Munitions Depot Strikes in Russia and Ukraine’s Strike Complex

What other nations can and should be learning from Ukraine about 21st century long-range strike operations

Source: @war_monitor_ua On Twitter / X

Another arsenal in Russia has been damaged, and it was a significant arsenal for the occupier…These were depots of Russian tactical missiles and guided aerial bombs – all the things that Russia uses to terrorize our cities, our positions. And I want to emphasize that we are doing this thanks to our capabilities, our weapons – without the means that can be provided by our partners and that can significantly accelerate the end of this war by destroying Russia's offensive potential. President Zelenskyy, 21 September 2024.

This week’s strikes on Russian munitions storage facilities in Tikhoresk, Tver and Toropets are part of the maturing Ukrainian strategic strike campaign against Russia. Long-range strike has been an important strategic adaptation for the Ukrainians since the beginning of the Russian large-scale invasion nearly three years ago.

And as President Zelenskyy has described, strike operations – and approval for wider use of U.S. weapons - are part of Ukraine’s New Victory Plan to force Russia into negotiating an end to the war. As Zelenskyy recently noted after a drone attack on Moscow:

Gradually, the war is returning to the territory of Russia - to its symbolic centres and military bases, and this is an inevitable, natural and absolutely fair process.

Since 2022, Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to undertake a systemic program of indigenous research, development and production of drones and weapons, as well as the absorption of Western weapons and the application of Western doctrine for strike planning and execution. Observing Ukraine’s progress offers insights and lessons in how other nations might evolve their own 21st century strike systems in an era where precision and reach are crucial to deterrence and warfighting.

To inform this exploration of potential lessons, I will first explore the components and functions of the Ukrainian strike complex, as well as the principles govern its development and employment.

Principles for Ukraine’s Evolving Strike Complex

Strike operations exist to support the execution of military strategy and national policy.

These activities are also a crucial element of deep operations as part of a deep-close-rear battlespace construct. Strike operations can employ forces in the physical domains, including missiles, drones, and special forces. But they may also include cyber operations or strategic influence operations by themselves or in concert with actions in the physical world to generate shock, surprise, influence and systemic effects.

Critical elements of the development, employment and adaptation of a nation’s strike capability align with the principles of war used by many nations. These include the following:

Selection and maintenance of the aim. This is an essential aspect of strike operations. It ensures that the right targets are chosen for the right purpose, and aligns prioritisation of resources, timing and the conduct of strike activities within military and national strategy.

Concentration of effort. Ukraine, like other nations, has a finite arsenal of strike weapons. Even Russia has to now import strike weapons from Iran and North Korea. Every military institution needs to make decisions about the balance of investment between strike systems and other military capabilities (such as air defence and ground combat forces). As such, the resources for the conduct of strike activities must be carefully husbanded and centrally coordinated for best effect.

Integration. Strike must contribute to achieving a systemic impact on the enemy. Strike must be conducted within an integrated plan of tactical, operational and strategic activities to achieve political outcomes. Strike activities also require integrated planning with different elements of a military force, and across domains. Quite often, these activities also need support from civil intelligence agencies outside the military, foreign partners and allies as well as contractors. Integrating the efforts of all these institutions is critical to achieving a designed outcome.

Surprise. This is crucial to strike operations. Surprising an enemy is one method of seizing the initiative and often comprises a crucial precondition for success. In strike operations, achieving surprise against air defence and enemy command and control are key enablers. Surprise is transitory however and must be exploited rapidly. Therefore, in partnership with surprise, concentration of effort is important. An example of this is the number of drones used to attack the Toropets munitions storage facility, allegedly over 100.

Sustainability. Strike operations must be conducted over a sustained amount of time. This means that a variety of capabilities that are available for employment for the right mission outcome at the right time and place over weeks, months or years. Different weapon stocks must be sufficient in quantity, constantly replenished, and continuously adapted to maintain their operational effectiveness in the face of enemy adaption. This has impacts on the secure storage of weapons (something the Russians appear to be poor at), the secure supply of foreign weapons and the secure supply of components for indigenously produced components of a strategic strike capability.

