from the peace talks held throughout this year that has changed Putin’s strategic calculus. He still perceives Europe as weak, the Trump administration as highly malleable, and Ukraine as beatable.

And given he is terrified of a losing army returning to Russia, Putin sees much less risk in continuing the war in the hope of some kind of win rather than the alternative that could see him in very big trouble at home. That must change in 2026 if there is to be any progress in peace talks in the coming year. Europe, America and countries like Australia and Japan need to step up and give Ukraine the support it needs to engender in Putin the fear necessary to change his strategic calculus.

Until that occurs, the war will go on.

The Ground War. It has not been a great week for Russia’s ground forces. They are yet to fully secure Pokrovsk, despite spending nearly two years with this as the Main Effort for Russian ground operations in eastern Ukraine. For this city, which is abandoned and largely destroyed and of minimal military value, the Russians have expended hundreds of thousands of casualties - and have still not taken it.

The Russians have become so desperate to capture the ruined city that, according to the Commander of the Ukrainian 7th Corps, the Russians have changed their tactics in the past month. Speaking this week, commander of the 7th Rapid Response Corps of the Airborne Forces, Brigadier General Yevhen Lasiychuk, described how “the enemy is trying to impose manoeuvre battles, shake up the Ukrainian defence and create a threat of flanking the Defence Forces. Almost a month ago, Russian troops changed their tactics in the Pokrovsk direction. Instead of infiltrating in small groups, the enemy switched to mechanised assaults on the city and is now actively using continuous infantry attacks.”

The Russians have also had to re-orient several formations to reinforce this main effort. According to Lasiychuk:

The enemy has already deployed the Pskov 76th Airborne Assault Division on our section of the front. Some enemy units that were planning to advance on Zaporizhzhia have also been transferred to Pokrovsk. We expect that before the New Year, the enemy will try to intensify its offensive and carry out active assaults, including mechanised ones.

At the same time, the Russians are struggling on their Luhansk axis of advance. The advance on Kupiansk failed and the Ukrainians have pushed back Russian forces while encircling several hundred others. This is contrary to recent Putin boasts that Russian forces had seized the city.

The Battle of Kupiansk was the subject of an excellent piece by Lawrence Freedman this week. Examining the battle and its political important, Freedman notes that:

The Russians are adamant that Ukraine’s defence of its territory is a lost cause. The Ukrainians are determined to show that it is not. This is the narrative battle at the heart of the actual battle. And that is why Kupyansk matters.

What should we make of this and other aspects of the ground war as the year comes to a close? I think that there are several takeaways:

• The Russians continue to experience quality problems with their units. Quantity is not their issue; they have a clear manpower overmatch against the Ukrainians. But, there remain unable to make decisive gains against the Ukrainians, even though they can make small bites continuously.

• Despite this, the Russians remain determined to seize the Donbas. Putin has repeated this multiple times and the peace talks have not deterred him from achieving this objective.

• The Russians have a larger plan for the Donbas which they continue working towards. Seizing Pokrovsk enables a follow-on campaign which would see the wide envelopment of the Dontesk fortress belt. One arm of the double envelopment is moving west on the Lyman axis of advance. The other would be a northern advance for a meeting of Russian forces somewhere around Barvinkove. That might be there 2026 plan but the Russians are someway from achieving such a grand aspiration.

• Russia’s continued challenges on the ground should indicate to western politicians that a Russian victory is by no means assured. Lawrence Freedman described this as follows in his Kupiansk article during the week: “Putin’s ‘narrative power’ influenced discussions of the war ‘in ways that encourage fatalism and defeatism in the West.’ The source of the power was the assumption that Russia was bound to win because of its superior numbers, and its apparent willingness to tolerate huge losses in pursuit of its objectives. So long as Russian forces were moving forward, no matter at what pace and at what cost, then a decisive victory surely awaited them. The logic of this narrative was that Ukraine would be wise to accept the inevitable and get the best deal it could now, even if that meant handing over territory that Russia had failed to take by force of arms.”

• This ‘inevitable victory’ narrative from Putin is laughable, and there is sufficient evidence from just this year alone that we should place no faith in Putin’s assurances on this (or any other issue).

• Finally, as we saw in Kupiansk, limited offensives are possible. A couple more of these in the new year from Ukraine might finally convince Trump that Putin has been lying to him about Russia’s inevitable victory. Or maybe not.

Ramstein Conference Delivers. Fortunately for Ukraine, its partners stepped up in the past week and have made commitments to aid in 2026. The commitments, made during the 32nd round of meetings of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, included air defence systems and munitions, drones, artillery, artillery ammunition, air warfare weaponry and other military materiel. All up, commitments for delivery of military aid worth $45 billion in 2026 were made at the meeting.

While the United States made no commitments at the meeting, a proportion of the equipment to be delivered will be procured from America using the priorities contained in the PURL (Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List). This is an American foreign military sales program that enables the transfer of U.S. military materiel to NATO countries in the knowledge that it will be transferred to Ukraine.

Key donors at this week’s meeting were as follows:

• Germany: US$13.4 billion.

• Norway: US$7 billion.

• UK: US$800 million.

• The Netherlands: US$820 million.

• Denmark: US$293 million.

• Lithuania: US$258 million.

• Estonia: US$166 million.

• Canada: US$21 million.

• New Zealand: US$15 million.

A special ‘bravo’ to Japan. This week it announced another $6 billion in financial aid to Ukraine in the coming year.

This week, the European Council also committed to providing 90 billion Euros in financial support to Ukraine in 2026-2027. As the EU release notes, this will be “a €90 billion loan to Ukraine for 2026 and 2027, to be based on EU borrowing on the capital markets backed by the EU budget headroom.”

Ukraine Strikes Back. Ukraine had a relatively successful week in its long-range strike campaign against Russian economic and military targets.

It hit the Belbek Air Base in Crimea, apparently destroying two Russian Su-27 fighters jets. It also struck a Russian tanker in the Mediterranean Sea for the first time. The tanker Qendil, part of Russia’s shadow fleet, was struck on its way to the port of Ust-Luga, the second largest oil shipment in the Baltic Sea.

The tanker was stuck by aerial drones more than 2 thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. It represents the sixth successful Ukrainian strike operation against ships carrying Russian oil. Others include:

• On 28 November, two tankers were attacked near the Bosphorus by Ukrainian Sea Baby uncrewed maritime drones.

• On the first of December, a tanker was damaged off the coast of Senegal, after which its owner announced a cessation of operations with Russia.

• On the second of December, the tanker Midvolga-2 was hit near the coast of Turkey.

• On 10 December, Ukraine attacked the tanker Dashan in the Black Sea.

The Pacific

The NDAA and the Pacific. This week, the U.S. president signed the 2026 National Defense Appropriations Act (NDAA). It authorised 900.6 billion U.S. dollars in defence spending for the 2026 fiscal year.

Importantly, the bill places a significant focus on support for American alliances in the Pacific region. It fully funds the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, and strengthens activities related to the AUKUS agreement between the U.S., U.K. and Australia

Another beneficiary is The Philippines. The Philippine Enhanced Resilience Act (PERA) was passed by the Senate as part of the 2026 NDAA, and provides up $500 million in security assistance annually for five fiscal years to support Philippine defence modernisation and enhanced military cooperation between the U.S. and The Philippines.

For Taiwan, the NDAA authorises up to US$1 billion for the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative. This includes medical equipment, supply capacity, and combat casualty-care needs. It also allows the U.S. military to continue training Taiwan and other partner countries to counter Chinese coercion and malign influence operations. Under the NDAA, the Pentagon is required to “enable fielding of uncrewed and anti-uncrewed systems capabilities” with Taiwan by March 1, 2026, which includes establishing a joint US-Taiwan production program for unscrewed systems and counter-uncrewed systems technology.

With regards to South Korea, the NDAA includes a section restricting any reductions of U.S. forces in Korea to ensure a minimum of 28,500 US troops are deployed. The NDAA also contains a provision requiring the Pentagon to examine wartime command and control between America and South Korea.

The NDAA contains important provisions that have the objective of countering Chinese malign activity, limiting Chinese supply chain control in critical industries, and limiting Chinese investment in American biotechnology firms.

If you are so inclined, the entire bill can be read at this link.

Japan and Nukes. This week, a source in the Japanese Prime Minister’s office claimed that the nation now may require nuclear weapons. A reaction to the growth in China’s military, its expanding aggression and incursions into Japanese territory, and the growing concerns about America’s reliability as an ally have all combined to produce this realisation in some of the Japanese national security community.

This should not be taken however that the issue is under active consideration by Japanese politicians or that a decision could be pending. That is unlikely - at least in the short term. Japan has adhered to its Three Non-Nuclear Principles, first declared by then Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1967, for over five decades. The cultural, legal and ethical boundaries to changing this approach are significant.

China’s Big Drone Mothership. The PLA has released imagery of a new airborne mothership that will permit them to continue their expansion of their uncrewed military capabilities. Footage released on 11 December 11 showed the uncrewed drone carrier Jiutian undertaking its maiden test flight. The Jiutian large uncrewed mothership aircraft is the first of its type of the PLA, and is the largest uncrewed drone carrier in the world.

The PLA has claimed that the Jiutian mothership can carry up to 100 one-way attack drones. Chinese state media claim that the Jiutian has an operating range of 7,000 km, with an endurance of up to 12 hours with a payload of up to 6 tons.

This range and payload could make this a very useful platform for multiple missions. In peace time, it might be used to resupply outposts in the South China Sea, or to loiter just outside the ADIZ of Taiwan or Japan and launch several drones at different periods to measure and exhaust response aircraft. In wartime, it has the range and payload for a range of expeditionary missions, from supporting amphibious lodgements in the region to helping construct drone barriers against American, Japanese and other forces who might come to the aid of Taiwan.

Of course, this all assumes the mothership works as advertised!

Japanese Resilience. This week, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released a new report that examines Japanese national resilience. This report assesses Japan’s national preparedness and identifies areas of relative strength and vulnerability. The examination of resilience is conducted against the context of demanding national security scenarios such as a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan or Chinese pressure on Japan over contested islands.

The report has many strong elements. For me, one of the best parts is the framework that it offers for assessing national resilience. This is a good model for other nations to employ, and you can view the model below:

The report offered the following overall conclusions

Japan is actively building upon this strong foundation for resilience. The Japanese government has numerous offices, agencies, and plans that are preparing national security-related resilience activities. Tokyo is also openly increasing its security focus on China, emphasizing supply chain security, the hardening of military sites, and efforts to address shortages in ammunition and air defense, among other measures.

Japanese officials, to their credit, often recognize the country’s weaknesses and limits: The new National Cybersecurity Office (NCO), for example, is a worthy attempt to build up the country’s long-neglected cyber defenses.

While acknowledging these strengths, the authors of this report find that Japan would benefit from additional preparatory measures for many national security–related contingencies, such as disputes with Beijing over contested islands or Chinese pressure related to a blockade or invasion of Taiwan. Further investments are required to bolster relatively undeveloped elements of national security resilience that China or another foe may seek to exploit.

You can read the full report at this link.

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This week, I published two new articles.

Early in the week I published a piece that explored failure in war, and how military fiction can help build a better understanding of military failure and strategic tragedy. The article also contained a short preview of the sequel to my 2023 novel, White Sun War. You can read that article here.

On Friday morning, I published an article in the Lowy Interpreter about the massacre at Bondi Beach on 14 December. It explored how surprise and failure remain central to human affairs on this planet, but there is much we can do to reduce the chances of surprise, and mitigate the impacts of shock generated by surprise - particularly by challenging old, established ideas. You can read that article at this link.

For those doing last minute Christmas shopping, I published my annual reading list. Designed as a one stop, one page starter list, it contains my favourite books, websites, journal, podcast and social media feeds if you are interested in the study of war and strategic completion. You can read that post here.

Finally, I recently published a long analysis of the state of the war in Ukraine, in particular from the perspective of Ukraine and its key strategic endeavours in 2025. It is available to read here.

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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings, my final list for 2025.

I have included a good piece that analyses Russian strategic narratives about its war against Ukraine, and a new article that proposes a new era of total war. There is an interesting report on translating Ukraine lessons for countries in the Pacific region, an examination of the core concepts that underpin American strategic competition doctrine, and a useful article on how we need to ensure that AI slop does not compromise military and strategic decision-making.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Reframing the Nature of Strategic Competition

One of my favourite authors on strategic issues is Antulio J. Echevarria II. In his latest piece in the just-released edition of Parameters, he offers a critique of the core concepts that underpin American doctrine related to strategic competition. As he notes in the piece, “war is an instrument of strategic competition, even as strategic competition is an instrument of policy. Ergo, one can use strategic competition in the same way one uses war, either with or without kinetic force.” The full piece is available at this link.

