NATO Troops in Ukraine

A Thought Experiment to Flesh out Macron’s Grand Statements

Image: President of Ukraine official site

We are resolved to do everything necessary, for as long as necessary.

Emmanuel Macron

Recently, comments by European leaders have included speculation about increased NATO support to Ukraine, including NATO ‘boots on the ground’ to support the defence against the ongoing Russian offensive operations. French President Macron has led the way, stating on 26 February that there was "no consensus on deployment of ground troops to Ukraine, but that "nothing was excluded." His comments were not supported but not dismissed by Estonia and Lithuania. The Polish Foreign Minister stated that “the presence of NATO forces in Ukraine is not unthinkable.” The Czech President also stated that he is in favor of looking at new ways to support Ukraine including possibly sending troops there.

These comments were met with widespread denial and derision from other European leaders and from the broader commentariat. The U.S. has been particularly emphatic with Pentagon spokesman Pat Ryder stating, “we have no plans to send U.S. service members to fight in Ukraine” and NSC spokesman John Kirby noting “there’s not going to be U.S. troops on the ground in Ukraine”.

While the probability of any NATO military forces deploying to Ukraine is vanishing small, it is nonetheless an interesting exercise in speculative near future scenarios that might inform other NATO and individual country risk assessments as well as broader NATO contingency planning.

So, despite the very low chance of such a scenario playing out, in this article I will look at the array of additional contributions that NATO or member nations might make on the ground, across the other domains and on the periphery of Ukraine and Russia. I will then explore what the risks of such operations might be, and then conclude with an assessment of why Macron may have made these comments now.

NATO Support to Ukraine

NATO support to Ukraine precedes the 2022 large scale Russian invasion. Since the late 1990s, NATO has had a partnership agreement with Ukraine to assist its transition from a Soviet-era military institution to one that is modernized along NATO standards. The Russian 2014 invasion of the Donbas and illegal seizure of Crimea accelerated NATO partnership activities, including deployment of NATO training teams to Ukraine.

The 2022 Russian invasion supercharged NATO’s support, with the mass inflow of weapons, munitions, intelligence support, as well as training in NATO countries and non-lethal assistance via the Comprehensive Assistance Package. It has also seen the expansion of NATO to include Finland and Sweden, the development of updated regional defence plans which were considered at the 2023 Vilnius summit, introduction of a new strategic concept, and development of a Defence Production Action Plan.

Macron’s comments would appear to seek a shift beyond these moves, significant as they are. To shape the consideration of options of an enhanced NATO commitment, the question of purpose must be at the fore. What would be the strategic objectives of such an enhanced commitment? We might speculate about several. These include:

• Initially, halt any further Russian gains on the ground in Ukraine.

• Subsequently, support Ukraine to liberate its territory.

• Force a change in Putin’s strategic calculus and seek negotiations on a full Russian withdrawal.

• Signal NATO resolve to resist all Russian aspirations to attack NATO countries.

• Demonstrate resolve to other authoritarian nations.

• Avoid an escalation to nuclear conflict.

With a sense of what the strategic objectives of an enhanced NATO commitment look like, what might a sliding scale of military options look like?

Training. The most basic ‘in Ukraine’ assistance might consist of widespread deployment of NATO training staff into Ukraine. These could supplement, replace and increase the capacity of the Ukrainian military training workforce to free up personnel to serve on the frontline. It could also help address issues with combined arms collective training at the battalion and above, as well as staff training. However, many in the current Ukrainian military training workforce may be unfit for frontline service, and NATO trainers are almost certain to be targeted at their training bases.

Staff. Another low-profile but consequential capability on the ground might be staff sections who provide additional expertise in joint targeting, intelligence, geospatial, space-based capability, cyber, EW and other strategic and operational functions. The planning of coordination of multi-brigade operations could be enhanced through this, as could Ukraine’s strategic strike complex. Additionally, NATO logistic staff could be used to streamline the arrival and distribution of assistance, freeing up Ukrainian personnel for logistics units.

Air Defence. One of the challenges at present is keeping up the supply of air defence interceptors for the defence of cities, infrastructure and tactical units. While Ukraine has been supplied with advanced western air defence capabilities, and constructed a sophisticated integrated air, missile and drone defence regime, additional NATO air defence units could be ‘plugged in’ to this network. Not only would it broaden and improve Ukraine’s air defence capacity, it would also shape the environment for the arrival of western fighter aircraft into the Ukrainian Air Force in 2024 and 2025.

