Oceanic Barrier Systems: Barrier Concepts for War and Competition in the Pacific
An examination of how recent massive Chinese fishing vessel concentrations might be a harbinger of future Chinese oceanic barrier systems in the Pacific.
The Ukrainian Drone Wall is the culmination of years of efforts in drone technology, tactics, industrial development and institutional adaptation. Unfortunately, the Russians have applied many of the same technologies to build their own version of the drone wall. Given China’s massive manufacturing capacity for drones, and Russia’s sharing of lessons within the authoritarian learning and adaptation bloc, China might be able to build their own air, land and maritime drone barriers in Taiwan and elsewhere in the coming years to complement their existing A2AD capacity. A Chinese Version of Hellscape, 2 September 2025.
As the competition for the best drones, most concentrated employment of autonomous systems, and the race to develop the best warfighting concepts and military structures to exploit drones continues to accelerate, an event early in the new year allows outside observers some insights into how China and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might be thinking about the issue.
Between 5 December 2025 and 12 January, between one and two thousand Chinese fishing vessels were mobilised to form a linear barrier that was over 400 kilometres long on at least two occasions. As the images below from the original story in The New York Times shows, the barrier was established in waters between China and Japan, to the north of Taiwan.
The possibilities suggested by these activities are fascinating.
As Thomas Shugart, a former U.S. Navy officer and military strategy analyst noted not long after this phenomenon was detected, the Chinese fishing vessel concentration might be employed by the Chinese during a war “as missile and torpedo decoys, overwhelming radars or drone sensors with too many targets.”
The December 2025 - January 2026 concentration of Chinese vessels acts as yet another rehearsal of China’s whole-of-nation capacity to wage a campaign of coercion against its neighbours, or to employ this kind of barrier during a future war. The rehearsals will have allowed senior Chinese military and political leaders (those who have not been purged, of course) to assess the large-scale mobilisation of smaller civilian vessels to support a whole of nation approach to warfighting and securing Chinese political objectives in its region.
This is hardly new. The Chinese have been rehearsing the use of larger civilian cargo vessels and ferries for some time. In a January 2026 report from the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), Thomas Shugart and Michal Dahm described how the PLA has “employed a unique type of civilian deck cargo ship known as a Landing Craft Tank (LCT) to transport military vehicles directly to shore as part of an amphibious landing exercise.” In an earlier report from CMSI called Chinese Amphibious Warfare, the subject of civilian shipping in a maritime invasion of Taiwan is given an entire chapter.
Therefore, the most recent concentration of fishing vessels is also an extension of contemporary Chinese military practice in the maritime domain. And it constitutes a rudimentary yet potentially effective barrier system for naval operations. But, given the technological and operational creativity of the PLA, another potential trajectory of this maritime barrier is suggested.
Maritime Drone Barriers in the Pacific
The technology, and the command and control, employed to achieve the Chinese fishing vessel concentration might be employed as a test bed for an oceanic version of the drone barrier system we have watched Ukraine deploy along its eastern front line. Under the auspices of the Unmanned Systems Force, a 600-mile-long drone barrier is being established. Initially employing aerial systems operating at various depths behind enemy lines, this drone barrier – or drone wall – also increasingly features a wide range of uncrewed ground combat and support vehicles.
But it is not only on the eastern Ukraine frontline from which the Chinese may have drawn inspiration. For several years, the Ukrainians have been developing an increasingly capable drone barrier system in the Black Sea. With almost no major surface combatants, Ukraine’s drone and long-range missile capabilities have forced the Russian Black Seas Fleet out of the western reaches of the Black Sea.
For an excellent description of this war in the Black Sea, H.I. Sutton’s continuously updated narrative at Covert Shores, which you can read here, is highly recommended.
The obvious question is this: why wouldn’t the Chinese do the same as part of their anti-access strategy in the western Pacific?