2. Russia’s Ukraine Narratives

This is an interesting piece that analyses Russia’s narratives about its war against Ukraine. As the author notes, “it is worth analyzing how the Kremlin has justified its expanded war and how Moscow has tried to sell the deadliest war Europe has seen since the days of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Such analysis can not only help Western allies of Ukraine figure out how best to back Kyiv’s efforts but can provide a roadmap for sounder Russia policy in the West overall. In sifting and sorting these narratives, we can identify precisely what is motivating the Kremlin—and, better yet, how to stop it.” You can read the full piece, published by The Atlantic Council, at this link.

3. Ukraine Lessons for the Pacific

In this publication from the Japanese National Institute for Defence Studies, the authors explore the lessons from the war in Ukraine since 2022, and then seek to apply them in the context of different scenarios in the Pacific. The study assembles an array of different experts on strategy and warfare, and includes topics such as “Ukraine and the PLA”, Future Air Battles Envisioned by China, and “US Denial Strategy against China”. The full publication can be accessed at this link.

4. The Return of Total War

In this new article for Foreign Affairs, Mara Karlin examines how the third decade of the 21st century has witnessed a return of total war. She notes in the article that “in both Ukraine and the Middle East, what has become clear is that the relatively narrow scope that defined war during the post-9/11 era has dramatically widened. An era of limited war has ended; an age of comprehensive conflict has begun.” It then offers ideas for how America and other democracies around the world might respond in this new era. You can read the full article at this link.

5. The Age of Synthetic Deception

The War on the Rocks site regularly produces some quite creative and innovative thinking. This piece by Nick Krohley is one of them. It examines the application of AI in military institutions and how rapidly accelerating fake news and synthetic content might deceive politicians and policy makers, have a negative impact on strategic decision making. As the author notes, “without a direct pipeline that delivers structured, consistent ground truth at scale, the U.S. military’s AI intelligence systems will optimize what they can based upon the inputs fed to them. This will mirror the failures of the past two decades, wherein the U.S. military mastered the targeting process but lost war after war.” The full piece can be read at this link.

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Finally, thank you to all those who subscribe and read Futura Doctrina. I endeavour to bring you to the most timely and relevant analysis on war and great power competition. I know there is a lot of material out there to consume, and I deeply appreciate you spending just a small proportion of your valuable time with my substack.

I wish you all a very Merry Christmas and a prosperous new year.

I hope that I will see you all back here in 2026!

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In the past week, we have seen a more joined up approach to the Ukraine peace process from the Trump administration, and a counter-proposal from the Ukrainian President. Ukraine and Russia have traded strikes on oil tankers and commercial cargo ships, and Ukraine conducted a series of successful counter-attacks around Kupiansk.

In the Pacific, a Chinese aircraft carrier strike group conducted operations in the western Pacific off the coast of Japan, Taiwan unveiled the design for its T-Dome missile defence system, and China continued its aerial incursions into Taiwanese and Japanese airspace.

Welcome to my regular update on modern war and strategic competition.

Ukraine

Mr Zelenskyy Goes to Kupiansk. Not long ago, the Russian President claimed that Kupiansk was under Russian control. If it ever was, it isn’t anymore (see frontline update below).

And to show Putin was lying - and demonstrate again to Trump that Putin lies - the Ukrainian president travelled to the front line around Kupiansk this week. There is even proof (see image at the top of the article).

These frontline visits have been a feature of Zelenskyy’s leadership since the beginning of the war. He has travelled all over his country, and visited soldiers in bunkers, trenches, training establishments, headquarters and hospitals.

When Russia commenced its full-scale invasion of his country in February 2022, Zelenskyy stayed put and asked for help.

Compare this with Putin.

In June 2023, when Prigozhin began his short-lived mutiny and advance on Moscow, Putin rabbited out of Moscow. Even though Prigozhin never got within 100km of the Russian capital, the Russian leader preferred to get out of town than stay and lead the counter-mutiny. As far as we know, Putin has never visited Russian frontline positions, probably because he fears his own troops more than the Ukrainians.

Zelenskyy is not a perfect President, and the recent corruption scandal has tainted him. But, no one can deny his courage.

That is something that will never be said about Putin.

Peace Negotiations. This week, Russia rejected Ukrainian proposals for a ceasefire and referendum. Put forward by President Zelenskyy on 12 December, the Kremlin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov rejected the proposal and noted that they “will not work” for Russia. The Kremlin also rejected a Ukrainian offer this week to establish a demilitarised zone in the Donbas.

Ukraine has put forward a counter proposal. The New York Times described it as follows:

The 20-point Ukrainian plan for ending nearly four years of fighting, unlikely to be accepted by Russia, is part of a Ukrainian attempt to stymie Mr. Trump’s demand, made in his proposal last month, that Ukraine secure peace by relinquishing more land than Russia now occupies.

In a 13 December social media post President Zelenskyy has covered the outlines of the plan sent to America, along with negotiators. It has three elements: security guarantees; economy, reconstruction, and investment; and, communications with Ukraine’s security partners. Zelenskyy described it as follows:

In Germany preparations are underway for the work of our military group focused on the details of security guarantees for Ukraine. Our group is led by Lieutenant General Hnatov; representatives of our army, intelligence services, and security forces are also taking part.

In the United States the group on economy, reconstruction, and investment has already begun its work this morning and will keep working to prepare a good outcome. On our end this group is led by Prime Minister Svyrydenko, Deputy Prime Minister Kachka, and Minister Sobolev with the participation of experts.

The third line of work consists of ongoing online contacts between National Security Advisers and all those brought in by the leaders’ decision. Today, as on almost every day, communication continues between the United States, Ukraine, European countries, and other participants of the Coalition of the Willing. On our side Rustem Umerov moderates these discussions.

Across all areas, our goal is the same – to bring the war to a real conclusion and to define the steps that will make peace dignified for Ukraine, with security and reconstruction – guaranteed.

I guess we will see after the weekend where we are at.

Meanwhile, as part of its ‘peace proposals’, Russia undertook another large overnight strike on cities across Ukraine. In the past 24 hours, Russia attacked targets in Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Chernihiv regions. 495 drones and missiles were fired at Ukraine, with 430 being shot down by Ukrainian air defences.

The Front Line. The big news this week, and probably some of the best news for Ukraine’s ground war for a while, was the Ukrainian liberation of territory around the city of Kupiansk. In counterattacks executed by Ukraine’s 2nd Khartiia Corps north of Kupiansk, it appears that the Russian infiltrations into the city - and the creation of a Russian corridor into the city - have been cut off. At least for now.

The Institute for the Study of War also reports that around 200 Russian troops might be trapped in the city, surrounded by Ukrainian forces.

This tactical development demonstrates again that Putin is deceiving the Americans (and his own people) about Russian battlefield success. While I am sure that he may not be getting the full, God’s honest truth from his own military, Putin is a willing manipulator of information to perpetuate the ‘inevitable Russian victory narrative’ to shape the views of America’s peace negotiations team.

Beyond this, the Kupiansk operation does tell us a couple of other things.

First, Ukraine still has offensive capacity that can be employed where it identifies Russian weaknesses and where other conditions (such as weather, weaker units, etc) are right for exploitation. This is a good sign.

Second, it is an indication of the capacity of the new Ukrainian Corps organisation. Admittedly, it is a single case study of a corps on the offensive, but it does give some indication of the capacity of a unified corps. The corps involved, the 2nd Khartia Corps is a combined arms unit of the Ukrainian National Guard, and has five combat brigades. It was formed on April 15, 2025, as part of the C2 reforms of the Defense Forces of Ukraine.

Third, again, this shows the fallacy of the transparent battlefield concept. If the battlefield was truly transparent, such offensive actions should not be possible. But seeing lots of things on the battlefield is not the same as understanding them, and transparency is more than a physical construct. The Ukrainian attack again validates that offensive actions are still possible in the modern era that don’t require the horrendous expenditure of human lives like those of the Russians.

Despite this success, it is just a limited success. It is a bright spot in an overall grim frontline where Ukrainians and Russians continue to fight, suffering large casualties for minor territorial gains. We should be careful not to read too much into this week’s successes around Kupiansk, encouraging as it is.

Finally, this week, British intelligence issued one of its periodic updates on Russian operations and casualties. By their estimation, up until 13 December, the Russians had suffered 395,000 casualties during the 2025 calendar year. To provide a sense of what Russia has ‘gained’ from this massive casualty figure, below is the latest table on Russian territorial gains from Russia Matters.

Of course, territory means less than political gains to Putin. And this is where Putin is really making hay while the sun shines. Even with all his rejections of Trump’s peace proposals in 2025, he is yet to pay a major price. He has however convinced many on the Trump administration that coercing Ukraine into handing over territory and making accommodation about the size of its military is a good idea. Russia, of course, is not being asked to make any accommodations.

Maritime Strikes. Over the past week, Ukraine has continued to strike oil tankers that are part of Russia’s shadow fleet, which are used to ship oil and avoid international sanctions. Given the Russian Navy has basically vacated large parts of the Black Sea, Ukraine is now using its advanced Sea Baby drones to attack Russia’s shadow fleet and up the pressure on Russia’s economy.

Ukraine’s missile and drone strikes against Russia also continue, including a strike this week on the massive Slavneft–YANOS refinery. This is one of the largest in Russia and located about 700 km from Ukraine’s state border. The strike was carried out by the Ukrainian 14th UAS Regiment.

Ukraine has also reportedly hit two Russian cargo vessels in the Caspian Sea.

Russia has responded by hitting commercial ships that are either docked in Ukraine or may be shipping goods to or from Ukraine. Russia has now hit 4 Turkish ships in the past couple of days, including three in the port of Odesa.

For a good synopsis of the timeline for the war in the Black Sea, H.I. Sutton has recently updated his rolling summary of this element of the Ukraine War at his Covert Shores website. You can read this here.

Finally, for a recent examination of Ukraine’s development and employment of uncrewed maritime vessels, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently published this report, called A Navy of Necessity.

The Pacific

Chinese carrier patrols off Japan. This week, the Chinese PLA-N aircraft carrier strike group, which included CNS Liaoning, the Type 055 cruiser CNS Nanchang, Type 052D destroyers CNS Xining and CNS Kaifeng, and Type 901 fast combat support ship CNS Hulunhu, transited northeast through the waters between Okinawa’s main island and Minami-Daito Island. It then sailed north to waters approximately 190 km east of Japan’s Kikai Island.

These Chinese patrols serve several purposes. First, they are training the Chinese navy in the conduct of aircraft carrier strike group operations, including the integration of different ships and high tempo aircraft operations. Second, they serve an operational purpose to provide PLA joint theatre commands experience in commanding high-level expeditionary naval operations.

Finally, they serve obvious political purposes. This includes projecting the will of the Chinese Communist Party, to test the reaction of Japanese military organisations as well as the U.S. administration’s support for Japan, and to cow regional nations.

The Chinese aircraft carrier naval capability provides little utility against the U.S. navy and its fleet of much more capable aircraft carriers and integration of them into joint warfighting plans. But they are excellent coercive tools against every other nation in the region.

As the image below shows, this deployment by the Liaoning carrier strike group is the furtherest north such a task force has ventured since Chinese carriers started operating in the Pacific. It is also closer the Japan’s home islands than other deployments - clearly a political message.

The Chinese continue to stretch their legs. I would not be surprised to see a Chinese aircraft carrier strike group doing a circumnavigation of Australia in the coming years to really stretch the legs of the PLA-N, ascertain the reaction of America given its continued build up of capacity in Australia, and to test the rather rubbery and inconsistent strategic resolve of the Albanese government with regards to China.

Taiwan’s T-Dome. More details about Taiwan’s proposed national air, drone and missile defence system, known as “T-Dome”, became available this week. According to a report in the Taipei Times, the system will be comprised of several layers (see diagram below) and will cost just short of $13 billion U.S. dollars.

T-Dome will contain both indigenous elements. Taiwanese elements include the Chiang Kung ballistic missile interceptor. This system, which is now in production, features a two-stage interceptor and includes an active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar domestically produced in Taiwan. It is able to engage targets at an altitude of at least 70 kilometres. The War Zone recently had an excellent in-depth look at this missile defence system, which you can read here.

Other domestic elements include the TKIII system (or Sky Bow 3), a single-stage, Mach 7 interceptor for missiles and aircraft; and, the TCII beyond visual range air defence missile. The project will be implemented between now and 2033, according to Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo.

Japan’s “Missile Archipelago”. This article in The Japan Times provides interesting political context, including domestic political issues, on the establishment of an electronic warfare division by the Japanese Self Defence Force on the Japanese island of Yonaguni. The island site just 110 kilometres east of Taiwan, making intelligence collection from facilities on the island a critical element of Japan’s developing counter-strike capacity.

