No Safe Rear: Ukraine, the Pacific, and the Limits of Strategic Depth
My weekly update on war and strategic competition. This week, Ukraine's longest-range strike & ground ops, First Island Chain strategic deterrence and my Big 5 reading recommendations.
30% of all drone strikes must hit military personnel. You can call it a destruction plan — yes — and right now we are exceeding it. We have been exceeding that target for four consecutive months. Every kill must be confirmed by video. Otherwise, it doesn’t count. Unmanned Systems Forces commander, “Madyar” Robert Brovdi, 28 April 2026.
As the American president struggles to develop a viable theory of victory for his war against Iran, the conflict continues to exert a significant influence on the global economy. The comments by the German Chancellor this week that Iran is humiliating America did not go down well; President Trump subsequently announced a drawdown of the American presence in Germany – and then announced today that the cuts would go beyond the previously announced 5,000 troops. The U.S. administration is diverting resources from, and paying less attention to, more consequential theatres: eastern Europe and the Pacific.
This of course is hugely encouraging for Russia’s president. Engaged in a war that is going wrong for him on nearly every front, Putin’s sole source of hope at the moment is the kind of impulsive, anti-ally statements and behaviour that are emerging from the Trump administration. And what encourages Putin to act more aggressively in Europe will also eventually encourage greater Chinese aggression in the Pacific.
In Ukraine, fighting continues with no ceasefire within reach, even as battlefield innovation and long-range strike capabilities appear to be shifting the strategic momentum in Ukraine’s direction. In this week’s update, key areas I examine include the landmark deep-strike operation against Russian aviation assets at a distance of 1,700 kilometres, Kyiv’s military reform agenda, the ground war, diplomatic manoeuvring around Russia’s Victory Day on 9 May, and the stalled peace negotiations.
In the Pacific theatre, my analysis covers the expansion of Balikatan 2026, China’s response, and the deepening web of security partnerships that is reshaping deterrence along the First Island Chain.
A short synthesis at the end of the update examines what links these two theatres and why developments in one have implications for the other. And finally, I have included my top war and national security reads for the week.
Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five.
Ukraine
The Deepest Strike Yet. The most significant deep strike of the past week was Ukraine’s long-range drone strike on the Shagol airfield in Russia’s Chelyabinsk region, deep in the southern Urals. Carried out on 25 April by Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces and confirmed publicly by the General Staff on 1 May, the operation hit four Russian combat aircraft at a distance of approximately 1,700 kilometres from the Ukrainian border. Those aircraft included two Su-57Felon fifth-generation fighters and a Su-34 strike aircraft, as well as a fourth Sukhoi variant of unconfirmed type.
Ukrainska Pravda confirmed the involvement of operators from the 1st Separate Unmanned Aerial Systems Centre, while Commander Robert Brovdi subsequently verified damage through satellite imagery and reported that the damaged aircraft had been moved to enclosed hangars after the strike. UNITED24 Media published the Ukrainian General Staff’s detailed statement.
The strategic implications extend beyond the immediate damage. Each Su-57 carries an estimated production cost of between $100 million and $120 million, while an Su-34 is valued at between $35 million and $50 million. With only around 40 Su-57s estimated to be in service, the loss or disabling of even a small number of these platforms matters.
The Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces noted that the Su-34 is Russia’s primary strike aircraft, capable of delivering guided bombs and cruise missiles at ranges up to 1,000 kilometres, making it central to Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian civilian and military infrastructure. The Kyiv Independent reported his assessment that “hunting multi-role fighter-bombers such as the Su-34 and fifth-generation Su-57 fighter jets is critical to reducing the enemy’s strike potential.”
This attack set a new standard in Ukrainian long-range strike capability. Russia has redeployed much of its aviation fleet to bases deep inside Russian territory on the assumption that these assets were beyond Ukrainian reach. That assumption no longer holds. Ukrainian drones are now capable of strikes exceeding 2,000 kilometres, meaning there is no safe haven for Russian aircraft within the country’s European landmass. This has major implications for Russian operational planning, force protection and posture, and the allocation of its air defence resources. A fire at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant in mid-April has also raised questions about Russia’s capacity to replenish Su-57 losses at the production level.
