Decapitation, Epic Fury and the Unknown
Insights and questions from the initial phase of the new U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran.
Over the course of this full-scale war, Russia has used more than 57,000 shahed-type attack drones against the Ukrainian people, cities, and energy infrastructure. Other nations have also suffered from Iranian-backed terror. Therefore, it is fair to give the Iranian people a chance to rid themselves of a terrorist regime and to guarantee security for all nations that have suffered from terror originating in Iran. President Zelenskyy, 28 February 2026
It is now two days since the beginning of the US-Israel military campaign against Iran. Unlike the other strikes against Iran in the post 7 October 2023 era, the military strikes commenced in broad daylight which appears to have caught the Iranians off guard.
As American and Israeli military strikes continue, and Iran pursues its campaign of retaliatory strikes across the Middle East, I wanted to provide a short update. This will cover the current situation with the military campaign, the context for these provided by Trump’s stated political objectives for the war, and finally, pose some insights and questions about this new war against Iran.
Strategic and Operational Update
Phase 1 of the military campaign focussed on three target sets and was largely successful: command and control (leaders, staffs, and networks); air defence networks (radars and other sensors, C2 and launchers); and Iran’s long range retaliation capacity (long and medium range missiles, TELs, storage depots, naval vessels and possible missile factories).
The strikes were designed to rupture the regime’s ability to provide a cohesive military defence while US and Israeli forces destroyed their air defences, offensive capacity as well as internal security forces. I expect that covert operations are also being undertaken by Israel and America while the pressure of strikes take place to support a change in Iran’s regime.
America and Israel have employed a variety of missiles, uncrewed aircraft, land and carrier based crewed aircraft and munitions in their attacks so far. This includes at least one mission by U.S. Air Force B2s that employed 2000lb bombs to attack Iranian subterranean missile storage sites. So far, casualties to military forces appear to have been restricted to the three members of the U.S. Army killed yesterday as well as one USAF F-15 that has been reported to have been downed in a friendly-fire incident. Thankfully both crew survived. Video of the incident is available here.
After the strikes commenced, President Trump published an eight-minute video that outlined the key political and strategic objectives of what has been called Operation Epic Fury by the U.S. Department of Defence. The objectives are as follows:
1. Deny nuclear weapons to Iran.
2. Destroy Iranian regime’s capability to proliferate weapons including IEDs.
3. Destruction and/or co-option of the IRGC and other Iranian military and security agencies.
4. Create the conditions for a regime change driven by the people of Iran.
There appears to be a delineation of responsibilities in achieving these objectives between America and Israel. American strikes appear to be focused on destroying or degrading Iran’s military capabilities, including military leaders as well as command and control, munitions storage locations and air defence systems. Israel appears to be focussed on strikes that bring about regime decapitation, collapse, and hopefully, regime change. These are not entirely separate enterprises, but this appears to be a key difference in approach. And it should be noted, President Trump in both his public addresses since strikes commenced has supported regime change.
Iranian retaliation strikes. This war poses an existential threat to the Iranian regime. As such, for Iran, this is may be The Big One against America, and I expect they will throw everything they can at America, Israel and neighbouring countries. They will be seeking to survive as a regime, and if they do, that will be a victory for them. It would also be a problem for the Trump administration.
Thus far, Iran has launched hundreds of missiles and drones against American bases and regional targets. While they have killed Americans and others in the region, the Iranian response so far has been largely ineffective. But, that could change.
Iran also has proxies, sympathizers and those who self-radicalise around the world that it might exploit to attack western targets and attempt to prolong this war. Iran and its supporters have been effective at whipping up anti-Israel sentiment since 7 October 2023. We should expect them to step up their cognitive warfare efforts now.
Even the Iranians understand that western nations have low patience for protracted military commitments in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan. They may seek to draw out this conflict to adopt a ‘long war’ strategy. But of course, the leaders who take Iran down this pathway have to survive long enough to do it.
At this stage, the Iranians have indicated that they are not interested in negotiating with the Americans.
Early Insights and Questions
The final part of this article poses questions and offers some initial insights. There is still a degree of uncertainty about the ultimate direction of this conflict. We may understand what the American and Israeli administrations want to achieve in Iran. But, actually achieving these aims is subject to the actions of the current Iranian regime, the Iranian people and any number of external factors that could influence military operations.
That said, I think the following are a useful set of insights and questions for the first phase of the Iran War.
Surprise is still possible. The Americans and Israelis clearly achieved tactical and operational surprise on Day 1 with the initial phase of strikes. This is a lesson that will be analysed by many, including the Chinese in the Pacific.
Getting out front with the political objectives of a military campaign is important. While the Trump administration did small scale shaping before the war about removing Iran’s nuclear capability, it was not until after the bombs began to fall that an explanation of the strategic rationale was provided.
The U.S. and Israel have formed an effective, integrated planning and execution capability in military operations (and it is assumed, intelligence activities). This is a step forward for the two nations.
