I have a great passion for reading that I like to share with others.

Reading widely and in depth was fundamental to my professional development for decades and it remains a key part of my daily routine. On a normal day, I read for about 3–4 hours, with 1–2 history books and a non-fiction novel going at the same time. I also attempt to peruse as many journal articles and blog posts as I can. It is one of the ways I try to keep learning and to stay current with developments in modern war, national security affairs and geopolitics.

Almost a decade ago, I began producing an annual reading list, with the first one being published in 2017 and my most recent one published here in 2024. (You can read the 2024 list here).

The objective of my producing these reading lists was to provide a “starter kit” for young professionals that contains a few essential books, journals, blogs, podcasts, and Twitter feeds. To this end, I keep my annual list to the size of a single, A4 page printed out. It is hard to keep it at this size given the enormous amount of high-quality material available.

Like all of my previous lists, the 2025 list is not just about books. It provides a range of other resources that permit military and national security professionals, as well as others with an interest in these matters, to immerse themselves in a global professional discourse about strategy, military affairs, modern war and strategic competition. Never before have we possessed the range of networking opportunities afforded by the digital age that allow us to reach out to fellow travellers seeking enlightenment about the modern war, national security and the profession of arms.

The list contains reading resources that stretch from the classics of antiquity through to speculation (some informed, some fictional) about future war. It has selections from military history and contemporary operations.

C.S. Lewis once noted that “We read to know we are not alone.” Reading drives us to look beyond the tunnel vision of our day-to-day duties that often absorb much of our time. It provides shared areas of interest among military and national security practitioners, and a mechanism for individuals to join a larger discourse. This includes organisations such as the Military Writers Guild (of which I am a proud member) and other institutions.

This reading list is intended to comprise a small (and expandable) collection of resources for those who wish to begin (or re-engage in) their journey of exploration in the many tenets of our profession. It consists of a range of resources beyond just books that permits the military and national security professional to connect into a global discourse on strategic challenges, as well as professional education and development. This permits us to reach out to fellow travellers seeking enlightenment about the modern war, the profession of arms and national security issues. I hope that the recommendations contained in my 2025 reading list helps you to move closer to this objective.

The 2025 reading list is below. New entries for this year are shown in red.

Happy reading!

My 2025 reading list can also be downloaded as a single-page pdf document at the link below.

2025 Doctrina Futura Reading List

157KB ∙ PDF file

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Recently, I had the opportunity to read Alexander Vindman’s excellent new book, The Folly of Realism.

In 2019, Alexander Vindman was a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel detailed to serve on the National Security Council serving as the director for Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Russia. As he later described his responsibilities, “my role was to coordinate all diplomatic, informational, military, and economic policy for the region, across all government departments and agencies.”

In July of that year, as part of his duties Vindman was listening to a phone call between the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and the first-term President Trump. During the call, Trump demanded that Zelenskyy find incriminating evidence against the Biden family.

Vindman was faced with a tremendous moral quandary. Was maintaining the secrecy of presidential communications more important than reporting what he believed was a highly improper demand from a sitting president for a foreign government toinvestigate a U.S. citizen and political opponent? He made the morally courageous decision to report the call.

His report, and a range of other evidence, led to the House impeachment inquiry (you can read the Articles of Impeachment here), and the subsequent impeachment of Trump by the House of Representatives. Trump was subsequently found not guilty in his trial by the U.S. Senate.

Vindman’s life has been on a different trajectory since then.

Not long after retiring from the US Army, Alexander published his book, Here Right Matters. It was the story of his childhood, his US Army service and his service in the National Security Council until that July 2019 phone call.

His latest book, which is a New York Times bestseller, examines America’s policy towards Russia and Ukraine. It is also an exploration of the twists and turns of U.S. policy towards Russia since the end of the Cold War, as well as a lesson in Ukraine’s modern history.

Vindman contends that since the end of the Cold War, America has prioritised relations with Russia at the cost of relations with Ukraine. This has included an acceptance of Russia’s attacks on Ukraine, justified by a philosophy of “realism”, a theory favoured by John Mearsheimer that contents that the United States must engage in a cold-blooded pursuit of its national interests. Stable relations with large powers like Russia and China take priority over the needs of smaller nations.

In The Folly of Realism, Vindman proposes that this approach has manifestly failed with Russia and will probably fail with China too. An alternative approach that is proposed by Vindman is to adopt the policy that Ben Tallis recently described as Neo-idealism. As Tallis has written about this concept:

This is an approach that can not only defend but renew our free societies and help spread their values. The first pillar, value primacy, reflects neo-idealism’s morally based approach to geopolitics; it conceives of core liberal democratic values as ideals to strive for – and sees these values as our most fundamental interests. From this value primacy follows the need for: military readiness, effective internationalism, geo-economic realism, inclusive dynamism, ecological modernization, democratic futurism, and societal cohesion. By combining these tenets, neo-idealism offers an approach that addresses both internal and external threats to our democracies and allows us to marshal the various sources of our power.

Vindman writes in his book about this concept that:

More consonant with American values than realism, and more literally realistic about achieving long- term stability and securing vital American interests, neo-idealism is emerging as a new way of thinking about foreign relations…Neo-idealism thus departs sharply from recent approaches to foreign policy that seemingly reject the short- term, transactionalist basis of realism but have proven, in the end, merely fantastical— often with disastrous results.

To provide more insights into the book, I recently posed several questions to the author. You can read his answers below.

1. The book is very much the prequel to the February 2022 Russian full scale invasion of Ukraine. Can you explain why you decided to cover the antecedents to the war (noting it began in 2014) rather than the post Feb 2022 aspects?