Military Engineers. There is a saying in many armies that ‘you can never have enough engineers.’ (As a retired army combat engineer, I am not biased of course). The Ukrainian emphasis on a strategic defence this year placed a premium on construction of defensive lines as well as developing new concepts for the survivable breaching of Russian defensive lines. There is also a very significant humanitarian mine clearing mission as well as the need for rapid repair of damaged civil and military infrastructure. All of these could be enhanced with the deployment of NATO military engineers (combat, construction and geomatic). That said, how much Ukrainian military engineer capacity it would free up is probably limited. Large parts of the construction of defences and humanitarian demining is undertaken by civilian companies and/or non-government or non-military organisations.

Black Sea Support. NATO aircraft already undertake intelligence collection missions in the Black Sea area. Stepping up in risk would be deployment of air and maritime forces to secure Black Sea trade routes for Ukraine and push back Russian missile launch warships. Obviously, this would pose a significant risk of a confrontation between NATO and Russian forces at sea. But it would also rely on NATO ships being permitted to transit the Bosporus, and would have a very significant logistic support requirement.

Space Denial. Space based capability is a critical enabler for both sides in the war. Whether it is imagery, precision navigation and timing or communications, Ukraine and Russia rely on military and satellites and their ground-based infrastructure to fight this war. NATO’s 2022 space policy spells out the defensive approach NATO has adopted with regards to space operations. However, many alliance members are believed to possess or are developing space denial capabilities. Would they be willing to use them to support Ukraine? It would certainly be a risky proposition. Not only would it reveal very sensitive national capabilities required for larger scale contingencies involving Russia or China, it also risks Russian retaliation against NATO countries sovereign and commercial space-based capacity.

Cyber and EW. Might NATO consider stepping up cyber and EW support to Ukraine with the deployment of these military capabilities into Ukraine itself? While NATO cyber cooperation with Ukraine has been in existence for some time, tactical EW units would certainly be a welcome addition to the fight against Russian loitering drones, UAVs, and in targeting Russian command and control nodes. It would be certain Russia would target these units and it would also risk unveiling very sensitive NATO capabilities.

Air Forces. Russia is clearly stepping up its employment of its air force to attack Ukrainian tactical forces as well as military and civil infrastructure. It was an underused asset in the first year of the war. One key challenge the Ukrainians face now is air dropped glide bombs which are very difficult to intercept and can be dropped in large numbers to generate significant battlefield effects. Pushing Russian launch aircraft’s back out of launch range might be a mission for a NATO air deployment as would be the broader air denial mission over Ukraine. There would be significant challenges to this. For best effect, NATO aircraft might have to be based in Ukraine which would require support forces at bases. These would be vulnerable. Or, if NATO aircraft conduct missions against the Russians front outside Ukraine, their home bases would be legitimate targets for Russia. The U.S. is probably the only NATO country that could plan and coordinate a large-scale NATO air campaign of this type.

Ground Forces. The ultimate expression of collective will by NATO would be the deployment of ground combat forces to Ukraine. This would be logistically complex to begin and sustain. The capacity of many NATO counties to deploy ground forces that are capable, sustainable and survivable under modern battlefield conditions is questionable. Such a deployment would also pose challenges with command and control - would NATO forces come under the command of the Ukrainian commander in chief or act separately with their own rules of engagement? This would inform decisions about whether they are allocated their own geographical area or integrated into Ukrainian formations. And the politics of such a deployment would be extraordinarily difficult given the likelihood of high casualties and Russian escalation.

There are probably many other options that are variations of the above. And these are very speculative. But this list of possible options should provide a sense of the kinds of things that might be considered if NATO were to step up its commitment to Ukraine. None of them are very likely now, primarily because of the many strategic and political risks involved.

Risks

One of the reasons conducting a hypothetical exercise like this can have value is to inform and test various assumptions about strategic risk in NATO and its constituent countries. There are multiple risks apparent in any NATO deployment of combat or support forces to Ukraine.

Russian Escalation. The most obvious risk, and one that strategic and political decision-makers must always have as a central element of their calculus is Russian escalation. While this can be overdone, and some have succumbed to ‘escalation terror’ in the past two years in debates about provision of equipment to Ukraine, deployment of NATO forces to Ukraine would significantly change the consideration of risks associated with Russian escalation. A variety of potential Russian responses are possible including attacks on NATO troops in Ukraine, attacks on NATO bases across Europe (physical and cyber), submarine attacks against NATO warships or commercial ships carrying military material in the Atlantic and elsewhere, support for terror groups to attack European and American interests around the world or even larger Russian operations against NATO countries on its border. This is a very high risk.

Nuclear Options. NATO deployments would almost certainly result in Russia considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Whether it makes their use more or less likely is a separate consideration – even Russia probably doesn’t want to start a nuclear exchange that could get out of control. But, if it felt that there was a live threat against Russian sovereignty or the Putin regime from NATO, it would increase the possibility of their employment in Ukraine or elsewhere.

