Ukraine’s Campaigns: A February 2024 Update
Russian offensive continues, Ukraine reshuffles it leadership and continues its strategic strikes, the U.S. Congress dithers
Throughout this war, I have produced regular campaign updates. These have explored both the Russian and Ukrainian campaigns in the war, while also delving into the measures of success and failure for each. My last campaign update for 2023, which wrapped up much of 2023’s fighting including the Ukrainian southern counteroffensive, can be read here.
One of the most important developments of the war since that last campaign update has been the shake up in the military leadership of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. If 2023 was the year of mayhem for leadership of the Ministry of Defence, 2024 brings with it turmoil for Ukraine’s senior military leadership.
Last week saw the dismissal of the Ukrainian military commander-in-chief, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi. Zaluzhnyi, appointed by President Zelenskyy in 2021, had commanded through the darkest hours of the Russian large-scale invasion in February 2022 and the successes of the Kharkiv and Kherson offensives. But, his dismissal had been the subject of rumour and speculation for some time. Zaluzhnyi’s public comment on Ukrainian strategy, his intervention in the mobilization debate, the inability to forge a military force that could execute a successful counteroffensive in 2023, and undoubtedly an array of other factors resulted in a breakdown in trust between the President and commander-in-chief.
After Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal, the commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces, General Syrskyi, was elevated as the new Ukrainian military commander-in-chief. A series of other appointments have also been made, including a new commander of Ukraine’s ground forces. These new appointments, announced on 11 February, are:
Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavliuk is appointed as the new commander of the Ground Forces. He served as deputy defense minister from February 2023.
Major General Ihor Plahuta was appointed as the new commander of the Territorial Defense forces. He previously commanded the Separate Presidential Brigade and led the southern command of the National Guard in Odesa.
Brigadier General Ihor Skibiuk was appointed as the new commander of the Airborne Assault Forces. Skibiuk had previously served as the deputy Airborne Assault Forces for and had also commanded the 80th Air Assault Brigade.
Lieutenant General Yurii Sodol was appointed as the Commander of Combined Forces. He is a former head of Ukraine’s marine corps.
At the same time Zelenskyy appointed his new commander-in-chief, the Ukrainian President also provided explicit guidance to his military chief. It represents a mix of strategic and tactical initiatives.
While this was occurring, Ukraine continued its defensive operations on the ground in the south and in the east. These ground operations have been accompanied by Ukraine’s continuing strike campaign in Russia and the Black Sea region.
The Russians however are advancing, albeit slowly. Since the beginning of the year, Russia has continued its offensives against Ukraine. Over the past couple of months, the Russians have undertaken attacks in the northeast, the east and in the south. Of recent importance, Russia has continued prosecuting its offensive operations to envelop and capture Avdiivka. However, it is apparent that Russia may be preparing for stepping up its offensive even further as winter turns to spring in Ukraine.
Finally, political and diplomatic initiatives in Europe and the United States continue. From Europe, a range of support packages have recently been announced from countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom (which has also signed a security agreement with Ukraine), Finland, The Netherlands, Latvia, Estonia and Canada. The bill before the U.S. Congress on ongoing military assistance packages for Ukraine remains subject to debate.
All of these will have an influence on Ukrainian strategy for this year. This, in turn, will then shape how Ukraine executes its various campaigns in 2024.
Ukraine’s Strategy for 2024
In his statement announcing the dismissal of General Zaluzhnyi and the appointment of General Syrskyi as commander-in-chief, the Ukrainian President also provided direction on a range of 2024 priorities for the incoming senior military commander.
First and most importantly, Zelenskyy directed that a strategy for 2024 be developed. The President was clearly unsatisfied with the existing strategy for Ukraine’s defence in 2024. Syrskyi will need to rapidly develop and present a plan that balances defensive and offensive operations as well as reconstituting and rotating elements of the Ukrainian military. He must also align Zelenskyy’s political goals with existing military means.
He must conduct an aggressive defence of his homeland, destroying Russian forces in Ukraine and striking Russia itself, while preserving and reconstituting Ukraine’s military. Syrski must also successfully execute a major program of transformation in a million-person military. These are major challenges.
