The Battle of Lyptsi: Robotic Land Combat

Ukrainian robotic forces recently conducted an uncrewed, air-land assault on Russian positions in the Kharkiv region - and won. An assessment on what this tells us about the future of land combat.

Source: @Maks_NAFO_FELLA

This year we purchased several thousand ground platforms, and next year, I believe, we need tens of thousands. Mykhailo Fedorov, 2 December 2024

In the past 48 hours, reports have emerged of a Ukrainian attack on Russian positions near the village of Lyptsi in the Kharkiv region. According to the Kyiv Independent, the attack utilised dozens of uncrewed ground combat vehicles (UGV) and FPV drones. The ground vehicles deployed in the assault conducted several different missions, including surveillance, mine clearing and direct fire using machine guns.

The UGVs were apparently supported throughout the activity by FPV drones. While this doesn’t make the attack fully autonomous – the vehicles need human operators – is one of the more significant examples of drone combat in this war.

This combination of ground and aerial recon - attack capabilities means that the operation was in effect an air-land operation. But it was probably one that was very different to that envisioned by the architects of the Cold War era Air-Land Battle doctrine.

The information on the attack provided about the attack was provided by a spokesman from the Khartiia Brigade. This brigade formed in March 2022, and is assigned to the National Guard of Ukraine, which is a military force under the command of Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs. In August this year, the National Guard established its Typhoon specialised unit with only operates uncrewed systems. They were sure to have either been involved, or supported preparations for, the attack.

The Battle of Lyptsi may yet prove to be a milestone in the history of human conflict. That is for future historians to decide. But it is fair to state that it is an important step in the transformation of the character of war from a purely human endeavour to something quite different in the 21st century.

Uncrewed Systems on the Land

From the beginning of the large-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, uncrewed aerial vehicles have been used in a wide range of missions by both the Ukrainians and Russians. As the war progressed, the Ukrainian navy began to experiment with, and has now mastered, the development and employment of uncrewed maritime strike systems. A range of small boats and semi-submersibles have been employed to strike Russian naval vessels in the Black Sea, forcing the Russians to restrict their operations in the western parts of that body of water. For coverage of this, see this report from Covert Shores.

However, until late in the second year of the war, uncrewed ground systems in Ukraine were relatively scares on the battlefield. There have been several practical reasons for this.

First, autonomous and remotely operated vehicles have difficulties with navigation and crossing many forms of terrain. It is one of the major obstacles to widespread use of uncrewed ground systems.

A second reason for their later appearance on Ukrainian battlefields has been that the ground environment normally has a higher density of military forces than the air or sea. Deconfliction is an issue. And the last thing ground forces want is to be accidently shot by their own armed ground drones. This is a technological as well as an organisational issue that needs resolution.

Third, ground systems also consume larger amounts of on-board power than those in the other environments because of the need to travel across bumpy, vegetated terrain at slow speeds. Power and recharging ground systems in the tactical environment can be a problem, and this needs practical and scalable solutions that can be used, with minimal training and support, by large numbers of units

Finally, trust by humans in these systems is a challenge. I mentioned earlier the problem of humans being shot by their own robots. But equally, if robotic systems are being employed to hold part of the line in a defensive scheme of maneuver, other soldiers want to ensure they can trust them to do so and not let the enemy through. Trust, that the UGVs will perform as designed, and only target the enemy, is a significant issue for military institutions.

Many commercial companies have been developing solutions to these challenges. The greatest contemporary driver for using UGVs is that both sides are seeking solutions to a more transparent and much more lethal ground combat environment, while at the same time they are trying to manage deficiencies in manpower (a bigger problem for Ukraine than Russia). The low signature, ability to use in large numbers and their expendability makes them very attractive in the mass casualty environment of the Ukrainian front line.

Ukrainian D-21-11 UGV. Source: Brave1

Robotic Ground Combat: Ukraine as a Battle Lab

The deployments of UGVs in Ukraine comprises a large, real-time battle laboratory. It is an important element of the larger adaptation battle which is occurring across multiple aspects of the war.

While Ukraine has generally led the way in deploying uncrewed ground systems, the Russians have also been experimenting with them and deploying them on the battlefield. Last year, American expert on uncrewed systems, Sam Bendett, produced a detailed exploration of Russian developments in uncrewed ground vehicles (UGV). Among systems being tested were the Marker UGV. The Russians have apparently also tested other uncrewed ground systems for armed reconnaissance and sentry operations as well as casualty evacuation.

Battlefield experimentation, some formal and much of it informal, is providing insights into the applications of UGVs, the variety of capabilities needed to make them feasible in the land environment such as power, sensors, propulsion, running gear and weapons, as well as how changes to land tactics are needed. This process is informing the deployment of successive generations of uncrewed ground systems for both Ukraine and Russia. Inevitably, their lessons are also leaking out further into armies around the globe to inform their development of uncrewed ground systems.