It has been a month since my last Ukraine campaign update. In that September article, I explored Ukraine’s progress across multiple endeavours against the measures of success and failure that I laid out earlier this year. In the intervening period, much has occurred.
First, I had the opportunity to visit Ukraine again. As always, it was a very interesting and insightful visit, particularly as I gather information about how Ukraine has developed its own, unique way of warfare. I have published multiple articles on this topic in the past several weeks.
Second, Ukraine has continued its offensive operations on the ground in the south and in the east, although gains over that time have been minor. These ground offensives have been accompanied by Ukraine’s continuing strategic strike campaign which has most recently seen strikes on the headquarters of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and against two more vessels from the Black Sea Fleet.
Third, Russia has stepped up its attacks against Ukraine. Over the past month, the Russians have conducted attacks in the northeast, around Bakhmut and most recently, in a significant combined arms attack designed as an envelopment of Avidiivka. None of these made substantial progress but it does show that Russia retains sufficient reserves for offensive action, and that it is trying break any Ukrainian momentum going into winter.
A fourth important development has been the provision of ATACMS missiles to Ukraine. This represents another policy shift from Washington. That said, the Ukrainians clearly relish getting their hands on this weapon, and as President Zelenskyy noted in a 17 October speech, “ATACMS have proven themselves.”
Finally, the appalling attacks by Hamas on Israeli civilians on 7 October has not only upended stability in the Middle East but has also provided Russia with other ways of potentially creating rifts among NATO members. While the kinds of weapons required by Ukraine and Israel differ, the potential for a wider war in the Middle East does potentially risk distracting US and NATO decision makers from their focus on Ukraine. Russia, as I wrote here, is a major beneficiary of the Hamas attacks.
China will also appreciate another strategic distraction for an American administration that wants to shift its attention to the Indo-Pacific. Coordination on how China and Russia can further undermine international norms of behaviour, and the legitimacy of the United States in the Middle East and Asia, are sure to be a topic of disucssion between Xi and Putin during the latter’s visit to China.
The events in Israel – which the Russian government is yet to comment on - will support Russia in working towards its current theory of victory. Putin’s aim is to draw out of the conflict, enjoy Congressional disfunction and hope for a Trump victory in the 2024 US presidential elections. At the same time, Putin is assuming that western patience and its commitment to providing aid to Ukraine will decline over time. The events in Israel since 7 October, and his friendly meeting in Beijing with President Xi, will have only encouraged Putin in these views.
So, it has been a very hectic and eventful month since my last campaign update. What does this all mean for the overall Ukrainian war effort and the status of its various campaigns?
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