Maintenance of Morale. This is not the principal objective of strike operations. But, high profile strikes on the Kerch Bridge, airfields, Russian oil refineries and most recently, on munitions depots containing weapons that target Ukrainian civil targets, have an impact on civilian and military morale. It is a principal that cannot be discounted in the conduct of strike activities.

Components of Ukraine’s Strike Complex

Ukraine’s strike complex has five key elements.

Element 1: Reconnaissance and surveillance. The mensuration of targets is an important part of any strike system. You cannot strike what you cannot find or target accurately. As I have written in previous articles, the meshing of civil and military sensor networks provides a massive trove of targeting data for clever military institutions. The Ukrainians have become adept at this during the war. However, it is more than just access to commercial satellite date.

3D data is needed, as is complex route planning, enemy, weather, and terrain data. This is enabled by satellite capabilities, advanced electronic warfare and cyber systems, highly trained intelligence and targeting analysts, HUMINT as well as a diverse range of military and commercial drones, and special operations activity. Ukraine has access to these kinds of capabilities from its allies and from its own military forces. Bringing all this together is not a simple undertaking, and the reconnaissance and surveillance element is a complicated and adaptive system all on its own.

Element 2: Joint strike planning and coordination. This is an area where Ukraine has adopted NATO joint targeting doctrine. NATO doctrine notes that “joint targeting is fundamentally an integration function that requires participation from the strategic and operational levels, all joint force staff elements and component commands, along with various non-military organizations.”

An integrated, commonly understood targeting doctrine allows for the better application of scarce resources, improved integration of strike operations with strategic and operational objectives, as well as the coordination of issues such as airspace deconfliction, deception and prioritisation of targets. It also allows for collaboration with allies and foreign partners. To do this, Ukraine has a joint targeting staff as part of the general staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Element 3: Strike systems. This is the part of the Ukrainian strike complex that many focus on. It has been a subject of much debate during the war, particularly about the provision and employment of western strike systems.

Over the course of the war, Ukraine’s arsenal of strike weapons has continuously expanded and adapted. From mid-2022, Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to absorb and use very precise, long range rocket systems against the Russians such as the HIMARS and MLRS systems. Other ground launched systems include the S-300, which has a ground attack mode, and the Neptune maritime strike missile.

Ukraine has also indigenously developed an array of drones for longer range strikes. The Covert Shores site updates this range of Ukrainian systems frequently, and the latest update can be seen below.

Source: Covert Shores

Air launched systems also play a key role. The provision of the UK-built Storm Shadow missile was announced by Britain in May 2023. The missile, and its French SCALP-E equivalent, extends the ability of the Ukrainian armed forces to strike Russian targets. Most recently, there has been speculation about the provision of the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) by the United States. There has also been a long debate about removing restrictions on the use of American precision weapons deeper inside Russia.

The Ukrainian maritime strike capability has developed quickly since February 2022. The Ukrainian Navy now deploys a multitude of uncrewed surface attack vessels, including one that is armed with rockets.

Element 4: Deception and Survivability. To plan and execute strike activities, Ukraine has become adept at deception and camouflage operations to ensure that systems such as HIMARS and the locations of its strike aircraft and missiles are hidden as much as possible from Russian intelligence and strike target planners. Indeed, a small cottage industry has arisen in Ukraine to construct an array of decoy tanks, HIMARS and other weapon systems.

Also important is not declaring when new capabilities are arriving or will be employed so as to surprise the Russians. The initial operations of HIMARS and ATACMs were very successful because of this, but the Russians soon adapted to their use. Fortunately, HIMARS and MLRS platforms are simpler to hide than aircraft and their supporting infrastructure. This ongoing effort to protect the Ukrainian strike complex remains a major concern for the Ukrainians this year.

Finally, the storage locations of expensive, small quantity strike weapons must also be hidden from the enemy, lest they be destroyed before they can be employed. This priority is something the Russians are learning in the past few weeks.

Element 5: Strike Assessment Systems. Finally, the Ukrainians undertake post-strike assessments. These activities ascertain whether strikes achieve their objectives. These assessments also seek reasons for the failure of strikes, including technical problems in the missile or drones used as well as Russian defensive methods that either defeated the strike system enroute or at the target. Strike assessment after the fact is a crucial element of strategic learning and adapting to continuously improve the effectiveness of Ukraine’s strike complex.  While there are a range of classified systems that are used in this process, open-source information on strike effects is also vital.

