Four Years of War, No End in Sight. The Big Five 22 February edition.

My regular update on war and great power competition. This week, diplomacy splutters, energy war, Russian mobilisation, StarLink and the Ukraine ground war, as well as my Big Five recommended reads.

Image: @DefenceU and 127th Heavy Mech Brigade

“I’m ready not to kill you – give us everything”. What does it mean? It’s not a compromise. This is an ultimatum. That’s why I said: We are ready for compromises that respect Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, our army, our people, and our children. But we are not ready for ultimatums. President Zelenskyy, 20 February 2026.

Another week in the Ukraine war has passed, and it is almost four years since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022. Russian forces continue their methodical operations on the ground in Ukraine, in the skies over the frontline and Ukraine’s cities, and in the minds of western politicians and civilians.

Meanwhile, in Geneva, discussion about the war’s political and military dimensions and the achievement of a viable and enduring peace continue to show little progress.

But as many ponder the meaning and lessons of four years of large-scale war in Ukraine, another war is possible in the Middle East in the coming days. President Trump has directed a large-scale build up of American forces in the region. Whether these forces will be used or not, and what the political and strategic objectives of their operations might be, remains to be seen.

Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five.

Image: @DefenceU

The Geneva Diplomatic Theatre. As the war approaches the fourth year since Russia’s full-scale invasion, another round of trilateral talks in Geneva on 17-18 February produced a now familiar combination of modest procedural progress and substantive deadlock. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy described the outcome as mixed: “progress has been made, but for now, positions differ because the negotiations were difficult.” This diplomatic and increasingly common description of talks barely masks the reality that Russia still demonstrates zero willingness to moderate its maximalist demands for this war.

There was more progress with the military track of talks however. As President Zelenskyy stated:

All three sides acknowledged that a ceasefire, if there is to be an end to the war, and thus the monitoring of the ceasefire will be led primarily by the Americans. They will chair this track.

The military subgroup “basically agreed on pretty much everything” regarding ceasefire monitoring mechanics. This represents procedural advancement—agreement on how a ceasefire would be monitored if one were agreed—but says nothing about whether the political will exists to reach agreement on what would be monitored or who would do it.

As noted above, on the political track, positions remain irreconcilable. Russian chief negotiator Vladimir Medinsky described talks as “difficult but businesslike,” while Ukrainian delegation head Rustem Umerov emphasized the need to “prepare a real, not formal, basis” for presidential-level decisions. The gap between these formulations remains large. Russia describes talks as businesslike transactions, while Ukraine emphasizes the need for substantive rather than cosmetic agreement.

The territorial issue remains a critical impasse. Russia demands Ukrainian withdrawal from remaining areas of Donetsk oblast that Moscow’s forces haven’t captured. This represents about 20% of the region. Over the weekend, President Zelenskyy has ruled out the withdrawal of Ukrainian ground forces from the eastern Donbas as part of a potential peace agreement with Russia.

Economic issues have also contributed to the outcomes of peace talks so far. As noted in a recent assessment, Putin’s unwillingness to compromise in negotiations is a result of “his belief that the Russian economy can continue to support a protracted war.” The question is whether this belief is accurate or delusional. Economic pressures are mounting despite surface stability. However, economic measures alone are not going to change Putin’s strategic calculus with regards to the war in Ukraine. As a recent report from RUSI notes:

The history of war offers few examples of conflicts ended by economic pain alone. Where economic pressure has mattered, it has done so indirectly, by reshaping military capacity, elite incentives or regime stability.

The timing of Russian attacks with their strategic drone and missile attacks against Ukrainian cities underscores Moscow’s negotiating posture. As the image below indicates, Russia has kept up a baseline of continuous pressure through aerial attacks, with periodic pulses using 400-600 drones and missiles. The attacks don’t feature random timing but are deliberate signalling: Russia negotiates from a position of ongoing military pressure, not genuine commitment to de-escalation or peace.

The Energy War Continues. Russia’s systematic campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure continued during the reporting period. Russia Matters reports that “every power plant in Ukraine has been damaged by Russian attacks, according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s February 2026 estimate.” At one point, approximately half of Kyiv’s 12,000 apartment buildings lost heating. The human toll continues to rise. On 12 February, an attack on Kramatorsk killed a mother and 11-year-old daughter and wounded 16 others.

