The Big Five - 23 August edition
My regular update on conflict and confrontation in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific, accompanied by recommended readings on the character of modern war and planning for future conflict.
Our operation in the Kursk region continues—further steps are being taken, and we are maintaining control over designated areas. I am especially grateful to our troops and all units for replenishing the “exchange fund.” President Zelenskyy, 22 August
Advances by Ukraine in Kursk, and Russia in the Donbas, continued this week. These dual offensives, which see the two sides in the Ukraine War executing major offensive and defensive campaigns concurrently, and their political and strategic objectives remain the main focus of many observers of the war.
In Kursk, the Ukrainians continue to expand their holdings of Russian territory. The Russian response, while gathering steam, is still lacking in effective coordination. Apparently, Putin has given his forces a date of 1 October to clear Ukrainian forces from Russia but will not shut down Donbas operations to do so. That said, the Russian forces have managed to stem the initial rapid advance through Kursk by the Ukrainian forces.
After dropping bridges on the Seim River, the Ukrainians now appear set to clear a large parcel of Russian territory that lies south of this river, to the west of the Ukrainian salient and which has the Ukrainian border on its southern and western extremities. Apparently there is a significant force of Russians trapped in this pocket, which can hopefully be captured and add to Ukraine’s PoW holdings for future prisoner swaps.
To the east, Ukraine appears to be stepping up its operations in Belgorod, which might extend the Ukrainian salient further east along the Russo-Ukraine border.
As the map below shows, the Ukrainians are showing no sign of withdrawing from Russia. Indeed, Zelenskyy’s recent statements about buffer zones indicate the Ukrainians will continue to widen the current salient along the Russo-Ukrainian border to establish a buffer zone some tens of kilometres deep. While this will be an operational liability and will consume combat as well as air defence, logistics, EW and other elements to defend it, it also ensures that Putin has an ongoing military problem on his soil, which is also a political problem for him.
The retention of this buffer zone also provides an opportunity for the Ukrainians to attrit Russian forces on Russian soil and could potentially be used as leverage should Ukraine be forced into negotiations in the short term.
The Ukrainians have been supporting the offensive with a series of operational strikes. I have written about the evolving Ukrainian strike capability over the last couple of years, and they have demonstrated again their ability to conduct the ‘deep battle’ with strikes on airfields, bridges and troop convoys in order to assist their soldiers in the ‘close battle’ in Kursk.
At the same time, strategic strikes on Russia’s energy infrastructure continues. Large strikes at Port Kavkaz in the Kerch Strait area and on a large facility in Rostov are still burning as I write this.
But the Ukrainians also face a very significant challenge in the Donbas. The Russians have continued their advance on the Pokrovsk and other axes of advance. There is no finesse in the Russian operations; they are glide bomb and artillery barrages followed by continuous waves of meat soldiers. It is inelegant but it works for the Russians. And, the Russians show no inclination to draw forces from this advance, one of their major successes for some time, in order to reinforce their defensive operations in Kursk.
At some point in the coming weeks, one side will culminate. Neither can afford to conduct both offensive operations at scale, and defend against a significant offensive, over the medium term. As President Zelenskyy noted in a recent speech, Ukraine has now brought the war home to Russia. How dangerous this will be to Putin’s regime remains to be seen.
There have been some very good reports in recent weeks on the change in the status quo of the war. If you have a chance, check out Ollie Carroll’s reports in The Economist on the Donbas and Kursk. They are well worth a read.
In the Middle East, the Iranians are apparently still preparing for a strike on Israel. Hezbollah however has continued its daily rocket and drone attacks, which have become normal in the norther Israel border region since last year. The Alma Research and Education Centre recently published a map of Hezbollah attacks in northern Israel from October 2023 to July 2024, which you can see below.
Israel and the United States are still working to deter a large-scale Iranian and Hezbollah attack. As a recent report from the Institute for the Study of War notes “The United States and foreign mediators seem to be attempting to delay or indefinitely postpone an Iranian and Hezbollah attack targeting Israel by both threatening Iran and presenting a potential ceasefire-hostage agreement as an off-ramp from further regional escalation.”
Finally, to the Pacific Theatre.
