The Big Five - 18 January edition
My regular update on conflict and confrontation in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific, accompanied by recommended readings on modern war and future conflict.
Welcome to the 18 January 2025 edition of The Big Five.
This week, as Russian oil facilities continue to burn, I cover the normal range of conflicts, starting with Ukraine, move to the Middle East and then zoom across the world to the Pacific Theatre. As always, I will finish with my five recommended reads on war and national security issues from the past week.
In my weekly commentary, just published here, I explore these issues and conduct a special deep dive into military trends to watch in 2025.
Ukraine
Over the past week, the Ukraine-Russia conflict has seen significant developments across various fronts, highlighting the ongoing intensity and complexity of the war.
Strategic strike activities. Ukrainian forces this week launched the largest air attacks on Russian territory since the beginning of the war. They attacked targets in 12 regions of Russia which reportedly included oil depots, munitions storage locations and airbases used by Russian bomber planes. What did Ukraine actually hit this week?
Engels. Ukraine attacked Engels at least twice. The first attack began a five day fire, and the second was conducted just after the fire was extinguished. Apparently the oil depot is burning again.
Saratov. In Saratov, an oil refinery may have been hit. The governor of Saratov region, Roman Busargin, confirmed the attack.
Kazan. Ukraine apparently attacked the Kazan Orgsintez plant, a producer of polycarbonates, sevilene, high-strength plastics, as well as high and low-density polyethylenes. The plant also produces explosive content for Russian munitions.
Bryansk. Ukraine reportedly attacked the Kremniy plant in this location which is a chemical plant. Additionally, one online commentator has speculated that the 120th GRAU arsenal, attacked in November last year, might also have been a target here.
Tula. Explosions and "air defense work" were reported in Tula region. As of today, an oil facility in the town of Uzlovaya in Russia's Tula Oblast appears to be burning there.
Tatarstan. The Russians have claimed that in Tatarstan, drones also tried to attack an oil industry enterprise in Almetyevsk.
It is hard to credit anyone who thinks this is not having an impact on the Russian economy, on Russian manufacturing more broadly, as well as on the daily lives of Russian people. This element of economic warfare appears to be a particular focus of the Ukrainians now, and given the increasing capability and quantity of their long range attack drones, it is probably going to continue to put political pressure on Putin.
Ukraine, which has developed a significant drone design and manufacturing capability, will retain the ability to strike deep in Russia even if it is not provided with ATACMs or other U.S. long-range strike missiles. This important message they are sending to Putin - “even if the Americans don’t help us, we will keep hurting you for as long as it takes.”
To read more on this issue, a good piece by Maria Avdeeva was published by Atlantic Council this week and is available here.
In response, Russia conducted an attack with drones and missiles against energy infrastructure, attacked the central Ukrainian city of Kryvyi Rih (also hometown of President Zelenskyy) killing four people, and has conducted an attack against Kyiv using ballistic missiles over the evening of 17 January. Initial reports indicate that at least three people have been killed in this latest attack on Kyiv.
The Ground War. Russia this week has continued its offensive operations on multiple axes of advance in Ukraine and in Kursk.
In Kursk, Russian and North Korean troops continue to press on Ukrainian positions in the eastern and western parts of the salient. During the week, the Russians did manage to make small gains in territory there.
Ukrainian forces also captured their first North Korean prisoners of war in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces captured one North Korean soldier on 9 January and Ukrainian airborne forces also captured one North Korean soldier. One of the POWs informed Ukrainian authorities that he believed he was going to a training exercise in Russia, not to the war in Ukraine, and that he had recieved one week of coordination training with Russian forces before deploying to combat.
Also during the week, President Zelensky stated that Russian or North Korean forces normally kill wounded North Korean personnel to conceal their participation in the war. The Kyiv Independent has also just published a good report on the North Koreans in the war.
In the north east of Ukraine, Russian forces advanced northeast of Kharkiv City as part of their offensive operations in the area this week.