I wrote this book to understand how we arrived at such a tragic and destabilizing moment in global affairs. The full-scale invasion in 2022 did not begin in a vacuum—it was the culmination of decades of decisions, miscalculations, and permissive policies. It’s impossible to grasp the dynamics of the current war without examining the intertwined histories of Ukraine and Russia and the policies pursued by the United States, its European allies, and Russia itself after the Cold War.

For over 35 years, successive U.S. administrations—both Democratic and Republican—have pursued a “Russia First” policy that effectively ceded Moscow a sphere of influence over the newly independent states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Rather than advancing a comprehensive strategy grounded in shared values and long-term strategic alignment, the West chose short-term stability and transactional diplomacy. This approach propped up Russia’s hegemonic ambitions and was justified by a combination of misplaced optimism that Russia would “normalize,” and fears of either geopolitical chaos or renewed rivalry should Russia collapse.

These Western policies lacked strategic resolve and helped entrench Ukraine in a geopolitical gray zone—kept out of NATO yet unmistakably breaking away from Moscow’s orbit. My decision to focus on the 1991–2022 period also reflects my personal and professional experiences: I served in the military during the Orange Revolution and worked at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv from 2009-2010 and the Embassy in Moscow during the Euromaidan period. I observed firsthand the political and strategic shifts that shaped Ukraine’s westward turn and Russia’s mounting belligerence.

This book is about the warning signs we missed and the policy failures we must not repeat. While the war since 2022 has rightly drawn immense attention, my aim is to help readers understand the deeper roots of Russia’s aggression, Ukraine’s enduring resistance, and the West’s repeated failure to deter Moscow.

2. You conduct a detailed, and very balanced, examination of Ukraine in the lead up to the 2022 Russian invasion. Why do you think this context is important for understanding the course of the war?

In the months before the invasion, I was privately urging the Biden administration and publicly —urging sanctions, forward posture shifts in Europe, and desperately needed military assistance to Ukraine. I saw the war coming with a clarity that, unfortunately, many in the national security establishment lacked. That foresight came not from guesswork, but from understanding Russia’s imperatives and perceptions.

Russia interpreted the tepid Western response to Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as a green light. The very territory it seized in 2014 became a launchpad for the 2022 invasion. Moscow assumed, with some justification, that the West would once again hesitate. Putin believed he had a narrow window to decisively reassert control over Ukraine before it fully consolidated its Western orientation.

Domestic factors were just as important. By late 2021, Ukraine had recovered from the political shock of 2014, stabilized its democratic institutions, and was continuing its integration with the West. For Putin, the emergence of a stable, democratic, and largely Russophone Ukraine aligned with Europe was intolerable. The considerations were not essentially derived from a security dilemma, but over the loss of a core constituent of Russia’s former empire and an integral component of Russia identity.

A stronger Western commitment between 2014 and 2021—deeper political support, military cooperation, and a credible deterrent posture—might have made the invasion unthinkable. Instead, Washington and Brussels were caught off guard and had to scramble to deliver aid and impose costs after the invasion was already underway.

3. It is clear from your book that there was a general reluctance in Europe (and elsewhere) before 2022 to accept that a large-scale war was still possible in Europe. This led to different deterrent strategies and methods of dealing with Russia. Just how much do you think this has changed now?

Since 2022, European countries have begun to rethink security in broader terms. They now more clearly recognize the role of economic coercion, energy dependence, disinformation, and sabotage in modern warfare. Yet military preparedness remains uneven, and Europe still lacks a coherent, continent-wide defense strategy.

European militaries are rearming. They’re investing in capabilities associated with high-intensity warfare—artillery, tanks, air defenses—not just counterterrorism or peacekeeping. Russia’s hybrid tactics, from cyber operations to GRU sabotage, underscore the urgency. And the involvement of other autocracies—North Korea, Iran—in support of Russia has laid bare the global dimensions of the threat.

Despite this progress, the pace of rearmament remains too slow, especially as the United States appears poised to reduce its footprint in Europe. Even a future U.S. administration committed to transatlantic solidarity will face different global priorities. Europe must prepare not only to defend itself but to contribute meaningfully to stability in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific and a world in which the United States’ primary focus is war planning and preparation in the Pacific theatre.

4. Particularly in the first year of the war, there was a reticence among US and European governments to provide weapon systems such as tanks, air defence systems and artillery to Ukraine? What impact do you think this had on the Russian strategic calculus in the first couple of years of the war, and on Ukraine's?

Western reluctance to provide advanced weapons in the first year of the war allowed Russia to recover from its early battlefield failures and shift to a strategy of attrition. The delay signaled to Moscow that the West was hesitant and risk-averse, reinforcing its belief that time was on Russia’s side.

Once aid did arrive, it helped level the playing field. U.S. and European systems were essential in enabling Ukraine to destroy Russian hardware and hold ground. Still, Russia retained advantages in the air and maritime domains, missile capabilities, and manpower. Ukraine responded by pioneering innovations in drone warfare and asymmetric tactics—leveraging ingenuity over brute force to neutralize Russia Black Sea Fleet, nearly eliminate Russian close air support, and neutralize Russia’s larger force of armored vehicles. Russia still maintains advantages in artillery fire, long-range strike, and tactical bombing, but these capabilities are not decisive on the operational or strategic plane.

Today, while there is near parity in many conventional domains, Ukraine still faces acute shortages in artillery, air defenses, precision strike capabilities and critically short in manpower. The war has become a test of endurance, and the West’s inconsistency has made that test far harder for Ukraine than it needed to be.

5. You lay out the case for US policy before 2022 having a Russia-first approach. Can you explain the key elements of this policy and why US administrations embraced such a policy?

“Russia First” has meant treating Moscow’s sphere of influence as legitimate and tolerating its coercion of neighboring states. It reflects a Cold War-era realpolitik that sees stability through deference rather than deterrence.

