Getting Back on the Offensive
My new article in Foreign Affairs
I wrote this article in the past month and it has been published by Foreign Affairs today. Given Ukraine’s cross-border attack into Russia’s Kursk region in the past few days, the timing of the article is useful as it explores Ukraine’s theory of victory.
Toward the end of 2023, the Russian military was presented with an opportunity to truly transform the war in Ukraine. Kyiv’s ground forces had run out of steam in their southern counteroffensive. Ukraine had blown through large quantities of munitions and air defense interceptors and was struggling to resupply its lines. At the same time, a controversial bill to expand mobilization stalled in Ukraine’s parliament, as the country’s manpower shortages became acute. It only passed parliament in April after months of debate, coming into force in May. And in the United States, support for Ukraine was fracturing along party lines, holding up a $61 billion aid package in Congress.
But over the past six months, Russia has generally failed to capitalize on this convergence of openings. It has launched air and missile attacks against Ukraine’s power grid—dramatically reducing the country’s capacity to generate electricity—and it has terrorized civilians. Yet Russian ground forces have managed to gain only small bits of land. All in all, the amount of territory seized by Russia since January 2024 adds up to around 360 square miles, an area roughly two-thirds the size of New York City. It is hard to describe these gains as a success when they came at the cost of more than 180,000 Russian casualties, according to Western intelligence estimates.
Moscow’s forces are not done with their offensive. They keep attacking across multiple fronts on the ground and bombing Ukrainian infrastructure from the air. But even the largest and most capable military organizations cannot sustain offensives forever, and after losing so many troops, Russia’s window of opportunity may soon close. The soldiers who have died in combat were disproportionately Russia’s best. Its equipment reserves are being slowly run down. Moscow will eventually have no choice but to pause its offensive and regroup.
In military institutions, this is known as a culminating point: the time when the attacking force runs out of the people, equipment, and capacity it needs to be effective. The timing of culminating points is difficult to predict, and Russian President Vladimir Putin appears comfortable fighting on in this offensive for as long as his country possibly can. But Russia has been attacking for more than half a year, and it can probably sustain its current tempo for only a month or two more. The military will likely be able to carry out some ground and aerial attacks afterward, but at a significantly reduced rate.
That means Ukraine must begin planning for how best to capitalize on Russia’s impending wane. Doing so will not be easy: its people are suffering, and many of the factors that will determine its success are beyond its control. Kyiv, for example, cannot determine when or where Russian forces will culminate, and it cannot be certain that the West will provide continuous support. But Ukraine can closely study the battlefield for signs of Russian weakness. It can work with NATO to train and prepare for new offensives. It can manage outside expectations. And it can devise a new theory of victory—one that makes Russia’s military position truly untenable. It is then, and only then, that Ukraine will be able to negotiate on favorable terms and secure a durable win.
You can read the full article here at Foreign Affairs.