In eastern Ukraine, Russian troops have made small gains on their Kupyansk, Lyman and Toretsk axes of advance. On the Kramatorsk axis of advance, Russian troops advanced at the refractory materials plant, and attacked near Chasiv Yar and other locations. Russian troops advanced in the northwest and northern parts of Toretsk
On the Pokrovsk axis of advance, Russian troops continue their attempted envelopment of the city. They have made some progress, as the maps below demonstrate, but this has come at a significant cost in casualties according to the most recent analysis of the Centre for Defence Strategies. As it notes in its 17 January assessment:
In the near future, the enemy will be forced to transfer additional forces and equipment to the Pokrovsk direction (potentially from the Novopavlivka direction), regroup forces within the operational zone of the "Tsentr (Center)" Operational Grouping, particularly the 2nd and 41st Combined Arms Armies, and replenish its first-echelon troops with personnel, weapons, and military equipment. These measures will be carried out without an operational pause, but the deployment of additional forces is likely to result in a decrease in the intensity of combat operations.
Further south, on the Novopavlivka axis of advance, the Russians are assaulting to the north of the Donetsk - Zaporizhzhia highway. They are advancing slowly and taking significant casualties doing so.
Diplomacy and Peace Negotiations. This week, Donald Trump stated that a meeting is being arranged between himself and Russian President Putin. No timeline was provided for when such a meeting might take place, or whether the Ukrainian president will also be invited. Moscow has responded that it is open to the talks.
As we contemplate the return of Trump, and the statements he and his team have made about ‘stopping the killing’ in Ukraine, we should remember that Putin also gets a big vote in this issue. To that end, I read an interesting piece this week by Anastasiia Marushevska, who gets to the heart of the matter where she writes that:
When US President-elect Donald Trump returns to the White House next week, his foreign policy priority will be ending the war in Ukraine. As he seeks to engage with the Kremlin, however, Trump is likely to discover that Moscow’s war aims extend far beyond limited territorial gains and leave little room for any meaningful compromise.If Trump’s peace initiative fails to make progress, it should come as no surprise. After all, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not a simple land grab that can be resolved with some kind of compromise deal. Instead, it is an old-fashioned war of colonial conquest that forms the latest chapter in an historic campaign of Russian imperial aggression against Ukraine stretching back hundreds of years.
You can read her full piece here.
Finally, this week the Prime Minister of Britain visited Kyiv. As part of the visit, Kier Starmer announced a 100 year partnership with Ukraine. The agreement contains 14 articles and continues Britain’s commitment to provide military to Ukraine, as well as the training of Ukrainian troops. It also includes delivery of a new mobile air defence system, economic aid, support for healthcare, and increased cooperation on maritime security and drone technology. The full agreement between Britain and Ukraine is available to read here.
People Issues. On 15 January, President Zelensky described how Ukraine's military has comprises 880,000 personnel. Russia currently has about 600,000 troops concentrated in specific parts of the north east, east and south of Ukraine.
This week, an investigation was launched by the Ukrainian government into the transfer of Ukrainian air force technicians to the ground forces to serve as infantry. Kyiv Independent journalist Asami Terajima wrote this week that “the issue of sending specialist troops to infantry units had largely been hidden in the shadows until a video surfaced online on Jan. 14, prompting responses from President Zelenskyy and the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces.”
Now I am sure there must be more to this story, but if true, this was not a clever decision. It is difficult to keep aircraft flying, and the training for an aircraft technician is an expensive and time consuming process. It will be interesting to see what comes of this issue. You can read more about this issue here.
Finally, the Ukrainian government has announced that from September this year, basic military training will be mandatory for students in higher education institutions. This training will total 90 hours of academic study and 210 hours of practical training. You can read the full details of this program in this story from the Kyiv Independent.