Russian drone and missile attacks in the past week. Source: Ukrainian Air Force

The strategic calculus of Putin with regards to these attacks has not changed since they began in 2022. He seeks the degradation of Ukraine’s capacity to sustain modern society and to create the conditions to erode the civilian will to resist. This strategy is yet to see any meaningful success in degrading Ukrainian will to resist Russia’s invasion, but Russia continues with increasing intensity anyway.

The Russian theory of the case is that while it may not have worked yet, a few more big pushes might work. We have seen this logic before in war, and it never ends well. The disconnect between Russian strategy and demonstrated Ukrainian resilience suggests – again – that Putin’s decision-making remains fundamentally detached from battlefield reality.

The Ground War. Ukrainian Counterattacks. The past week witnessed what has been a somewhat rare tactical development on of the frontline in recent times: Ukrainian forces liberated nearly 300 square kilometres so far this month. This represents the most land retaken by Ukrainian forces in such a concentrated period since 2023.

The geographic focus of Ukrainian gains centered on the Zaporizhzhia oblast, specifically the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions. According to Russia Matters’ analysis of ISW data for 10-17 February, Russian forces actually lost 19 square miles of Ukrainian territory—slightly less than the area of Manhattan Island. This represents a dramatic reversal from preceding weeks when Russian forces maintained consistent offensive momentum.

The catalyst for these recent Ukrainian counter attacks was the Starlink shutdown for Russian forces in Ukraine. AFP reporting indicates that Ukrainian forces “took advantage of a Starlink shutdown for Russian forces” to conduct these operations.

The tactical impacts of the past couple of days may take some time to assess fully. While Ukraine has taken back territory, and degraded Russian drone forces that have built operational command and control models around Starlink communications, this is unlikely to change the overall trajectory of the war. But it has complicated Russian planning for Spring offensive operations in the south and potentially drawn Russian reserves from elsewhere. Both of these are good, if short term, impacts for Ukraine.

It is worth noting that in the east, Russia continues its efforts to execute an operational double envelopment of the fortress belt. While this is moving slowly, it still continues to be Russia’s main effort in the east. However, given the very slow rates of advance, the chances of Russia seizing this ground in 2026 are low.

Russian Manpower Mobilization Pressures. In an assessment published on 18 February, the Institute for the Study of War provided insight into Russian force generation challenges:

Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely setting informational conditions to restart limited, rolling involuntary reserve call-ups as Russia appears to be struggling to replace its losses in Ukraine with existing force generation mechanisms.” This represents significant shift. Putin aims to use limited call-ups “to maintain Russia’s loss rates and the current tempo of offensive operations—not to significantly build up the Russian force grouping fighting in Ukraine.

A report in Euronews this week described how Putin was considering an involuntary reserve call-up to sustain Russian ground offensive operations in Ukraine. This indicates that the model employed by the Russians since 2022 – emptying jails and offering huge recruitment bonuses – is reaching the end of its sustainable life. A new model for continuous provision of warm bodies is required to backfill the 1000 casualties a day that Russia is suffering in Ukraine.

The quality of Russian personnel also continues to decline. Leaked messages from a senior Russian general documented on February 19 revealed concerns about weaknesses in the training of soldiers and officers in the Russian Army. He also admitted to the systematic abuse of Ukrainian POWs, including sharing photographs of severed human ears. This adds to years of evidence about Russian war crimes, its systemic nature and how Russian commanders view it as integral part of Russian military operations.

Russian Mothership Drone Adaptation. The Russians have shown throughout the war that they can act as both fast followers of Ukrainian innovation and be innovators in their own right. The Russians developed a ‘first mover’ advantage with their fibre-optic controlled drones and have continued to develop these. Their deployment of large quantities of Iranian drones – which are cheaper that Russian missiles – has continued to evolve. As the recent issue of the Snake Island Institute’s technology publication reveals, the Russians are continuing to evolve their Shahed / Geran drones.

Geran Drone Adaptation. Source: Snake Island Institute

This week, ISW reported that “Russian forces have reportedly adapted their Geran-2 drones to be ‘mothership’ drones that carry first-person view (FPV) drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear.” This represents significant tactical innovation. Geran-2 platforms, essentially Iranian Shahed-136 drones produced under license, now serve as carriers for smaller FPV drones, extending their operational range and complicating Ukrainian air defence.