AUSMIN 2025. Finally this week, the annual AUSMIN talks have were conducted in Washington DC. Both Australia and America issued official releases about this year’s meeting and the key outcomes. Key themes were multi-lateral cooperation in the Pacific, economics and the US-Australia military alliance.

The US and Australia committed to work with Japan and the Philippines on the Luzon economic corridor, as well as partnering with PNG to develop communications and transport infrastructure. Cooperation with PNG will also include disaster management. Collaboration on more assured ICT networks in the Pacific is also part of the way forward, and this includes partnering the Japan, Taiwan and NZ to deliver this. Cyber resilience with south East Asian nations will also be a priority.

Economics was a key element of the just-released US National Security Strategy and it would have been a surprise if it wasn’t discussed at AUSMIN. The meeting agreed to rapid execution of the Critical Minerals framework, which includes Japanese investment, and USD600 million in funding from EXIM in the US will be provided for the critical minerals supply chain.

The meeting confirmed that it is now full steam ahead with AUKUS, as announced in the press in the past 24 hours. This includes another one billion dollar payment (US or Oz not specified) to the US soon for expanding the US submarine base.

Work will continue on expanding infrastructure at key Australian air bases to facilitate USAF access. The USMC MRF-D in Darwin will expand in capacity including the pre-positioning of V22 aircraft. This will probably mean an increase in the permanent numbers of Marines in Darwin and elsewhere in Australia. Accompanying this will be new command and control arrangements for the expanding US military presence in Australia with the formation of the “U.S. Oversight and Support Group – Australia”. This is important given the establishment of the new Submarine Rotational Force-West in 2027, and the regular visits and maintenance of U.S. SSNs at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia.

Overall, no real surprises. As I wrote in a post earlier this week:

Australia got what it wanted - American presence and investment in Australian infrastructure and critical minerals as well as no public commentary on Australia’s low defence spending as a % of GDP. America got more money for its submarine enterprise, more real estate in Australia, an enhanced strategic logistics hub, as well as some useful multi-lateral cooperation on security in the Pacific region and some additional munitions production by an ally. Lots of European nations would love this deal!

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Recently I published three new articles here. This week I published my annual reading list. Designed as a one stop, one page starter list, it contains my favourite books, websites, journal, podcast and social media feeds if you are interested in the study of war and strategic completion. You can read that post here.

I also published an analysis of the impact on the Pacific of the recently released U.S. National Security Strategy. There has been quite a bit of hysteria about this document, and the aim of my analysis is to get beyond the ‘disappointment rhetoric’ that has emerged and assess the opportunities and challenges for Pacific nations that emerge from the document (if it is fully implemented, of course). You can read that piece at this link.

Finally, I have recently published a long analysis of the state of the war in Ukraine, in particular from the perspective of Ukraine and its key strategic endeavours in 2025. It is available to read here.

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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

I have included a good, long-read from T.X. Hammes that examines how American procurement and thinking about modern war needs to change, driven by the transformative impact of cheap drones and containerised munitions. There is a useful analysis of the U.S. National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA) and its impact on Asia, and an article on the risks of AI applications with nuclear command and control. There are also articles on leadership and the use of AI to train military leaders.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. We Can’t Buy Our Way Out

T.X. Hammes is one of America’s foremost thinkers and authors on the future of war, and the impact of new technologies. Over the past decade, he has written extensively about the impact of massed, cheap autonomous systems, and in this piece, he explores the technologies of drone and containerised munitions. Importantly, he argues for changes in mindset and warfighting concepts to shift how the American military thinks about war and warfighting. You can read his piece, for the Stimson Center, at this link.

2. Asia and the U.S. National Defense Authorisation Act

Somewhat balancing what some have viewed as a catastrophic 2025 U.S. national Defense Strategy, the U.S. National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA) provides more insight into American defense priorities. This analysis, by Zack Cooper from AEI, examines some of the key elements of the NDAA and how they assist America’s allies in Asia. Initiatives include Taiwan’s drone defences, restricting any Trump drawdown of the U.S. presence in Korea and strengthening the U.S.-Philippines alliance. You can read the full article here.

3. Humility and Leadership

Military Review is one of those ‘must read’ professional journals for junior and middle ranking military leaders. Published by the U.S. Army, it is well worth scanning every time a new issue comes out. Its latest edition contains a very interesting piece on the role of humility in leadership. And, to the credit of the authors, they fully explore the potential downsides of humility in military leadership. Overall, this is a thoughtful piece that provides useful insights for developing contemporary military leaders. You can read the full piece at this link.

4. Managing Nuclear Risk in an AI world

If you are anything like me, you are probably terrified by the prospect of AI having anything to do with nuclear command and control systems. Given how awash we all seem to be now with AI-generated slime, why would be put the most dangerous weapons ever created anywhere near this imperfect technology. While some might reason that humans are similarly imperfect (we are), humans at least have an existential interest in preserving the now 80 year long non-use of nuclear weapons. This piece examines how AI might amplify misperceptions by strategic decision-makers, leading to more rapid escalation towards the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. As the author writes, “the risk is not only that adversaries will misinterpret signals, but that domestic publics will demand responses based on false premises.” A sobering piece from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, you can read the full article at this link.

5. Decision-Making and Human-Machine Teaming

One of the areas where human-machine teaming is starting to gain a lot of traction is in decision-support for military personnel. It is a subject that experts in the field have been examining and writing about for some time. The prospect of AI leading to better decision-making is something that most military organisations have at least been pondering for the better part of a decade. In this article, the author explores the integration of AI into military officer training and education. You can read the article, published by Small Wars Journal, at this link.

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This week, Russia’s president Putin reminded us during a press conference that his objectives for the war in Ukraine have not changed. While he was open to negotiations, he did not feel any rush to do so and he again described the Ukrainian government as not the legitimate interlocutor for such talks. In Ukraine, President Zelenskyy’s closest adviser and head of the Office of the President resigned/was sacked, although this is unlikely to suppress calls for more scalps in the ongoing corruption scandal.

In the past week, we have also observed the bungling, disconnected approach to peace talks and peace plans from Trump’s representatives. It has demonstrated again why real estate developers probably should not be allowed anywhere near international diplomacy (unless the desired outcome is a mega real estate deal, of course and not peace).

Welcome to my weekly update on modern war and strategic competition.

Ukraine

Putin’s Press Conference. This week, the Russian president conducted a media question and answer session. It is worth exploring this at the start of the update on Ukraine because it provides context for everything that follows. Bottom line up front: Putin has not changed his main objective for the war, which is the subjugation of Ukraine. No business deal with Trump and his representatives (which was reported on by the Wall Street Journal this week) is going to change that.

Key points from Putin’s media appearance were as follows:

• On the draft peace agreement: “In general, we agree that this could form the basis for future agreements. However, it would be inappropriate for me to speak now of any final versions, as these do not exist…Certain matters are of a fundamental nature, and overall, we observe that the American side is, in some respects, taking our position into account.”

• On Europe: “Russia does not intend to attack Europe. To us, that sounds ridiculous, does it not? We never had any such intentions. But if they want to have it formalised, let’s do it, no problem...Perhaps there is even merit in this, considering that we all wish to talk, to discuss, and to articulate matters of pan-European security. Probably so; we ourselves proposed this at one point. If our Western – let us once again call them “partners” – now want this, then very well, we are ready. But we all understand that this requires serious discussion, as every word carries significance.”

• On Russia’s war prospects: “The positive dynamics persist in all directions. Moreover, our troops’ advance in each of these directions continues to pick up the pace, and quite noticeably…the East group of forces is effectively enveloping the entire fortified area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the north. On one side, our Dnepr group is confronting them whereas the East group of forces is bypassing them from the north. This may lead to a collapse of the front in this sector.”

• On Ukraine’s military prospects: “The main problem for the enemy lies elsewhere: the widening gap between their losses and the number of personnel they are able to bring to the line of combat contact…We must also add those who desert the army. The scale of desertion is significant, and this is evident not only from our media or from Defence Ministry reports, but is also widely covered in Western media, and it is virtually impossible for them to hide this information.”

• On Ukrainian leadership: “I believe the Ukrainian leadership made a fundamental and strategic mistake when it gave in to fear and chose not to hold presidential elections, after which the president lost his legitimacy. However, today, the current political leadership of Ukraine can hardly expect to be able to win the election without rigging it. It is almost impossible, I think. That brings to mind Stalin famously saying, “It does not matter who votes for whom; what matters is who counts the votes.”

Assessment. Maybe I lack perception, but these aren’t the comments of someone who is willing to compromise in their core objectives for the war. The comment that the new peace proposal would form the basis of future agreements means that Putin’s timeline to end the war is not the same as Trump’s much shorter timeline. And his comments continue the key strategic messages from Russia about the illegitimacy of Ukraine’s government, Russian war progress and Russia’s lack of threat towards Europe.

But, these comments do demonstrate that Putin has learned to employ more calculated language in public to ensure he does not induce Trump to give Ukraine more support by appearing obstructionist. At the same time, he is not renouncing any of the objectives of the war that he announced in February 2022.

The Fall of Yermak. This week, Ukrainian corruption authorities conducted a raid on the home and office of Presidential advisor and confidant, Andrii Yermak. This came at the end of weeks of pressure that resulted from the latest, and largest, corruption scandal of the Zelenskyy presidential era. A former film producer and lawyer, Yermak served as the head of the Office of the President from 2020 through until his resignation this week.

A report in Politico Europe described this as “a tectonic shift for Ukraine that sets the stage for a fierce battle over how the country is governed.” It further speculated that:

Opposition politicians will use his firing over a $100 million corruption scandal to press home their demand for a national unity government in Kyiv, something they’ve urged ever since Russia launched its full-scale invasion nearly four years ago, and Yermak’s exit will embolden those factions.

The timing, which to be fair would never be good given the circumstances of his departure, could not be worse. As Ukraine continues to fight off the Russian ground and aerial assaults, and diplomatic assaults from a Trump administration seeking to impose a peace solution on Ukraine, government cohesion and stability in Kyiv is vital. Yermak’s departure is a temporary blow for peace negotiations given Yermak central role in discussions. It also heightens the perceptions of Zelenskyy’s weakness, which is sure to be exploited by the Russians. Indeed, Putin mentioned this issue in his press conference (see above).

Of course, stability and cohesion should never be permitted to over-ride democratic accountability and transparency. The coming days and weeks will see whether Zelenskyy is able to achieve a better balance of these imperatives.

In the wake of his resignation, Yermak shared the following in an interview with the New York Post:

I’m going to the front and am prepared for any reprisals. I am an honest and decent person. I served Ukraine and was in Kyiv on February 24, 2022. Maybe we’ll see each other again. Glory to Ukraine.

Peace Negotiations. In the wake of Yermak’s departure, Zelenskyy has re-set his peace negotiations team. As reported by Ukrainska Pravda, nine people have joined the Ukrainian peace talks delegation. This includes Rustem Umerov, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine; Kyrylo Budanov, Head of Defence Intelligence of Ukraine; Vadym Poklad, Deputy Head of the Security Service of Ukraine; and Andrii Hnatov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The delegation has arrived in the United States to continue talks over the coming days. As President Zelenskyy noted in his evening address on 29 November:

The Ukrainian delegation should already be in the United States by this evening, U.S. time. The dialogue based on the Geneva points will continue. Diplomacy remains active. The American side is demonstrating a constructive approach, and in the coming days it is feasible to flesh out the steps to determine how to bring the war to a dignified end.

Strategist Eliot Cohen has written a useful assessment of the peace talks from the perspective of the U.S. administration this week. In it, he explores the timing of the peace talks, and the imperatives behind President Trump’s current push for a deal. As Cohen notes:

From Ukraine’s perspective, it will be a much worse deal than was possible in the first two years of the war. The timidity of the Biden administration in arming Ukraine and the incapacity of a self-disarmed Europe have cost Ukraine its best opportunity to reclaim by force most of its invaded territory.

A plausible cease-fire would freeze territorial control more or less along current lines, with provisions for Ukraine’s economic reconstruction, the repatriation of its citizens from occupied lands, entry into the European Union, and long-term military support from the West, including at least a rotational NATO military presence. Above all, it would need to include recognition by all parties of Ukraine’s sovereignty and right to choose its own destiny.

The problem is the American bunglers who are trying to make the deal.

The coming week will reveal whether a deal now is possible, and if not, just how far apart Russia and Ukraine are at this point of the war.

Ukraine’s Strike Operations. While Ukraine continues its campaign to hobble the Russian energy industry, two strikes this week stood out.