This mindset rationalizes Russian dominance in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe—regions the U.S. has often ceded as Moscow’s to manage. For many in Washington, this posture appeared to reduce confrontation and prevent escalation. But in practice, it emboldened the Kremlin and demoralized partners seeking closer ties to the West.

The 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive illustrated this pattern. After Ukraine's breakthrough, Washington slowed military aid and pivoted to a policy of “managed escalation,” ostensibly to avoid nuclear provocation. This response, shaped by Russia’s saber-rattling, was emblematic of the flawed logic underpinning Russia First—rewarding nuclear blackmail and undermining Ukrainian gains.

6. The obvious follow-up question is this: since January 2025, has the US returned to a Russia-first policy?

Yes, and with greater intensity. Previous administrations enabled Russia passively. The second Trump administration is doing so actively. Trump’s worldview reduces global affairs to a contest among great powers—Russia, China, and the U.S.—while dismissing the sovereignty and interests of smaller states.

The abandonment of Ukraine, disengagement from European allies, and withdrawal from the peace process are not just mistakes; they are choices that directly serve Russian interests. While this may seem like a break from past policy, it’s really an major acceleration of the same flawed logic that has defined U.S.-Russia relations for decades.

7. What are the prospects for a peace deal with Russia?

I remain deeply skeptical but not without hope. Any viable peace deal is unlikely before mid 2026. The Trump administration is openly sympathetic to Russia, and Moscow is understandably eager to see how far this alignment can go.

Militarily, both sides are grinding toward exhaustion. A peace process might emerge after another campaign season, when the costs become unsustainable. Politically, however, both Kyiv and Moscow remain intransigent. Zelenskyy cannot accept a deal that rewards Russian aggression––looking for a solution similar to the status quo ante February2022––and Putin shows no willingness to scale back his demands to eliminate Ukraine’s sovereignty.

The sharp reduction in U.S. aid may force Ukraine into a more defensive posture, but European support and domestic production could offset this to some degree. The critical challenge lies in air defense, long-range strike capability, and artillery resupply. And the situation doesn’t become critical for many months and mainly in a condition of frozen U.S. security assistance. Ukraine’s and Europe’s ability to keep U.S. intelligence sharing and security assistance flowing, while expanding direct purchases and domestic production for Ukraine, provide staying power that Russia does not have.

Additionally, Ukraine is looking for a meaningful agreement with Western guarantees to prevent Russia from rearming and attacking a few years down the road. Building European support for such an agreement will take the better part of a year.

Diplomacy has thus far forestalled the worst-case outcome: a complete Western abandonment of Ukraine. It’s possible that continued Ukrainian engagement and willingness to compromise as well as Putin’s intransigence might persuade the Trump administration to pivot policy away from Russia. In this scenario, framing Putin, not Zelenskyy, as the obstacle to peace will be key.

But that outcome depends on a fundamental shift in how the administration understands power, deterrence, and the costs of appeasement.

*******

This is a terrific book, and one I greatly enjoyed reading. It provides a very accessible, and well informed to the historical foundations of the ongoing war in Ukraine, as well as the U.S. policy settings that are currently hindering effective peace negotiations.

It is an important book that should be read by policy makers, military officers and business leaders. Vindman has provided a clear diagnosis of some of the many challenges that currently face American foreign policy as well as recommending a pathway to a more effective approach for the United States’ interactions with the world.

The Folly of Realism is published by Public Affairs (part of the Hachette Book Group) and was released on 25 February 2025.

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Welcome to the next entry in my examination and celebration of books!

In his excellent blog Logistics in War, military logistics expert and Australian Army officer Dave Beaumont describes logistics as follows:

Logistics, the means of strategy and tactics, determines what is practically possible in war. Its nature is expressed in operational choices and decisions, and is fundamental to military preparedness. Therefore, understanding its nature is vital to commanders and institutional leaders.

Dave is part of a community of experts who discuss and advocate for deeper thinking about military logistics, and the role it plays in shaping and informing the development of strategy and military operations. Unfortunately, this community of logistics experts is much, much smaller than those who comment on other topics more interesting to the media. But, the work of Dave and his fellow logisticians remains as vital, if not more so, than that of many other military ‘experts’ commenting on modern war and the impacts of new technologies and weapons.

Therefore, this new book from Howgate Publishing called Professionals Talk Logistics: Sustaining Strategy and Operations, is a timely addition to the much too-small literature on this topic. Edited by Steve “Doctrine Man” Leonard and Jon Klug, the book has chapters that cover off on the many human and technical aspects of modern logistics operations. Importantly, chapters in the book explore how logistics shapes strategic options and strategy execution, as well as the operational level of war.

This is not Steve and Jon’s first collaboration. Their previous book, Power Up, examined leadership through the lens of the modern superhero genre. Before that, in To Boldly Go, strategy and leadership in the 21st century was explored through the context of science fiction. (Full disclosure: I have chapters in each of these books, as well as a chapter in Professionals Talk Logistics).

To celebrate the release of Professionals Talk Logistics, I thought I would conduct a short Q & A with Steve and Jon to discuss the origins of the book, and why this topic is so important.

1. Can both of you, without referring back to the book, explain why we should care about military logistics?

I made this point in the first chapter. Logistics is what made the great captains of history great. Those early empires were possible because the great captains who led them understood how to sustain the long campaigns necessary to build and maintain them. At the operational and strategic levels of war, success is made possible by the purposeful synchronization of logistics. That's proven true throughout history — when you address the art of war, concepts like reach and culmination are inherently tied to logistics. So, when we shortcut logistics — the resources that fuel military strategy — we handicap our ability to achieve our desired goals.