Unfortunately, many of the keys to Syrskyi’s potential success this year lie outside his authority. Securing Western military support is a political responsibility and subject to the whims of various Western national leaders and parliaments. Compounding this challenge, the West’s military inventories are declining with less artillery and air defence munitions to give Ukraine. The Ukraine conflict, a war of industrial systems, will be significantly influenced by production levels this year.
The Ukrainian mobilization debate will also have a major influence impact on Syrskyi’s personnel resources over the next 12 months. Combat forces on the front line are increasingly exhausted, understrength and short of important munitions. Defending territory currently held requires an influx of fresh conscripts to rebuild units with personnel shortages and rotate brigades out of the line.
Finally, an array of warfighting challenges confronts the Ukrainians. The coming year requires addressing the key intellectual challenges that may allow Ukraine to break out of the battlefield stalemate and generate strategic momentum. The key operational problems needing resolution, which I explored in detail here, are:
Challenge 1: Integrating old and new technology.
Challenge 2: Resolving the massing versus dispersion predicament.
Challenge 3: Lowering the cost of defending against missiles and drones.
Challenge 4: Achieving the right balance of long-range strike and close combat.
Challenge 5: Closing with the enemy in a survivable manner.
This is important context for the design and execution of Ukraine’s campaigns in the coming year.
The Ukrainian Campaigns of 2024
Since the beginning of the Russian large-scale invasion nearly two years ago, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been planning, executing and evolving a variety of campaigns in the east, north, and south of the nation, in the skies above, in the Black Sea and in the information and cyber domains.
The key Ukrainian campaigns for 2024 are explored below.
The Ground Campaigns. The Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to execute multiple defensive campaigns with their ground forces. In the south, Ukraine is defending along the new lines created by its counteroffensive and the Ukrainian river crossing late in 2023. The Russians have however conducted attacks in the south and against the Ukrainian toehold on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River.
It is not yet clear whether this operation was an effort at operational level deception to draw away Russian reserves from Zaporizhia, or a more substantial effort to create another supporting effort in the southern ground campaign. Either way, it has not developed beyond a desperate battle to sustain the Ukrainian forces on the eastern bank of the river.
In the east, Ukraine is conducting defensive operations in Donetsk and Luhansk as well as Kharkiv. Over the course of 2024, Russian forces have been conducting a continuous series of attacks, which are clearly designed to exploit the culmination of Ukrainian ground forces at the end of 2023 as well as shortages in munitions and manpower in frontline Ukrainian units.
In the northeast, Ukraine continues a defensive campaign against the Russian offensive in Luhansk. Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line have made some advances in this area. Ukraine is also defending against ongoing Russian attacks in the Avdiivka area. Recently, there are reports that the Russians have improved their ability to conduct assault group operations here.
Russian success in Avdiivka would straighten their frontline in eastern Ukraine. More importantly, Russia appears to be wanting to draw in more Ukrainian units to defend Avdiivka. The Ukrainians cannot afford a battle of attrition here. As such, a difficult political decision will need to made soon lest the remaining Ukrainian forces lose the ability to withdraw in good order. Russian success here, while not militarily significant, would be a political and propaganda gain for President Putin.
The Ukrainian Strike Campaigns. Ukraine continues its strike campaign, seeking to corrode Russia’s ability to support its combat forces. This strike campaign is utilising long range missiles, including HIMARS, Storm Shadow and SCALP air-launched missiles. Increasingly it is employing an array of indigenously developed long-range aerial and maritime uncrewed systems for reconnaissance and strike missions.
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A key function of Ukraine’s maturing strike capability is the degradation of Russian’s industrial capacity. Ukraine is unlikely to entirely destroy Russia’s defence industrial capacity, but it can degrade it in concert with international sanctions. It would also slow down weapon deliveries or make it difficult for workers (or foreign advisors) to want to work in this industry. There have also been multiple attacks against Russian energy infrastructure, including attacks against oil and gas export terminals. Given the potential economic impact of such strikes on Russia’s national budget, such strikes are certain to play an important role in Ukraine’s 2024 strategy.