First, a strike on Russian shadow fleet. Sea Baby naval drones deployed by the Ukrainians struck two sanctioned Russian oil tankers, the Virat and the Kairos 28 November. The ships were targeted off Turkey’s Black Sea coast. According to the Kyiv Independent, both oil tankers were making their way to the Russian port of Novorossiysk to load cargo and were empty at the time of the attack.

Second, a Russian Air Force special mission aircraft was hit with Neptune cruise missiles and jet-powered drones launched by Ukraine’s 1st Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces. The target was the only remaining Ilyushin Il-76MD transport A-60 airborne laser laboratory, originally developed in the 1970s as a testbed for airborne laser weapons.

Not only was this aircraft destroyed in the raid, the Ukrainians also damaged the Beriev Aircraft Company factory at the Taganrog/Tsentralnyy military installation in Russia’s Rostov region. This is a special facility which converts aircraft for special missions, including the the A-50 and next-generation A-100 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platforms.

Finally, the Ukrainian Navy and Ukrainian special operations forces hit the Russian facilities at the Saky airfield in the west of occupied Crimea. Among the targets claimed hit by the Ukrainian military were a command and control facility, storage infrastructure for Orion strike UAVs, air defence equipment, including a Tor-M2, a Pantsir-S1, and ZU-23-2 mounted on a KamAZ truck.

The Ukrainian deep strike capability is one of Ukraine’s main tools for hurting Russia and forcing it to the negotiating table. Developed from almost nothing four years ago, the lessons of Ukraine’s hybrid long-range strike capability provide good insights for Western middle power military organisation who aspire to improve their conventional deterrence capacity.

The Frontline. No major changes on the ground this week, however the Pokrovsk, Lyman and southern fronts remain quite dynamic and worthy of examination.

Pokrovsk. The Russians are yet to fully secure the Pokrovsk pocket and clear the city of its Ukrainian defenders. On 27 November, the Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Syrskyi claimed that Ukrainian forces have cleared over 11 square kilometers within the Pokrovsk pocket of Russian forces. With winter conditions coming, fog has played a key role in recent weeks. This week, the 7th Rapid Response Corps published a video that showed how foggy conditions can degrade their ability to generate situational awareness on the ground and from the air.

In a report published by Ukrainska Pravda this week, titled “As Trump and Putin seek to force Ukraine into “peace”, what’s the situation in Donetsk Oblast?”, journalist Olha Kyrylenko describes the Pokrovsk situation as follows:

Pokrovsk – largely lost. There are still Ukrainian positions on the northern outskirts of the city, but most of Pokrovsk is under Russian control. Ukrainska Pravda has information that the entire part of the city south of the railway line, which cuts the city in half, is held by the Russians. The line of contact, according to Ukrainska Pravda’s information, runs almost along the northern edge of the city. The General Staff’s map for the Pokrovsk front is at least a month out of date.

The Lyman Front. Russia continues to press on this front. The Russians have been chipping away on this axis since at least May 2025, and have allocated higher quality ground forces and drone units (including Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies) to this effect. The Institute for the Study of War has also reported that Russia is using a number of mercenaries from Africa on this axis of advance as well.

As I described in a previous update, and you can see in the above maps, this is an important axis of advance for the Russians because it comprises the northern arm of an operational envelopment of the remaining cities of Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donetsk. And if Russia were to envelop these cities, it would also permit them to claim that they had captured all of Donetsk, and thus the Donbas. This would allow Putin to claim success in one of his key war aims.

The South. Russian forces have continued offensive operations in southern Ukraine, although this is very much a secondary or even tertiary effort compared to those in the eastern and north-eastern regions of Ukraine. Russian forces this week have attacked Ukrainian positions to the east of Kherson City.

The Russians have also continued their repulsive ‘drone safari’ operations against civilian vehicles and infrastructure in Kherson City. As one assessment by The Atlantic Council recently described it:

Kherson’s current predicament should set alarm bells ringing across Europe and beyond. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is widely recognized as the world’s first drone war. Moscow’s human safari tactics in Kherson offer a chilling window into what this could mean when military drone technologies are unleashed against civilian populations.

Based on what is known about the Russian human safari campaign in the Kherson region, it should now be abundantly clear that drones can potentially paralyze the life of any modern city. They can be used to leave the population without access to electricity, water, and heating, while also disrupting core supply chains and even preventing people from setting foot outside.

It is a very grim situation indeed, and one that Russian military and political leaders must be held accountable for.

Finally, more reports from the south of Russian war crimes. As the Kyiv Independent reported this week, at least five Ukrainian prisoners of war were executed by Russian soldiers during a chaotic withdrawal near Huliaipole in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

Earlier this month, Russian troops reportedly shot dead two captured Ukrainian troops on the outskirts of Zatyshshia in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The Russian perpetrators were killed by a Ukrainian drone about 20 minutes later.

Assessment. Russian territorial gains in the past week were the largest since July 2025 - nearly 260 square miles (as reported by ISW and the Russia Matters report). But, this hardly indicates any kind of imminent Russian breakthrough. Putin’s hypothesis at his press conference during the week that “the positive dynamics persist in all directions…our troops’ advance in each of these directions continues to pick up the pace, and quite noticeably” isn’t accurate.

As the chart below indicates, Russia’s ground campaign in the past two years has been characterised by slow, steady gains - the “1000 bites” method - rather than any accelerating gains or great breakthrough that causes major losses in Ukrainian forces or territory.

Given the impending winter, and the lack of vegetation cover during that time, it will be even harder for Russian forces to mass for attacks in any proximity to the zero line. On the flip side of course, winter fog and other weather effects the limit Ukrainian use of surveillance and strike zones in the frontline areas are often used by the Russians to cover their movements on the ground, and it should be expected that they will continue to do so. The Russians have also developed their capacity for identifying weaker Ukrainian brigades, and when brigades are conducting relief-in-place operations, which they focus their attacks on.

The prospects for next year’s ground campaign include a Ukrainian defensive campaign to the west of Kupyansk in the north east of the country, and defensive campaign to hold onto the fortress cities, and thus, the remaining parts of the Donbas in Ukrainian possession. Both of these campaigns, in ground that is less favourable to the defence than that further east, will stretch the Ukrainian ground forces - who have fewer reserves, significant desertion rates and are increasingly short of resources - to their limit.

The Pacific

Trump’s Call to Xi. President Trump this week had a phone call with President Xi of China. They discussed Ukraine as well as Pacific security and the broader America-China relationship. The Chinese official description of the conversation, which you can read in full here, included the following:

President Xi outlined China’s principled position on the Taiwan question. He underscored that Taiwan’s return to China is an integral part of the post-war international order. China and the U.S. fought shoulder to shoulder against fascism and militarism. Given what is going on, it is even more important for us to jointly safeguard the victory of WWII. President Trump noted that President Xi is a great leader.

Trump, whose statements about the call focused on trade and fentanyl, did not mention Taiwan but did mention a visit to Beijing.

Given the current spat between China and Japan, it was inevitable that the Xi-Trump call would be followed by a discussion between Trump and Japanese Prime Minister. While the full details of the call have not been released, there has been speculation about whether Trump asked the Japanese PM to ‘turn down’ the heat with China.

Problems at China’s Eastern Theatre Command. The PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command is the joint headquarters that is designated as the lead for any military action against Taiwan. It coordinates large exercises, such as Joint Swords in 2024, and conducts contingency planning for the invasion of Taiwan and its offshore islands.

This week, an article in the Jamestown Foundation covered command and control challenges currently affecting the PLA’s Easter Theatre Command. In recent purges, Xi has removed both the commander, Lin Xiangyang, as well as the Political Commissar. As the article notes:

The Eastern TC’s leadership has been seriously disrupted by the ongoing PLA purge. The TC formally lacks a commander and its political commissar has vanished. It is unclear who is acting in either role, and the Eastern TC Party Committee is hollowed out. Restoring leadership competence will take time. Given this turbulence, the TC Party Committee is likely functioning at substandard capacity, with remaining leaders lacking substantial experience leading a TC. They also are likely working under acute anxiety due to the ongoing purge of their colleagues.

This level of senior command instability inevitably erodes readiness, disrupts decision-making, and damages cohesion and morale among officers. As tensions rise between the PRC and Japan, concern over a possible military conflict also grows. But the Eastern TC’s destabilized leadership likely constrains the PRC’s ability and willingness to escalate, providing a glimmer of hope that the latest tensions will remain below the threshold of war.

The recent purges by Xi have had the primary effect of instilling fear into senior and middle-ranking officers, and for them to double-down on their demonstrations of loyalty to the CCP. The challenge for Xi is that if he demands loyalty to the party above all else, generating a world class military institution will be very difficult to achieve.

Taiwan’s Speeding Up Defence Spending Increases. This week, the Taiwanese president used an op-ed in the Washington Post to announce that Taiwan will introduce a $40 billion supplementary defence budget that underscores its will to defend itself. This package would include “significant” new U.S. arms purchases. As he writes in the piece:

Beijing’s willingness to alter the status quo by force has become increasingly evident…Taiwan is equally committed to keeping the Indo-Pacific region safe…In response to growing pressure from Beijing, our defense spending, which has already doubled in recent years, is expected to rise to 3.3 percent of gross domestic product by next year. I am committed to lifting this baseline to 5 percent by 2030.

While we will continue to pursue opportunities for cross-strait dialogue, with the understanding that our democracy and freedom remain nonnegotiable, we remain grounded by more than wishful thinking, as some have suggested. We will ensure that Taiwan’s security and sovereignty are defended not just by rhetoric but also through robust, decisive action.

Taiwan Strait Transit Tracker. The Taiwan Security Monitor has introduced a new page that tracks transits of the Taiwan Strait by U.S. Navy and allied naval vessels. At this stage, the tracker goes back to 2018, and lists each ship transit by nation and date. You access the tracker here.

Japan’s Rising Defence Budget. The Japanese cabinet this week approved a supplementary budget proposal of 18.3 trillion yen (US$117 billion) for fiscal year 2025. Included in this is 1.1 trillion yen for increased defence spending, bring the total Japanese defence budget for the current fiscal year to 11 trillion yen.

That means defence spending will exceed 2 percent of Japan’s gross domestic product. Initially, it was expected that the 2-percent goal would be achieved in 2027. However the new Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, brought forward the goal to deal with an increasingly aggressive China and demonstrate to the Trump administration that the Japanese government is pulling its weight in deterring Chinese aggression.

Also this week, the Japanese government revealed that it would shortly release a new cyber security strategy. As the Japan Times article on this subject notes:

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government plans to adopt a new cybersecurity strategy next month that calls for needed measures to address foreign threats such as election interference.

A draft of the strategy notes “an increase in state-supported cyberthreats” such as those by China, Russia and North Korea. It calls for “defense and deterrence with the state at the core” following the enactment of a law to introduce what is known as an active cyberdefense.

The draft expresses caution over the fact that “cyberattacks, even those backed by states, are regularly carried out to halt critical infrastructure, interfere in other countries’ elections and steal sensitive information.”

Two other bits of news this week from Japan.

First, the Japan Self-Defence Force will procure next generationJapanese anti-landing craft missiles next year. Eleven units of Multi-Purpose Missile System Kai launchers were included in the major projects section of Japan’s 2026 budget request. The missiles are designed to attack enemy landing craft and armour.

Second, the Japanese defence minister, Shinjirō Koizumi, visited military garrisons in Japan’s Ryukyu Islands. His visit included meeting with Japanese troops of the Yonaguni Garrison, which lies just off the north-eastern coast of Taiwan.

*******

It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

I have included a good article on how Chinese military and intelligence planners are examining the use of their own AI to deceive western AI, and the latest report from Japan’s NIDS on China’s military and national security developments in the past year. There is an excellent piece from Eliot Cohen about the current Ukraine peace initiative and a good examination of Ukraine’s transition to Corps command and control structures.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Deceiving AI

The various applications of AI are taking up more of the attention of military leaders and staffs. This technology is being increasingly used in intelligence assessments, closing kill chains, agentic planning as well as assisting in the analysis of personnel and logistics challenges. In this new piece, the authors examine another application of AI - the deception of adversary AI. As the authors write: “Chinese companies have also begun to market counter-AI products in the categories of physical deception, electronic warfare, and software…Meanwhile, Chinese tech firms are developing counter-AI software. Tencent Cloud runs a large-model red-team program and offers tools that monitor and lock down model inputs and outputs to block prompt injection, tainted data, and leaks.” The full article is available here.