2. Does the conduct of military logistics have lessons or insights for those who are outside the military?

Absolutely. The successful execution of strategy relies on the ability to balance limited resources in space and time. This is something I spend a lot of time instilling in my business strategy students — you will never have all of the resources you need all of the time, so the successful strategist is one who learns how to balance requirements and capabilities, ways and means. In the military context, it's finding that delicate balance between "just in time" and "just in case." The same principle applies for strategist outside the military.

3. What were the drivers for you to bring together so many authors to talk about this topic in a single book?

Well, we're lazy. Seriously, this is a subject that benefits from a wide variety of perspectives, people who have experienced war in all its various forms and understand the challenges of sustaining it. The broader those perspectives, the better. Even as a career logistician and strategist, much of my experience is limited to sustaining the tactical (division and below) fight, and from a decidedly Western perspective. We broke that mold here, and for good reason. Those added voices bring a richness and diversity to the knowledge base.

4. Why is this subject relevant now?

I think it's always been relevant, but in an era where we're seriously concerned with another conflict in the Pacific, it's especially relevant. We learned a lot of valuable lessons about sustaining warfare across vast distances in the Pacific during World War II. That was 80 years ago. Today, we struggle with basic warfighting tasks like operating a floating pier in rough seas, something that we absolutely have to be capable of executing if we're conducting land-based operations in the Pacific. Regaining that knowledge makes this subject all the more relevant to us now and in the future.

5. What were the most challenging, and most enjoyable, elements of editing this new book?

Obviously, the challenge comes with assembling the team and getting everyone working toward a common goal. Once you've done that, the writing and editing seem to fall into place relatively quickly. This is our fifth project together and I think we've got that part handled quite well. The enjoyment comes with watching the book cross the finish line. There's just something about seeing another book on the shelf, something satisfying.

*****

A year ago, the National Bureau of Asian Research dedicated an entire edition of their journal, Asia Policy, to this topic. The particular focus was the issue of logistics in the event of a war over Taiwan.

Despite facing critical munitions shortages and growing political divisiveness over the substantial financial burden of this policy, the West’s resupply of the Ukrainian military during Ukraine’s current war with Russia has—so far—been a success. Major obstacles distinguish the Taiwan scenario.

Not all logistics operations are the same. Significant geographical, political, cultural and industrial factors can influence how logistic support is undertaken in different wars and military operations. The exploration of the breadth and depth of logistics is one of the strengths of this new book edited by Steve and Jon. It explores modern logistics from many different angles. Be it human or technical, large or small scale, Europe or the Pacific, this book covers it.

I thoroughly recommend this book to all those who are interested in how military logistics supports and shapes strategy and military operations. Professionals Talk Logistics, published by Howgate Publishing, is now available in paperback, hardback and e-book formats.

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One of my favourite Christmas gifts this year was a wonderful book that explored the great libraries of the world. Written by Vincent Phan, The Most Beautiful Book Places in the World covers dozens of the great libraries and book stores on every continent (except Antarctica of course). It has histories of the libraries and stores and terrific images. I thoroughly recommend it.

I love this book on libraries and book stores because I love books and reading. It is something that I have enjoyed for as long as I can remember. For some time, I have been thinking about how I might share this joy.

Over the past decade, I have shared my love of reading by creating reading lists. These have primarily been focussed on military affairs - history, contemporary conflict, future war, leadership and technology. I published several with the Modern War Institute, which you can read here. But I have also published reading lists on technology as well as three lists on science fiction (co-authored with the awesome Nate Finney). You can read our science fiction reading lists here.

Recently, I published my first Futura Doctrina reading list, which is available at this link.

But I want to do more than this, so I have set up this new page to cover books, those of others as well as mine. It will also feature reading lists from time to time (not just mine) and short Q&A interviews with authors, as I recently did with Professor Hal Brands for his new book, The Eurasian Century. You can read that article (see above image) at this link.

I don’t have an established publishing schedule for the content in this new section on books. I will just put out articles when appropriate. And, all the content here will be free!

I have already placed several previous articles in the section, which you can read here.

I know there are many, many people out there who share my joy of reading, and I look forward to sharing with you books, my thoughts on books, as well as different reading lists.

Happy reading!

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Recently, I had the opportunity to read an advance reading copy of Professor Hal Brands’ fabulous new book, The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World. Professor Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is also a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion.

Professor Brands is also the author or editor of multiple books, all of which I can thoroughly recommend. He is one of the few people I know who is both prolific in their writings, but also produces extraordinarily high quality analysis and policy recommendations in all his work. Some of his more recent books include The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (2022), and Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China (with Michael Beckley, 2022). He was the editor of the new version of Makers of Modern Strategy, The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age (2023), and editor of a 2024 book on the war in Ukraine, War in Ukraine: Conflict, Strategy, and the Return of a Fractured World.

Given this background, Professor Brands is very well placed to conduct an examination of the precursors to contemporary geopolitics, and offer recommendations to modern policy makers on dealing with the threats posed by the axis of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Early in his book, he writes that “Eurasia is the fulcrum of world order: A country or group of countries that dominates its vital regions would have unmatched resources, wealth and global reach. If an aggressive autocracy or alliance of autocracies became preeminent within Eurasia, it could fundamentally reshape world order and coerce its rivals around the globe”.

Throughout the book, Professor Brands explores over a century of history in which nations have struggled to dominate Eurasia - or at least large parts of it. The First and Second World Wars, and the Cold War, are all part of what Professor Brands describes as the first Eurasian century, and each of these key world events are reviewed in the book.

Professor Brands also examines the work of geographers and geopolitical theorists such as Halford Mackinder, Rudolph Kjellen, Friedrich Ratzel, Karl Haushofer, Nicholas Spykman, and Alfred Thayer Mahan. This review of the theoretical underpinnings of modern geopolitics and the importance of the Eurasian landmass is one of the highlights of the book.

