An Interview with General Budanov

This week in Ukraine, I had the opportunity to have a conversation with Lieutenant General Budanov. We discussed what he has learned in this war, and the future of intelligence and strike operations.

Before my current visit to Ukraine, I requested an interview with a man who is perhaps the most recognisable intelligence officer in the world, Lieutenant General Budanov. I wished to discuss the war in Ukraine, as well as topics related to the future of war, intelligence and deep strike operations.

I was surprised and delighted that he accepted my request for a discussion. We ended up having a wide-ranging conversation, which was also joined by his deputy and head of analysis, Major General Vadym Skibitskyi.

The full article on our conversation has just been published by the Australian Financial Review.

We are ushered into a room located in the Kyiv area. There is a long table that dominates the room. On one side of the table is a single nameplate with my name on it. On the other side, the entire length of the table has an extended line of nameplates. In the very centre is the name of the man I have come to see. Budanov.

Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov is the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence. He has been in this position for almost five years, and has a reputation for creative, outside the box thinking and daring strike operations occupied territories and deep inside Russia. He is also well known for his personal courage and has been wounded several times on operations.

The door opens and Budanov appears, accompanied by his deputy, Major General Vadym Skibitskyi. We shake hands and then take our places on respective sides of the conference table. To break the ice, I offer to Budanov that given the number of Ukrainian intelligence officers on the other side of the table, perhaps I am the one being interrogated. He smiles and I then congratulate him on the previous evening’s drone attack on Moscow, the largest single mass drone attack in history.

I have come here as part of my ongoing research into the changing character of modern war, and to learn how Ukraine has sustained and adapted its war effort over time. Battlefield operations are impossible without strategic endeavours such as logistics, procurement, research and development, and crucially, intelligence and long range strike. I hope my discussions with Budanov will yield insights for Australian military and national security professionals about the nature of contemporary intelligence and long-range strike operations.

Our discussion begins with the topic of recent trends in Russian intelligence and strike activities. My focus on recent trends is deliberate. This is a war that has evolved in character over three years. Indeed, because of changes in technology (and not just drones), political objectives and foreign support, the war in Ukraine is a different war every six months. What mattered a year ago is often irrelevant now.

Budanov confirms that Russia has learned to learn much more quickly than it was able to at the beginning of the war. In the past three years Russia’s intelligence apparatus has improved and has evolved its planning and conduct of long range strike to adopt similar methods to NATO.

The Russians have also improved their ability learn from Ukrainian strike operations inside Russia. They have a sophisticated approach that constantly changes the disposition of their air defence network to confuse Budanov’s planners. The Russians have also become adept at using decoys, smoke and fogging machines to confuse those interpreting satellite imagery in the lead up to, and after, Ukrainian strikes. This holds lessons for potential Australian future operations in the western Pacific.

According to Budanov’s deputy, Major General Skibitskyi, the North Koreans are also learning. Indeed, the Ukrainians have seen a fast-learning curve from the North Koreans over the past several months.

Their tactics have evolved and they have learned to employ drones and to counter them better. At the same time, North Korean weapons such as the KN23 ballistic missiles have had their accuracy improved by Russian engineers. Once again, this is relevant to our region.

But the Ukrainians are also learning and adapting. Budanov describes this as a constant competition. For every Russian reaction to Ukraine’s actions, the Ukrainians are watching and developing counter-reactions.

This adaptation battle moves at an increasing speed. Indeed, as Budanov noted during our conversation, the pace of learning and evolution in intelligence and strike operations is probably only possible in wartime.

You can read the full article published in the Australian Financial Review at this link.