The Middle East
Israel-Hamas agreement. The big strory out of the Middle East this week has the Israel-Hamas agreement. The Israeli government approved a ceasefire agreement with Hamas on 18 January that includes a ceasfire in the fighting in Gaza as well as the release of the first three Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners. Additional releases of Israeli hostages, held since the Hamas massacres of 7 October 2023, are expected.
The Institute for the Study of War also reported on the details of IDF units redeploying from Gaza. The IDF’s 99th Division will withdraw from the Netzarim Corridor during the ceasefire’s first phase, and the 162nd Division will secure the area north of the Gaza Strip. The IDF 143rd Division will secure the southern Gaza Strip and then withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor. The IDF will continue have a presence in the Philidelphi Corridor beyond the first phase of the agreement and until “Israel achieves its war objectives.”
Israel and Hezbollah. The Israel-Hamas deal does not mean the Israeli operation against Hezbollah is over. Operations continue to ensure Hezbollah cannot attack northern Israel on the ground, or with missiles. On December 17 the IDF moved from Maroun al Ras towards the general direction of Bint Jbeil in southeastern Lebanon.
Confiscating Syrian military equipment. Israel this week confirmed that they have been conducting a ‘confiscation campaign’ of former Syrian Army equipment. The statement noted that “Over 3,300 weapons have been confiscated from Syrian territory so far. Our troops continue their mission of frontline defense in Syria to ensure the safety and security of Israeli residents. Syrian Armed Forces tanks, anti-tank missiles, RPGs, mortars and observation equipment were confiscated.” It is smart. And, it is always better to confiscate equipment than to have to fight to destroy it at some point in the future.
Iranian leader visits Moscow. This week, the president of Iran visited Moscow to meet with Russian president Putin. They discussed all kinds of things, and signed a strategic partnership agreement that covered many elements of Russia-Iran interaction and collaboration. Key areas included intelligence sharing, which is crucial to the Russia-Iran learning community and military adaptation, as well as collaborating on avoiding international sanctions, a (weak) mutual defence agreement, military-technical cooperation, extradition, and a range of other issues.
Nicole Grajewski, a Fellow at Carnegie Endowment, has published an excellent thread on this topic, which I highly recommend. You can read it at this link.
Hellfires against drones. The adaptation battle is alive and well in the campaign to degrade the ability of the Houthis to attack shipping in the Red Sea. It has been reported this week that U.S. Navy has rushed Littoral Combat Ships armed with Hellfire missiles to provide another layer of drone defences for naval and commercial vessels that transit through this area.
It sounds like a good idea to me. Earlier this week the U.S. Navy disclosed its Red Sea munition expenditures at the annual Surface Navy Association conference. This included 120 x SM-2 missiles, 80 x SM-6 missiles and 20 x ESSM and SM-3 missiles.
A February 2024 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies examined the issue of cost exchange ratios. This is the cost of shooting down drones and missiles versus the cost of the attacking drone or missile. The report contained the table below on the costs of different missiles used by the U.S. military. An SM-2 costs around $2.2 million and an SM-6 around $4.3 million. A Hellfire costs $85 thousand.
Now, I know this over simplifies things a little, and that sometimes only a SM-6 will do the job against sophistocated ballistic missiles. But, it is also nice to have a cheaper option in shooting down some of the lower cost drones and missiles used by the Houthis while we develop even cheaper methods of doing so.
The Pacific
On 17 January, the Taiwanese Ministry of Defence announced that Taiwan and the U.S. have signed a two-year specialised training program for the Taiwanese navy. A report in the Taipei Times speculates that the training, to be conducted bu U.S. personnel in Taiwan, may centre on amphibious capability. It might also relate to the previously announced Littoral Combat Command which will be established in 2026.
Four China Coast Guard ships entered Taiwanese waters at four locations south of Kinmen on January 9. This was a synchronised entry, by two groups of two ships, which entered at 7.30am local time and left two hours later. China has recently normalised coast guard incursions into the restricted waters around Kinmen to assert its law enforcement jurisdiction in the waters and force the Taiwanese to expend resources responding to them.