The questions remain however: have they established an integrated, effective post-conflict civil capacity building apparatus. Military organisations can win military campaigns, but winning wars requires societal, economic and other non-military endeavours. We did not do this well in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Conventional, crewed aircraft, particularly when integrated with long range precision missiles and drones, remain a potent battlespace capability. This operation featured the first America use of their new LUCAS kamikaze drones. Notwithstanding the establishment of the new ‘air littoral’ with drones in Ukraine, conventional airpower still has an important role to play.
But there are questions about conventional, crewed aircraft that must be answered. How vulnerable are their bases and supply chains for aircraft, and what is the right mix of crewed and uncrewed systems for different theatres, missions and forces?
The obvious follow-on question about airpower here is whether regime change can be delivered from the air. The historical evidence tends to indicate that the answer to this question is no. Professor Robert Pape, who has written about this very topic, with his most recent article available at this link. In it, he notes that:
It is a recurring promise of modern warfare: decisive political results without occupation. And many will interpret the latest news as the ultimate proof that decapitation works. Removing the head of the regime appears synonymous with removing the regime itself. History suggests otherwise. Airpower is extraordinarily effective at destroying infrastructure and eliminating individuals. It is far less reliable as a tool for reshaping political systems. There have been no successful regime change operations carried out solely from the air.
As such, in the likely event that it is not possible to win the war and build a new regime solely from the air, what is the plan for support to new regime construction and societal rebuilding in Iran? I hope it is better than the Phase 4 plan for Iraq. For insights into what we learned about this subject from Afghanistan, this report makes interesting reading.
Protecting civil infrastructure and military bases is a crucial mission that has been changed by the introduction of cheap, massed strike drones. This lesson has been obvious in Ukraine for nearly four years. It is not clear from the reaction of Middle East nations to Iran’s attacks that they have fully internalised the ramifications for force structure, personnel and defence budgets.
What is the future for Hamas and Hezbollah? Long advised and resourced by Iran, how might these organisations adapt to a world where their principle ideological sponsor and funder no longer exists? Israel has already commenced operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and this part of an expanded war could continue for some time.
The bigger question is what will be the nature of the Middie East security architecture after this? Will it be fundamentally reshaped? I think it might, but it is too early to have any definitive answer to this, much less what the Middle East order might look like in 1-5 years.
After Venezuela and now Iran, one could draw the conclusion that the Trump administration is avoiding taking on major powers – Russia and China – and focussed on beating up weaker entities. Whether this is a temporary phenomenon or something that will have a bigger impact on the global security environment remains to be seen.
How might Russia exploit America’s attention to a new war in the Middle East? While we already expect Russia to step up operations as Spring arrives, they do not appear to have the excess manpower or other capabilities to really escalate the war while America focusses more on Iran. One area that Russia might exploit is an increased hit percentage with their long-range strike missiles and drones if there is a decline in U.S. (or European) air defence interceptors provided to Ukraine.
And finally, what of China? China follows American strategy, decision-making and military activities closely. It will be learning about all these things from its observations of the new Iran War. Additionally, Xi and Trump are due to meet on 31 March in Beijing (although some have speculated this meeting could be cancelled due to the Iran War). The two big questions that Xi will want to answer at this summit will be as follows: Will Trump focus on economics over military competition? Will Trump fight to defend Taiwan? Xi probably already has tentative insights about these questions in the wake of the Trump administration’s performance on Ukraine, Venezuela and Iran in the past year. But, Xi will want to get a read of Trump personally on these issues.
Conclusion
In 2005, I served in Baghdad with a U.S. military unit. It was during this time that Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) IEDs began to proliferate in Iraq due to the Iranians. It was a terrible time, and I damn the Iranian regime every day for this intervention and horrendous deaths of American service personnel it caused. It is good to see many of those Iranians responsible are now being removed from the land of the living.
The first couple of days of the new Iran War has provided some interesting initial insights which I have covered in this short article. Unfortunately, I think there are more questions than answers at this point, but that is the nature of war. There will also be more surprises, just like the accidental downing of the F-15 aircraft today. That too, unfortunately, is an elemental part of warfare.
The initial phase of the military campaign has been a success. The really hard bits – the formation of a different regime and reconstruction of a more liberal Iranian society that can get on with its neighbours – still lies ahead. Neither success nor failure in this endeavour are guaranteed.
Mick, I think we need to be clear eyed about the strategic end game here for the US: there is none but for feeling the insatiable and insecure ego of the Orange cancer in the WH. There is no reason for this action given all the other conflicts or potential conflicts (thinking Taiwan).
While nobody should weep for this Iranian regime, and it does my heart good to see it being decapitated, the only real strategic objective is to help Trump get a win for the domestic audience and “pay back in kind” what he has gotten from Bibi, MBS, and others in the region.
All this does is deplete stocks of US weapons that cannot be immediately or easily replaced given the lack of industrial capacity in the US for that task. It makes China that much stronger in relative terms for the prospect of taking Taiwan…the longer this misadventure goes with Iran, the better it gets for China.
Thanks to all. The callous attitude towards Americans killed in action is deeply disturbing.. A war not approved by Congress is deeply disturbing. Whatever Trump and his middle east allies want, they do not control the Iranian people. Are the pro-democracy people who suffered under the ayatollahs strong enough to lead their country or will we be just changing ayatollahs? The last US intervention in Iran did not go well.