Not Yet Our Darkest Hour

My regular update on global conflict and confrontation. This week: Trump realigns with Putin and doubles down on Zelenskyy bashing, the transformation of Europe's security, and the war in Ukraine.

Image: Kara-Dag Brigade and @DefenceU

The truth is incontrovertible. Malice may attack it, ignorance may deride it, but in the end, there it is. Winston Churchill

The quote above is from Winston Churchill and it also featured in the 2017 movie, Darkest Hour. I loved it but the film can be polarising. While Gary Oldman does a wonderful job of portraying Winston Churchill, there were accusations that some of the history in the film (such as the subway scene) were invented. But the overall narrative, of a new British PM having to decide whether to negotiate or fight on against the Nazis, is a terrific story of individual leadership and national resoluteness. It is an inspriring story and one that is entirely relevant to Ukraine’s story of the past three years.

However, the events of the past couple of weeks in Europe have led many to despair on the future of European security, and to many doomsday predictions about the role of American leadership in the world. One might ask whether we are now experiencing another ‘darkest hour’ in Ukraine’s fight for freedom and European security affairs. As the retitled Big Five this week suggests, I don’t think it is time for too much pessisim just yet. There is certainly much to be concerned about, but good, resolute leadership can see us through the current shifts in geopolitical security affairs. Europe and other nations such as my own still have agency, and can make the big decisions that will ensure their security and prosperity into the future. They just have to decide to!

Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five. This week, the focus is on Ukraine, and in particular, an examination of the potential trajectories for the war now that Trump has inserted himself into the process. Of course, as always, I conclude with my top five war and national security reads from the week.

Before I get into the update, tomorrow we commemorate three years since the start of the Russian large-scale invasion of Ukraine, and recognise the courage and resilience of Ukrainian soldiers and citizens in defending their country. Slava Ukraini!

Ukraine

We should have just believed Trump and Vance during the election campaign when they told us they did not support future American assistance to Ukraine or any of the other concoctions about the war they spouted. Clearly they are in full-on anti-Ukraine mode, while attempting to extort huge mineral consessions from the Ukrainian government and avoiding any mention of Russian complicity in starting and continuing the war.

Francis Fukuyama summed it up neatly in an article during the week when he wrote that:

Even though anyone with eyes could see this coming, Donald Trump’s recent moves with regard to Ukraine and Russia come as a huge blow. We are in the midst of a global fight between Western liberal democracy and authoritarian government, and in this fight, the United States has just switched sides and signed up with the authoritarian camp.

The relationship between Ukraine and the Trump regime is now in freefall. Key events in the Ukraine-Trump relationship of the past week:

• On Tuesday, President Trump doubled down on his personal war with President Zelenskyy calling him a poor negotiator and grossly incompetent.

• Trump accused Ukraine of starting the war, stating that “You should have ended it — three years. You should have never been there. You should have never started it.”

• Trump again used ‘Trump truth’ to call for elections in Ukraine. “We have a situation where we haven’t had elections in Ukraine, where we have martial law in Ukraine, where the leader in Ukraine — I mean I hate to say it, but he’s down at 4% approval rating.”

• The U.S. continued in its attempted grand extortion of the Ukrainian state by pushing Ukraine to sign an extraordinarily one-sided deal (towards America) on rare earths.

• The U.S. side cancelled a scheduled press conference between President Zelenskyy and Keith Kellogg in Kyiv.

• In arguments over a G7 communique, the U.S. wanted reference to Russia as an aggressor removed.

• Trump accussed the UK and France of “not doing anything” to end the war in Ukraine.

• The U.S. announced late in the week it was near a deal on minerals access in Ukraine.

• The U.S. pressured Ukraine to tone down its UN resolution for 24 February 2025 about the Russian invasions of Ukraine.

There have been so many accusations thrown at Ukraine and its president this week by the American president that the Institute for the Study of War published a detailed ‘fact checker’, which you can read at this link. It is a very good resource for those who might be tempted to believe any of the spurious and misleading statements that now appear to be spewing out of the White House on a regular basis. A summary of the White House ‘myths busted’ by ISW is shown in the image below.

Image: Institute for the Study of War

Trump’s intervention in the Ukraine War in the past couple of weeks opens up a wider range of trajectories for the war, and injects much more uncertainty. It probably also increases the chance of an unjust outcome for Ukraine.

