This week, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy will travel from Ukraine for meetings in Washington DC. It will be Zelenskyy’s second visit there since the the large-scale Russian invasion commenced in February 2022.
The situation in Ukraine is quite different from when Zelenskyy last came to Washington DC.
Then, in December 2022, Ukraine had just completed two successful and very important offensive campaigns. The Kharkiv campaign, in September 2022, shocked the Russian Army and saw the Ukrainian Armed Forces liberate large portions of Luhansk oblast. Around the same time, the Ukrainian offensive in Kherson eventually saw the Russians conduct a deliberate withdrawal from the territory they occupied in Western Kherson.
While these were military successes, they also had political impacts.
In Russia, Putin announced a partial mobilization that was needed to backfill the huge losses in personnel that the Russian Army had sustained since February 2022. At the same time, a new overall commander was appointed. General Surovikin, who has since gone on to be a character in the Prigozhin drama, stabilized the Russian situation and commenced the construction of the Surovikin Line in southern Ukraine. And in the eyes of western politicians and publics, the Ukrainians proved they were capable of the offensive operations to liberate their territory occupied by Russia.
Ukraine was then subjected to a systemic Russian attack using missiles and drones on its critical infrastructure, including power, water and heating, from late 2022. This saw many Ukrainians endure a colder and more miserable winter than normal. It did however prompt the provision of additional western military assistance for air defence of key Ukrainian cities.
Since Zelenskyy’s last Washington visit, Ukraine was also forced to defend against an early 2023 Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. This offensive, launched in January by newly installed Russian commander, Valery Gerasimov, achieved little in the way of securing additional territory. The Russians, with the help of Wagner mercenaries and newly recruited convicts, did capture Bakhmut, although it possesses little military value. This Russian offensive however did force the Ukrainians to commit formations and resources they probably would have preferred to keep training and preparing for their summer offensive.
Over the past ten months, Ukraine has also broadened its strategic strike campaign against targets in Russia. There have been two broad targets sets. The first has been political targets. Generally these have been attacks that have avoided civilian casualties but have generated large scale media attention. It includes attacks in Moscow, the Belgorod incursions and the multiple attacks on the Kerch Bridge (this, admittedly, is also a legitimate military target). Ultimately, with these attacks the Ukrainians are focused on placing political pressure on Putin, and showing the Russian people that this is no longer a limited or special military operation.
The second target set has been military. This has included spectacular attacks on Russian airfields, destroying strategic bombers and transport aircraft. But it has also including multiple attacks on targets in occupied Crimea. This has included air defence sites, airfields, logistics depots and on ships either in the Black Sea or in the vicinity of Sevastopol. This week, in perhaps the most spectacular and successful attack, Ukraine destroyed a landing ship and a Kilo-class submarine in a Sevastopol dry dock.
But the key event since Zelenskyy’s last Washington visit, and one most are focused upon, is the continuing Ukrainian offensive campaign in southern Ukraine. While a stunning, Kharkiv-like breakthrough was the hope of many, those hopes were dashed early in the offensive. Ukraine’s early attacks against the Surovikin Line demonstrated how well the Russians had prepared their defensive scheme of maneuver in the south. Early problems with the southern offensive necessitated Ukrainian adaptation in its battlefield tactics - and in its strategic influence campaign. Even the Ukrainian President has admitted it has gone slower than hoped.
Therefore, many will be viewing Zelenskyy’s visit to Washington primarily through the lens of this current Ukrainian southern offensive. It is moving slowly. But, it has chewed through the Russian first line of defence and is well into the second (some reports have it through this as well in places). In doing so, the Ukrainians have caused very significant casualties to Russian personnel and have caused significant destruction of Russian artillery (including its supporting counter battery radars and EW support).
While combat exhaustion will start to play a larger role soon, we could still see the Ukrainians achieve a more decisive penetration of the Surovikin Line before Christmas. But even were this to eventuate, it is clear to even the most exuberant of Ukraine’s supporters that this is a war likely to continue into 2024 and probably 2025 as well.
While Ukraine is probably in a better strategic position now than it was in December 2022, it is perceptions of success (and failure) in Washington DC and other western capitals that are just as vital. With this as context for President Zelenskyy’s 2023 visit to Washington DC, what might the Ukrainians and Americans be seeking from the visit.
Zelenskyy’s Visit Objectives
While President Zelenskyy has made multiple visits to western capitals in the last few months, none have been as vital as his trip to Washington DC this week. The magnitude of American military, diplomatic, economic and moral support makes this so. He has four likely objectives.
First, Zelenskyy will want to reassure American legislators that their massive investment in Ukraine over the past 18 months is paying off, even if the velocity of liberating Ukrainian territory isn’t what many had hoped for. So far, the U.S. has committed tens of billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine. This comprises economic, humanitarian and intelligence assistance as well as regular military assistance packages. American assistance comprises about a half of all foreign assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the war.
Zelenskyy’s meetings and speeches are certain to describe how vital this American assistance has been and how grateful Ukraine is for that help. He will want to talk about how the assistance has been well managed, with corruption minimized, and that American weapons have reached the right troops at the right time for the right purpose. Well, perhaps not always the right time. This could be a key point that Zelenskyy makes; aid is important, but rapid aid is better.