The Chinese Shandong carrier battlegroup completed its latest deployment and returned to its home base in Hainan. These deployments assist the PLA Navy to increase its knowledge and competency in carrier operations, while also providing for another mechanism to coerce and intimidate its neighbors.
This week also saw another collision between a Chinese and Philippine vessel at Sabine Shoal. Both sides blamed each other for the collision, and this is part of the continuing program of aggression on the high seas, and in the air, from the PLA and its coast guard. The trajectory of these incidents is not good, and eventually, it is possible that there will be deaths from such behavior.
Mike Studeman, a former U.S naval intelligence admiral, has a deep knowledge of Chinese strategy and coercion in the western Pacific. His regular updates on Twitter are well worth following. You can find him at @MikeStudeman on Twitter / X.
It has been yet another busy week for me.
On top of a short visit to Vietnam to speak at a conference of Australian companies on contemporary leadership, I published a piece here about the Kursk and Donbas Dilemma for Russia and Ukraine, as well as an article with The Lowy Institute on surprise in modern war and what Australia can learn from recent events in Kursk. I also had a chapter in a new report from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies on U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Cooperation on Strategic Stability in the Taiwan Strait, which you can read here.
Finally, I did an interview with Kyiv Independent journalist, Francis Farrell, earlier this week which you can read about here, or watch at this link.
To this week’s recommended readings….
My five picks these week cover subjects such as Ukraine’s decision to not inform the U.S. and other allies about its pending Kursk offensive, a new U.S. intelligence assessment of the war in Ukraine, an interesting piece on strategic thinking, and a new report on Japan-Australia-U.S. collaboration to support Taiwan.
As always, if you only have time to read one article or report, the first one is my pick of the week.
Happy reading!
1. Achieving Surprise in Kursk
This article from Vladislav Davidson is an interesting exploration of the Ukrainian decision to not inform the Americans or other supporters about the pending offensive into Kursk. As one Ukrainian official is quoted in the article, “Last summer we told everyone what we were going to do and we all know how that turned out. Everyone knew what we were going to do and in which location we intended to strike. There is definitely something to be learned from the Israeli example of acting first and only later explaining what you are doing.” It is a good piece, and can be read here.
2. Supporting Taiwan
A few months ago I had the opportunity to participate in a CSIS-led trilateral event that examined the current challenge posed by China in the western Pacific, and the threat to Taiwan in particular. The result of this event is a new report which contains policy recommendations aimed at strengthening this alliance, enhancing coordination, and ensuring a robust and unified approach to countering threats and preserving peace in the region. You can read the report here.
3. On Strategic Thinking
In this article, the author proposes that there is a decline in effective strategic thinking in the West. As the piece notes, ”the current war in Israel and the discussions surrounding the looming conflict with China over Taiwan should serve as warnings for what might occur if we completely extinguish the strategic imperative to think about the unthinkable.” The article proposes some solutions to this decline in strategic thinking and is available here.
4. A U.S. Special Assessment on Ukraine
This week, an assessment by the Special Inspector General in the U.S. was published on Ukraine. The assessment had some interesting findings, including that both Ukraine and Russia could not undertake large-scale offensive operations. Notwithstanding this assessment, the report does provide a useful summary of U.S. support to Ukraine so far and challenges with that assistance moving forward. You can read the report here.
5. Why We Write
I love to write. It is my yoga! In this article from Francis Gavin, he explores the importance of writing and in particular, “the value in making such writing more accessible, and the need to consider big questions that lack clear answers.” You can read the full article here.
Thanks, as always. I do have a question for you and for your knowledgeable readers. Does anyone know NY Times corespondent Anatoly Kurmanaev? In his article “Russia Seeks to Use Ukraine’s Surprise Attack to Its Advantage “ ( 8/22 NYT), he seems to have already decided that Russia will prevail. Now, while that is certainly possible and the odds may favor Russia, it’s a bit early to predict the outcome of this war. Did anyone else read this article?
Nice collection of articles. Re the Davidzon article on Ukraine secrecy about the Kursk operation- it seems to have Ukraine leadership complaining on the one hand that the US has no strategy for Ukraine, and on the other saying they (the US) shouldn’t be dictating strategy to Ukraine anyway. The interaction between US and Ukrainian military leaders will make for an interesting story when this is over.