And, his actions are reinforcing Russian misinformation campaigns around the world, especially in America. As the Institute for the Study of War noted this week, “Russian state media and Kremlin officials appear to be leveraging select statements from US officials alongside long-standing Russian narratives to create tension between the United States and Ukraine and undermine faith in America's commitment to Ukraine.”

Given these events, and the geopolitical earthquake in Europe the preceding week, what does the trajectory of war termination talks look like from here? I think there are a wide range of potential outcomes, very few of which look good for Ukraine or Western nations. I have described just a few of the potential pathways for peace negotiations below.

1. Negotiations drag on. This would see negotiations dragging on throughout the year due to Russian instrangigence, and Trump having too much patience for Putin’s inability to compromise. Also, ending a large war like this takes time. Implications: Both Ukraine and Russia would attempt to conduct military operations that project confidence in their ability to fight on and seek some kind of strategic breakthrough. The latter is unlikely at this stage, but this option will see the death and misery inflicted on Ukrainians by Russia continue, and potentially increase throughout 2025.

2. Trump doesn’t get a deal, and ups the ante against Russia and Putin. This would see Putin dragging his heals, not making any concessions, and eventually Trump loses patience with him. Trump might then decide to increase the support for Ukraine in a Trumpian version of ‘escalate to de-escalate’ in order to get Putin to make concessions. Implications: This could see U.S. military assistance continue to flow to Ukraine, although even then, the American administration might demand payment for more assistance. Whether this would work against Putin remains to be seen.

3. Trump doesn’t get a deal and ups the pressure on Ukraine and its government. This would see the Americans continue with their current approach of leaving Ukraine out of negotiations, reaching an agreement with Putin but Ukraine and Europe decline to acknowledge the U.S.-Russia deal. America remains engaged in the process. Implications: If this was the case, clearly Trump’s ego would take a hit and he would increase the economic pressure on Zelenskyy while pulling military, intelligence and training assistance. Putin wins in this scenario because he gets to continue his war to destroy more of the Ukrainian state, and he solidifies in Trump’s mind that Ukraine should thrown under the bus.

4. Trump gets a deal which all sides agree to. This would see Ukraine, Europe, Russia and the Americans reach an agreement on war termination, and not just a temporary ceasefire. I think this is a low probability because the U.S. negotiators so far have largely sided with Russian narratives about the war, and an inclination to restart Russian-American ties as a more important outcome of the talks that securing Ukraine. Implications: We might see a deal that all sides agree to, but it is hard to imagine that this leads to long term security and prosperity for Ukraine and eastern Europe.

5.Trump walks away. This would see an exasperated Trump, impatient at not being able to get a deal because, you know, war is complicated and war termination is even harder, disengage America from the peace process and in essence say “Europe, Ukraine and Russia, sort it out among yourselves”. Implications: It is very unlikely that negotiations would continue under this scenario. Putin only wants to deal with those he sees as equals, which is Trump. And, of course, Xi, which leads me to the final scenario.

6. Xi Steps in. This would see China intervene diplomatically to pick up faltering negotiations or in the wake of Trump walking away. I think this is low probability because keeping the war going actually helps China strategically. Also, Xi will know that if America walks away from this problem, it will have more time and energy to focus on confronting China, so he would need to focus on that. I think this is an outlier scenario. It is possible, but very unlikely.

One thing is almost certain however. The current U.S.-Russia approach to negotiations will probably not end the war. The talks may result in some kind of coerced ceasefire, and a temporary end to fighting, but the current U.S.-Russia narrative of the war being Ukraine’s fault and the ‘Zelenskyy is a dictator’ fantasy means that the fundamental issues of the war may go unaddressed. This means that there will be no justice for the Ukrainian people after a decade of Russian military operations, and the attendant murders, rapes, torture, kidnapping and attempted eradication of Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian state. And Putin (and Xi) will be encouraged and energised to conduct further acts of aggression.

In other news this week, an interview with two captured North Korean soldiers was published by The Chosun Daily. The two soldiers discussed where they were from in North Korea, their training and their experiences on the battlefield in Kursk.

Ukraine this week unveiled another long range attack drone. Called the Trembita, it is designed as a medium range (about 400 kilometres) cruise missile with a smallish 20kg warhead. The real attraction of this missile is its cost - under $5000. This comes on the back of other Ukrainian revelations in the past month which include a massive underground drone manufacturing plant and tests of a new laser weapon called Trident designed to down drones and possibly other weapons.

