Australia Side Steps Mobilisation Planning
My commentary on the recently announced national inquiry into national resilience, and why national mobilisation must be included in its terms of reference, published by News24.
In many other democracies in Scandinavia, eastern Europe and Asia, the preparation of mobilisation plans and the conduct of national service is entirely unremarkable. In Australia, and other English-speaking democracies, the “m” word has become the term that shall not be mentioned by government.
Earlier this month, the federal parliamentary committee for defence announced an inquiry into Australia’s national resilience and civil preparedness. (You can read the terms of reference at this link).
While the primary driver is likely to be the government wanting to be seen to do something in the wake of Australia’s lack of preparedness for the Strait of Hormuz fuel and fertiliser supply shock, it offers the opportunity to examine foundational aspects of societal cohesion and national capacity to prepare for, and respond to, global shocks and attacks on Australia.
There are two key reasons to do this now, one external and one internal.
Externally, Australia faces perhaps the most perilous international security environment since Federation.
Our major security ally, the US, has become unwilling to fund the defence of other nations to the degree it has since the end of the World War II, and the democratic world is under threat from a resurgent set of authoritarian regimes.
The big four authoritarians, China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, are not allies but have formed a learning and adaptation bloc where they are sharing insights from Russia’s war against Ukraine, Iran’s war against America and Israel, and China’s aggression in the Pacific.
Given the perceived weakness of US’ will to support allies, its dwindling supply of the key munitions that underpin the Western way of war, its inability to adequately fund its war in Iran, the purges of senior US military leaders, and the potential instability in the American polity likely during their 2026 and 2028 election periods.
China, Russia and others could use these periods to engage in enhanced military aggression against their neighbours.
Miscalculation might plunge the world into a catastrophic period of global conflict.
No ally will aid us if we are unwilling to defend ourselves.
And to magnify the challenge, we have seen from the experience during Covid and more recently during the war in the Middle East that Australia’s geography does not isolate it from global shocks.
Our foreign supply chains for medical supplies, energy, fertiliser and other essentials necessitates a closer examination of these issues.
The second, internal driver for this inquiry is that the 2026 National Defence Strategy deliberately avoided the politically sensitive but critical exploration of national mobilisation.
Mobilisation considers not just the full utilisation of people and industry for defence in wartime.
It also incorporates the legislative, societal, civil-military relations and strategic messaging inherent in tackling national crises.
In many other democracies in Scandinavia, eastern Europe and Asia, the preparation of mobilisation plans and the conduct of national service is entirely unremarkable.
In Australia, and other English-speaking democracies, the “m” word has become the term that shall not be mentioned by government.
This is an abrogation of the government’s national defence responsibilities.
A mobilisation plan is not just a way to harness national resources during a time of collective emergency (and not just military ones), it also complicates the strategic planning of any nation wishing to harm us.
It is an essential component of our national deterrent. Most crucially, the existence of a mobilisation plan is a profound statement of will.
You can read the full article at News24 Australia at this link.
Well said. But what is the solution?