It is such an interesting book, and one that has significant relevance to contemporary geopolitics. Professor Brands’ analysis provides insights that should help light the way for modern politicians in the West who appear to be struggling with the pace of change in technology, and the growing threat and alignment of techno-totalitarian powers.

To provide more insight into the book, I recently posed several questions to Professor Brands. You can read his answers below.

1. Your book explores historical theorists of geopolitics such as Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman. Why are these figures relevant to 21st century geopolitics and the strategic competition between America and China?

These guys are relevant because they provide us with the right mental map for understanding all of the great conflicts of the last century--and for the emerging conflicts of this century, as well. Mackinder and Spykman were among the great geopolitical thinkers of the early 20th century. I'm simplifying a bit here, but they basically explained why Eurasia--the supercontinent where most of the world's people, economic power, and military resources are located--would be the central shatterzone in global politics.

They outlined how aggressive powers would try to conquer Eurasia's vital regions and use them as platforms for global expansion--and how worldwide coalitions, made up of onshore and offshore nations, would try to hold them back. That's a pretty good template for understanding World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. It's a good model, also, for understanding our current situation--in which the US and its allies are facing off against an axis of Eurasian autocracies that are trying to dominate their regions and dramatically shift the global balance of power. Like it or not, we're still living in Mackinder's world.

2. You write that "the world's expansionist states are banding together, for self-protection and strategic profit." While the shared interest of China, Russia, Iran and NK in rolling back the American order might predate 2022, how much has the conflict in Ukraine provided the environment for an acceleration of authoritarian alignment and confrontation with the west?

Ukraine put the process of autocratic alignment into turbodrive. Yes, the convergence among the autocratic states runs deep: Are are ruled by illiberal regimes that feel existentially threatened in a world led by a democratic superpower. All see the United States as the primary barrier to the achievement of their neo-imperial dreams. If you're Iran, for instance, you can't rule the Persian Gulf without kicking the US out of the region.

Same goes for China in the Western Pacific. But Ukraine has been incredibly catalytic, because it has forced Vladimir Putin to seek more support from his illiberal friends--North Korean troops, Iranian arms, Chinese computer chips--as he grows more isolated from the West.

And now these relationships are paying real dividends: The bad guys are building an arsenal of autocracy that is shifting the military balance in multiple regions. So even after the Ukraine war ends, these relationships won't.

3. Late in the book, you write that "a generation ago, leading experts believed great power war was 'literally unthinkable'. Today, a return of history's horrors is all too plausible." Is the current generation of western politicians able to conceptualise the magnitude of the threat, and if so, do they have the communication and organisational skills to mobilise to deter a 21st century great power war.

Yes and no. Don't get me wrong--there were smart, serious people in the Biden administration who understood how dangerous the world is getting. I'm sure there are folks in the Trump administration who understand the same thing. But I think it still strikes many people, including many members of our political class, as absurd--even insane--to suggest that America and China could find themselves in a high-intensity shooting war. Or that a war that starts in the Western Pacific could spread into other regions around the globe.

We certainly aren't acting like we understand the danger: If we did, we wouldn't be trending toward a one-war military in a three-theater world. The success of the US-led international order since 1945 has simply made it hard for us to imagine that the horrors that haunted earlier generations could return today.

4. Your book is released just a few days before the inauguration of the 2nd Trump administration. How well do you think his administration understands the challenges you outline in your book?

I spend more time thinking and worrying about this than any other subject. I want to be fair to Trump and the people around him: I think it is very likely that this administration will pursue strong, necessary policies in a variety of areas. If Trump rolls back Iran's nuclear program and its power in the Middle East, if he hikes defense spending, if he pushes the allies--hard--to do the same, all of those things would leave the free world better positioned for the hard fights ahead.

But with Trump, there's also the possibility that he will spend his time brawling with allies over tariffs or host-nation payments, or that his administration will simply be a conflicted, disorganized mess. People who don't like Trump's policies might be tempted to root for that outcome, but that would be a mistake.

The US and its friends need Trump to be a successful foreign policy president if we are all to get through the dangerous years ahead.

*******

This is not a long book, but it is a very good one. It is an important work that should not just be on bookshelves and bedside tables of modern politicians, policy makers and strategists; it needs to be read and pondered by these folks. Beyond politicians and strategic decision-makers in the national security and business communities, this is a book that should be read by the broader citizenry of Western nations. It is a highly accessible book, and provides the background and insights that all of us require to understand the challenges our nations will face in the coming decades.

The shape of the century ahead will be influenced by the historical foundations of the first Eurasian century. Hal Brands’ book is an exemplary account of this period in world history. But more importantly, it is a superb assessment of the hard decisions that American and other western politicians will be faced with in the coming years, and how they might develop and execute the best strategies to successfully navigate the second Eurasian Century.

The Eurasian Century is published by W.W. Norton and Company and will be released on 14 January 2025.

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I love reading!

My passion for reading is something that I also like to share with others as much as I can. During my last job in the Army, I used to have lunch with officer trainees at the Australian Defence Force Academy. I always finished our meals together by asking each of them “what are you reading?”

I find reading to be one of my greatest joys. It is something that relaxes my mind after a busy day, and complements the formal learning opportunities that I received during three and half decades in the Australian Army.

Jim Mattis, a U.S. Marine Corps general and a Secretary of the Department of Defence, once wrote that “by reading, you learn through others’ experiences, generally a better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the consequences of incompetence are so final for young men. It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead.”

Reading widely and in depth was fundamental to my professional development as a soldier and remains a key part of my current daily routine. I normally read for 3–4 hours per day, with 1–2 history books and a fiction novel going at the same time. I also attempt to peruse as many journal articles and blog posts as I can daily. It is one of the ways I try to keep learning and to stay current with developments in modern war, national security affairs and geopolitics.