Another priority for the Ukrainian strike campaigns in 2024 will supporting achievement of Ukrainian operational and tactical activities. An example of this is the recent downing of the Russian air force A-50 Mainstay command and control aircraft this month. Other targets include key Russian headquarters, transport routes and logistics nodes in occupied Ukraine. Additionally, airfields have increasingly been targeted by the Ukrainians.
However, these Ukrainian strikes have not paralysed or significantly degraded Russian operational support or their overall command and control. More effort will need to be allocated to operational strike in 2024 to attrit key Russian enablers and to degrade Russia’s capacity to undertake coordinated offensives, particularly as Spring approaches.
The Ukrainian strike campaigns will also seek to enhance Ukraine’s strategic freedom of maneuver. An example of this is the attacks on the Black Sea Fleet, which has resulted in the Russian fleet being less effective in the western Black Sea. This has allowed Ukraine to reopen a maritime trade corridor which is essential to their grain export operations.
Finally, the Ukrainian strike campaigns will be designed to have an enhanced political impact in 2024. The 2023 strikes on Moscow using drones, as well as strikes against the Kerch bridge, airfields and even railway tracks within Russia were designed to paint a picture of Russian military and political incompetence. Another political purpose, vital this year, will be to demonstrate to Ukraine’s western supporters that it is still in the fight. As the land campaigns focus on defensive operations in 2024, these strikes provide Ukraine with a method of continuing to hit Russia, and place political pressure on Putin.
The Air, Missile and Drone Defensive Campaign. Ukraine is continuing its campaign to defend against Russian air, missile and drone attacks. It has been able to weather the worst of the Russian campaign of strikes against civilian infrastructure over the winter, although this probably was not the concerted campaign some expected. Russia instead appears to be focussing on a dispersed target list across Ukraine, to confirm gaps in air defence coverage and to force Ukraine into a game of ‘whack-a-mole’ with its existing air defence capabilities.
The Ukrainian air defence system has recently received additional western air defence systems, and therefore the defence of some Ukrainian cities will be enhanced. However, it is not possible to cover every possible target, and the Russians know this, which is why they are targeting many secondary cities.
One variable for 2024 will be the likely introduction of F16 fighters into the Ukrainian Air Force. Long anticipated, the training and logistic preparation for the arrival of this new capability will introduce another headache for Russian air planners. Key tasks for these aircraft are likely to be pushing back even further the Russian bombers that launch missiles against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, as well as the interception of Russian tactical aviation. This includes the destruction or degrading the effectiveness of glide-bomb launching Russian aircraft.
Strategic Influence Campaign. The Ukrainian strategic influence campaign has been a continuous endeavour since Russia’s large-scale invasion two years ago. Recent strategic narratives have included noting the similarities between Russian and Hamas atrocities, and how Ukraine and Israel are both facing aggressive predators that seek to extinguish their nations.
More broadly, Ukrainian strategic influence operations in 2024 will seek to sustain European and American support for Ukraine, as the US Congress continues to debate funding additional support for Ukraine. Europe is still strongly supporting Ukraine, with multiple new commitments of support from European nations, and a stepping up of industrial production there.
Ukraine does have some work to do to remediate its reputation in the wake of the recent civil-military crisis. While such tensions are not unusual in democracies in wartime, they are messy. And the timing could not have been worse. As such, part of Ukraine’s strategic influence operations this year must be to project a unified civil-military effort to defend their homeland.
Ukrainian Military Transformation Campaign. Ukraine has been undertaking a large-scale campaign to transform its military. This commenced before the war, with Ukraine’s government adopting a policy the mid-1990s of moving towards a military organization that more aligned with NATO processes, equipment and organisations. This reform accelerated after the 2022 Russian invasion. Western weapons and munitions have been provided in large numbers, although they do not yet out number Soviet era tanks and artillery systems.
The recent direction by the President has added another dimension to this institutional transformation campaign. In addition to his requirement for a 2024 strategy, Zelenskyy’s initial public direction to the new commander-in-chief included seven priorities:
Each combat brigade on the first line must receive effective Western weapons, and there must be a fair redistribution of such weapons in favour of the first line.
The logistics problems must be resolved. Avdiivka must not wait for the generals to find out which warehouses the drones are stuck in.
Every general must know the front. If a general does not know the front, he does not serve Ukraine.