Image: New Voice of Ukraine

The Frontline.On the frontline, Ukrainian soldiers grimly continue to hold their positions where they can, or give up small parcels of territory after inflicting significant casualties on the Russians.

As I described in my update last week, wars do not stop for politicians and their representatives to discuss peace (see my potential negotiation pathways above). As talks continue, we will continue to see some fighting as both Ukraine and Russia aim to demonstrate their ability to continue the war if negotiations don’t work out (which it is very possible given Trump’s statements so far).

Tough fighting continues in the Ukrainian Kursk salient. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have executed multiple ground attacks in the past week. The Russians have managed to make small, but operationally insignificant, gains in territory over the past week as the maps below show.

Kursk maps 15-21 February 2025. Source: ISW

In Kharkiv, Russian and Ukrainian forces have also been active. Russia also continues offensives on the Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk and Kramatorsk axes of advance. On the Pokvosk axis of advance, which has been the Russian main effort on the ground for some time, it appears that their efforts have shifted. In their most recent update, the Centre for Defence Strategies writes that “the Russian command in the theater of war is focusing its main attention not on Pokrovsk but on the adjacent Novopavlivka and Toretsk directions.”

The Pacific

It has also been a busy week out in the Pacific region.

America’s State Department revised its Taiwan Fact Sheet during the week to remove language related to not supporting independence for Taiwan. The updated sheet notes that “we expect cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait.” The Chinese, always alert to any statement about Taiwan anywhere in the world, noted that this sent “a seriously wrong signal to the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces.”

China’s unprofessional behavior also continued in the West Philippine Sea. This week a PLA-Navy Z-9 helicopter approached within 3 meters (yes, you read that right, 3 metres) of a Filipino aircraft. This follows on from an incident last week when a Chinese J-16 fighter aircraft dropped flares near an Australian P-8 patrol aircraft.

Image: Ian Ellis Jones

The big event in the South Pacific this week was the Chinese naval task force sailing down the east coast of Australia and then conducting at least two short-notice live firing drills off Sydney. This forced changes to commercial airline traffic between Australia and New Zealand. I wrote an opinion piece on this for the Sydney Morning Herald, where I explored China’s rationale for its actions.

The most obvious reason for China’s actions this week is to make clear that if Australia conducts freedom of navigation exercises off the Chinese coast, China will can reciprocate. But unlike China, Australia doesn’t have a nine-dot line beyond the 12-mile limit where it seeks to deny international maritime traffic. China does, and this is a key difference between these activities.

Another reason the Chinese have done this is to normalise Chinese military activity in the South Pacific. Their security arrangement with the Solomon Islands was calculated to improve access by Chinese military and commercial entities and extend Chinese influence. The Chinese may now normalise these kinds of naval deployments around Australia (as they have around Taiwan) to demonstrate how vulnerable it is to maritime interdiction of trade.

Image: @Detresfa_

The Chinese may also wish to force Australia to keep its ships closer to home for political as well as military reasons. In essence, this could be a Chinese rehearsal for the kind of ‘south seas’ operations they might conduct to bottle up the Australian Navy in home waters so it cannot help Taiwan, Japan or America in any north-west Asian security crisis.

China will be measuring the political response by the Australian government. So far, the response has been largely supine. But the events of the past 24 hours are a significant shift in the regional security environment. More importantly, China will be assessing U.S. responses. Will the U.S. say something about this deliberately aggressive act against a treaty ally? This is perhaps the primary driver of the PLA aggression. Do the principles on display by the U.S. administration in Europe last week also apply to its allies in Asia?

While one hopes this might be the wake up call that Australia needs to begin to reinvest in its military, intelligence and diplomatic services, I am not holding my breath for that to actually occur in the wake of this Chinese aggression off the Australian coast.

In the meantime, too many in Australia are letting CCP propagandists live rent free in their heads. The amount of people, including some well known commentators, who think this is just a Chinese response to Australia undertaking freedom of navigation activities in the South China Sea is amazing. It says something about the lack of sophistocation in the national security debate here, and the lack of education in defence, war and security affairs in our universities.

Certainly the CCP wants Australians to believe this is just a response to Australian patrols in the South China Sea, but there is no equivalence between the two activities. One is an activity by multiple democracies to keep open international sea lanes that China is using coercion and bullying to try and close. The other is irresponsible live fire activities in international waters under commercial airline routes where there is no question about hindering traffic. So, to my fellow Australians, don’t accept the Chinese propaganda on this - they conducted their activity this week for much more sophistocated and aggressive reasons than ‘tit-for-tat’ maritime patrols.

