On Christmas eve, it will be ten months since the beginning of the disastrous Russian ‘special military operation’ to subjugate the nation of Ukraine. It was not the beginning of this war, of course. The broader war commenced in 2014 with Russian operations in the Donbas and Crimea.
The war, which has seen the torture, murder and rape of Ukrainian civilians, destruction of their cities, infrastructure and economy, has also become a focal point for those who observe and study warfare.
Scholars will study this war well into the future, and will do so in ‘breadth, depth and context’, as the late Sir Michael Howard once wrote. They must. And while we are yet to clearly divine whether recent observations are relevant to just this war, or have broader application, there are so many aspects of this war that can inform governments and military institutions about deterring threats and securing their own sovereignty into the future.
As I described in my very first thread on this war, back on 25 February:
Democrats & dictators are watching. There will be a profusion of articles and discussions on this in the coming hours and days and weeks. That is good. In democracies, our ability to debate a full range of different ideas is our strategic advantage in the 21st century.
There have been few new lessons from this conflict, however. Most of what we are seeing played out on TV, and in social media, is old ideas of war in a new era. Or things we have forgotten, like artillery being the biggest killer on the battlefield, or the need to protect soldiers with armoured vehicles.
Timeless elements of war – uncertainty, fear, friction – have been a constant. Land, air and maritime conduct have all occurred, and the old lessons of logistics, force integration, morale among others have been explored at length over the past ten months.
That said, some new lessons on strategic influence, the convergence of military and open-source intelligence, and the application of multi-level autonomous systems (and counter autonomy systems) have emerged. These will be a focus of subsequent posts here, and in my articles with other publications, in due course.
Just nine days before the war began, I had been in Washington DC to launch my book, War Transformed. The book was a collection of my ideas on preparing military institutions and people for modern, and future, competitions and conflict. It was the product of my three (plus) decades of study and the practice of the military art.
There were many elements of the book that are relevant to this war, but perhaps two stand out.
First, modern war is not just about new technologies. Enduring aspects of war matter. There are many continuities that are likely in future wars. These include the requirement for military forces regardless of contemporary ‘decline of violence theories’, that war will remain part of human affairs, that surprise will always occur regardless of how good our sensors are, and that good leadership remains vital.
A second important theme was the centrality of humans in competition and conflict. Wars are begun by humans (generally politicians), fought by them, and it is humans who suffer the consequences. It is also humans who decide - through defeat or negotiations - to terminate wars.
So, regardless of some of the breathless reporting about wonder weapons in this war, and historic wars, it is humans that determine the outcome of warfare. It is humans who decide the warfighting ideas to be used, the kinds of organisations employed, and it is humans who learn and adapt to generate an advantage against their adversaries.
It humans who inspire the courage and sacrifice.
And it is humans who commit the most barbaric and heinous of actions.
All of these have been in evidence throughout the Russo-Ukraine War. I have written about many of them in the past ten months. I will be writing about them into the future.
It was against the background of my experience, study and writing (including War Transformed), that I posted an initial thread on this war on the morning of 25 February. Despite the lack of clarity, there was sufficient knowledge available about some aspects of the war – even at that stage – to offer initial observations. Ten months later, I think many of them retain their relevance.
While the full text of that first thread can be found at the bottom of this article, I wish to conclude with a small part of it. It provides a useful opportunity to ponder the terrible journey that the people of Ukraine, their leaders and their very fine military have been forced to endure by President Putin of Russia.
I do not see a viable Theory of Victory for Putin in anything other than in the short term. Blitzkrieg operations only work when backed up with viable strategy. History is full of a desire for rapid operations that turn into long wars. [I am] Not sure Putin has a realistic strategy here – instead, he appears to have a dream of a new Russian empire. Dreams are not good strategy.
And so it has turned out for Putin. His dreams of an enlarged Russian empire have turned into a nightmare for the people of Ukraine.
Image credit: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russian-forces-fired-at-kyiv-tv-tower-and-holocaust-memorial-ukrainian-officials-say
MY FIRST THREAD ON THE WAR IN UKRAINE (25 FEBRUARY 2022)
Some terrific reporting from many sources on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This includes @KofmanMichael @maxseddon @IAPonomarenko @RALee85 @shashj @DanLamothe @ikhurshudyan @McFaul. My initial thoughts, noting the current lack of clarity & abundance of ambiguity, follow. 1/19
2/19 It is too soon for any definitive conclusions or lessons. In due course we will need to turn to this process. For example, the US Army studies of the Arab-Israeli wars informed the development of how the US Army reformed itself after Vietnam and won the 1991 Gulf War.