A few years ago, I began producing an annual reading list, with the first one being published in 2017 (you can read that list here). The aim of my lists was to provide a “starter kit” for young professionals that contains a few essential books, journals, blogs, podcasts, and Twitter feeds. To this end, I normally kept the annual list to a single, A4 page. It was tough, given the massive amount of high-quality material out there.

The list contains reading resources that stretch from the classics of antiquity through to speculation about future conflict. It has selections from military history and contemporary operations. I should emphasise that my reading lists aren’t ‘annual best books’ lists; there are plenty of such lists around.

My lists don’t only contain great books. They include a range of other resources that allow the military and national security professionals as well as interested citizens, to immerse themselves in a global professional discourse. Never before have we possessed the range of networking opportunities afforded by the digital age.

Finally, my reading list is not restricted to non-fiction. I have included several fictional novels, including science fiction, that feature military themes. I have written previously about why I think military officers should read sci-fi and have collaborated on three sci-fi reading lists.

Albert Einstein once noted that “I have no special talent; only that I am passionately curious.” Reading drives us to look beyond the tunnel vision of our day-to-day duties that often absorb much of our time. It also provides the military and national security practitioners, as well as interested citizens, with an excellent opportunity for vicarious learning.

My 2024 reading list is below. Happy reading!

My 2024 reading list can also be downloaded as a single-page pdf document at the link below.

2024 Futura Doctrina Reading List

143KB ∙ PDF file

Download

Download

Finally, a reminder that from now until 26 December 2024, I will be offering a discount on annual subscriptions. Whether you are upgrading from a free subscription or continuing an existing paid annunal subscription, you will recieve a 20% discount. You can access the discount here.

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Yesterday my next book, The War for Ukraine: Strategy and Adaptation Under Fire, was released by the U.S. Naval Institute Press.

I am excited for everyone to be able to read this book. I have enjoyed researching and writing it. I will also be donating all my royalties from the book to Ukrainian charities and crowd funding efforts. So, if you purchase a copy, you will also be supporting the Ukrainian people and their efforts to defend their nation.

The War for Ukraine examines wartime strategy from the perspective of Ukraine and Russia. This includes their pre-February 2022 strategies which provided the foundation for their strategies in the past 30 months. My book also examines the strategies of the United States and NATO. These strategies from external supporters of Ukraine have an impact on Ukrainian and Russian strategy, and therefore must be understood in developing an appreciation of how strategy is developed, resourced, executed, adapted and led in the 21st century.

Adaptation is the other key topic in my book. The War for Ukraine examines the intellectual and organisational foundations for Ukrainian and Russian adaptation through the lens of their military transformation programs in the decade before February 2022. Building on this pre-war work, I then explore adaptation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels that has occured during the war.

The concept of the adaptation battle is one I have explored at length during the war in Ukraine, as well as before the war. I wrote about this topic in War Transformed, my book about 21st century conflict and competition, published by USNI Press in 2022.

The second part of The War for Ukraine covers the array of adaptations that have taken place in Ukraine, and offers recommendations for contemporary military institutions on the kinds of individual and institutional traits required to ensure that they too can be effective at multi-level adaptation in peace and war.

The book covers only part of the war - that between February 2022 and the NATO summit in Vilnius in 2023. I had to stop writing at some point and get the manuscript to the publisher, and this was the cut off point that I chose. Perhaps in the future I will look at a subsequent book to explore the war from this point onwards.

Some of the early reviews for the book are as follows:

In the aftermath of Russia's brutal, unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Mick Ryan quickly emerged as one of the war's essential analysts. Mick brings to bear his extensive command experience and historical understanding to explain the strategies employed by both Moscow and Kyiv, and how they have adapted these strategies. He draws out the lessons which military planners should take from this conflict. Through it all, he never loses his moral compass or his sense of outrage at Russia's behaviour. I commend Mick Ryan's book to anyone wishing to understand the war in Ukraine and its implications for warfare in the twenty-first century.--Michael Fullilove, Executive Director, Lowy Institute

Mick Ryan's book is a solid attempt to paint a comprehensive picture of the first 18-months of Big War at different levels with diverse conclusions worthy of broader attention and consideration. In the process the author managed to highlight the eternal issue of continuity and change in strategy and warfighting using specific examples of Russo-Ukrainian War while constantly reminding that every war is unique and context dependent. I believe this book about the ongoing Ukrainian confrontation with Russia will aid countries which cherish peace and security to quickly learn back the art of strategy and warfighting, which atrophied after the end of the Cold War. --Mykola Bielieskov, National Institute for Strategic Studies in Ukraine

This wonderful book shows Mick Ryan's excellence as a teacher of military strategy and adaptation in warfare. He's observed carefully and often at close range the choices Ukraine and Russia have made to achieve their objectives in the war. I hope it will be required reading in staff and war colleges, as well as garnering a wide public readership. — Kori Schake, Director of Foreign and Defense Policy, American Enterprise Institute

The War for Ukraine combines deep yet accessible military expertise with admirable moral clarity, and an acute sense of both the geopolitical stakes and human cost of this war. Moving at speed, Mick Ryan cuts through the fogs of war and social media alike to illuminate the operations, tactics and strategy that have shaped the conflict. The lessons he draws from Ukraine's fight, particularly on the need for grand strategic alignment of political, military and economic means and ends, are ones that all democratic leaders must heed if we are to prevail in the conflict against authoritarian regimes.--Benjamin Tallis, Senior Research Fellow, German Council on Foreign Relations

Eschewing the breathless focus on the employment of technology that dominates too much commentary on the Russo-Ukraine War, Mick Ryan valuably tackles the strategic level of the conflict before honing in on how both sides have adapted. Ryan's sound insights will most benefit current and future military professionals who have the grave responsibility of preparing for future warfare.--Heather Venable, USAF Air Command and Staff College

I want to thank all those who have helped me produce the book, including friends and colleagues who have observed and analysed this war, as well as the amazing staff at the publisher, USNI Press.