2. Ukraine’s Transition to Corps Structures

This article, published by Jamestown Foundation, provides a timely update on Ukraine’s ground forces command and control changes, and in particular, its formation of Corps organisations. The author describes both the opportunities of Corps-type organisations and the current challenges that Ukraine has in realising these benefits. The current organisation of brigades, Corps and Groupings of Forces is described in detail. The article doesn't get everything right - the new Ukrainian ground forces operational command and control does not align with NATO structures - but that is a minor quibble in an otherwise very useful article. You can read it here.

3. Peace Through Bungling

In this peace, Eliot Cohen examines the latest peace initiative being fostered by Donald Trump and his representative Steve Witkoff. As he describes the current situation with Ukraine, “it deserved so much better. But its own efforts, despite the bungles and cowardice of its friends, have at least bought it a chance for the freedom it is due. As for the Trump administration, it may crow or throw tantrums or stalk off in a huff. But it is also just barely conceivable that it may bring an end—in all likelihood, alas, a temporary one—to Europe’s most hideous and unjust war since 1945.” You can read the full article at this link.

4. Latest NIDS Report on China, Russia and North Korea

The Japanese National Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS) is an excellent source for research and analysis on Japanese, Chinese and other Asian national security issues. The publish an annual report that examines developments in Chinese military, intelligence and national security affairs, and the most recent report has just been released. The theme of the NIDS China Security Report 2026 is “Imbalanced Partnerships: China, Russia, and North Korea.” It is a comprehensive and very useful report for all those interested in China and the PLA, and can be read at this link.

5. The War on the Rocks Holiday Reading List

The annual War on the Rocks holiday reading list is here. It is a comprehensive list of books, provided by a range of experts, about military, intelligence and national security topics. You can read the full list at this link.

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There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen is a phrase regularly misattributed to Vladimir Lenin. But the thrust of the idea is entirely apt as we peer back on the past few days. In a stunning, although true-to-form move by the Trump Whitehouse, American and Russian interlocutors collaborated on a new Russia-America pact which is ostensibly about ending the war in Ukraine, but in reality is just as much about restoring the business relationship between Russia and the USA, and walking away from European security affairs. If implemented, it will also fundamentally change global security norms.

It would be tempting, in such a tumultuous week, to focus only on events related to Ukraine. But, events in Europe are indelibly linked to the security and prosperity of the Pacific region. And as we well know, the Chinese are experts at observing and learning from European wars. Thus, despite the focus on Ukraine in the update this week, I cannot neglect events in the Pacific region.

In the Pacific, the Chinese tantrum aimed at Japan has continued in the wake of the Japanese PM’s comments linking Japanese and Taiwanese national security. And, the new annual report by U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission found that a growing divergence between China’s English-language and Chinese-language propaganda about Taiwan might suggest that the CCP is taking the initial steps to prepare its people for the possibility of war.

Welcome to my weekly update on modern war and strategic competition.

Ukraine

The 28-Point Plan: Afghanistan as Prelude

Back during the first Trump administration, Trump representatives engaged in secret talks with the Taliban to end the war in Afghanistan. The outline of the deal was hashed out without any input from the Government of Afghanistan, which America and dozens of its coalition partners had been providing assistance to for nearly two decades. The final deal, known as the Doha Accord, was published by the U.S. Department of States under the title Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan. You can read the document at this link.

The aim of the accord was to end hostilities and draw down the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan. That, at least, was Trump’s objective. The Taliban’s objective was to re-seize power in Afghanistan and remove any government or military personnel and institutions that would stand in the way of that goal. In the wake of the accord being agreed, the U.S. stopped much of its air support to Afghan ground troops, which saw a huge spike in Taliban attacks.

Throughout 2020 and 2021, most western nations withdrew their residual forces, even though the in July 2020, the U.S. House Armed Services Committee voted in favour of an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act to restrict President Trump’s ability to level of 8,600 set in the accord. By the time Joe Biden became president, the Trump administration had drawn down U.S. troop levels to around 2500.

In April 2021, Biden announced that all remaining U.S. forces would withdraw by 11 September 2021. By August 2021, the Taliban was advancing rapidly and had taken over large parts of Afghanistan. The final, chaotic and deadly evacuation of troops and civilians occurred during the final days of August 2021. It was a disastrous end to Afghanistan for which Biden was blamed. But the foundations were laid by the Trump administration.

The Afghanistan debacle provides useful insights into how the Trump administration thinks about its relationships with foreign partners and its approach to war termination negotiations. We should understand these because the same mindsets are probably being applied to the ‘end the war in Ukraine’ initiatives that periodically leap forth from the Oval Office. What are the key insights from Trump’s Afghanistan accord.

• First, Trump feels no compulsion to speak with all parties that are involved in a conflict if that means that involving them will slow down or complicate a resolution.

• Second, those with most at stake - the citizens of the nation being supported - are allowed no agency and given no consideration or compassion by those seeking to negotiate a quick and easy end to the conflict.

• Third, the most heinous acts conducted during the war are seen as irrelevant and permitted to be overlooked, thus denying any type of justice to those who were subject to warcrimes during the conflict.

• Fourth, as the U.S. government’s after action review of the Afghanistan withdrawal noted “during both administrations there was insufficient senior-level consideration of worst-case scenarios and how quickly those might follow.” The old military approach to hoping for the best but planning for the worst did not occur. This report also found that U.S. estimates of friendly and enemy capabilities were wrong.

How might we apply this knowledge as Ukraine navigates the extraordinarily difficult period between now and Thanksgiving on 27 November - just four short days?

First, we can finally dispense with the notion (if anyone still believed it) that the interests of Ukraine or the Ukrainian people will play any role in how Trump and Putin see this war ending. While Trump may have made some noises in the past about Russia’s nightly terror attacks using drones against Ukrainian civilian targets, such statements have all but disappeared. The Trump-Putin Pact is all about Russia and America - Ukraine is seen by both leaders as getting in the way of a return to business as normal.

Second, another crucial actor - Europe - has been conspicuously sidelined from the proposed agreement and would have little say in the execution of the agreement. This would be welcomed by Putin as well as the anti-Europe faction in the Trump government. While this might help speed along negotiations, it also ensures that many of the complexities about future Ukrainian and European security, as well as triggers for U.S. future support to Ukraine, will probably be overlooked or under-thought.

This is a point that is well made by Ruth Deyermond, a Senior Lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, in a recent social media post:

The proposed security guarantee is allegedly modelled on NATO Article 5, but that doesn’t contain any of these qualifications for action, let alone all of them.

This proposed security guarantee requires that an armed attack by Russia would have to be significant *and* deliberate *and* sustained to merit a response. In theory, Russia could drop a nuke on Kyiv and that wouldn’t meet the criteria because the attack wouldn’t be sustained.

Plus, of course, any decision-maker acting in bad faith could find grounds to claim that one of these enormously vague criteria weren’t met (when they had been). Which brings us to who gets to decide what action will be taken taken.

The proposed security guarantee is clear that *only* the US president decides what action would be taken in the event that it’s determined there’s been a Russian breach. Ukraine, NATO and “European partners” are consulted, but they aren’t given a decision-making role here.

Either deliberately or because of incompetence, the security guarantee is worded in such a way that it would allow for the U.S. president to consult with Russia before deciding whether to take action against Russia.

Monty Python could not have developed a more ludicrous solution.

Europe is apparently scrambling to intervene and produce an alternative that does not result in Putin getting exactly what he wants, but they appear to have been caught flat-footed here.

And in the latest developments, the EU has rejected key elements of the latest peace plan, stating that international borders must not be changed by force. A meeting between officials from the EU, U.S., and Ukraine to discuss revisions to the draft Trump-Putin pact will take place in Geneva in the next 24 hours. You can read the joint statement issued by EU leaders below.

A third takeaway from how the previous Trump administration negotiated over Afghanistan is that just like the agreement negotiated with the Taliban, the Trump-Putin pact would ensure that every single Russian war criminal is totally absolved of blame for any of their actions during the war. As the text of the initial draft of the 28-point plan describes:

All parties to the conflict will receive full amnesty for wartime actions and agree not to file claims or pursue grievances.

This is a repulsive solution. There must be justice for those who perpetrated the array of awful war crimes against Ukrainian civilians and soldiers. These war criminals must never be allowed to rest.

Finally, the combination of restricting Ukraine’s armed forces, restricting their foreign military alliances, giving Russia territory that it has taken by force and that it has yet to capture, the prevention of NATO forces entering Ukraine, the permitting of Russia to reintegrate into the global economy with no sanctions and the fantasy of Russia’s assurances about future military aggression can only result in the worst possible outcomes for Ukraine and Eastern Europe. The Trump administration has just not thought through all the worst possible outcomes of this agreement, just as they didn’t for Afghanistan.

The alternative is that they have anticipated all the very worst outcomes for Ukraine and Europe and just don’t care.

Zelenskyy’s Toughest Week

The period between 17 and 24 November is probably going to be the worst week that Zelenskyy has experienced during his presidency. While the realisation of Russia’s attacks in February 2022 would have been dreadful, at least then he knew he had the backing of his people and NATO in those first terrible days.

This is a totally different and a far more dire situation. He now faces the intersection of at least seven (and potentially more) major challenges:

• An ongoing corruption scandal where he has yet to assume full responsibility and accountability, and which has a significant impact on how Ukrainians view their president and how Ukraine’s supporters view Ukraine.

• Allegations that a Ukrainian official may have amended one of the clauses in the draft 28-point plan to remove the possibility of audits of Ukraine’s wartime spending.

• The potential for a significant military disaster as Ukrainian forces are encircled at the destroyed city of Pokrovsk and under siege from a Russian army that intends to destroy as much of the Ukrainian force there as possible while manpower shortfalls (including shortages of drone pilots) continue to plague the armed forces.

• Ukrainian annual budget shortfalls that are estimated to total over $50 billion over the next three years.

• A declining interest in the war in Ukraine from many citizens in western nations.

• A persistent hostility towards Zelenskyy from some in the Trump administration.

• Russia’s unwillingness to negotiate away its initial objectives for the war.

Assessment

The week ahead for Zelenskyy will determine the future of his nation. Even if the draft Trump-Putin pact does not succeed, and no agreement is signed, the trajectory of the war - and broader global security affairs - could be changed by several potential events or outcomes over the next few days.

Trump might finally walk away from the conflict after threatening to do so on multiple occasions. Although, Trump has also folded in his threats to invade Canada and Greenland and on many of his tariffs against both allies and adversaries like China. Predicting what Trump might do if Ukraine does not agree to the current peace deal is best described as “an inexact science”. But European nations are already examining how they might fill any shortfalls in intelligence if Trump again ‘pulls the plug’ on intelligence sharing.

Ukraine’s relationship with America will be indelibly changed. I was in Ukraine earlier this year when American intelligence was turned off for a short period and that had a profound psychological impact in Ukraine particularly when it came trust between Ukraine and America. And as I highlighted in a social media post earlier this week, if America does impose this deal on Ukraine it “will lead to an embittered nation (towards the West) and the likely growth of a ‘stab-in-the-back’ narrative that will hurt Ukraine-Europe ties and only benefit Russia.” While many of us hope that this latest proposal might just be another of the periodic storms over a peace deal and that the normal U.S.-Ukraine relationship resumes next week, it is hard to see that being the case right now.

In her excellent 22 November piece in The Atlantic, Anne Applebaum writes that “for a decade, Russia has been seeking to divide Europe and America, to undermine NATO and weaken the transatlantic alliance. This peace plan, if accepted, will achieve that goal.” In the wake of an agreed Trump-Putin pact, Europe will continue to re-cast its security calculus and its view of the U.S. relationship. However, no one in Europe is seriously proposing a break in the relationship, regardless of how exasperating some in the Trump administration might get at times. Europe still needs America, and even though he won't admit it, Trump needs a stable and prosperous Europe. But, depending on how the next few days go, we might see an acceleration of European initiatives to shore up their defences to hedge against potential Trump decisions about U.S. support to Ukraine and broader European security.

China, which will have been watching this play out with great interest, is being given a fine tutorial in how to further develop its interaction with the Trump administration. Regardless of how the next few days play out, and even if there is no agreement reached on the 28-point plan, the President of China now probably sees an opportunity to present his own version of a 28-point plan for the absorption of Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China. Xi has always preferred to take control of Taiwan by using means other than a military invasion. As such, we might expect the Chinese Communist Party to present the Trump administration with 28-point plan for Taiwan, either in secret or publicly, in the near to medium term. We even know what they will ask for - it is all contained in the CCP’s White Paper on Taiwan, which you can read here.

While American allies will be disheartened by the Trump administration’s posture towards Ukraine and its willingness to absolve Russia of all its heinous behaviour, those nations which rely on America for their security but are not treaty allies will be even more concerned. Of course, the obvious nation in this boat is Taiwan. Government officials in Taipei are sure to be wargaming the various potential outcomes of the next few days in Europe, and what each outcome might mean for the future security and prosperity of their nation. But, we all need to be doing this, just as all of us need to significantly increase defence spending, and work more closely together, in order to build a more robust collective deterrent against authoritarian aggression.