Elsewhere in the deep strike campaigns of Ukraine and Russia, the Institute for the Study of War’s assessment for 1 May 2026 noted that Russian forces launched 409 drones toward Ukraine overnight on 1 May. Russia’s regular evening drone campaign also remained punishing. A Russian drone struck a civilian bus in Kherson on the night of 2 May, killing at least two people and injuring seven. A daytime drone strike targeted Ternopil in western Ukraine, with 36 aerial targets detected and 27 intercepted by Ukrainian air defences.
Ukrainian forces also launched their fourth strike on Russia’s Tuapse oil refinery in the Krasnodar region, sustaining their campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure. They also struck oil infrastructure across multiple Russian regions, including fires at the Gorky pumping station in Kstovo, Perm, and the Tikhoretsk-Nafta oil hub in Krasnodar Krai. Ukrainian drone operators also struck a warehouse holding 6,000 FPV drones in Rostov-on-Don, an FSB base in Donetsk.
Russia’s Victory Day and the Ceasefire Proposal. The approaching Victory Day commemoration in Russia on 9 May produced diplomatic activity during the week, most of it optics rather than real progress. On 29 April, President Putin telephoned President Trump in a 90-minute call during which Putin floated the idea of a temporary truce for the Victory Day celebrations. Trump expressed support, describing it as a small but welcome step. The Kyiv Independent reported that Kremlin spokesman Peskov confirmed the truce would be declared unilaterally by Moscow and did not require Kyiv’s consent, applying only to 9 May. That is right on brand for Russia in this war.
President Zelensky responded by proposing a genuine long-term ceasefire, pointedly reframing Putin’s limited offer as an opportunity for something more substantial. As Zelensky observed: “We will clarify what exactly this is about — a few hours of security for a parade in Moscow, or something more.” The Kyiv Independent’s full coverage detailed these exchanges. The Asia Times noted that Putin’s 9 May truce offer was likely shaped by his desire to protect the parade’s political theatre while also signalling flexibility to Washington.
Russia’s Victory Day parade will be scaled back again this year. Over the past four years, battlefield attrition and security concerns have seen it become a pale imitation of its former self. For the first time in nearly two decades, the parade on Red Square will take place without military vehicles. The Kremlin cited operational security concerns. The Moscow Times reported that analysts believe the possibility of Ukrainian drone strikes on Moscow’s staging areas made a full display of armour and missiles an unacceptable risk. Former British Defence Attaché John Foreman noted that the threat of air raid alerts on 9 May might “incentivize some of the air defences to be moved from the front back to Moscow, opening even more gaps in Russian territory.”
To sum all this up, the obvious takeaway is that if Russia were being as successful as Russian propaganda portrays, it would not need a truce to protect a military parade 1,000 kilometres from the frontline. This is yet another sign of a weakened Russian state that is desperately casting about for a way to make real progress in its war against Ukraine.
Stalled Peace Talks. The British House of Commons Library published an updated briefing this week with the full timeline of failed mediation efforts, confirming that Washington’s attention has shifted considerably toward the Middle East following the US-Iran conflict. The Kyiv Independent reported exclusively that Trump’s envoys are not currently planning to visit Ukraine, an indication of the parlous state of the bilateral relationship. Zelensky has shifted his public posture, moving from support for Washington’s approach to open criticism. This reflects frustration with what he sees as insufficient American pressure on Moscow and an unwillingness of envoys to visit Ukraine directly.
The broader diplomatic environment for the Ukraine war remained largely frozen this week. The key sticking points remain unchanged: Russia continues to demand Ukrainian withdrawal from eastern Donbas oblasts it has not fully occupied and the formal renunciation of NATO membership aspirations; Ukraine rejects both conditions categorically. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has assessed that while Ukraine has shown considerable flexibility under intense pressure from Washington, Russia has not moderated its stated positions by any meaningful measure. As analyst Tatiana Stanovaya wrote: Putin “feels more confident than ever about the battlefield situation and is convinced that he can wait until Kyiv finally accepts that it cannot win.”
European governments have continued their own planning in parallel. The UK and France have committed to establishing military hubs within Ukraine and providing protected facilities for weapons and equipment in the event of any future ceasefire arrangement. NPR reported that a Paris summit earlier this year produced commitments on five key priorities for the post-ceasefire environment: ceasefire monitoring, support for Ukraine’s armed forces, multinational force deployment on land, at sea, and in the air, guarantees against renewed Russian aggression, and long-term defence cooperation. But delivering on those commitments requires U.S. backing that has not yet been secured.