Importantly, I continue to be inspired by the courage and determination of the Ukrainian people - both soldiers and civilians. My book is dedicated to them.

You can order The War for Ukraine at USNI Books and Amazon.

Share

In two weeks my next book, The War for Ukraine: Strategy and Adaptation Under Fire, is published by U.S. Naval Institute Books.

The War for Ukraine studies wartime strategy from the perspective of Ukraine and Russia, including their pre-February 2022 strategies which provided the foundation for their strategies in the past 28 months. My book also examines the strategies of the United States and NATO. These strategies from external supporters of Ukraine have an impact on Ukrainian and Russian strategy, and therefore must be understood in developing an appreciation of how strategy is developed, resourced, executed, adapted and led in the 21st century.

Adaptation is the other key topic in my book. The War for Ukraine examines the intellectual and organisational foundations for Ukrainian and Russian adaptation through the lens of their military transformation programs in the decade before February 2022. Building on this pre-war work, I then explore adaptation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels that has occured during the war.

The concept of the adaptation battle is one I have explored at length throughout this war. I also wrote about this subject extensively in War Transformed, my book about 21st century conflict and competition, published by USNI Press in 2022. The second part of my new book covers the array of adaptations that have taken place in Ukraine, and offers recommendations for contemporary military institutions on the kinds of individual and institutional traits required to ensure that they too can be effective at multi-level adaptation in peace and war.

The book covers part of the war - that between February 2022 and the NATO summit in Vilnius in 2023. I had to stop writing at some point and get the manuscript to the publisher, and this was the cut off point that I chose. Perhaps in the future I will look at a subsequent book to explore the war from this point onwards.

Some of the early reviews for the book are as follows:

Mick Ryan's book is a solid attempt to paint a comprehensive picture of the first 18-months of Big War at different levels with diverse conclusions worthy of broader attention and consideration. In the process the author managed to highlight the eternal issue of continuity and change in strategy and warfighting using specific examples of Russo-Ukrainian War while constantly reminding that every war is unique and context dependent. I believe this book about the ongoing Ukrainian confrontation with Russia will aid countries which cherish peace and security to quickly learn back the art of strategy and warfighting, which atrophied after the end of the Cold War. --Mykola Bielieskov, National Institute for Strategic Studies in Ukraine

This wonderful book shows Mick Ryan's excellence as a teacher of military strategy and adaptation in warfare. He's observed carefully and often at close range the choices Ukraine and Russia have made to achieve their objectives in the war. I hope it will be required reading in staff and war colleges, as well as garnering a wide public readership. — Kori Schake, Director of Foreign and Defense Policy, American Enterprise Institute

The War for Ukraine combines deep yet accessible military expertise with admirable moral clarity, and an acute sense of both the geopolitical stakes and human cost of this war. Moving at speed, Mick Ryan cuts through the fogs of war and social media alike to illuminate the operations, tactics and strategy that have shaped the conflict. The lessons he draws from Ukraine's fight, particularly on the need for grand strategic alignment of political, military and economic means and ends, are ones that all democratic leaders must heed if we are to prevail in the conflict against authoritarian regimes.--Benjamin Tallis, Senior Research Fellow, German Council on Foreign Relations

Eschewing the breathless focus on the employment of technology that dominates too much commentary on the Russo-Ukraine War, Mick Ryan valuably tackles the strategic level of the conflict before honing in on how both sides have adapted. Ryan's sound insights will most benefit current and future military professionals who have the grave responsibility of preparing for future warfare.--Heather Venable, USAF Air Command and Staff College

In the aftermath of Russia's brutal, unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Mick Ryan quickly emerged as one of the war's essential analysts. Mick brings to bear his extensive command experience and historical understanding to explain the strategies employed by both Moscow and Kyiv, and how they have adapted these strategies. He draws out the lessons which military planners should take from this conflict. Through it all, he never loses his moral compass or his sense of outrage at Russia's behaviour. I commend Mick Ryan's book to anyone wishing to understand the war in Ukraine and its implications for warfare in the twenty-first century.--Michael Fullilove, Executive Director, Lowy Institute

I want to thank all those who have helped in my research for the book, including friends and colleagues who have observed and analysed this war, as well as the wonderful staff at USNI Press.

Most importantly, I have been inspired by the courage, resilience and determination of the Ukrainian people - both soldiers and civilians. I hope this book is an appropriate statement of my respect and admiration for the Ukrainian people, how they have defended their nation, and their aspiration to live as a free and prosperous society. My book is dedicated to them.

One final thing: I will be donating all of my royalties from this book to charities and crowd-funding efforts that are supporting the Ukrainian war effort and humanitarian activities for the people of Ukraine.

So, if you buy the book, you will also be supporting Ukraine in its struggle against Russia.

You can order The War for Ukraine at USNI Books and Amazon.

Share

In just one month, my new book The War for Ukraine: Strategy and Adaptation Under Fire will be published by U.S. Naval Institute Books.

I started writing this book just after the start of the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Based on a variety of different sources, including my own visits to Ukraine over the past 27 months, my book covers the lessons of the war for other military organisations that will need to transform themselves to be better prepared for modern warfare.

To do this, I have structured the book to explore lessons in two crucial areas: strategy and adaptation.

An important lesson from this war is that strategy really matters! The ability to develop, test and implement strategies that are evidence-based, able to be resourced, founded on appropriate assumptions, and which have clear purpose, is essential to national deterrence, war-making and war-winning capabilities.

The War for Ukraine explores wartime strategy from the perspective of Ukraine and Russia, looking back well before February 2022 for the foundations of the strategies that both nations have adopted and adapted in the past two years. I explore the strategies of the United States and NATO. These external strategies and how they are resourced impact on Ukrainian and Russian strategy, and therefore must be understood in developing an appreciation of how strategy is developed, resourced, executed, adapted and led in the 21st century.