While understanding the principles and components of Ukraine’s strike complex is important, how does the possession of a strike capability contribute to military and national strategy? This is an important question because Zelenskyy has described strike operations in Russia as one of the key aspects of the new Victory Plan.

Functions of Ukraine’s Strike Complex

There are four key functions of Ukraine’s evolving strike complex. These strike activities – at the operational and strategic levels - underpin the achievement of larger strategic and political outcomes.

The first important function is to support the achievement of Ukrainian operational and tactical activities. An example of this this would be attacking key Russian headquarters, transport routes and logistics nodes in occupied Ukraine, as well as Russian munitions depots deep inside Russia. Airfields have increasingly been targeted by the Ukrainians. While this campaign against Russian airfields began in 2022, it has broadened over time. Airfield attacks degrade Russia’s ability to launch long-range missiles and glide bombs against Ukrainian targets, as well as forcing them to redeploy these assets further from where they are most needed. They also force the Russians to reassess their air defence resources.

This may also be the case in the wake of the recent targeting of Russian munitions depots. Will Russia have to further disperse these storage locations and do so further from Ukraine?

During the Ukrainian campaign in Kursk, operational strike has played a significant role. Russian reserves moving to the region have been interdicted by Ukrainian strike activities. Additionally, existing bridges, and military pontoon bridges, across the Seim River have been attacked to isolate Russian forces south of the river and protect the Ukrainian left flank.

A second function of the Ukrainian strike system is to enhance Ukraine’s strategic freedom of maneuver. A good example of this is the attacks on the Black Sea Fleet. This has led to the Russian fleet being less effective in the western reaches of the Black Sea. Consequently, it has permitted the Ukrainians to reopen a maritime trade corridor which is essential to their grain export operations.

A third function is to engage in economic warfare and to degrade Russian industrial capacity. Recent strikes against Russian oil storage and export facilities, pipelines and ships indicates that Ukraine is also implementing an economic warfare strategy. Russian oil and gas export income declined in 2023. Ukraine may aim to further decrease this source of revenue in 2024 because of how important it is to the Russian federal budget. It may also have an impact on fuel supply for Russian forces.

Ukraine is unlikely to entirely destroy Russia’s mobilized defence industrial capacity. It can however degrade it in concert with international sanctions, slow down weapon deliveries, or make it difficult for workers (or foreign advisors) to want to work in this industry.  Often, destroying the power source for an area can have an equal, or even larger, impact than physically destroying a factory that makes defence material. 

Finally, the Ukrainian strikes have important political purposes. The strikes on Moscow, the Kerch bridge, airfields and munitions depots within Russia are calculated to paint a picture of Russian military and political incompetence for the Russia people. This is intended to keep political pressure on Putin and demonstrate to Russian citizens that the war is not going their way. It is not clear that this is having a major effect (yet). Such strikes also have an impact on Ukrainian morale.

Another political purpose, which is vital this year, is to demonstrate to Ukraine’s western supporters that it is still in the fight and that along with ground operations, it can keep the pressure on Russia and liberate occupied Ukrainian territory. This is designed to give confidence to Ukraine’s supporters and ensure their continued support as the Ukrainian president implements the new Victory Plan.

Lessons for Building a 21st Century Strike Capability

While countries such as the United States have very sophisticated and broad strategic strike capabilities, including a nuclear triad, most countries have more limited resources. To that end, how might mid-size military organisations that have to make tough decisions about long-range and short-range combat capabilities in their force design and budgetary processes think about 21st century strike? I offer the following five insights to inform that process.

Lesson 1: High-end and low-end mix of capabilities. An advanced strike capability should embrace a mix of high-end and low-end strike systems. Traditional solutions for strike have featured sophisticated, expensive and low-density systems. These remain essential, given their range, stealthy features, survivability and large warheads. However exquisite strike systems are increasingly expensive and will rarely be available in the quantities required. Nations will need to build and sustain their magazine depth for their missile and drones.

This is a profound industrial challenge, which Western nations are still struggling to address. 21st century strike systems should  be comprised of a mix of exquisite and expensive strike weapons and large numbers of cheaper autonomous aerial, maritime and ground systems. This different mix of weapon types, particularly if cheaper weapons can be used in mass, will pose a bigger challenge for potential adversaries.