Amongst all this, my heart goes out to the people of Ukraine. They have fought so hard to defend their country, their culture and their future over the past 11 years from a nasty, brutal and voracious predator named Putin that they deserve much better than to be treated like they are by Trump, Witkoff and others. I hope and pray we will see some kind of outcome in the coming days that recognises the courage of Ukraine, and the potential it has to be a more secure and prosperous democracy in Europe.

It is easy to anticipate the worst that might emerge this week given the behaviour of the Trump and Putin administrations. In his latest piece for the New York Times, Thomas Friedman writes the following:

If Ukraine is, indeed, forced to surrender to the specific terms of this “deal” by then, Thanksgiving will no longer be an American holiday. It will become a Russian holiday. It will become a day of thanks that victory in Putin’s savage and misbegotten war against Ukraine’s people, which has been an utter failure — morally, militarily, diplomatically and economically — was delivered to Russia not by the superiority of its arms or the virtue of its claims, but by an American administration.

The world is a vicious place at times. Putin appears to have a far better capacity to manipulate the Trump administration than Ukraine or the Europeans do. I fear for what lays ahead. But I don’t despair, because the Ukrainian people have shown us so many times what they can do in the darkest and toughest of times. The coming week, and months that follow, will again draw upon their reserves of patience, resilience, fortitude, gallantry and spirit.

The Pacific

China Raises the Temperature in its Spat with Japan. The Chinese have stepped up pressure against the government of Japan in response to the recent comments by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi where she stated that a war over Taiwan could threaten Japanese security. The CCP is attempting to have the Japanese PM retract her comments, and thus, deter other nations from linking their national security to that of the sovereignty of Taiwan.

The US has come out in support of Japan. As the Japan Times has reported:

The U.S. has signalled its support, with Ambassador George Glass saying Washington firmly stands with Tokyo, echoing U.S. President Donald Trump’s earlier offer to give Takaichi “anything.” Glass called Beijing’s reaction “outrageous” and said the U.S.-Japan alliance remains focused on ensuring peace in the region.

The Chinese issued a travel advisory for Japan on 14 November, and they reimposed bans on seafood imports from Japan on 19 November. The PLA undertook live-fire military drills near Japan over the period 17-25 November.

And in a further escalation, the Chinese have taken the dispute to the United Nations. Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN Fu Cong wrote in a letter to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres that:

If Japan dares to attempt an armed intervention in the cross-Strait situation, it would be an act of aggression. China will resolutely exercise its right of self-defense under the UN Charter and international law and firmly defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

China continues to seek to diplomatically isolate Taiwan. As such, any statement of support for Taiwanese sovereignty like the recent comment from the Japanese PM will come under sustained attack from the CCP.

Japan’s Hypersonic Strike Capability. In the past week, USNI News reported that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces had tested the deployment of their Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) Block I missiles. The test incorporated loading the vehicle-based launcher on ships and aircraft as well as launch rehearsals. The initial variant of the missile, the Block I, will be capable of striking targets hundreds of kilometres away and will enter service in 2026. Subsequent development of the missile will expand the missile’s range through the incorporation of improved glide performance technologies. These Block 2 and 2B variants of the missile are expected to have a range of between 2,000 to 3,000 kilometres.

The USNI News article notes that “the U.S. has supported the Japanese hypersonic program with testing ground access and support equipment. HVGP’s first test firing occurred in California last year. Washington also approved a $200 million sale in support of Tokyo’s hypersonic development in March. The project is set to equip two battalions of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force for potential deployments in Hokkaido and Kyushu to defend against threats from the north and south. While the composition of the upcoming units is unknown, each launcher wields two HVGP missiles.”

Below is a visualisation of the HVGP’s effective range, including both Block I and II systems, as well as Type 12 missiles, provided by the Taiwan Security Monitor.

US, Japan and Philippines Exercise Near Scarborough Shoal. Last week, the USS Nimitz Carrier Strike Group exercised with naval vessels from The Philippines and Japan in the South China Sea near Scarborough Shoal in years. This follows on the heels of multiple incidents of aggressive behaviour by Chinese naval and coast guard vessels towards America’s allies in the area over the past few years.

Chinese Military Developments. This week, the annual report to Congress by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission was released. There is lots to cover in the 700 (plus) pages of the report. It’s key findings with regards to China’s military capacity and intentions were as follows:

• China has continued to rapidly advance its capabilities to launch a successful invasion of Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) intensifying military activities near Taiwan have made it so that the PLA could pivot from a routine exercise to an actual blockade or invasion with almost no advance warning.

• A divergence has emerged between China’s English-language and Chinese-language propaganda about Taiwan—a split that suggests Beijing may be taking initial steps to prepare its people for the possibility of war. Whereas Chinese statements aimed at international audiences downplay the possibility of an invasion, China’s domestic propaganda has stated that Taiwan’s “provocations” could justify military action in the near future.

• The United States and its allies and partners can no longer assume that a Taiwan contingency is a distant possibility for which they would have ample time to prepare.

• Beijing has continued to rapidly modernise its military forces across all domains with the goal of being able to fight and defeat “strong enemies” like the United States.

• China views space as a crucial warfighting domain, and the PLA is rapidly expanding space and counter-space capabilities that could be used to target U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific and incapacitate U.S. space-based assets. Beijing’s investment in counterspace systems—including direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons and co-orbital interference platforms—illustrates its strategy of blinding and disorienting U.S. forces in the opening phase of a conflict.

• China’s deepening cooperation with Russia, Iran, and North Korea has enabled these pariah economies to withstand multilateral economic restrictions, undermining U.S. statecraft and providing China with a live testbed for sanctions evasion and wartime logistics.

I have included the 2025 report in my Big Five recommendations for this week (see below).

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This week, I published a new report at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) where I am a non-resident adjunct fellow. My report, called Seven Contemporary Insights on the State of the Ukraine War, explored many of the insights of my most recent research visit to Ukraine (in October 2025) as well as other research conducted into the war over the past two years.

As I note in the report, the war in Ukraine remains a rapidly evolving conflict. The battlefield, strategic strike, information operations, and industrial production campaigns remain crucial to both Ukraine’s and Russia’s war efforts. In all of these endeavors, there is an ongoing adaptation spiral occurring that is spinning out innovative techniques and technologies. At the same time, this is providing insights for Western strategists and force structure planners.

My new publication is designed to provide contemporary insights into the war and offers assessments on what they mean for possible conflict trajectories in the coming months. The seven key findings offer external observers not only an update on this rapidly changing war, but a view from the ground into how the character of war itself is evolving.

You can read the report in full at this link.

Also this week, I published an essay here about Russia’s performance in its war against Ukraine in 2025. While the outcomes of their 2025 war effort could shift considerably depending on the outcomes of the next week, my report offers an assessment of Russian tactical and strategic performance since January this year.

You can read it here.

Also this week, two podcasts featuring interviews with me dropped on their respective feeds.

First, on the School of War podcast, I was interviewed by Aaron Maclean about the latest from the war in Ukraine and what it means for the future of war. You can listen to our discussion at this link.

Second, on the Last Line of Defense podcast (published by CSIS), I had a conversation with Seth Jones. This discussion also focussed primarily on Ukraine, and we talked about the evolving dynamics of the war, highlighting Ukraine’s successes, Russia’s challenges, and key developments, including shifts in U.S. policy, the change in air defence posture, and the increasing use of long-range strikes and drones. You can listen to our conversation at this link.

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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

I have included a good article from Engelsberg Ideas about the impact of the new corruption scandal on President Zelenskyy, the new report just released by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission as well as articles on AI Disinformation, the military profession and an article from Modern War Institute describing a concept called Transition Period Warfare.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. The tragedy of Zelensky’s Ukraine

In this piece by Owen Matthews, published by Engelsberg Ideas, the impact of the latest Ukrainian corruption scandal on President Zelenskyy and the war efforts of his beleaguered nation are examined. As the author notes, “it is a supreme irony – indeed, a tragedy – that Zelensky began his political career as a passionate opponent of corruption, only to become mired in serious allegations of war profiteering of the most cynical sort among his closest and most trusted associates.” You can read the full article at this link.

2. AI Disinformation

In this article in Foreign Affairs, the authors propose that “a perfect storm is brewing. U.S. adversaries are investing heavily in disinformation campaigns, AI advancements are ushering in a more dangerous form of conflict, and the second Trump administration has weakened the defenses that are meant to shield the United States and its partners from foreign malign influence.” In a world awash in authoritarian disinformation, the magnifying impact of generative AI is something that national security institutions must come to grips with. You can read the full article here.

3. U.S.-China Economic & Security Review 2025

This week, the annual report to Congress by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission was released. It is quite a volumous document, and covers a range of topics that include: China’s revisionist ambitions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea; China and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands; China’s ambitions to dominate space; Beijing’s weaponisation of supply chains; and a review of Taiwan, Hong Kong, economics, trade, security, politics, and foreign affairs development in 2025. As the report notes, “Beijing has intensified its destabilizing gray zone activities, advanced its preparations for potential military conflict, and deepened its coordination with malign actors like Russia and Iran.” The full report is available at this link.

4. Transition Period Warfare

In this article, published by Modern War Institute, the author argues that the rise of autonomous systems means that a transitional period of warfare now exists and that continuous learning and adaptation is required. Further, this learning and adaptation must embrace not only technology, but tactics, strategy, military structures and organisational culture. You can read the full article here.

5. Janowitz and the Military Profession

In this essay, the author examines the contemporary definitions of the profession of arms and the meaning of military professionalism through the lens of the work of Morris Janowitz’s seminal work, The Professional Soldier. The author notes that “professional mastery is not what you think and know but how you think, learn, and interpret the world. Good professional mastery is developed through challenging and scaffolded military education, career development that includes diverse postings, and a willingness to recognise, accept and use different world views. It is this final point that Janowitz and others believe is critical for officers during periods of great power competition and war.” You can read the essay at this link.

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It has been another big week for news on modern war.

The Ukrainians, while focused on the defence of Pokrovsk and pounding Russia in their strike campaign, are also enduring another government corruption scandal as well as nightly aerial assaults by the Russians.

In the Pacific, China outlined its long-term plan for military and economic confrontation with the West while pushing back on the recent comments by the new Japanese Prime Minister about the security of Taiwan and Japan.

Welcome to my weekly update on modern war and strategic competition!

Ukraine

The Battle of Pokrovsk. The Russian double envelopment of Pokrovsk is nearing completion. At present, the single potential withdrawal route from the area currently occupied by Ukrainian defenders is only about 2-3 kilometres wide. This does not include several kilometres of ‘grey zone’ at the leading edges of the southern and northern axes of the Russian double envelopment.

The Ukrainian president, in statements this week, acknowledged the difficult circumstances facing Ukrainian defenders (that is an understatement if ever I heard one), but has deferred any decision on staying or withdrawing to the Ukrainian commander-in-chief. Zelenskyy was quoted as follows:

No one is forcing them to die for the sake of ruins. I will support our soldiers, especially the commanders who are there, in how they can control the situation, or if it’s too expensive for us. The most important thing for us is our soldiers.

Zelenskyy’s comments, and the situation in Pokrovsk, highlight again Ukraine’s central strategic dilemma on the ground. Do they try to hold as much ground as possible, in the recognition that it might result in higher Ukrainian casualties. Or, do they focus on force preservation while using the terrain to inflict maximum casualties on the Russians.

But, in the Battle of Pokrovsk, the Ukrainian commander-in-chief has chosen to do a bit of both. As his most recent Telegram post describes:

Yesterday, I held a working meeting with the commanders of the units engaged in combat operations in the Pokrovske and Ochertynske directions, specifically directly in the area of the Pokrovsko-Myrnohrad agglomeration. I heard reports on the operational situation in the areas of responsibility. The enemy does not cease attempts to break into residential areas, apartment buildings, and establish themselves there to expand their control zone. In view of this, we developed a set of measures to counter the enemy’s plans.

The greatest attention was given to the issues of sustainable logistics for the Defense Forces units, as well as countering the enemy’s use of FPV drones, reconnaissance UAVs, artillery, and mortars. Additional action options were worked out for various scenarios of situation development.

Ukrainian warriors continue to inflict significant losses on the enemy both in manpower and equipment, localizing their movements. Our commanders act with mandatory consideration of the need to preserve the life and health of subordinate personnel.

