Assault into Gaza

The Challenges of Israel’s Expanded Ground Operation

IDF Armoured Bulldozers lead the attack into Gaza. (Image: Twitter / X)

Ground forces are expanding their operations tonight.

Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, Israel Defense Forces spokesman

(This is an update to my 20 October article, Advance into Gaza)

A stepped-up operation by Israel, to advance into Gaza and destroy Hamas, commenced in the past few hours, with armoured bulldozers, tanks and heavy infantry fighting vehicles in the vanguard.

Israeli ground forces have been occupying assembly areas for nearly three weeks, and while there have been small scale raids into Gaza, this expansion of ground operations is the most significant ground incursion into Gaza in recent years. It is likely the size of the Israeli forces involved in the current operation will be larger than those employed in Operation Cast Lead (2008-09) and Operation Protective Edge (2014).

The recent raids into Gaza will have had several objectives. First, they will have been used to gather intelligence on the impact of Israel’s air raids, on the number of civilians remaining in the areas where Israel might stage larger scale attacks, and the responses from Hamas. These small-scale raids will also have been employed to convince any remaining civilians that Israel was serious about its warnings to evacuate. The Israeli’s will have been using these raids to calibrate the responses of its neighbours and its US and European supporters to attacks into Gaza by IDF ground forces.

The Israeli’s will have used the raids to hone their tactics for the days and weeks ahead. At the macro level today’s attacks might seem significant in scale. However, the reality is that what we are seeing – on multiple axes – is the Israelis moving fast with many concurrent raids. Not only will this aim to confuse Hamas commanders about what is happening and why, but it will aim to get inside the decision cycle of the Hamas leadership and ensure their responses are always just a little too late to matter.

Finally, by generating a lot of activity, the Israeli’s will be prompting Hamas fighters to come out and fight, so they can be detected and destroyed.

Today’s ground operation was preceded by air attacks and ‘taking down’ the internet in Gaza. And while no one has accepted responsibility for the internet outage, it will assist Israel in breaking down the command-and-control networks used by Hamas and have an impact on the spread of misinformation in Gaza and beyond.

This attack into Gaza, while having a major ground component, will be a more than just a land combat operation. It will be supported by the Israeli Air Force and Israel’s Navy. Concurrently, the different intelligence services of Israel will be collecting sensitive and open-source information in a meshed civil-military approach, analysing that information and disseminating this intelligence to tactical leaders in Gaza as well as strategic and political decision makers in Israel.

Israel will also be posturing its forces to deter the development of a second or even third front in northern Israel and the West Bank. Israeli diplomats will be working to gain support for Israel from its friends and partners, while also seeking to mitigate the impact of ground operations with countries in the Middle East and beyond. Israel will also continue its strategic influence campaign to inform and influence many different regional and global audiences, which is part of a wider information war.

As such, this will not be just a ground campaign – it will be a national, multi-dimensional war effort. And in the conduct of this national war effort, there are likely to be multiple challenges for Israel. There are six main challenges for Israel in the days and weeks ahead as it progresses its attack into Gaza to destroy Hamas.

Challenge 1: Aligning Political Purpose and Military Objectives.

The most important element of any military operation is purpose. The ‘why’ of military endeavours is orders of magnitude more crucial than the ‘how’, ‘who’, ‘when’ or ‘where’. This is because people respond to and are inspired by purpose. It is purpose that binds units together and sees soldiers willing to risk their lives in the service of their nation and their fellow citizens.

This purpose must ultimately be derived from political, not military, objectives. It is the most fundamental rule of warfare. As Clausewitz wrote two centuries ago: The political view is the object, war is the means. Thus, the impending military operation that will be executed by the Israelis in and around Gaza must have clear political objectives.

Alignment between political and military actions will be vital in the weeks ahead. Ultimately, the outcome of Israel achieving its political objectives must be a reset in the Israel – Gaza relationship. The strategy employed by Israel in recent years – Mowing the Grass – has failed and a new approach is needed. As RAND expert Raphael Cohenhas written:

“Mowing the grass” embodies more than just strategic fatalism; it also reflects a large measure of hubris. At its core lies the assumption that Israel can control the rheostat in Gaza, hitting Hamas just hard enough to deter it from attacking Israel but not so hard that Gaza implodes into chaos or explodes into a regional war. Israel's mowing-the-grass strategy finally failed spectacularly on October 7.

Challenge 2: The Challenge of Imperfect Awareness.  

Everything, regardless of whether it is close combat or policy making, is impeded by the impact of imperfect awareness of the tactical, strategic and political environments. Modern technology may provide more visibility of events, but it does not always improve our wisdom about the background of those events, or the array of motivations of the people and organisations involved.

This will be the situation for IDF operations being conducted in Gaza. Despite the very impressive advances in the collection of information, and the use of advanced digital battle command and control systems by the Israelis, uncertainty in combat will still be a significant factor. This uncertainty is magnified by the physical environment. Urban operations, with limited sight lines, the presence of civilians, the uncertainty about the locations of civilian hostages, and the multi-level buildings and subterranean infrastructure (including the Hamas tunnel network), absorb large numbers of troops while at the same time restricting their movements and situational awareness.