Lesson 2: Indigenous and foreign systems are both needed. Building an effective 21st century strike capability requires investment in indigenous innovation and production for lower-end systems. Indigenous companies might produce rockets, rocket fuel, drones as well as situational awareness systems that can augment higher-end foreign systems, similar to the approach now adopted by Australia. Indigenous solutions support local industry, build a foundation for ongoing adaption, and guarantee supply of different weapons in wartime.

Ukraine has developed multiple indigenous systems during the war, including drones and most recently, a ballistic missile. Indigenous production of strike weapons, or sovereign weapons, also helps to get around the challenge of allies or suppliers potentially vetoing the use of their weapons, or weapons containing their components, in certain scenarios. Ultimately, an approach with a mix of indigenous and foreign-sourced systems should afford multiple, reliable options for strike activities at an affordable cost.

Lesson 3: Multi-domain and cross domain strike is an imperative. A modern strike complex must include drones for surveillance and attack, as well as high-end missile systems that are launched from land, air, and sea. Not only does this multi-domain approach pose a much larger dilemma to any adversary, having drones and missile launchers on land, sea and air ensures that strike operations can be scaled to the particular contingency or mission required, and that the components of the strike complex are more survivable.

Cross domain strike, where weapons are launched from one domain at targets in another, complicates matters even further for a potential adversary. A good article on this topic in Joint Forces Quarterly explores the concept of cross domain strike:

Cross-domain could be defined according to the platform from which an actor launches an attack and the platform on which the target resides…cross-domain can also be defined according to the effects of an operation. Under this approach, an attack is cross-domain if its intended consequences unfold in a different domain than its target.

Such a practice not only highlights the need for strike capabilities resident in the ground, air and maritime services but also the requirement for joint targeting and strike doctrine, rather than single domain approaches.

Lesson 4: Strike capabilities must constantly adapt. Just as the military that wins a war is not the same as the one at the start of the war, strike capabilities will constantly evolve over the duration of a conflict.

Nations that develop and employ a strike complex must constantly adapt the conduct of their strike activities. Ukraine is an exemplar of adaptation in the development of its current multi-domain strike system. The Russians have developed an effective approach to strategic adaptation, which is producing electronic warfare and other systems which attempt to degrade the Ukrainian strike complex capability.

Nations must therefore possess formal processes to evolve their strike systems to ensure they are hardened against enemy counters, continue their operational security and deception operations, and potentially broaden the type of attack systems they possess to keep their adversary off balance. At the same time, those conducting strike activities must continue their learning about the best employment of their own strike capabilities and adapt their operations accordingly to enhance effectiveness, sustainability and affordability of strike systems.

Adaptation is at the heart of successful tactical, operational and strategic activities in peace and war. For this reason, adaptation is a topic I have returned to multiple times here and elsewhere. It is also a core element in my new book, The War For Ukraine: Strategy and Adaptation Under Fire.

A recent article on adaptation during the war in Ukraine

Lesson 5: Strike must support political outcomes. Strike operations might support tactical and operational outcomes but ultimately, they should support the achievement of strategic and political objectives. This is one of the reasons that Zelenskyy includes strike operations as one of the pillars in his new Victory Plan. In a new interview with The New Yorker, Zelenskyy describes the Victory Plan as “a plan that swiftly strengthens Ukraine. A strong Ukraine will force Putin to the negotiating table.” Strike operations are part of this proposed political solution to the war.

There may also be a temptation among some to generate spectacular strikes in the short term to generate political attention and to improve the morale of citizens. This will be necessary at times, but getting support from allies, and increasing civilian morale, requires other methods as well.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s development of its continuously evolving strategic strike complex has been a very impressive achievement over the past 32 months. The Ukrainian long-range strike campaign is vital to its war effort and to its plan to force an end to the war. Their ongoing development of a strategic strike complex offers useful insights for many other nations that seek a modern strategic strike capability for deterrence and warfighting.

It is not, however, a silver bullet. Strike operations alone do not win wars. Wars are national undertakings and must be won through military as well as the full array of non-military endeavours.