This is either a very clever deception plan, or a plan to stay and fight in Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk now has limited military value, although it does have potential use as a launch point for subsequent Russian offensive operations on the ground and with drones. Given the ability of Russian drones now to not only engage in the close fight but also in deep operations, this is a consideration in the hold or leave calculus of Ukrainian strategic military leaders. That said, Russia already holds ground to the west and north of Pokrovsk from which it might launch such attacks, so the value of the territory in the pocket still held by Ukraine should not be over estimated.

Thus, it is probably time to think about an orderly withdrawal while it is still possible to do so. The reserves that Ukraine is committing to hold onto this pocket of territory can probably be used better elsewhere. They will certainly be required for re-setting Ukraine’s eastern defences.

While the fall of Pokrovsk would provide Putin some strategic messaging and propaganda gains, it would not change the overall trajectory of the war at this point.

One interesting point from the last few weeks in the Battle for Pokrovsk: once again, the impact of weather on military operations - especially drone operations - has raised its head. The Russians have become adept at using fog to cover their offensive operations given the degradation by fog of Ukraine drone surveillance and strike activities. The Ukrainians do the same.

Many drone advocates have overlooked this obvious point, which has been observed in each of the winters during this war. And contrary to media reports, fog and other weather effects are not a ‘new player’ in this war or any other. The weather has always had an impact on miltary operations. It is a topic of relevance when examining the application of drones elsewhere in the world, a subject I examined recently in my study of how we might translate Ukraine lessons for the Pacific theatre.

Another corruption scandal. The Government of Ukraine is currently working its way through another major corruption scandal. Described by the Kyiv Independent as “the biggest corruption scandal of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s term”, the latest scandal involves an investigation by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. It alleges that Timur Mindich, an ally of Zelensky, led a group that received kickbacks from energy construction and procurement, including building defences for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, and laundering the proceeds.

It goes without saying that this latest corruption scandal hurts Zelenskyy at home and it hurts him and Ukraine abroad. According to a report in Politico, the EU is “seeking reassurances from Ukraine over future financial support to the country after a far-reaching corruption probe revealed a $100 million kickback scheme tied to its energy sector.”

The scandal also provides enormous amounts of ammunition for Russian misinformation campaigns as well as for those who seek to reduce the level of support being provided to Ukraine by western nations.

In a social media post on 15 November, Zelenskyy committed to reform and described specific actions for the energy firms Energoatom, Ukrhydroenergo, the Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine and Naftogaz. He also stated that:

We are beginning the overhaul of key state-owned enterprises in the energy sector. Alongside a full audit of their financial activities, the management of these companies is to be renewed. Today, together with Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko and Minister of Economy Oleksii Sobolev, we defined the course of action.

I have also instructed government officials to maintain constant and meaningful communication with law enforcement and anti-corruption bodies. Any scheme uncovered in these companies must receive a swift and just response. Full transparency and integrity in the energy sector remain an absolute priority.

Ukraine continues striking Russia. Some signature strikes against Russia were conducted by the Ukrainians in the past few days.

First, Ukrainian military forces executed precision strikes against oil infrastructure. This included the Ryazansky oil refinery, which produces gasoline, diesel, liquefied gas, and aviation kerosene for the Russian Aerospace Forces, was hit by multiple explosions. Also hit was the Lukoil refinery in Volgograd, the Saratov refinery, and the oil loading facilities at the port of Novorossiysk. This final strike, according to some reports, has taken offline (at least temporarily) up to 2% of global oil available for trade.

Next, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that it had destroyed four S-400 Triumph launchers and two radar systems during a strike on Novorossiysk in Russia. This was part of a long-term campaign to degrade Russian air defences to enable Ukrainian strikes deeper into Russia. As an SBU source reported to the Kyiv Post:

The SBU continues methodically destroying enemy air defence systems that protect critical military, infrastructure, and logistical sites. Each destroyed system creates a gap in Russian defences that Ukrainian drones and missiles will exploit.

To read more about how Ukraine has developed its deep strike capability over the past four years, and what western nations can learn from this, see this article.

The Pacific

The Pentagon’s Acquisition Reform. This is a topic relevant to both European and Asian security affairs. Not only does it potentially offer a speeding up of acquisitions to acceleration the learning and adaptation cycle in military institutions, it also offers a potential example for other nations’ military organisations whose innovation and adaptation is being held back by slow, zero-risk acquisition policies. The Pentagon media release on this topic can be read here.

Arms for Taiwan Announced. This week, a proposed package of military equipment for Taiwan was announced. The package includes nonstandard components, spare and repair parts, accessories, and repair and return support for F-16, C-130 and Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Fighter aircraft. The U.S. Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency has delivered certification notifying the US Congress of the sale.

Japan’s Taiwan Posture. Recently, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that if a “Taiwan contingency” were to occur — an emergency situation involving the use of force — it could constitute a “situation threatening Japan’s survival.” In these circumstance, Japan might exercise its right to collective self-defence.

In a predictable move this week, the CCP has indicated that it did not really appreciate these comments. Part of the Chinese response, provided by the CCP’s Taiwan Affairs Office, is as follows:

There is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is part of China. The egregious remarks concerning Taiwan made openly by a Japanese leader in the Diet seriously violate the one-China principle and constitute a blatant interference in China’s internal affairs. We express strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to this. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has lodged solemn representations and strong protests with the Japanese side.

Japan bears historical guilt toward the Chinese people on the Taiwan issue and committed countless crimes during its 50 years of colonial rule and enslavement of Taiwan. Eighty years ago, we defeated the Japanese aggressors, recovered Taiwan, and ended Japan’s occupation and plunder. Eighty years later, anyone who dares to challenge China’s core interests or attempts to obstruct the great cause of China’s reunification will find that the Chinese government, the Chinese people, and the Chinese military will never agree and will never tolerate it.

A couple of points need to be made here. The CCP did not defeat Japan in the Pacific, and it has neither possessed nor recovered Taiwan at any point since the formation of the PRC in 1949. But then again, historical facts have never gotten in the way of a good propaganda yarn for the CCP.

The larger message is that any time a nation offers any kind of support for Taiwan, the CCP will engage every lever it has to bully, cajole, coerce and aggressively push back on such support. But we already knew that.

And to put an exclamation mark on China’s displeasure at the Japanese PM, Senior Colonel Jiang Bin, spokesman for China’s Ministry of National Defense, stated that Japan will suffer a “crushing defeat” by the PLA if they were to “use force to interfere in the Taiwan question.”

China’s Plan for Confrontation with the West. During Fourth Plenum of the Twentieth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) was ratified. There are many elements of this plan, but an important part of it is setting up China to undertake a sustained period of confrontation with America and other western nations.

There are three important characteristics of the strategy (as described by Matthew Johnson):

• Centralized control of strategic resources and flows. The CCP seeks to sustain its command over the components of Chinese production, which allows it to calibrate access, pricing, and supply as tools of deterrence and coercion. The aim is strategic interdependence: a system flexible enough to weaponise trade while preserving internal stability through external market access and resource absorption.

• Directed innovation through the “new national system.” Xi’s new national system transforms the Party-state into a permanent strategic mobilization machine, fusing industry, research, and security planning. By integrating AI, infrastructure, and state finance into a single command framework, Beijing seeks to ensure technological catch-up and retaliation are routine functions of governance.

• Security as the organizing principle of development. Economic growth, once an end in itself, is now subordinated to the preservation of political control and survival under pressure. The guiding design, “using a new security pattern to guarantee a new development pattern”, recasts every policy domain, from technology to the One Belt One Road initiative, as an element of long-term confrontation management.

The full exploration of the impacts of this Five Year Plan by Matthew Johnson is included in my recommended readings for this week.

New Chinese Big Deck Amphib. This week, the Chinese Navy (PLAN) Type 076 amphibious assault ship Sichuan started its first sea trial. The new amphibious carrier, which uniquely contains an electromagnetic catapult for launching fixed wing drones, is around the same size as the U.S. Navy’s America class LHD.

The ship, while designed to facilitate amphibious operations, will probably also deploy combat drones. It is unclear which type of drone the Chinese will choose to deploy from the Type 076. Given the Chinese are yet to pursue a crewed STOVL capability to support amphibious operations, the uncrewed combat drones launched from the Type 076 may seek to fill this capability gap.

Photo of the week

Every now and then, I share a photo related to military operations, equipment or people that takes my fancy. I don’t do it every week. However, this week I came across this image that was shared on the Twitter / X feed of the Royal Navy’s Carrier Strike Group. It is, simply, lightning over Lightnings.

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This week I published a new report with the Special Competitive Studies Project in Washington DC. The report proposes that adaptation in the Ukraine War has now metastasised into a global Adaptation War.

The aim of this report is to examine the new adversary learning and adaptation bloc that has emerged joining Iran, North Korea, Russia and China, and to explore the various components of this global Adaptation War. The report also offers recommendations for western nations about how they might compete with this new learning and adaptation bloc.

You can read the full report at this link.

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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

I have included a new article that examines the state of the debate on cognitive warfare published by Small Wars Journal. There are also articles that examine drones and the revolution in military affairs, China’s plan for long-term confrontation with the West, frontline operations in Ukraine as well as will and resilience in modern war.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Assessing Cognitive Warfare

In this new article from Frank Hoffman that was published at Small Wars Journal, the author explores the current state of the debate and various literature on a topic that is alternatively described as cognitive warfare and cognitive domain operations. Frank offers a detailed examination of western, Chinese and Russian approaches, and writes that “the scope of Cognitive Warfare would have to incorporate efforts to develop and attain cognitive advantage at both the individual and collective level, as well as detecting and defending against cognitive domain operations.” The article provides a new and useful definition for cognitive warfare that should inform debate in western military and government institutions on this subject. The full article is available at this link.

2. Revolutions in Military Affairs and Drone Warfare

This recent article published by the Military Strategy Magazine examines the legacy of British academic and strategist Colin Gray’s work on revolutions in military affairs, and how this might be employed to guide our thinking about the rise of autonomous systems in military institutions world-wide. The author offers that “while keeping in mind Gray’s admonition to use analogies cautiously, the rise of drones does appear to be the next phase of the information-based RMA that was first identified by Soviet theorists in the 1970s.” But he also provides a caution: “Nevertheless, just as battlefield necessity led to the rapid eruption and dynamism of drone warfare, the interaction of the demands of some future battlefield and emergent technology will push drones into the background.” You can read the article here.

3. A Five-Year Plan for Managed Confrontation

Recently, the Twentieth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held its Fourth Plenum, during which it ratified the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030). In this terrific article published by the Jamestown Foundation, the author examines the contents of this five year plan. The article examines how Xi is using this plan to consolidate his command of the Party, military and economic systems in China, and is employing this as a foundation for a long-term confrontation with the United States and the west. As the author notes, “the result is a model of strategic endurance—a self-contained system able to sustain rivalry with the United States through control of capital allocation, industrial organization, and information flows.” The full article is available at this link.

4. The Eastern and Southern Frontlines in Ukraine

One of the best journalists covering the frontline situation in Ukraine today is the Kyiv Independent’s Francis Farrell. Francis has provided a stream of high-quality reporting and analysis about the war since its beginning. In this new piece, the author examines the current state of the frontline, with a focus on how Russia might exploit the current situation in eastern Ukraine to begin more active operations in souther Ukraine. It is a worthy read, and available at this link.

5. Will, Cohesion, Resilience, and Future War

Wars are not just fought by military organisations - they are fought by entire nations. This is a point that is reinforced in this new essay by Daniel Byman, published in the Center for Strategic and International Studies War and the Modern Battlefield: Insights from Ukraine and the Middle East. As the author notes, “in both Ukraine and Israel, the story of resilience is not only about battlefield endurance but also the mobilization of society—military, civilian, technological, and psychological—to resist aggression and maintain national cohesion. Their experiences underscore the critical importance of preparing societies for long-term conflict, including safeguarding infrastructure, cultivating civilian readiness, and maintaining the credibility of national narratives in the global information space.” You can read the full article at this link.

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As is normally the case these days, it has been another big week in international affairs, and the war in Ukraine.

The Ukrainians conducted an insertion of special force troops to hold open the route into the Pokrovsk salient, although this smacks of desperation rather than good tactics. Ukraine and Russia are pounding away at each other’s power generation and distribution system as another northern hemisphere winter approaches. Citizens in both nations face a cold, bleak winter with rolling blackouts in many areas.

In the Pacific, China commissioned its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, in the presence of President Xi. This is a significant technological achievement as the carrier is the first indigenously designed and produced carrier for the PLA Navy. China also continued its incursions into Taiwanese airspace, although at a slightly reduced tempo.

And, in other news, my brain is finally back to normal operations after a few days of reduced capacity due to jet lag!

Welcome to my weekly update on modern war and strategic competition.

