Smashing Russia's Oil Industry: Ten Strategic Strike Lessons from Ukraine
Ukraine is increasing the power and lethality of its long-range, strategic strike capability, and Russia is hurting. There are good lessons for other military institutions to learn from this.
Russia’s economy is fast approaching a fiscal crunch that will encumber its war effort. Though that may not be enough to compel Putin to seek peace, it does suggest that the walls are closing in on him. Anders Aslund, 7 August 2025
Over the past week, Ukraine has continued smashing Russia’s oil industry.
In the latest attacks, Russian oil refineries in Samara and Krasnodar Krai have been hit just in the past day. Last Sunday, Ukraine also attacked a major condensate gas processing site near the Russian Baltic Sea port city St. Petersburg. As journalist Stefan Korshak described the attack in an article published by the Kyiv Post:
Flying wing drones tipped with explosive warheads swooped down on the Ust-Luga facility, Russia’s main processing site for natural gas piped from the Arctic and West Siberia, during the morning work shift. Eyewitnesses reported at least two massive fires following the daylight attack.
In the past 48 hours, the Ukrainians have also struck an oil pipeline supplying Moscow.
This fits the Ukrainian modus operandi. First, it is hitting Russia’s oil industry and hurting the Russian economy. Second, by cutting off oil supplies, it is making the war felt at home by Russian people – without targeting civilians directly like Russia does.
This extensive strike campaign by Ukraine is becoming an increasingly critical vulnerability for the Russian government. The earnings from their energy exports helps to fund Putin’s war, and reducing oil refining capacity impacts on this. Domestically, fuel rationing and shortages also indicate to Russian citizens that all is not well with their war against Ukraine and with how Putin is running their country.
In my previous exploration of Ukraine’s ongoing development and adaptation of a strategic, long-range strike capability, I wrote that:
Ukraine’s long-range strike operations reinforce that Russia cannot win this war. Nothing demonstrates this more than the increasingly dangerous (for Russia) long-range strike campaign being executed with precision, focus and discipline by Ukraine. It is precise because the Ukrainian long-range attack systems employ a mix of indigenous and foreign intelligence and targeting assistance that ensures drones and missiles have the best chance of reaching and hitting their targets. It is focused because the Ukrainians are keeping a tight focus on just a few strategic classes of targets. And it is disciplined because despite the Russian focus on hitting civilian targets, Ukraine continues to avoid this practice as it has done throughout the war.
Ukraine’s development of a long-range, strategic strike capability over the past three and a half years has demonstrated such capabilities are no longer the preserve of wealthy, large nations. The explosion in drone technology in the past three years, and the convergence of commercial and military sensing and analytical capacity, has drastically lowered the barriers for entry into this once-exclusive long-range strike club. Ukraine has exploited this opportunity, but unfortunately, non-state actors have also demonstrated the capacity to do so as well.
The aim of this article is to explore the lessons from Ukraine’s development of a long-range, strategic strike capability since February 2022, and what western military institutions can do to enhance their military and strategic effectiveness by absorbing these lessons.
But before reviewing the ten key lessons of Ukraine’s long-range, strategic strike capability, a quick review of the main components of this capability is in order.
Elements of Ukraine’s Strategic Strike System
The Ukrainian long-range, strategic strike system is composed of five components. These are described briefly in the following paragraphs.
Component 1: Reconnaissance and surveillance. The finding and mensuration of targets is an important part of modern strike systems. In many nations, this is often a technical activity, enabled by satellite capabilities, advanced electronic warfare and cyber systems as well as many different types of military and commercial drones. However, people on the ground still play a crucial role, particularly in validating data from technical sources. Therefore, special operations, as well as local human sources, also play a vital role.
One of the issues with this for Ukraine has been that much of the intelligence employed for planning the penetration of enemy air defences and striking targets, is derived from U.S. sources. As such, a key lesson is that intelligence required for planning long-range strike needs to be continuously available and not limited due to a partner’s political considerations.
