Prigozhin, Putin and the War

The impacts of last weekend continue to ripple across Russia

Image: Official Website, President of Russia.

It has been a fascinating week in Russia. Today, a short update on the Prigozhin mutiny with a couple of linked articles and some enduring questions about the events of last weekend.

The ripples from the Wagner mutiny over the weekend are continuing to move across Russian institutions. The leader of the mutiny, Yevgeny Prigozhin, appears to have been sent into exile in Belarus. His private army has enriched him and made him infamous over the past year. It is hard to imagine him remaining quiet for long. Although, personal survival will be a more compelling focus for him in the short to medium term.

In Moscow, Putin has made television appearances, where he has denounced those who participated in the mutiny as ‘traitors’ and has heralded to courageous Russian soldiers and airmen who resisted the mutiny as it crept north towards the Russian capital. At the same time, he has pardoned those who were shooting at and killing Russian soldiers and airmen.

The mutiny has highlighted the brittleness of several weak or incapable Russian institutions of state.  Putin will remain as President of Russia, but for how long is anyone’s guess.

I should emphasize that it is still too early to make a detailed assessment of how the Wagner mutiny will impact on battlefield operations in Ukraine.  But it does raise many issues, which many commentators and analysts have addressed in the past few days.

The Mutiny and Russian Fighting Power

In my most recent article for ABC Australia, I explored how the mutiny could have an impact on Russian military fighting power. Fighting power, a term used by Martin Crevald in his 1982 book that examined the performance of US and German military institutions in World War Two, generally encompasses the intellectual, physical and moral aspects of military organisations.

In this article, I note that:

Much is still to be revealed about the Prigozhin mutiny, and there will certainly be elements that may never be revealed to the public. But scenes of Russian air force aircraft being shot down by their fellow countrymen will be a shock to the Russian military.

It will irrevocably change the status of private military companies in Russia. And the mutiny will slowly, over time, corrode the fighting power of the Russian military.

The Ukrainians, who know the Russian military better than anyone on the planet, will be sure to exploit this.

Importantly, the fundamental purpose for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has been undermined by Prigozhin. As I write in my article:

The rationale for the war was fatally undermined by Prigozhin. He "crossed the Rubicon" in his mutiny when he issued a video last week which challenged the purpose of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In the video, Prigozhin described an alternate reason for Putin's special military operations, blaming the invasion on Russian elite. In war, purpose matters.

Purpose is vital for soldiers, and it is vital for popular support for wars among the wider populace. It is hard to assess right now how this particular intervention by Progozhin will manifest.

Trust Issues

We might also expect that this will be a very uneasy time for Russian military leaders. The participation, acquiescence or non-interference from Russian military and security force organizations - and the possible participation by some senior military officers - means that trust has been a major casualty of the mutiny.

Military institutions don’t just need trust, rather, it is the foundation of how they train, plan, lead and fight. It is essential in building cohesive military units, in collaborating with other military forces and in the civil-military relationship. Now, from Putin down, the trust between individuals and institutions in the Russian system has been degraded even further. The impacts of this will manifest in the days, weeks and months ahead.

Another strategic impact is the status of Putin.

I don’t wish to make any predictions here, but clearly the mutiny has implications for Putin’s rule.  This week, former Australian ambassador in Moscow, Peter Tesch, wrote an excellent piece on the political ramifications of the mutiny. In this, Peter describes how:

As the capo di tutti i capi—‘boss of all bosses’—Putin has ruled for 23 years without challenge. The ultimate bestower of largesse, the man who both giveth and taketh away, he has refined an inherited system of patronage and persecution, ensuring that no member of the elite (each anointed by him) could gain power and influence in more than one area. The siloviki—those sprung from Putin’s own intelligence and security background—were played off against the uber-wealthy business elite oligarchs, in turn being balanced by those with their technocratic hands on the levers of government. Putin has been the final arbiter of all decisions of any note in a system that has become completely personalised around him.

Now, one of his own—albeit an outsider he brought into his sanctum—has turned on him, exposing the brittleness of the Kremlin’s Byzantine system. That will reinforce the misgivings that others clearly feel about Putin’s ability to steer Russia into the future by seeking to recreate its long-lost, and unrecoverable, imperial past. The incontestable failure of Putin’s personal war in Ukraine underscores these doubts.

What this ultimately means is yet to be revealed. But I recommend the entire piece if you have time to read it.

Many Questions Remain

Finally, what are some of the big questions - yet to be answered - that are raised by the Prigozhin mutiny? I think there are key five issues, but there are probably many others.

First, and probably most importantly, what will Putin’s short and medium term reactions be? As Tesch notes, “Russia’s political landscape has changed fundamentally”. How might Putin seek to reset his power in the wake of this change? Might he impose even more restrictions on democracy and cull potential rivals? Will he be distracted by domestic politics from exercising oversight of his Ukraine special military operation? Or, might be double down on Ukraine as a distraction for Russian citizens and to provide a unifying influence for his subordinates?

In his most recent post at Comment is Freed, Sir Lawrence Freedman provided an insight into how Putin might lean in regards to this particular issue. He writes that:

Putin cares about his survival, whether from Covid or coups. The unintended consequences of this war are now threatening his regime. Any suggestion that he wants to get out of the war will aggravate the image of weakness; sticking with the war regardless of losses will aggravate his actual weaknesses.  

Second, how might the Ukrainians react? It is hard to believe that someone like Major General Budanov, Chief of Defence Intelligence in Ukraine, would idly sit by and not exploit the distrust that has been stoked in the Russian system. While there were tactical actions over the weekend to exploit the situation, there could be a range of intelligence, diplomatic, informational and other initiatives that might eventuate as part of Ukraine’s strategic response to the Prigozhin mutiny.

Third, what is the future of Shoigu and Gerasimov? Despite Prigozhin demands, it is probably unlikely that Putin will remove Defence Minister Shoigu or head of the military forces, General Gerasimov. This combination, widely despised in the Russian military, and generally considered incompetent in their running of the war, are loyal to Putin. Right now, that is their most important quality for Putin. Prigozhin’s mutiny may have actually solidified the positions of these two senior Russian leaders. How might this impact on how the war is fought, and it’s future trajectory?

Fourth, how will this impact on the Russian Ministry of Defence absorption of private military companies? With the recent directive from Defence Minister Shoigu that all private military companies must sign contracts with the Ministry of Defence, private military companies are in essence being absorbed into the Russian military. How might this impact on the tactical and operational effectiveness of the Russian military?

Finally, how does this impact on the battlefield? While the Russians are conducting limited offensive operations in the east of Ukraine, the Ukrainian offensive has them under pressure in the south. Presently, there are no obvious manifestations of the Prigozhin mutiny on battlefield outcomes. However, the Ukrainians are generating both momentum and pressure, while at the same time, the Russians are fighting while glancing over their shoulders at what is occurring in their country.

Surprise - An Enduring Part of This and Other Wars

In a recent piece, I explored the surprise of Prigozhin’s mutiny, noting that it was just another in a long line of surprises that have occurred in this war so far. The impacts of the mutiny on the Russian military and the Russian political system, are likely to play out over some time. There are probably more surprises to come as a result.