The Big Five - 12 October edition
My regular update on conflict and confrontation in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific, accompanied by recommended readings on the character of modern war and planning for future conflict.
Thank you to all those who voted in my poll about the future of The Big Five. It was close (see results below) but those who voted to keep my weekly update and recommended readings in a single post were in the majority. Therefore, that is how I will continue. At least until you tell me otherwise!
Ukraine and Russia
In Kursk, Russian forces continued their effort to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast. The Russians have now advanced further into the Ukrainian salient in Kursk. Ukrainian forces have also been pushed back from their smaller salient, to the west of the main Ukrainian incursion, in Glushkovsky Raion. With some rain and muddy conditions beginning, and the limitations this imposes on offensive maneuver, the Russians will be keen to push the Ukrainians out of Kursk before the winter. Whether they can do so is a different matter.
In eastern Ukraine, Russian forces continue their advance on several axes of advance. Ukrainian officials have revealed that Russia now controls around half of the city of Toretsk. The Russians also continued assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. On the Pokrovsk axis of advance, the Russians gained ground east of Selydove and along the railway line south of Selydove. The Battle for Pokrovsk is likely to be the culminating battle in the east before the end of 2024.
This week, in the wake of the postponement of the Ramstein leaders meeting, President Zelenskyy conducted a series of short visits to key European capitals. With visits to London, Paris, Rome, and Berlin, the Ukrainian president provided key European leaders with the details of his not-yet-released Victory Plan. This plan, which aims to bring about a war termination favorable to Ukraine, will hopefully be made public soon. Until then, here is a recent piece from the Kyiv Post about the Victory Plan.
South Korea and Ukraine have both identified North Korean military personnel fighting in Ukraine as well as training in Russia for future deployments with the Russian military forces. North Korean officers are also conducting observation tours of the front lines to learn about modern war. North Korean units are also apparently planning on replacing Russian units within Russia to free up those units to fight in Ukraine. One of the unfortunate byproducts of this war has been the ability of countries like North Koreas, as well as China and Iran, to learn about modern warfare and to exploit captured western equipment. You can read a more detailed examination of this here.
In final Ukraine-related news, revalations from the new Bob Woodward book, War, revealed this week that former U.S. President Trump has spoken with the Russian President at least seven times since Trump left office at the start of 2021. The book also claims Trump secretly dispatched Covid testing machines to his pal Putin during his first term as president. This was at a time when all of the rest of us had great difficulty getting access to such tests. This reveals the depth of Trump relationship with Putin and provides insights into how favorably Trump might deal with Putin should he win the election in November.
The Middle East
Israel continues its assault on Hezbollah throughout Lebanon. It has conducted attacks against targets in southern Lebanon as well as in Beirut itself. While the long-term impact of these strikes against Hezbollah remain unclear, the Israeli strikes continue to result in civilian casualties and displacement on the ground.
In an opinion piece this week, Thomas Friedman wrote that “All wars come down to two basic questions: Who wins the battle on the ground? And who wins the battle of the story?” While Israel currently appears to be giving Hezbollah an absolute pounding, this doesn’t mean it is winning the war - or the international narrative.
Israel is also continuing its operations in Gaza. The IDF conducted operations to the east and west of the Jabalia refugee camp in Gaza as well as conducting a raid on school in Bureij in the central Gaza Strip.
The big issue however remains the potential Israeli response to Iran’s last large-scale rocket attack on Israel. That attack, which occurred on 1 October, killed one Israeli and one Palestinian on the ground, and caused damage to at least one Israeli Air Force base. Frantic diplomacy across the region is seeking to de-escalate the situation. The U.S. president has stated that he believes nuclear and energy targets are off the table. But the Israelis, seeing an opportunity, are not telling the Americans their plans.
An interesting article in The Economist proposes that the Israeli’s are considering four different kinds of targets:
Nuclear facilities.
Energy production and export terminals.
Iranian leadership.
Missile launch infrastructure.
Each has distinct advantages and disadvantages. Of course, Israel could also decide on a combination of these. However, as of yesterday, the Israeli cabinet had not apparently reached a consensus on the response to Iran’s most recent missile attacks on Israel.
The Iranians, struggling and looking weak with two degraded proxies (Hamas and Hezbollah) and two relatively ineffectual attacks on Israel, have turned on themselves. This week it was revealed that the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, was being interrogated in Tehran under suspicion of being an Israeli spy. Whether he is or isn’t, this reveals the level of distrust that has set into the leadership in Iran after multiple decapitation strikes by Israel in recent months.