Consequently, with a multitude of overhead sensors and even squad-level drones and reconnaissance systems, seeing around the corner or into the next building is a perilous undertaking. It is for this reason that Israel’s heavy main battle tanks, supported by armoured bulldozers, will be a vital element of the infantry-tank-engineer combined arms teams that will provide the vanguard of ground operations. In an environment where surprise is very likely, it is always preferrable to put lots of armour between soldiers and the sources of surprise.

Maintaining awareness is no easier at the political level. Despite Israel’s very fine intelligence services, there will be much scepticism about their insights over the coming weeks because of the massive intelligence failure in the lead up to the 7 October attacks. There are a variety of good articles on this topic if you wish to dig deeper. But, more than ever, Israeli leaders will need good strategic and political intelligence.

Israel will want to understand how its key security partners in Europe and the United States are thinking about the Gaza operations, and how strong their political and diplomatic support might be and how long it might last. The Israeli government will also be watching its regional neighbours – Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar among others – for their reactions to Gaza combat operations. And Israel will be desperate to ascertain information on Iranian, Syrian and Hezbollah intentions for the coming weeks. These unknowns will inform intelligence collection but will also shape and influence the pace and quality of Israeli government decision-making in the period ahead.

Challenge 3: A Changed Military Environment.

While the Israeli military has always been excellent at learning, and remaining at the forefront of tactical and operational theory, even it was surprised by the multidomain assaults conducted by Hamas on 7 October. The simultaneous, large-scale air, sea, ground and information operations executed by Hamas that day imposed tactical and operational shock on the Israelis. This was a deliberate outcome of the Hamas operations to blind border fence sensors and to infiltrate border posts and destroy their communications networks.

Even though it is likely to have been degraded in its capabilities since Israel commenced its aerial bombardment of targets in Gaza nearly three weeks ago, Hamas will seek to use similar measures to deceive, counter and break down Israeli command and control networks during any attack on Gaza. Operating in the urban environment is always tenuous for awareness and communications.

At the same time, the Cambrian Explosion in autonomous systems – driven by the war in Ukraine – has also been exploited by Hamas. Israeli troops will be expecting a battlefield environment where enemy drones will be ubiquitous. Not only will this enhance the situational awareness of Hamas commanders and fighters, it means that Hamas can more effectively exploit its subterranean network to move fighters to the right place at the right time – or to move them away from threats they cannot handle effectively.

The threat from uncrewed aerial systems has already been anticipated by the Israeli’s, who have begun installing protective cages on the roof of tank turrets in the lead up to their Gaza operations. They will also be likely to be issued with array of electronic countermeasures to degrade the threat from Hamas drones. Active protection systems on armoured vehicles will also help improve survivability. But it impossible to remove all threats. As a result, the closing of the ‘detection to destruction’ gap observed during the war in Ukraine is highly likely to feature in any assault into Gaza by the IDF. It will necessitate rapid tactical learning and adaptation, just as the Ukrainians have since February 2022.

Because of the degraded situational awareness in urban environments and the speed at which threats can appear, quick thinking and decisive leadership is required. These leaders, who may only have sporadic contact with their superior headquarters due to jamming or the challenges that urban canyons pose for tactical communications, must exercise good judgement and appreciate that their actions might appear on international news media within minutes of occurrence. This places significant pressure on leaders at all levels. Their understanding of purpose, strategic context and the ethical application of violence to guide their actions will be crucial.

Challenge 4: Civilians and Hostages.

One of the most obvious and difficult challenges for an Israeli assault into Gaza will be the presence of civilians. Gaza is one of the most densely populated locations on earth. As we have witnessed over the last few days, even with warnings from Israel, many citizens of Gaza have either been unable to move to safer locations, have been impeded from doing so, or as is always the case in urban operations, are unwilling to leave.

The IDF ensures that legal advisers review military targets and make recommendations to military commanders on the ramifications under international law of engaging or destroying targets.  However, this process is made much more difficult because Hamas often hides in civilian structures and stores munitions in civilian buildings such as schools in the Gaza strip. And, further complicating things, the scale of likely combat in a ground assault means that commanders will rarely have the time or resources to constantly consult with legal officers. While this might be a useful solution during airstrikes, close combat operations have different time pressures.

Therefore, the challenge of civilians in urban areas that are contested is a significant one. In every previous Israeli incursion into Gaza, there have been civilian casualties. This time will be no different.  And all those tunnels built under Gaza by Hamas are very unlikely to be used to protect civilians.

Killing and wounding civilians is not only a moral and legal issue. It is a strategic one.

Every report of civilian casualties, rapidly reported by traditional and social media, further engages and enrages interested audiences in the Middle East region and beyond. The recent allegations of an Israeli bombing of a hospital in Gaza, since disproved, is but one example (and the BBC has already apologised for its initial coverage). Such reports result in protests and social unrest – something that no regional country wants (besides Iran, of course). And, as the Gaza hospital issue demonstrates, such civilian casualty events – regardless of who is to blame - can compromise strategic dialog between leaders who are desperate to find solutions to the violence.