Ukraine

In Europe, the Drones Keep Coming. European authorities reported this week that more unidentified drone incursions occured in NATO airspace. The Swedish Civil Aviation Administration reported at least one unidentified drone flying over the Gothenburg Landvetter Airport on 6 November, which forced the diversion or cancelation of flights. On the same day, Belgium temporarily closed the Brussels Airport after an air traffic controller observed an unidentified drone. Belgian police confirmed on November 6 that unidentified drones flew near the Belgian Nuclear Research Center.

German General Warns of Future Russian Aggression. While presenting Operation Plan Germany this week - a new national defence plan aligned with NATO’s regional strategy - Lt. Gen. Alexander Sollfrank, head of the armed forces’ Operational Command, warned about future Russian aggression and stated that:

Russia is already today capable of carrying out a regionally limited attack on NATO territory…After the end of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and if its rearmament continues unchecked, a large-scale attack on NATO could become possible — and soon. That means we have to deal with the possibility of an attack against us, whether we like it or not. And beyond that, we have no time to lose.

Operation Plan Germany is part of Germany’s strategy of deterring Russian aggression by organising for up to 800,000 allied troops to move through Germany within 180 days to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank.

Ukraine’s Unmanned Air Defence Forces. This week, President Zelenskyy appointed Yurii Cherevashenko to command this organisation, and has tasked him with integrating unmanned systems – in particular, interceptor drones – and strengthening our air defense capabilities with advanced armaments.

Russia’s Casualties on the Uptick. As expected, and forecast in previous weekly updates, Russian average weekly casualties have shown an increase as the calendar year draws to a close. This increase has been observed now in all four autumn-winter periods of this war. The increase coincides with the desire of the Russian government to achieve significant Russian strategic objectives.

In 2022, it was the escalation in Russian operations around Bakhmut. Last year, it was Putin’s desire to capture as much territory as possible to shape the views of Presidential contender Trump. This year, Putin seeks the capture of Pokrovsk to again shape the narrative it rolls out to the Trump administration and it to put itself in a favourable position for subsequent operations in Donetsk.

We should expect the average casualties to rise over the next two months at least. Despite this, the only assessment that can be made with these figures is that Ukraine is killing enough Russians to ensure that Russia cannot win this war, but is not killing enough to change Putin’s calculus. Unless there is a drastic increase in the overall number of Russians killed (which the Commander of the USF has discussed) and the kill ratio between Ukraine and Russia improves, it is hard to see any drastic changes in the trajectory of this war.

USF Update. The Unmanned Systems Forces released their monthly update for October on 7 November. Key statistics included in this month’s report include the following:

• 26,067 unique enemy targets were struck, including 8,060 enemy personnel, of whom 4,729 were killed.

• The share of the Unmanned Systems Forces in the total volume of targets struck/destroyed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine is 33.5%.

• Over 25% of the enemy’s oil-refining capacity has been put out of action thanks to precise strikes by the Unmanned Systems Forces.

• Average cost to eliminate one russian serviceman — $784.

• Average cost to destroy one unit of military equipment — $949.

You can view the full update at this link.

The Battle for Pokrovsk. While Ukraine continues to fight to retain ground in the Pokrovsk salient, it appears that the Battle of Pokrovsk may be approaching its culmination. The insertion this week of special operations soldiers to hold open the route out of Pokrovsk for Ukrainian defenders was courageous but may only delay what appears to be the inevitable fall of Pokrovsk.

The Battle for Pokrvosk began in earnest in July 2024, and since then, the Russians have maintained the Pokrovsk axis of advance as their ground operations main effort. Even when Ukraine executed its incursion into Kursk in 2024, Russia sustained its efforts on the Pokrovsk axis of advance. As I wrote at the time:

For the foreseeable future therefore, both Ukraine and Russia must commit to conducting two major ground campaigns concurrently. While Russia is probably better placed to resource two such campaigns, neither Ukraine nor Russia is likely to be able to do so into 2025…Unfortunately, as stunning and clever as the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk has been, it may not change Putin’s overall war goals. Previous setbacks, including the Russian Army’s defeat in its 2022 Kyiv offensive, its defeats in Kharkiv and Kherson as well as the international sanctions regime, have not modified Putin’s overall goal of subjugating Ukraine and destroying its capacity to exist as a sovereign, prosperous democracy.

And so this campaign has played out. The Ukrainian Kursk campaign is largely over. Russia, freed from its need to clear the Ukrainians from Russia soil, has continued to throw troops at the Battle for Pokrovsk and to prepare for subsequent advances.

What will be the political and military impacts of a possible fall of Pokrovsk?

Political Impacts. The biggest impact of a fall of Pokrovsk will be to reinforce Russian strategic messaging about inevitable victory in this war. Of course, this proposition has no evidence given that in four years, Russia has lost over one million troops, taken less than 20% of Ukraine and is suffering massive damage to its economy from Ukrainian aerial assaults. But that won’t stop Putin, Lavrov and others from seeking to influence the Trump administration to pressure Ukraine to ‘stop the killing.’

The fall of Pokrovsk probably won’t do wonders for Zelenskyy’s popularity but he retains broad popularity and support of two thirds of the population. It is unlikely that Pokrovsk’s loss to Russia will have a major impact on Zelenskyy’s government given that he can demonstrate that the military has done everything possible to defend it. And, given the need to preserve the army is more important that retaining what is essentially now a dead city with no value as a logistics hub, the smart political move soon will be to withdraw Ukrainian troops while they can do so in good order.

Military Impacts. In many respects, the fall of Pokrovsk will simplify things for senior Ukrainian commanders in Eastern Ukraine. They will have straightened the defensive line, potentially allowing them to form some operational reserves to deny the Russians further advances if they take Pokrovsk.

Clearly this would also give the Russians a boost, and they will have an opportunity to potentially have an operational pause while they prepare for subsequent operations in the east. The seizure of the rest of Donetsk is a key political and military objective for Putin. Russian ground operations after Pokrovsk will be designed to achieve this goal.

The most likely campaign design to achieve this would be an operational level double envelopment of the Fortress Belt of cities in Eastern Ukraine. I have sketched out what this might look like on the map below.

Ukraine’s Long-Range Strike Campaign. Frequent readers here will know that I have covered the development of Ukraine’s deep strike capability over the past three and a half years. It has been a very impressive achievement for a nation that just four years ago had almost no capability to conduct long-range strike operations. In the intervening time, Ukraine has built a hybrid strategic strike force that is a mix of western and indigenous weapons, and mix of foreign and Ukrainian sourced target intelligence, and balance of technological and human capabilities to enhance the precision of their strikes.

You can read some of my recent assessments of Ukraine’s deep strike campaign, and the various components of Ukraine’s long-range strike force here, here and here.

For some time, the main effort of Ukraine’s deep strike campaign has been Russian energy infrastructure, primarily oil refineries and storage facilities. The supporting effort has been striking defence manufacturing sites (including this recent one which destroyed many Shahed drones) as well as munitions storage locations.

It now appears that Ukraine has shifted its targeting slightly to encompass the Russian power generation and distribution system. The Russian power plants struck in the past week (according to a list compiled by Stefan Korshak) include:

• Orel gas power plant, two explosions, fuel storage and main generator buildings hit and on fire.

• Vladimirskaya Power substation station, two hits.

• Zheleznegorsk power transmission station, Kursk region.

• Alechevsk city, Luhansk, power transmission station.

• Orel, city heating plant.

• Usman power transmission station, Lipets region.

• Vladimirskaya substation.

• Oryel heating plant.

• Yaroslavl region, two oil transfer stations hit.

• Volgorechensk, Kostroma thermal plant, supports Moscow.

As Korshak describes in his article for the Kyiv Post:

Since Oct. 13, according to Kyiv Post counts, Ukrainian strike planners have launched at least 29 separate strikes directly targeting power grid infrastructure inside Russia or occupied Ukrainian territories, with attacks almost always seemingly intended to hit flammable sections of a transformer station to set it afire. Over the same 3-week period Kyiv has launched a total 76 strikes, with the majority of attacks aiming at Russian capacity to process oil and gas products, or export them.

Prior to October, Ukraine targeted multiple Russian power generation and distribution facilities. The September strikes on Russian power infrastructure has been mapped by Shahed Tracker, and can be seen below.

So, there has been a shift in targeting by Ukraine. What are we to make of this?

First, it is clear that Ukraine is now producing sufficient long-range weapons to target a wider variety of Russian targets concurrently. This helps to overwhelm the Russian air defence system. While the Russians have demonstrated the ability to learn, adapt and improve their air defences, even they cannot defend every potential target at the same time. If the Ukrainians throw enough weapons at enough targets dispersed over a wide area, some will get through.

Second, it is unlikely the shift to targeting Russian power supplies is designed to bring Putin to the table. If over one million casualties can’t do this, a few power blackouts (which will not affect Putin or his senior leadership) is not going to achieve this. It could however be designed to foster a negotiation over halting the targeting of power plants by both sides.

Third, the means of conducting long-range strike has evolved since the beginning of this war. In 2021, the key methods for executing a long-range strike against an adversary were missiles launched from aircraft (particularly long-range bombers) as well as missiles fired from submarines and ships. Now, with the development of multiple classes of long-range drones which are produced in large numbers - and the introduction into service of ground-launched weapons such as PRSM and the Typhon system - western military organisations have a wider array of options to chose from in developing their deep strike capabilities. And, the flip side is, they have a wider range of threats that they must now defend against.

Finally, despite the huge expense and the mass use of aerial assault weapons so far in this war, they have proved again that this strategy is not a silver bullet in war. It can certainly cause significant damage, and pain to civilians and a nation’s war effort. But long-range strike operations by themselves are insufficient national tools by themselves for winning a war. As the evidence so far shows us in Ukraine, the deep strike campaigns of both sides has yet to force a negotiated resolution to the war.

Meanwhile, on the evening of 8 November, Russia launched a large, combined strike on critical infrastructure facilities in Ukraine using strike UAVs, air-, ground-, and sea-based missiles. As described by the Ukrainian Air Force, the air defence forces detected and tracked 503 air attack weapons – 45 missiles (including 32 ballistic) and 458 UAVs of various types (about 300 Shaheds). The main directions of the strike were the Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Poltava regions. Around 406 of their drones and missiles were brought down by Ukrainian air defence units, according to reporting in the Kyiv Independent.

The Pacific

China’s New Carrier. This week, the PLA Navy officially commissioned its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian (Hull No. 18), at the Yulin/Longpo Naval Base in the presence of President Xi. The first indigenously designed aircraft carrier for the Chinese navy, the new carrier is equipped with an electromagnetic catapult and recovery capability.

The carrier was launched in 2022 and has conducted nine series of sea trials. It is designed to carry up to 40 fixed wing aircraft plus helicopters. On display on the Fujian’s deck during the commissioning ceremony were the four types of aircraft most likely to form its initial airing: the fifth-generation Shenyang J-35 naval fighter; the Shenyang J-15T fourth-generation fighter; the KJ-600 airborne early warning aircraft; and, the Hongdu Z-20J medium multirole naval helicopter.

The PLAN now has three aircraft carriers in service. Theoretically, this means they should be able to keep one deployed at all times.

The China Power site at the Center for Strategic and International Studies has a primer on the new aircraft carrier, which you can peruse at this link.

BrahMos in the Philippines. The BrahMos missile system is now operational with the Philippine Marine Corps. The Corps unveiled its first BrahMos missile battery during a 75th anniversary ceremony on 7 November. The battery is deployed in Zambales. From there, the BrahMos missiles can reach locations such as Scarborough Shoal.

Designed and built in India, the Brahmos is a ramjet-powered, long-range supersonic cruise missile which is capable of being launched from a variety of platforms including ground, air and naval platforms. In Indian service, the missile has a range of up to 900km, but the export version is limited to a range of 290km.

UAV Battalions for Taiwan’s Operational Theatres. Taiwan has announced that each of the Operational Theatres in its military command structure will be allocated an integrated UAV battalion by 2026. The Taiwanese Theater Command boundaries are shown in the graphic below.

Taking effect from 1 January 2022, the Taiwanese reorganised their three army corps and two defence commands into five main “theatres of operation”.

In a related development, the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense has announced the reorganisation of drone development and employment into three key roles: joint operations, tactical, and combat

• At the joint operations level, Taiwan’s uncrewed aerial vehicles conduct long-range reconnaissance, surveillance, and strike missions in the air and sea domains.

• At the tactical level, drones will execute reconnaissance and target identification, draw enemy air defences to waste missiles, and support joint anti-landing and coastal defence missions by Taiwan’s Theater Commands.

• In combat, drones will be employed to extend the range of other weapons, speed up target acquisition, and to conduct sustainment activities during prolonged operations.