This week, Ray Powell published an excellent article that explored the agressive Chinese actions inside the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) over recent years. He outlines the long history of this dispute, including the Chinese subterfuge in its discussions on South China Sea issues with the United States. As he notes in his piece:
The U.S. has consistently arrived late to brushups in a gray-zone conflict that has been underway for decades. We have for too long clung to a paradigm that our role is merely to voice our opposition to changing the status quo and peacefully resolve disputes. Beijing has stolen several marches on us by employing a gray zone strategy for which we have had no response.
You can read the full article here.
Finally, this week the Philippine Navy held live fire drills during a "sovereignty patrol". The drills were undertaken at the Scarborough Shoal and were conducted by the frigate BRP Antonio Luna and Philippino patrol vessels BRP Ramon Alcaraz and BRP Andres Bonifacio.
*****
So, to my recommended readings…
This week, there is a interesting piece from Foreign Affairs that explores developments in AI and their likely impact on the conduct of intelligence operations. There is also a sobering articles that explores the possible consequences of a Ukrainian defeat by Russia, and the nuclear security issues that the second Trump administration is likely to face.
I have also included an interesting examination of the key elements of the Chinese community that are resisting the reforms of President Xi, and finally, a report that explores the costs of the U.S. Navy’s 2025 shipbuilding plan.
As always, if you only have time to read one article, the first one is my pick of the week.
Happy reading!
1. The Consequences of a Ukrainian Defeat
Sometimes, it is important to spell out the potential cost of failure in order to move politicians to a more informed or enlightened stance on military and national security policies and funding. In this piece, Dr Michaela Dodge lays out the consequences of a Ukrainian defeat, should its supporters fall short in their provision of military and economic aid to the nation. As the author writes, “Americans and their political leaders ought to have a proper understanding of the likely consequences of a Ukrainian defeat in order to make better informed decisions regarding U.S. measures to prevent that outcome.” The full article can be read here.
2. Nuclear Challenges Ahead
This week, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists published an examination of the key nuclear security challenges that the new American administration is likely to face in the coming years. As the piece notes, three central challenges await the returning president: “Russia’s repeated threats of nuclear first use in Ukraine and their relationship to viable endgames for that conflict; Iran’s status as a threshold nuclear weapons state and its implications for regional stability; and the emergence of a Chinese nuclear superpower and its implications for global security.” You can read the full article here.
3. Intelligence and AI
This article in Foreign Affairs, written by Anne Neuberger, examines the impact of artificial intelligence in the collection, analysis and distribution of intelligence. As the author notes, “fulfilling the promise and managing the peril of AI will require deep technological and cultural changes and a willingness to change the way agencies work.” But, there are risks as well, and Neuberger writes that “the United States must transparently convey to the American public, and to populations and partners around the world, how the country intends to ethically and safely use AI, in compliance with its laws and values.” You can read the full article at this link.
4. Challenging Xi
I thought this was a really interesting piece from the Jamestown Foundation. In it, the author proposes that there are four key groups in China that have an interest in opposing some of the reforms and initiatives being pushed by President Xi. There is almost no prospect of a coup, but as the author notes, “it might be far-fetched to speculate that Xi might be driven out of office this year, but it is crucial to understand who his enemies are and how they challenge the commander-in-chief.” The full article is available here.
5. The U.S. Navy’s Shipbuilding Plan
Finally, this week the Congressional Budget Office released its assessment of the 2025 U.S. Navy shipbuilding plan. The report is full of statistics and costs, and even has an analysis of the impact of providing nuclear-powered submarines to the Royal Australian Navy next decade. A key finding in the report: “The Navy’s 2025 plan would cost 46 percent more annually in real terms (that is, adjusted to remove the effects of inflation) than the average amount appropriated over the past 5 years.” Maybe I am bad at maths, but that sounds like a plan that is not feasible without a significant increase in defence spending in the U.S. You can read the full report here.
Thank you for your analysis and for sharing these helpful sources.