The final element of this challenge will be the presence of hostages. Over 200 Israeli citizens and soldiers (as well as some foreign citizens) were abducted by Hamas on 7 October and spirited across the border into Gaza. The hostages are likely to have been separated and dispersed across multiple locations in Gaza. Not only is this a political challenge for the Israeli government, but every soldier also who enters Gaza will have this issue in the back of their mind.

Overall, the challenge of the pervasive presence of civilians in Gaza operations will be extraordinarily difficult for the Israelis to manage.

Challenge 5: Balancing Different Fronts.

While most attention at the moment is being paid to Israel’s preparations for a likely assault into Gaza, this will not be the only front that is concerning Israeli leaders.

The most obvious other contemporary threat is that posed by Hezbollah in the north. Hezbollah is thought to possess upwards of 150 thousand rockets of varying ranges and quality. It is a threat that is an order of magnitude beyond that posed by Hamas.

Hezbollah has a large ground force, with somewhere between 50 and 100 thousand fighters organised mainly into light infantry units. While this is not a force that might be used in an attack into northern Israel, it has been very effective previously in defensive operations. Given the recent innovations in digitised battle command, meshed civil-military sensors and autonomous systems, they are sure to leverage these to maximum advantage.

And, while there have been small scale skirmishes in the past couple of weeks on the northern Israel border, Hezbollah has yet to reveal its intentions. A primary decision point for the Hezbollah leadership will have been the commitment of a large part of the Israeli army into Gaza. Once it has been committed, which it appears is either now underway or about to occur, Hezbollah will assess the opportunities for attacking Israel in the north.

As large and as capable as the IDF is, the Israeli government will not want to be fighting on this second front if it is decisively engaged in Gaza combat operations. But, if Hezbollah and its supporters in Iran see an opportunity to open a second front against Israel, they might do so. Israel’s political and military leaders will be ensuring that they have sufficient forces in northern Israel to deter such an attack.

At the same time, the West Bank is hardly a quiet and calm area. There has been a recent surge in violence on the West Bank, from protests and settler violence. A range of other actors, including the Syrians and Iranians, also pose a threat to Israel.

An important other ‘front’ is the global fight for influence. Information warfare has already been a key element of the current Hamas-Israel War. Hamas began its attacks by livestreaming its barbaric murders and kidnapping of civilians. It has used information warfare to attribute the deaths of all people in Gaza directly to Israel, even when faulty rockets were the reason. In an era where speed of reporting counts, verification can often take second place to getting a story broadcast. As an MIT study found, false news travels faster that factual reports. Therefore, the information battle to combat the surge in misinformation operations and cyber-attacks that accompanied Hamas’ assault into southern Israel will be a key fight in this war.

Challenge 6: The Clock is Ticking.

While the lack of internet services in Gaza will impede transparency for what is occurring in Gaza, information and misinformation will still get out. And as with every previous Israeli operation conducted in Gaza, there will come a point when diplomatic pressure from America and Europe may force a pause in Israeli operation in Gaza.

In the 2021 Israel-Gaza crisis, after nine days of war, President Biden apparently informed the Israeli Prime Minister that: “Hey, man, we are out of runway here.” After Netanyahu insisted on continuing the war, Biden then informed him, “It’s over.” A ceasefire followed two days later.

In the larger 2014 conflict, Israel conducted an eight-day aerial bombardment followed by ground combat over a period of nearly three weeks. Three more weeks of sporadic fighting, rocket fire from Gaza, Israeli airstrikes and the withdrawal of Israel’s ground forces, the 2014 conflict ended. The 2008-2009 Israel-Gaza conflict lasted about three weeks.

All these conflicts featured support but also pressure from the United States and Europe to limit civilian casualties and to end the war as quickly as possible. While the situation this time, in the wake of the 7 October atrocities committed by Hamas is different, Israel will still be under pressure to end the war from many directions.

Israel may have ‘more runway’ in this situation because of the attacks it suffered, but that runway is not infinite. It will need to achieve its military objectives, and set the foundations for longer term political goals before the strategic clock runs out.

Ground Combat Begins

The Gaza operation will tax the Israeli Defence Force, and pose physical, moral and intellectual challenges to the Israeli military and their wider society. Given the magnitude of the recent military mobilization, this is a fight in which every Israeli family has a direct stake.

The coming days and weeks will feature bitter combat on the ground, rocket attacks from Hamas and more airstrikes from Israel. Casualties among Israeli troops, Hamas and Gaza civilians are likely to be high. There will be pulses of combat, and some pauses, as well as many surprises. Both the IDF and Hamas will be learning and adapting in combat as the war continues.

And while Israel has vowed to destroy Hamas, it must also ensure that nothing worse follows in its wake. These military operations, which might continue for some time, should also set the conditions for an eventual ceasefire and transition of authority to the Palestinian Authority – or other entity – that can provide security and governance in Gaza. But that seems a long way away at the moment.