Economic Shock. The initial Russian invasion in February 2022 resulted in the economic impacts of the costs of the war to Ukraine, European nations seeking energy from sources other than Russia, higher commodity prices, the changes in national economies to step up defence production and continuing deglobalization. A couple of good sources on this topic are here and here. NATO intervention into Ukraine would probably result in a more significant economic shock. The magnitude of such a shock is unknown but markets around the world would probably be seeking to price in further demands to increase defence spending and its flow-on effects in national economies, the increased chances of a nuclear exchange, and a range of other factors associated with a potential expansion of the war beyond the borders of Ukraine.

China Sees an Opportunity. Another major strategic risk of an enhanced NATO intervention in Ukraine could be China seeing this as an opportunity to broaden its campaign of economic and political coercion in the Indo-Pacific region. This might include more aggressive tactics against non-Chinese vessels in the South China Sea, seizing the outposts of other nations in that body of water, or even a significant step up in their campaign to bring Taiwan under Chinese control. This might include a blockade, seizing offshore islands or even operations against the Taiwanese mainland itself.

Fence Sitters Get Off the Fence. Since the beginning of the war, many nations have remained on the sidelines of the war and have refused to support either side. These nations, many of which are part of the ‘global south’ might view a larger NATO intervention as international aggression and confirming Russian messaging (aka misinformation) that this is a war begun by NATO. While physical support from many of these nations is unlikely, it could impact on diplomacy and economic relationships between the US and Europe on one side, and an array of non-aligned nations such as India, Indonesia, Brazil and others.

The Unknowns. Wars are full of uncertainty. Any NATO deployment of forces – of any kind – into Ukraine would enhance the level of uncertainty that political and strategic decision makers will have about the war. This goes for both sides, not just NATO countries. Putin and his regime would also have less certainty about the success of their invasion of Ukraine. Good strategy and strategic decision making ultimately aims to reduce the level of uncertainty in the strategic environment and enhance the stability of the overall strategic system. The opposite is likely to occur in this instance.

The Rationale for Macron’s Comments

Given the range of potential risks that are almost certain to manifest with an enhanced NATO deployment, why has Macron spoken of such options now? There are several possible reasons.

First, he is unhappy with the criticism received from other European nations about the level of French support for Ukraine. According to the latest data from the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker, France does not even make it into the top 20 nations support Ukraine (by percentage of GDP). Given the proximity of the threat to Europe, other nations have called out France’s support and Macron is probably seeking to respond to this.

Second, he may be seeking to shape opinion in the United States about their support for Ukraine. That said, it is hard to see how not ruling out boots on the ground is going to do this. Indeed, it will probably support some of the arguments made by those opposing aid to Ukraine, particularly those who fear more Ukraine aid will compromise the American strategic competition with China.

Third, it might be designed to increase the degree of uncertainty felt by Putin at a time where Russia has the strategic initiative. Many European leaders, in describing what they will not do in Ukraine, have provided Putin excellent inputs for his strategic thinking and coercion of European nations. Macron might be seeking to induce in Putin some uncertainty about NATO future intentions to moderate his behavior or shape the environment for negotiations.

Perhaps the final word on Macron’s motives for his comments last week might go to the former US ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder. Critical of the Macron comments, in a Politico article Daalder wrote that:

Macron likes to throw rhetorical bombs every now and then. Remember how he once talked of the “brain death of NATO” only weeks before a leader summit convened in London? Or how, he urged the West to “not humiliate Russia” three months into its brutal invasion of Ukraine?...And yet, most of the time, the French president’s statements were dismissed as little more than grandstanding — much like his trips to Moscow and his frequent calls to Russian President Vladimir Putin in a fruitless attempt to forestall, and then halt, Russia’s invasion. This is because such attempts have been little more than vain shots at claiming a leadership role — as French presidents have been wont to do.

But…A Useful Thought Exercise

Notwithstanding the criticism of Macron for making these comments, it does provide the opportunity for strategic leaders, planners and others to take the opportunity to rethink or reframe some of their fundamental assumptions about the war. This is an important part of strategy and strategic decision making. Testing and retesting strategic assumptions is crucial to learning and adapting to the strategic environment.

Therefore, while considered unhelpful and of dubious motive by some, Macron’s injection of a different narrative into debates on future support to Ukraine is useful. It provides a weathervane for the strategic patience and will of western governments, provides a small degree of confidence to the government in Kyiv, and ensures a level of uncertainty in Putin’s mind about NATO redlines.

The debate in the past week may not have fundamentally changed NATO strategy for the war in Ukraine. As I noted in my introduction, while it is not uunimaginable that NATO would send troops to Ukraine, the chances at present are very small indeed. But Macron’s comments would have prompted some reconsideration of strategic assumptions and Russian reactions.

That is not a bad thing at this point in the war.