The mothership concept allows the Russians to deploy smaller drones from platforms already penetrating Ukrainian airspace, creating multi-layered threats that stress air defence systems. Ukrainian forces must simultaneously track and engage larger carrier platforms while also addressing dispersed FPV threats.

Image: @MiltaryLand and 56th Motorised Brigade.

The Last Week and the Next Year: An Assessment

The past week was characterized by continued Russian pressure which combines attacks on the ground and from the air, significant Ukrainian tactical successes in the south, an ongoing diplomatic stalemate, and evolving technological competition. Indeed, as I write this update, Kyiv is under attack again from a mix of Russian drones and ballistic missiles.

As I wrote last week, the Starlink shutdown disruption’s effects on Russian military operations will prove temporary. The Russians are already developing work arounds, but a systemic solution is likely to take weeks or months. The Ukrainian forces’ rapid exploitation of the window of opportunity created by Russian communications disruption shows impressive operational agility.

The Ukrainian counter attacks in Zaporizhzhia, while tactically important, do not fundamentally alter the strategic direction of the war. Russian forces retain initiative in most sectors, continue advancing, albeit at glacial pace, and maintain the capacity to inflict severe infrastructure damage. Ukrainian forces demonstrate superior tactical proficiency and capacity to exploit Russian vulnerabilities when opportunities arise. But they currently lack the quantity of assault formations for sustained offensive operations across broad areas.

The Geneva talks were another exercise in procedure but showed no substantive movement on territorial or security guarantee issues. Russia maintains maximalist demands while Ukraine shows willingness to compromise that Moscow interprets as weakness rather than good faith. The asymmetry is stark: Ukraine seeks genuine negotiated settlement while Russia seeks Ukrainian capitulation dressed in diplomatic language. As President Zelenskyy wrote this week:

We are ready for real compromises. But not compromises at the cost of our independence and sovereignty. We are ready to speak about compromises with the United States. But not to get ultimatums from the Russians again and again.

The reports that President Zelenskyy directed planning for three more years of war (which was disputed by the office of the President) is indicative of Ukraine’s confidence in a suitable outcome for peace talks in the short term. It is also smart strategy. The Russians must understand that Ukraine has the will to continue fighting.

Russia’s mobilization challenges indicate force generation mechanisms are stressed despite official optimism about being able to fight on indefinitely from the Russian government. Putin’s possible move toward limited involuntary reserve call-ups suggests the volunteer/contract system cannot sustain current casualty rates. However, Russia’s authoritarian system can impose costs on its population that democratic systems cannot, creating a different ‘tolerance’ for casualties. The economic pressures are real but Russia’s mobilized war economy can sustain operations for some time if political will holds.

The energy infrastructure campaign is a key element of Russia’s theory of victory: systematic destruction of Ukraine’s capacity to sustain modern industrial society will eventually break civilian will. This theory has failed repeatedly but Russia persists with increasing intensity. The strategy inflicts genuine suffering—millions without heat and power in subzero temperatures—but Ukrainian polling shows no indication of eroding support for resistance. The disconnect between Russian strategic assumptions and reality is profound.

As we approach the fourth anniversary of Russia commencing its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, only one possible conclusion is possible: the Ukraine War will continue through spring 2026 and very likely beyond that.

No diplomatic breakthrough is imminent despite pressure from President Trump for progress before summer and the campaign season for the United States’ 2026 mid-term elections. The military situation remains tactically dynamic but without significant operational or strategic break throughs that might presage a wider collapse in military capacity by Ukraine or Russia. Ukraine’s recent tactical successes in Zaporizhzhia show that opportunities exist, but exploiting them requires resources, timing, and Russian mistakes. Manufacturing such opportunities more consistently and having the right forces in the right place at the optimal time to exploit them will require ongoing conceptual and organisational innovation.

This is no mystery: we have seen similar deadlocks in previous wars, and these deadlocks have always been broken by just three means. First, a significant transformation of a trilogy of military endeavours: operational doctrine, organisational reform and clever absorption of technology. Second, a collapse in political will, which can be driven by battlefield reverses, widespread dissatisfaction by citizens or massive pressure from allies. Third, a combination of the two. Short of these events, 2026 is likely to see more fighting, more destruction and more bloodshed.