3/19 No responsible military institution will be able to ignore the lessons that will emerge from Ukraine. But, as we know, some will! Fortunately, there is a small cadre in the profession of arms who have dedicated their lives to such study. We must listen to them in due course.
4/19 However, some observations are useful at this initial stage of the Russian invasion. Please note that every military conflict, while a clash of human wills, is also unique in where, how, & with what tools it is fought. Some observations may not be relevant to other wars.
5/19 That said, the courageous Ukrainians appear to be fighting hard for their land, their people and the idea of a free and democratic society. This is important. It is not clear that the Russian soldiers fighting in #Ukraine have a similarly compelling sense of purpose.
6/19 This is not a fait accompli. There is unlikely to be a rapid collapse similar to Afghanistan in 2021. The Ukrainian military, with 245K active military and 200K reserves, this is a significant force to overcome. Especially when it is fighting on home turf.
7/19 I am not convinced that 190K Russians is sufficient for what Putin wants them to do. The old rule of a 3 to 1 force ratio for invaders still holds, even in the information age. Both sides have access to information and advanced technologies.
8/19 We are seeing now what is likely to be the 1st echelon of Russian forces. Russian operational theory emphasises assaulting in depth with multiple echelons. We will see more combat forces committed based on key objectives, location of main effort & breakthrough locations.
9/19 This is a fight that will be won by those who can secure victory on two fronts. The 1st battle is on the ground where the people are, and where Putin (in his mind) needs to rule.
10/19 The 2nd is the strategic influence front. Both sides will be fighting to ensure their narrative is dominant around the world.
11/19 That said, the Russians have several options for how much of Ukraine they eventually seize. These range from just the land east of the Dnieper River, to the construction of a land bridge to Crimea, or all of Ukraine.
12/19 I am not confident the Russians can pull this off without massive destruction and bloodshed. And if they have to win this way, they cannot win.
13/19 As such, I do not see a viable Theory of Victory for Putin in anything other than in the short term. Blitzkrieg operations only work when backed up with viable strategy. History is full of a desire for rapid operations that turn into long wars.
14/19 Not sure Putin has a realistic strategy here – instead, he appears to have a dream of a new Russian empire. Dreams are not good strategy.
15/19 But as I write in #WarTransformed – “Russian operations in Ukraine demonstrate that war remains an attractive option for political leaders to achieve their strategic objectives."
16/19 "But it is a different form of war…the Russian development & operational testing of new ideas & tactics provide important insights for future conflicts.” #WarTransformed
17/19 Democrats & dictators are watching. There will be a profusion of articles and discussions on this in the coming hours and days and weeks. That is good. In democracies, our ability to debate a full range of different ideas is our strategic advantage in the 21st century.
18/19 The situation will remain uncertain for some time, and we will be bombarded with different reporting and messages from both sides (as well as Russian apologists) to shape our perceptions.
19/19 Now, more than ever, the value of rigorous, professional journalism (and the observations of citizens online) to bring light to the darkest moments of war is vital. I thank them & wish these dedicated souls who are bringing us this ‘first version of history’ safe travels.
Or, read it at Twitter (if you are still using it):
I remember that thread (I started following you on Twitter because of it), and my favourite part remains at 3/19 for I think it identifies Ukraine’s key strategic advantage: motivation.
“[Ukrainians are] fighting hard for their land, their people and the idea of a free and democratic society. This is important. It is not clear that the Russian soldiers fighting in #Ukraine have a similarly compelling sense of purpose.”
I think the war has shown thus far that Ukraine’s sense of purpose you identified has only grown stronger as the consequences of Russian rule are revealed with every atrocity.
Russia on the other hand, where it has attempted to motivate its forces at all, can only advance weak and inconsistent rationalizations of why it’s fighting in the Ukraine.
This matters. It mattered then. It matters now. And it will matter until the war ends, as it eventually will, with the full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Thanks for writing. I enjoyed your book and I look forward to your periodic updates, for they are always insightful.
So impressive that you foresaw all of this that early in the war.
I went to look-up a timeline of where Russia was with its invasion when you tweeted that original thread (because it all runs together in my mind) and Russia was NOT in the dumpster-fire stage of over-extension of its push toward Kyiv. (Nor were they already being pushed back.)
You were QUITE perceptive to have seen what many (most?) still did not see at that time. And to save someone from clicking the link below, it wasn't until April -- well over a month after you wrote that original thread -- that Ukraine began to seriously push back the Russian column/thrust toward Kyiv.
Well done, General.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine