The Battle for Hostomel
Battle Studies, Institutional Learning and Preparing for Future War
French Colonel Ardant du Picq was killed in action near Metz during a Prussian artillery barrage. A single shell deprived French military, and the wider military profession, of a profound thinker on military affairs. As the introduction to a 1920 translation of his work notes, “when our warlike institutions were perishing from the lack of thought, he represented in all its greatness the true type of military thinker. The virile thought of a military thinker alone brings forth successes and maintains victorious nations.”
Du Picq left behind completed works as well as notes that, after his death, were published as a book titled Battle Studies. The book began with the following words: Battle is the final objective of armies.
The book is a wonderful exploration of battle in different ages, with a key theme throughout of the moral forces at play in the planning for, and conduct of, battles.
Both before du Picq’s time, and since, the conduct of battle studies has been an important source of learning for military leaders and the institutions they belong to. Because military personnel rarely get to practice their profession, most of their learning must be vicarious. As Sir Michael Howard described in his 1961 lecture, The Use and Abuse of Military History:
There are two great difficulties with which the professional soldier, sailor, or airman has to contend in equipping himself as a commander. First, his profession is almost unique in that he may only have to exercise it once in a lifetime, if indeed that often. It is as if a surgeon had to practise throughout his life on dummies for one real operation…Secondly, the complex problem of running an army at all is liable to occupy his mind and skill so completely that it is very easy to forget what it is being run for.
Exploring the Battle of Hostomel
The recent publication of several articles on the first battle of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, The Battle of Hostomel, highlights again the importance of battle studies. In the past day, the War on the Rocks site published an excellent article on the Battle of Hostomel by Liam Collins, John Spencer, and Michael Kofman. The authors possess a variety of different experiences inside the military and as analysts. This makes it one of the few accounts of the battle available in English and written by military experts.
There have been other accounts of the battle. In August 2022, a long piece by journalists Paul Sonne, Isabelle Khurshudyan, Serhiy Morgunov and Kostiantyn Khudov examined the battle in detail, as part of the wider Battle for Kyiv. The War Archive on YouTube has also published an excellent animated analysis of the battle, which you can view here. There also several contemporary accounts of the battle here, here and here. Finally, recently published books such as Serhii Plokhy’s The Russo-Ukrainian War, and Owen Matthews’ Overreach contain examinations of the battle.
These articles and books highlight a range of issues with the battle that are worthy of further exploration. But first, a quick description of the battle itself.
The battle for Hostomel Airport was the first ground battle of the Russian invasion after its commencement in February 2002. Beginning early on 24 February, the battle itself only lasted around 36 hours. A Russian air assault was attempted against the airfield, with its mission being to seize the Hostomel airport, creating an airhead for the subsequent air-landing of a larger Russian force of infantry and light armour.
The location of the airfield, approximately 20 kilometres to the northwest of Kyiv, was key. Russia aimed to use the capture of the airfield as a springboard to ‘march on Kyiv’, hopefully overthrow the government, and as a minimum, pressure Ukraine into political accommodations.
A Ukrainian National Guard unit – the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade – had around 200 troops based in close proximity to the airfield. With very short warning of the Russian air assault, the commander of the troops was able to deploy his soldiers to shoot down Russian helicopters and ensure that the Russians were unable to use their preferred landing zone for their air assault troops. Supported by Ukrainian artillery, the Ukrainian national guard troops imposed sufficient delay on the Russians to allow deployment of additional Ukrainian units to defend the airfield.
The Russian air land operation was cancelled, and the Russians instead conducted a ground advance south from Belarus to seize the airfield with several mechanised Battalion Tactical Groups. While the Ukrainians eventually withdrew from the airfield on 25 February, their actions on 24 February prevented the Russian coup de main on Kyiv. This set the operational conditions for the eventual defeat of the Russian invasion in northern Ukraine.
Observations from the Ukrainian Side. From the Ukrainian side, the importance of anticipation and force apportionment and prioritization played an important role in the battle. While the Ukrainian Armed Forces had prioritised most of the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade’s deployments away from Hostomel, sufficient force remained behind. This allowed the Ukrainians to ‘buy time’ as the Russian assault commenced, develop an understanding of the intelligence picture at Hostomel (and in the wider Russian invasion) and then commit additional forces to the fight.
Small team tactics and leadership were also important. The Ukrainian troops that defended Hostomel were not professional, first line infantry. Yet, with good leadership, they were able to fight for long enough to delay the Russians and be reinforced by larger and more capable Ukrainian brigades. This competency and determined resistance has been a consistent theme in Ukraine’s defence of its people and territory throughout the war.
Observations from the Russian Side. For the Russians, this was a bold tactical operation and it nearly worked. Surprise and shock action were important parts of their plan. Had they quickly seized the airfield, and been able to conduct the follow-on air land operations with a larger force flown from Russia, the war may have been set on a very different trajectory. But, like many of the Russian operations in this war, their intelligence preparation probably failed the Russian operation. While they probably knew there were Ukrainian troops near the airfield, they underestimated their capacity.
There are also lessons in the Russian air assault operation on the conduct of suppression of enemy air defences. Multiple Russian aircraft were shot down before the first wave arrived.
At the same time, there are observations that might be made about the size and force structure of the air assault troops in the first wave. If this operation was so vital to the overall operational design for Russia’s invasion, which relied on a rapid capitulation by the Ukrainians, why wasn’t a larger ground force and aerial support included in the operation?
Broader Themes of the Battle
Five other themes (this list could be longer) emerge from the battle that are worthy of study:
Context – the relationship between battle and strategy. For both sides, the outcome of the battle had a significant impact on the overall direction of the war. Too often battle is dismissed as being less important to study than strategy. And while this view is understandable, sometimes strategy is shaped by the outcomes of battle. This is one of those cases. While now just a counter-factual, this war may have been very different, and potentially much shorter, if the Russian operation at Hostomel succeeded.
Learning and Adaptation. The Russians did attempt a subsequent seizure of a Ukrainian airfield several days later, which probably had a similar objective. However, this air assault also failed. The Russians have clearly learned from this and decided not to attempt such an expensive and unsuccessful approach again. At least not in this war.
Use of Time. For both sides, time was a vital commodity. For the Ukrainians, their use of time was to impose delay on the Russians so that the overall picture could be clarified and so reinforcements could get to Hostomel in time to have a tactical impact. For the Russians, speed was critical. The faster they could seize the airfield, the faster they could air land their reinforcements. This speed of action was designed to paralyse the Ukrainian high command, as well as political leadership. The theory was good, but the execution was wanting.
Intelligence. As the War on the Rocks article notes, “both forces were to some extent surprised by what they faced on the opening day of the war.” While surprise is another enduring element of war, both sides had not effectively appreciated the strength and intentions of their adversary before the battle. Effective intelligence preparation before battle, and updating it during battle, is crucial. Where it failed or succeeded in this battle, and the others that followed, is worthy of examination.
Leadership. As has been observed throughout this war, tactical leadership has been critical at many stages of the war and in all of its major battles. The importance of good leadership is one of the great continuities of war. The Russians lost one of their senior leaders in the first Ka-52 shot down, which is sure to have imposed some decision paralysis. The Ukrainian commander, Lieutenant Andriy Kulish, responded quickly to hearing the first Russian helicopters and he was able to lead an effective defence of Hostomel Airfield using small arms and MANPADS (with support from artillery) until reinforced.
The Study of Battle
The Battle of Hostomel, the first major ground battle of the war in Ukraine in 2022 is worth studying – as Sir Michael Howard recommends - in breadth, depth and context. When explored from the Ukrainian and Russian sides, there are excellent lessons for military education as well as individual and collective training.
Military institutions have routinely turned to military history, and battle studies, to provide the intellectual foundations for the many elements of military affairs that are at play once a war does break out. These studies also include Staff Rides, where students study a battle then visit the site of the battle for in-depth discussions. As the US Army’s Center for Military History notes:
Properly conducted, these exercises bring to life, on the very terrain where historic encounters took place, examples, applicable today as in the past, of leadership, tactics and strategy, communications, use of terrain, and, above all, the psychology of men in battle. This historical study, particularly with personal reconnaissance, offers valuable opportunities to develop professional leadership and the capacity for effective use of combined arms on the air-land battlefield.
The war in Ukraine provides military professionals with an enormous array of learning opportunities. One of these is the close study of the many battles of this war for their lessons for individuals, teams and organisations. While the Battle of Hostomel has been the focus of this article, there have been many subsequent battles which should also be studied.
And while there are many observations that can be drawn from each, perhaps one issue stands out above all else. Wars, particularly those as long as this one, demand the ability to learn and adapt. Both the Ukrainians and Russians have learned and adapted since the Battle of Hostomel in February 2022. So too must Western military institutions if they are to be effective – and successful – in future conflicts.
“Secondly, the complex problem of running an army at all is liable to occupy his mind and skill so completely that it is very easy to forget what it is being run for.”
It is also easy to become so involved with the army’s creation and care that you become unwilling to risk the death and destruction which will occur in battle, if you to use the instrument for the reason it was created. The Union general McClellan is possibly the best example. He was a great army “builder” who loved to parade his army around but would not commit it to destroy Lee and his Confederate Army. Grant was the opposite. He knew he had superior resources and used McClellan’s army to bludgeon Lee to death, using his superior numbers and equipment in a war of attrition.
Great summary of the battle, Mick. I find fascinating the leadership qualities of Lt Kulish and his decision making under pressure and uncertainty should be studied more through interviews with his men and himself. The other piece that is fascinating are air logistics. Attack and resupply via air is a difficult and expensive operation and as observed were defeated by MANPADS. A discussion of suppression of air defense in resupply likely was not had on the Russian side in formulating it’s plan.