The excessive and unjustified number of personnel in the headquarters must be adjusted.
An effective rotation system must be established in the army. The experience of certain combat brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and units of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, where such a system is in place, can be used as a basis. Rotations are a must.
There is an obvious need to improve the quality of training for the warriors – only trained soldiers can be on the front line.
A new type of forces is being created in the structure of the Armed Forces – the Unmanned Systems Forces. The first commander is to be appointed.
All of these will pose challenges, and necessitate trade-offs, as General Syrskyi balances fighting the Russians, advising the President and transforming the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
On top of this, eventually the myriad of different Western systems in artillery and armoured vehicles will need to be streamlined and consolidated. As it is, this ‘zoo’ of many different equipment types poses significant training and sustainment issues in the coming years. Ukrainian military transformation in 2024 will need to address this with a consolidation of equipment into fewer types for different kinds of military systems.
The Training Campaign. Training is at the heart of the existence of all good military institutions. Good combat units rest upon a regime of constant, up-to-date and rigorous training. Combat leaders, over and above the normal regime of individual and collective training, must also engage in professional military education.
The counteroffensive in 2023 demonstrated some shortfalls in Ukrainian training. The time available for training basic recruits, about a month, is too short. While the demands for battlefield replacements drives this, Ukraine needs to find a way to lengthen this to the two-month training regime that was trialled and found effective by the Ukrainian ground forces in 2023.
At the same time, collective training needs to be improved. The ability to conduct combined arms operations at battlegroup and brigade level needs to be enhanced, as does the integration of various supporting capabilities such as engineers and air defence. At the same time, the capacity of higher headquarters to plan, integrate and control multiple battlegroup and brigade operations concurrent is vital in the defence and will be crucial to reconstituting offensive capacity for late 2024 and 2025.
Other Enabling Campaigns. A range of other less visible, but vital, enabling campaigns are also continuing. One is the equipping and re-equipping campaigns for the Ukrainian armed forces. This includes the absorption of NATO equipment, finding replacements for Soviet-era equipment and munitions in the Ukrainian inventory, and efforts to expand the drone fleet through programs such as the Army of Drones. Another enabling campaign is cyber defence and ensuring the resilience of Ukrainian infrastructure against Russian cyber intrusion. These are critical for Ukraine’s overall war effort.
Looking Ahead: A Russian Spring Offensive?
The Ukrainians will be preparing for a stepped-up Russian spring offensive.
Russia has a variety of reasons for conducting such an offensive. First and foremost is politics. Conducting a large-scale offensive against undermanned and under gunned Ukrainian troops may assist Putin in his re-election campaign while also exploiting the current US Congress’s disfunction and possible intention to abandon Ukraine.
Putin will also be seeking to exploit the recent civil-military relations crisis, although his ability to do so is dwindling. Putin will have an eye on regaining Russian prestige in the international community while also shaping the strategic environment for any potential future military adventures beyond Ukraine. He will want to be telegraphing to other European nations what will happen to them if they continue to resist Russian supremacy in its region.
Strategically, a Russian spring offensive could aim to pre-empt any Ukrainian attempt to undertake offensive operations in 2024, while also seeking to secure additional territory. Not only would securing more of Ukraine hurt Zelenskyy politically, but it could also gain Russia more defensible geography in eastern Ukraine in anticipation of any 2025 Ukrainian offensives.
Finally, Putin will also have an eye on the clock. He knows that Europe is slowly but surely stepping up its industrial production. And he appreciates that even dictators don’t have blank cheques and unlimited people and time to win wars. The Russian president probably sniffs a strategic opportunity to bring the war to an end that is advantageous to him in 2024.
The coming year will be dangerous politically and militarily for the Ukrainian nation. Putin, an opportunist at heart, will want to hurt Ukraine even more and gain as much as possible in the coming year.
Ukraine, which has consistently surprised the Russians (and the west) with its resilience and heart, will fight on. It is certain to surprise the us again in the coming year. But, Ukrainian success in 2024 will also require Western nations to continue, or step up, their military, financial and diplomatic support. This will underpin the Ukrainian campaigns for 2024, and the preparations for the future Ukrainian offensives necessary to liberate more of their territory.