The Pacific
This week, Taiwan celebrated its national day. In his national day speech on 10 October, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te noted that China "has no right to represent Taiwan" and that his mission as president is to "resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty." You can read his full speech here.
In the wake of the speech by the President of Taiwan, the highly sensitive and predictable Chinese response arrived. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Mao Ning stated that said that Lai had tried to “sell the fallacy of Taiwan independence,” and accused him of a “pernicious intention to escalate tensions across the Taiwan Strait for political gain.”
There is some speculation in the Taiwanese national security community that China may may use Lai's National Day speech as a pretext to launch military exercises around Taiwan, similar to those conducted in May. These new military coercion activities by China would have a similar name, possibly “Joint Sword 2024B.” However, as I write this, PLA activity around Taiwan is holding steady at an average of 10-20 aircraft and 4-7 ships across the past week.
China continued its campaign of bullying and coercion against its neighbours. On 8 October, the China Coast Guard fired water cannons at civil Philippine ships that were resupplying Scarborough Shoal. Two vessels from the Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources undertaking a resupply mission for fishermen near Scarborough Shoal were attacked by three Chinese vessels, however the Philippine vessels were able to successfully complete their resupply mission.
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This week I attended an excellent seminar in the United Kingdom that explored the interface of resilience, deterrence and technology. I also published one article, which examined the political, strategic and tactical effectiveness of Ukraine’s Kursk campaign. You can read that piece here. I also did a podcast with Volya Radio, which included a discussion with Rebekah Maciorowski, and you can listen to our discussion at this link.
Finally, during my brief visit to London, I stopped by The Telegraph and recorded a session with the team that produces the terrific podcast, Ukraine: The Latest. If you don’t already listen to this daily update, I highly recommend it. The episode with my interview should be released it the coming week or so.
Before I move onto the Big Five readings, I want to acknowledge that today is the 22nd anniversary of the terrorist bombings in Bali. On 12 October 2002, a series of bombings occurred in the tourist haven of Kuta in Bali. The attacks killed 202 people, which included 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, 28 Britons and people from more than 20 other countries. Over 200 people were injured in the attacks. I paid my respects to all those who died or suffered as a result of these bombings at the London memorial very early this morning.
And so to this week’s readings…
This week’s recommendations cover topics such as Russian higher command and control, as well as how to prepare for large-scale and protracted wars in the 21st century. There is a good article on the lessons of dealing with alliances of authoritarian powers in the past, and a good piece on U.S. diplomacy and influence in the Pacific. Finally, I have included a short article that explores the new-era dragons of the war in Ukraine, thermite-dropping drones.
As always, if you only have time to read a single article, the first one is my pick of the week.
Happy reading!
1. The U.S. in the Pacific
Ever since the Obama administration, different U.S. presidents and officials have talked of a ‘pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific. However, action has not always matched the rhetoric. In this piece, the authors argue that the United States’ influence in the region is still being undercut by limited diplomacy. This makes it more difficult for the U.S. to compete with Beijing for influence in the Pacific. They note that “without a shift in how Washington prioritizes and supports diplomacy in this area, the United States will continue to cede ground to China.” You can read the full article here.
2. Russian Higher Command
This week, the Center for Naval Analyses published four timely, and very good, reports on the state of the Russian military. Covering topics of nuclear strategy, command, defence industry and mobilization, this collection of report provides an array of insights into Russian defence capabilities and the trajectory of Russian force developments. Perhaps my favorite among the reports however is the one on command, which covers the Russian general staff and its influence on the war in Ukraine. You can read that report here.
3. Preparing for Protracted Wars
This week, the Modern War Institute published an excellent piece on the challenges of protracted, large scale warfare. The authors note a dissonance between the threat and investment in the response from the United States when they write that “we face the most challenging international environment at least since the end of the Cold War, when we were spending some 6 percent of our gross domestic product on national defense; we are currently at slightly more than half that level. It is likely time to dramatically increase our investment in national security.” You can read the full article here.
4. Return of the Dragons
Recently, Ukraine has employed uncrewed aerial vehicles to drop thermite on Russian positions in vegetated areas. This burns the vegetation, denying the Russians cover from view, and allowing the Ukrainians to better target the Russians. It was not long before someone started to describe these thermite-spewing drones as dragons. You can read the interesting story about the background to these 21st century ‘dragons’ here.
5. Confronting the Authoritarian Axis
In this piece, Philip Zelikow examines how the United States is faced with a very dangerous period in global politics and that the period of maximum danger might be in the next one to three years. Zelikow explores lessons from the anti-American partnerships developed by the Axis powers in World War II and Moscow and Beijing during the early Cold War. The full piece is available to read here.