Ukraine’s Military Reform: Addressing the Manpower Problem. In January this year, Kyiv Independent journalist Francis Farrell wrote of Ukraine’s manpower challenges that:
With the systemic lack of soldiers come greater tensions — between the assaulters and the defenders, between an exhausted nation and the existential threat it still faces, between the faceless commander and the dour-faced mobilized infantryman — that could define the war of 2026 for Ukraine.
This has been an issue that has defied solutions for some time. The Ukrainians are about to give it another try. President Zelensky announced on 1 May a major reform of Ukraine’s armed forces. The reform, to be implemented from June 2026, addresses three interlocking problems: manpower shortages, inadequate soldier compensation, and the absence of any clear rotation or discharge mechanism for troops mobilised at the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. As Reuters reported, Zelensky stated explicitly that Ukraine must be ready to continue fighting if a peace agreement cannot be reached, framing the reform as a long-term investment in military sustainability rather than a short-term political gesture.
The financial components are substantial. Rear-position personnel will receive a minimum salary of 30,000 hryvnias per month (approximately US$683), a one-third increase from current rates. For frontline infantry, special contracts offering between 250,000 and 400,000 hryvnias per month (US$5,650 to $9,000) will be introduced, with payments linked to combat task completion. Ukrainska Pravda reported Zelensky’s instruction that “combat missions on the frontline, real combat and leadership experience, and the effectiveness of a servicemember must guarantee increased pay.” Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, appointed in January with a mandate to improve mobilisation and deal with draft evasion, described the changes as “systemic” transformation.
The most politically sensitive element is the planned phased demobilisation of long-serving troops. Most soldiers mobilised since February 2022 have had no fixed term of service and no clear pathway out of the military. Additionally, media reporting of troops serving for months without rotation has corroded public confidence in the fairness of the system.
Euromaidan Press assessed this as one of the most significant planned structural changes to Ukraine’s military since the war began, while the Odessa Journal noted that the reform formally extends the contract system and creates clear service-duration timelines. Whether the financial commitments can be sustained given Ukraine’s ongoing dependence on foreign budget support remains an open question.
The Ground War. On the battlefield, the pattern of the past several months continued: high-intensity Russian pressure on multiple axes of advance, Ukrainian defensive resilience, and incremental Russian advances measured in hundreds of metres per day. Ukrainian General Staff reporting for the period around 29 April documented 177 combat engagements in a single 24-hour period, with Russia launching 69 airstrikes, dropping 226 guided aerial bombs, and deploying nearly 10,000 kamikaze drones in that day alone. The most recent Russia Matters report notes that Russia lost ground in the past month.
EMPR Media’s daily tracking documented Russian pressure around Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, the Lyman axis, and near the Antonivskyi crossing in Kherson Oblast, with Ukrainian defenders repelling 41 assault attempts in the Pokrovsk direction alone in a single reporting period. Near Kupiansk, Russian forces executed a mechanised attack, capturing the villages of Petropavlivka and Stepova Novoselivka, pressing what analysts assess as a renewed effort to encircle and threaten Kupiansk itself.
Ukraine War Assessment
The past week crystallised four realities that will shape the trajectory of the war in the months ahead.
First, Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign has crossed a new threshold. The successful targeting of Su-57 and Su-34 aircraft at Chelyabinsk at 1,700 kilometres demonstrates that Russia’s aviation fleet has no truly safe rear area within its European territory. This will force Russia to disperse assets further, increasing logistics costs and potentially reducing operational sortie rates at a time when airpower is central to its offensive campaign.
Second, Zelenskyy’s military reform announcement reflects an acknowledgement that Ukraine must sustain this fight independently of a diplomatic breakthrough. The reform targets real structural weaknesses in pay, rotation, and infantry morale, but successful implementation requires financial resources that Ukraine does not entirely control.
Third, the diplomatic landscape remains uncertain with no short-term peace deal in sight. Russia has not moderated its demands, Washington’s attention is committed elsewhere, and the temporary ceasefire gestures for Russia’s Victory Day are information operations, not genuine peace diplomacy.
Finally, Ukraine has stepped up its military effectiveness this year on the ground and in long-range strike operations. This is depriving Russia of momentum on the frontline, and in the past month it has lost ground. Russia is also losing the initiative in long-range strike operations, as Ukrainian drones range over larger parts of Russia and have a greater impact on oil exports.