A second objective for Zelenskyy will be to convince American voters that they should remain interested and engaged, and that the United States should continue to support Ukraine in this war begun by Russia. While the Ukrainian President will be sure to describe how American aid is helping defend against the brutal, rampaging Russians, he will also be mounting his argument that supporting this war is not just about defending Ukraine. The larger purpose of supporting a Ukrainian victory is to defend the international system, largely established and underpinned by the U.S. since the end of the Second World War.
Because a world where predatory authoritarian regimes feel free to coerce, invade and subjugate their neighbours is one not only dangerous for small and mid-sized countries. It would be a world where American national security and economic prosperity are endangered. As such, Zelenskyy will want to re-make the case to the American people that while Ukraine is grateful for their support, this is a struggle not only about Ukraine.
A third objective for the Ukrainian President will be to assess for himself the sentiment in the US capital, particularly in the lead up to the 2024 US Presidential election year. You can read all the reports you want, but nothing beats walking the ground yourself. It is one of the reasons Zelenskyy makes so many battlefield visits. Getting the ground truth is important.
By and large, there is widespread support for Ukraine in the US Congress. But over the last year, different interest groups have argued for reducing or even stopping assistance. There are a range of imperatives quoted by advocates for such action, including a focus on ‘China first’ to much less noble and more isolationist reasons. Zelenskyy will be keen to gain a sense of the political atmosphere in Washington, and how the pro- and anti-Ukraine support sentiments might evolve during a U.S. Presidential election year.
Finally, Zelenskyy will be requesting further American assistance. This includes military equipment and munitions, economic assistance as well as enhanced military training assistance (individual, technical and collective). And he will be seeking continued U.S. assistance in multinational fora. The difference in G20 joint statements between last year and 2023 will have worried the Ukrainian government. The lack of a clear pathway for Ukraine to join NATO is also a concern. As such, Ukraine will be keen to gain U.S. reassurances about support in international meetings and institutions.
American Objectives
It is not only the Ukrainian President who will arrive in Washington DC with strategic objectives for the visit. The Biden administration will also be seeking to kick some goals with Zelenskyy coming to the U.S. capital.
First, they will be providing Zelenskyy a platform to make his case to the Congress and the American people for ongoing support to Ukraine. While the Biden administration has supported Ukraine throughout the war, their strategic messaging on the purpose for the assistance has not always cut through. President Zelenskyy is a fine orator, and the U.S. administration will be keen for him to use those skills to assist them in securing additional appropriations from Congress to assist Ukraine.
Second, the administration - unfairly or not - will want to communicate direct to Zelenskyy that the clock on U.S. support to Ukraine may be ticking. Notwithstanding Biden’s commitment to support Ukraine for as long as it takes, the quantity and duration of that support is subject to Congress and possible changes in the U.S. administration at the beginning of 2025. Biden and key staff will probably be quietly urging more speed from the Ukrainians because of this. It is grossly unfair to the Ukrainians, but it is also the nature of politics in Washington DC and other western capitals. And as part of these discussions, President Zelenskyy may telegraph Ukraine’s war plans for the coming winter and for 2024.
Finally, the Biden administration will be keen for Zelenskyy to speak with as many members of Congress as possible. While some with anti-Ukraine sentiments may not shift their positions, others might. Open discussions between Zelenskyy and representatives, where both can express their views and concerns, provides the opportunity for legislators to consider - or reconsider - their views on U.S. assistance to Ukraine.
An Important Visit for Ukraine
While much of the focus of this article has been on President Zelenskyy, this is an important visit for all Ukrainians. Notwithstanding the massive amounts of assistance provided by America and dozens of other nations, it is only the Ukrainians who have suffered and sacrificed as a result of the many appalling Russian actions since 2014. They have earned ongoing support from America and other nations.
The ultimate success of the visit will be judged by whether U.S. support is continued (or enhanced) and whether Ukraine is in a better position to defend its people and its territory into 2024 and beyond. It will be an interesting few days in Washington DC.
Thanks Mick. Superb analysis as always. It’s always been so clear to me that the trillions spent during the Cold War to defeat the soviets is now basically being fought by someone else with hand me down military equipment that was going to cost money to actually dispose of. It’s the bargain of the century! I think that needs to be hammered home as it seems many don’t get it. One thing we all need to remember though is that our free societies need debate and the bad ideas need to be debated openly. Sadly Covid and the trump hysteria really was a dangerous time with extreme censorship and free debate was really stifled. Many of the issues with lockdowns etc could have potentially been avoided if that debate had been allowed to occur.
Mick, another great discussion. Living in the US, much of the opposition to aiding Ukraine are just a symptom of “if it is Biden, it must be bad” and the unfortunate wide reach of Russian propaganda that has be present now for a decade.
From a political, moral, and morale perspective, Zelenskyy just might be Ukraines most powerful weapon. War is a multidimensional activity, and winning the political and communication battles, as you continue to emphasize, are just as important as battlefield prowess and skills.