Adaptation is the other key topic in my book. The War for Ukraine examines the foundations for Ukrainian and Russian adaptation through the lens of their programs of military reform that took place in the decade before February 2022. I also explore adaptation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels that has occured during the war, on both sides.

The concept of the adaptation battle is one I have explored at length throughout this war. I also wrote about this subject extensively in War Transformed, my book about 21st century conflict and competition, published by USNI Press in 2022. The second part of my new book covers the array of adaptations that have taken place in Ukraine, and offers recommendations for contemporary military institutions on the kinds of individual and institutional traits required to ensure that they too can be effective at multi-level adaptation in peace and war.

The books examines the war up to the Vilnius NATO summit of 2023. I had to stop writing at some point and get the manuscript to the publisher, and this was the cut off point that I chose. Perhaps in the future I will look at a subsequent book to explore the war from this point onwards.

I have provided below a couple of early reviews for the book:

This wonderful book shows Mick Ryan's excellence as a teacher of military strategy and adaptation in warfare. He's observed carefully and often at close range the choices Ukraine and Russia have made to achieve their objectives in the war. I hope it will be required reading in staff and war colleges, as well as garnering a wide public readership. — Kori Schake, Director of Foreign and Defense Policy, American Enterprise Institute

The War for Ukraine combines deep yet accessible military expertise with admirable moral clarity, and an acute sense of both the geopolitical stakes and human cost of this war. Moving at speed, Mick Ryan cuts through the fogs of war and social media alike to illuminate the operations, tactics and strategy that have shaped the conflict. The lessons he draws from Ukraine's fight, particularly on the need for grand strategic alignment of political, military and economic means and ends, are ones that all democratic leaders must heed if we are to prevail in the conflict against authoritarian regimes.--Benjamin Tallis, Senior Research Fellow, German Council on Foreign Relations

Eschewing the breathless focus on the employment of technology that dominates too much commentary on the Russo-Ukraine War, Mick Ryan valuably tackles the strategic level of the conflict before honing in on how both sides have adapted. Ryan's sound insights will most benefit current and future military professionals who have the grave responsibility of preparing for future warfare.--Heather Venable, USAF Air Command and Staff College

Mick Ryan's book is a solid attempt to paint a comprehensive picture of the first 18-months of Big War at different levels with diverse conclusions worthy of broader attention and consideration. In the process the author managed to highlight the eternal issue of continuity and change in strategy and warfighting using specific examples of Russo-Ukrainian War while constantly reminding that every war is unique and context dependent. I believe this book about the ongoing Ukrainian confrontation with Russia will aid countries which cherish peace and security to quickly learn back the art of strategy and warfighting, which atrophied after the end of the Cold War. --Mykola Bielieskov, National Institute for Strategic Studies in Ukraine

I want to thank all those who have helped in preparing the manuscript including friends and colleagues who have observed and analysed this war, as well as the wonderful staff at USNI Press.

Most importantly, I have been inspired by the courage, resilience and determination of the Ukrainian people - both soldiers and civilians. I hope this book is an adequate reflection of my admiration for the Ukrainian people, how they have defended their nation, and their aspiration to live as a free and prosperous society. My book is dedicated to them.

One final thing: I will be donating all of my royalties from the book to charities and crowd-funding efforts that are supporting the Ukrainian war effort and humanitarian activities for the people of Ukraine.

So, if you buy the book, you will also be supporting Ukraine in its struggle against Russia.

You can order The War for Ukraine at USNI Books and Amazon.

Share

As some of you may know, I occasionally do a little bit of media commentary. One of these is a weekly spot on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s “Afternoon Briefing” with Greg Jennett. We discuss the war in Ukraine and a range of other military and strategic issues.

This week, a viewer wrote to the ABC asking about the titles of the books that appear on the shelf behind me. Unfortunately, some of the book titles are hidden behind me.

While I wrote back to the viewer concerned with the list of the books, I thought I would also share the list here.

To be honest, these books are just a very small selection of books from my library – I am a big reader and a strong advocate for reading. Anyway, the books behind me are as follows (from left to right):

Carl von Clausewitz, On War

Colin Gray, The Future of Strategy

Kenneth Payne, I, Warbot

Mick Ryan, White Sun War: The Campaign for Taiwan

Mick Ryan, War Transformed

Peter Rosen, War and Human Nature

Peter Singer & Emerson Brooking, Like War

Sean McFate, The New Rules of War

Serhii Plokhy, The Russo-Ukrainian War

Margaret MacMillan, War: How Conflict Shaped Us

Peter Singer & August Cole, Ghost Fleet

David Epstein, Range

Paul Scharre, Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of AI

Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon

James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers

Michael O’Hanlon, Military History for the Modern Strategist

Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred Year Marathon

Ralph Stacey, Managing the Unknowable

Ivo Daadler & I.M. Destler, The Shadow of the Oval Office

Michael Pearlman, Truman and MacArthur

Christopher Miller, The War Came to Us

Andrew Krepinevich, The Origins of Victory

Jim Mattis & Bing West, Call Sign Chaos

Frank Hoffman, Mars Adapting

Mick Ryan, War Transformed

Alex Joskie, Spies and Lies

Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence

C.E.W. Bean, Anzac to Amiens

Bill Bryson, Down Under

——

I used to publish an annual reading list of books at one point. You see them here at Modern War Institute where my friend Heather Venable has just also published an excellent reading list on AirPower.

In collaboration with Nate Finney, I have also published science fiction reading lists in 2017, 2018 and 2021, which you read at The Strategy Bridge.

Perhaps I should resume the habit of producing reading lists?

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