And, if it isn’t already obvious, this is NOT what a ‘stabilised relationship’ between Australia and China looks like. And the Australian government is failing miserably at talking to the Australian people on this issue.

*****

It has been a hectic week in publishing for me. My first article for the week was an opinion piece in the Sydney Morning Herald which explored how the geopolitical earthquake in Europe, spawned by the comments of Trump and other American officials, will eventually wash over the Pacific as well.

Next was a piece in the Lowy Interpreter that looked at the political lessons from the war in Ukraine that politicians might care to study (or that they might just ignore). I also published a short piece in Foreign Policy that examines Ukraine’s development of a strategic strike capability and what other nations can learn from this. You can read that piece here.

On Saturday I had two articles published. One was a piece in Foreign Affairs that explores the lessons from Ukraine about how the character of war is changing, which can be read here. The other was another opinion piece in the Sydney Morning Herald about the implications of China’s live-fire exercises off Sydney this week. You can read that at this link.

My discussion with Sam Roggeveen on the Lowy Institute podcast, about three years of war in Ukraine, was published early in the week. You can listen to our discussion at this link.

Finally, I travelled to Canberra this week. I gave a public lecture on military adaptation and how AI might improve learning and adaptation in military institutions, while helping us degrade enemy adaptation capabilities. You can read the full transcript of my speech at this link.

*****

So, to this week’s recommended readings.

This week, I have included two articles that explore the Chinese military. One is a report that is focussed on their military readiness and whether they are fully capable of invading Taiwan. The other looks at the development of China’s military force projection capacity and whether they may have missed the boat, and built the wrong kind of force too late.

There is also an excellent report from Modern War Institute about the Battle of Kyiv, as well as an article that looks at grand bargains in history and what insights they might provide for the current negotiations over the war in Ukraine. Finally, I have included Lincoln’s Lyceum speech which seems quite appropriate for the times.

As always, if you only have time to read one of my recommendations, the first one is my read of the week.

Happy reading!

1. The Battle for Kyiv in 2022

Over a long period of time, John Spencer and Liam Collins from the Modern War Institute have been studying and writing about modern urban warfare. They have published an excellent series of studies on this topic, and this week they released their latest study. The subject of this one is the Battle for Kyiv in 2022. It is another terrific study from these two, and you can read their full report here.

2. Is China Ready for a Taiwan Assault?

This is an interesting and detailed examination of China’s military readiness and its capacity to invade Taiwan. As the author notes “the PLA remains fundamentally focused on upholding Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule rather than preparing for war. China’s military modernization gains are designed first and foremost to bolster the appeal and credibility of CCP rule.” This goes against many contemporary reports and narratives about Chinese intentions, and offers a useful ‘red team’ on some other reports and books on this topic. You can read the full article at this link.

3. Lincoln’s Lyceum Speech 1938

The relevance of this speech was highlighted in a conversation on the Shield of the Republic podcast with Eliot Cohen and Eric Edelman this week, so I thought I would include it in the Big Five. In this 1838 speech, Abraham Lincoln stated that “shall we expect some transatlantic military giant, to step the Ocean, and crush us at a blow? Never…At what point then is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer, if it ever reach us, it must spring up amongst us.” It seems an incredibly relevant speech right now, and possibly a description for what we are witnessing in real time. You can read the full speech here.

4. Is China’s Military Build Up Too Late?

I found this to be an interesting article with a fascinating premise: what if China’s build up in military power and force projection capacity is the wrong approach at the wrong time? As the author notes, “power projection, in the form of a large blue-water navy and overseas bases, is increasingly expensive. Technological advances are remaking warfare, encouraging states to build cheaper and more expendable weapons that can limit the effectiveness of larger, costlier platforms. China is embracing power projection at exactly the wrong moment.” I think this is a fascinating topic, and you can read the full article here.

5. How Grand Bargains in History Inform War Termination in Ukraine

This is a short but useful article published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. As the author notes, “while Trump’s team should be bold and define a new grand strategy, failing to take stock of the history of grand bargains to calibrate its diplomatic approach increases the risk the gambit fails, and the United States finds itself more insecure.” You can read the full article at this link.