The Pacific
Balikatan 2026. The latest iteration of Exercise Balikatan, running from 20 April to 8 May 2026, has emerged as the largest and most strategically important in the exercise’s history. With approximately 17,000 personnel from seven nations (the U.S., the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand), the exercise represents a qualitative as well as quantitative shift in defence cooperation along the First Island Chain.
The Diplomat has described the unprecedented scale, noting that Canada, France, New Zealand, and Japan are all joining as active participants for the first time, reflecting the rapid expansion of Philippine security partnerships driven by shared concern about Chinese maritime assertiveness. An additional 17 nations participated as observers.
Japan’s participation is the most strategically significant change. For the first time since the Second World War, Japanese combat-capable troops have deployed to Philippine soil. Approximately 1,400 Japanese Self-Defence Force personnel participated in scenarios involving defensive operations while armed. Japanese and Philippine marine forces conducted amphibious operations along the coast in northern Luzon’s Cagayan Province. Japan’s Defence Minister Koizumi is scheduled to observe the sinking of a decommissioned vessel off Laoag City, near the South China Sea and Taiwan, in the coming week on 6 May.
Japan’s deployment of Type 88 anti-ship cruise missiles, combined with the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) and HIMARS batteries in Palawan and northern Luzon, has sent a message to China: the democratic coalition has the will and the capacity to contest key maritime chokepoints.
The rapid deployment of these anti-ship systems to northern Luzon threatens the PLAN’s ability to break out of the first island chain via the Luzon Strait in any conflict. The U.S. Typhon mid-range missile system, forward-stationed in the Philippines since 2024, and BrahMos cruise missiles acquired from India also featured in the exercises, as did advanced counter-drone and integrated air and missile defence drills at Zambales.
China’s Naval Response to Balikatan. China’s military response to Exercise Balikatan 2026 was carefully choreographed. On 20 April, aircraft carrier Liaoning transited the Taiwan Strait southward into the South China Sea, while the 133rd PLAN task group simultaneously deployed through the Yokoate Channel into the Western Pacific. The Diplomat assessed this as a “cross-theatre exercise,” with operations unfolding simultaneously in the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea.
The Eastern Theatre Command described both deployments as “routine training activity organized in accordance with the annual plan” and “not aimed at any specific country or target.” The composition of forces suggested otherwise. The 133rd task group included the Baotou, a Type 052D guided-missile destroyer frequently paired with aircraft carriers. The South China Morning Post reported that the Southern Theatre Command’s simultaneous drill, led by the Type 055 guided-missile destroyer Zunyi, was described as “a necessary action taken in response to the current regional situation”. The Liaoning’s southward transit, combined with the Philippine Sea deployment, suggests early preparations for multi-carrier blue-water exercises later in 2026.
China’s dispersed, two-axis naval response to Exercise Balikatan was revealing. Beijing appears to be practising the maritime envelopment of allied forces near Luzon while rehearsing carrier battle group operations. Over the coming years, this will give the PLAN significant far-seas power projection. The trajectory of Chinese naval power development is clear: China is building a capacity to contest not just the Taiwan Strait but the broader western Pacific.
The First Island Chain Deterrence Framework. Exercise Balikatan 2026 is best understood not as a single exercise but as one component of an emerging coalition deterrence framework in the western Pacific along the First Island Chain. The rapid deployment of anti-ship missile systems to the Batanes Islands in northern Luzon, positioned to threaten the Luzon Strait through which the PLAN would need to break out in any Taiwan contingency, represents the capability layering that defence planners in Washington, Tokyo, and Manila have been working toward. The presence of Japan’s Type 88 systems and American NMESIS launchers signals that a dense, coalition anti-access structure is being built along the First Island Chain.
Linked Theatres: Ukraine, the Pacific, and the Broader Contest
The wars and security competitions described in this report are not separate phenomena. They are elements of a wider systemic challenge: the attempt by authoritarian states to reshape the international order by force or coercion, and the response of democratic nations trying to sustain rules-based norms against that pressure. Therefore, I wanted to include a short section on how Ukraine and the Pacific are linked. Some of these links include:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has consumed American political bandwidth, financial resources, and munitions stockpiles, reducing the attention available for Indo-Pacific deterrence at the same time that capability of expeditionary Chinese military operations is accelerating.
The drone warfare revolution pioneered in Ukraine is being studied by the PLA, by Taiwan’s defence establishment, and by every military in the Indo-Pacific. This is shaping investment decisions, military structures, force design balances and tactical doctrines across the region.