For Russia, strategy remains centred on the political and cognitive warfare components, supported by military and sabotage operations. Putin has largely convinced the Trump administration that Russian victory is inevitable (which is highly contestable and discussed in this podcast), and this has led to most of the pressure from the Trump administration being directed at Kyiv. Thus, for Putin, the way ahead is to continue claiming small amounts of territory as major victories and destroy Ukrainian civil infrastructure in order to reinforce the inevitable victory narrative.

For Ukraine, their strategy moving forward is focussed on maintaining domestic unity; building indigenous defence production; stabilising the front line with an evolving mix of human-machine teams and higher level C2 reforms; enduring the Russian aerial attacks; sustaining and building support from Europe; and keeping Trump and his negotiating team on side. How long the domestic will and resources can hold out remains to be seen.

Front page of the New York Times as Russian invaded Ukraine. Source: New York Times.

Looking beyond the weekly wrap up, in a couple of days we will commemorate the fourth anniversary of Russia’s brutal full-scale assault on Ukraine. It reminds us to reflect on the value of the liberties possessed by citizens in democratic nations. While recent American strategic documents appear to have minimised the values that democracies have sought to protect since 1945, Ukraine has shown us how we must do so. Valuing our systems, while acknowledging their flaws, and protecting them is not a transaction. It is a profound purpose, handed down to us by our forebears who fought so hard to establish and protect our freedoms.

While we might debate the respective strategies of Ukraine and Russia for 2026, the potential outcomes of diplomatic initiatives and the human and financial resources required for the coming year, ultimately, we must return to why this war is being fought. It is being fought because it is the most compelling example of good versus evil since the defeat of the Nazi’s in 1945.

This is a war where a free people determined that they would not permit the forces of dark authoritarianism to overwhelm their history, their culture, their freedoms and their future prosperity. With the forces of brutal techno-authoritarianism now on the march in Europe and Asia, the dedication to purpose shown by the Ukrainians should be something we can all embrace.

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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

In this week’s Big Five, I have included an excellent new report from The Guardian that examines the interaction of intelligence and politics in the lead up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. There is also an update on the progress of forming corps in the Ukrainian ground forces, reforming littoral operations, how the war is coming home to Russia, and China’s United Front operations.

As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.

Happy reading!

1. A War Foretold

This week, The Guardian published a detailed expose of how intelligence services performed in the lead up to the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It contrasts the posture of intelligence agencies in Ukraine, Europe and America and examines how political leaders responded to the intelligence briefings about Russian invasion preparations. You can read the full article here.

2. Harnessing the People

In this report, the author examines how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has created a global network of individuals and organizations as part of its united front system. Through these groups and individuals, the CCP’s seeks to influence political decision-making by conditioning stakeholders to consider Beijing’s interests and sensitivities. This is a comprehensive and interesting report, and can be read at this link.

3. Reforming Ukrainian Military Command and Control

Journalist for the Kyiv Independent, Francis Farrell, has offered penetrating analysis of the war and the performance of Ukraine’s armed forces since the beginning of the war. In his latest analysis, Francis explores the command and control changes implemented by the Commander-in Chief, particularly the formation of multiple corps. As a journalist with great links in the Ukrainian military and who makes multiple unit and frontline visits during each year, this analysis is a valuable contribution to how Ukrainian military institution is learning and adapting its operational command and control. The article is available at this link.

4. Rethinking Littoral Manoeuvre

In this latest report from the Australian Army Research Centre, the author proposes that a comprehensive conceptual re‑evaluation is needed about how the Australian Army operates in the littoral environment. He argues that the Army must no longer view itself as a land‑focused force that is occasionally projected by sea, but rather as an indispensable contributor to sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection. You can read the full report at this link.

5. The War is Coming Home to Russia

In this new commentary published by RAND, author John Tefft explores the growing domestic impacts of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Examining issues such as crime rates, declining population, economic hardship, repression and corruption, Tefft notes that “whatever the outcome of Russia's war in Ukraine, the changes it has produced within Russia are likely to be profound and harmful. The long-term costs for the Russian economy will be enormous.” You can read the full piece at this link.