One of Japan’s most significant lessons from Ukraine - that the ability to produce large quantities of defence materiel is essential, not merely the ability to operate sophisticated platforms - is now explicitly embedded in Tokyo’s evolving defence industrial strategy.
China’s covert military support for Iran, documented by U.S. intelligence, may be a means of testing American capacity and resolve across multiple theatres simultaneously.
The clearest link of all is the demonstration effect. How Russia’s war in Ukraine ends, and on what terms, will be read in Beijing as a signal of how far the international community is prepared to go to resist territorial conquest by force. As a new report from the Jamestown Foundation notes:
Beijing has been closely studying Russia’s evolving approach to the conflict, conducted under sanction, surveillance, and constant drone threat. Across the People’s Republic of China (PRC), researchers and analysts are extracting lessons on how to fight, endure, and prevail in a conflict against a U.S.-led coalition characterized by deep intelligence, technological, and financial leverage. For analysts and researchers linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Russia’s war illuminates the contours of a Taiwan Strait contingency or a parallel crisis in the South China Sea.
An outcome for the war in Ukraine that rewards Russian aggression would probably lead to the conclusion in Beijing that coercion pays dividends. The democratic coalitions forming around, and supporting, Ukraine and Taiwan are separate endeavours. But the strategic logic that binds each together carries implications for the leadership, strategy and endurance, of the other.
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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.
In this week’s Big Five, I have included an analysis of the Russia’s campaign in Ukraine, the impact of land-based long-range strike in joint operations, China’s observations of the war in Ukraine, mobilisation challenges and the U.S.-China nuclear competition.
As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.
Happy reading!
1. The plateauing of Russia’s military strategy in Ukraine
In this article from Ukrainian military analyst Mykola Bielieskov, he proposes that Russia’s military capacity against Ukraine has plateaued in 2026. This is the combination of new drone and ground tactics from the Ukrainians and a range of other issues that have seen Russian casualties increase but their advances on the ground slowed significantly compared to previous years. It is an informative piece, and can be read at this link.
2. Watching Beijing Watch Moscow
In this detailed analysis published by the Jamestown Foundation, the author examines the many dimensions of China’s observations of the war in Ukraine and Iran, and how it might learn the strategic lessons of these conflicts. As the author notes, “for analysts and researchers linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Russia’s war illuminates the contours of a Taiwan Strait contingency or a parallel crisis in the South China Sea.” You can read the full report here.
3. The Mobilisation Challenge
This new report, published by the American Enterprise Institute, explores the many elements of mobilising a nation for war. As the author notes, recent wars have exposed a reality that peacetime defence planning often understates: Stockpiles are finite, production does not surge overnight, and success in a protracted conflict depends as much on the ability to regenerate combat power as on the ability to win early battles. This report examines mobilisation readiness in four dimensions: economic strength, workforce capacity, industrial capacity, and political will. The full report is available here.
4. Landpower and the Sea-Air Battle
The Modern War Institute has been a consistent source of excellent analysis on preparing for, and executing, land operations. In this latest piece, the author explores how land power in the form of long-range missiles can influence the fight in the air and at sea. As he notes in the article, “in the Indo-Pacific, where geography, distance, and antiaccess strategies will define the character of war, the integration of landpower into joint operations will not be a supporting effort but a central means of shaping the theater’s balance of power and achieving strategic objectives.” The full article is available at this link.
5. The U.S.-China Nuclear Race
The final recommended article this week, published by Foreign Affairs, explores the current build up and modernisation of nuclear weapons by China and the United States. The author proposes that “neither country wants nuclear war, so the two sides should make careful choices to establish limits on their arsenals and operational policies.” Whether that is possible or not remains an open question. The article can be read at this link.
The only positive thing about the US folly with Iran is that it has demonstrated how deeply reluctant China is to invade Taiwan. They'll never get a better chance than now, with the carrier groups far away, the missile inventories depleted and a President who is clearly reluctant to risk high levels of casualties of its troops. But thankfully China has remained patient.
"The drone warfare revolution pioneered in Ukraine is being studied by the PLA, by Taiwan’s defence establishment, and by every military in the Indo-Pacific."
To extend this slightly further, my understanding is many components for Ukraine's drones are manufactured by China.
So I wonder if, more than just providing learnings about drone warfare, Ukraine is (inadvertently, unintentionally, but unavoidably) funding and sustaining a system of Chinese military drone manufacturing and its industry? I wonder if that links the two also?