The Big Five - 31 August edition

My regular update on global conflict. This week: Gerasimov's Ukraine war update and the ongoing aerial campaigns of Ukraine and Russia, Japan's missile moves, China's big parade and my Big Five reads.

Ukraine’s amazing emergency service first responders in action this week. Image: @ZelensyyUa

The war—it’s a lottery. When we go to bed, we have no idea whether or not we will get up the next morning because you never know what next residential building will be hit. It’s difficult to live in such conditions, but we try to adapt to this new normality. Because Russians came to steal everything from us: our children, our country, our future, our freedom, our democratic choice, our families, our joy, our love—and we decided not to provide them this chance. Oleksandra Matviichuk, Center for Civil Liberties, interview with Garry Kasparov, 29 August 2025.

Before starting the update this week, a shout out to all of the amazing and courageous emergency service first responders in Ukraine. Every night, these heroes standby and respond to Russia’s ongoing attacks against Ukrainian cities. Thank you for your selfless dedication to saving the lives of your fellow citizens.

It has been another hectic week in international affairs and the war in Ukraine. In the past week, Ukraine and Russia continued pummelling away at each other with their aerial attacks. Despite the appalling death toll of Russia’s attacks against Ukrainian cities, Ukraine appears to be hurting Russia more than Russia is hurting Ukraine. And as this is happening, Trump is apparently getting more frustrated by his inability to wave a magic wand and make the war ‘go away’.

In the Pacific, Japan announces several measures related to its counter-strike missile capabilities. China continues is strategic influence operations and rehearsals for its big 3 September parade, which will be attended by Putin and an array of the world’s finest authoritarian leaders.

To conclude, I have included my top five national security and war reads.

Welcome to this week’s The Big Five!

Ukraine

Gerasimov’s Update. The Russian military Telegram channel published an update by the Russian military leader, General Gerasimov, during the week. As one might expect, Gerasimov claimed all kinds of successes for the Russian military in its war against Ukraine. There has been a bit of analysis of the map in the background (what a crappy map for the commander of the Russian military to use) and there are many discrepancies with the reality on the ground.

In his briefing, Gerasimov declared that Russian combat operations in Ukraine will “continue until the army achieves its set goals.” Simply put, this means that nothing that the Trump administration is doing at the moment is deterring Russia from continuing its war against Ukraine.

Source: Social media.

Gerasimov also stated during his briefing that Russian military forces are conducting a continuous offensive along almost the entire front line. This is broadly true - the Russians have been executing a rolling offensive on the eastern front since 2024. Their operations in the north east and south of Ukraine have been more sporadic.

Gerasimov claimed Russia holds the “strategic initiative.” In military affairs, having the initiative means having the power to make an adversary’s actions to conform to one’s own. It is about whether or not one’s forces possess the capacity and inclination to take the offensive, thereby forcing an enemy to respond before they are prepared and waste resources.

If he is referring to ground operations, in the broadest sense of the term, he is right. Russian forces have the strategic initiative due to their advantage in manpower, which permits them to threaten Ukraine on a larger number of fronts than Ukraine might effectively cover, and to sustain offensive operations (albeit with a continuously evolving tempo) over a longer period of time.

But the air campaign is an area where Ukraine probably has the initiative. As I have covered for the last couple of years, Ukraine is able to attack Russian targets deep inside Russia, forcing the Russians to expend enormous resources on air defences and other measures to reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian aerial attacks - and deny the strategic impact of Ukraine’s air campaign to domestic and foreign audiences.

On the diplomatic front, Russia has the initiative because it has been able to manipulate the American president (and key interlocutors such as Steve Witkoff) into using Russian talking points and assuming Russian positions about war termination. This has provided Russia with more time to hurt Ukraine. This diplomatic performance, coupled with the new administration’s refusal to seek the appropriation of more aid for Ukraine from Congress and the ongoing campaign for a Nobel Peace Prize, has essentially handed the diplomatic initiative to Russia.

Long Range Strike Campaigns. Both Ukraine and Russia have sustained their aerial strike campaigns over the past week, and if anything, these strikes are only expanding in scope and the damage caused.

Three nights of Russian strikes on Ukraine. Source: Ukrainian Air Force

Russia launched large drone and missile strikes on Ukraine this week. While the head of the Russian military, General Gerasimov, claimed in his briefing this week on the Russian military Telegram channel that only military and industrial targets were being struck by Russian weapons:

According to the plan of the General Staff, targeted massive fire strikes are being carried out exclusively against military facilities and objects of Ukraine’s military-industrial complex.

The reality is very different. Russia has had the ability to plan and conduct such strikes for decades - they know exactly what they are doing with their terror campaign aimed at Ukrainian cities.

Ukraine has continued its campaign to hit Russia oil infrastructure, and critical military targets such as area air defence systems. In the latest attacks, on the evening of 30 August, two Russian oil refineries were struck by Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles in Krasnodar Krai and Samara Oblast.

This is a topic I have been tracking from 2022, and the growth in the capacity and sophistication of Ukraine’s strategic strike capability (assisted by its western partners) has been very impressive. I have published two additional updates on this topic in the past two weeks, including one that provides the lessons for other military organisations of Ukraine’s new strategic strike capacity.

Ukraine’s New National Military Memorial Cemetery. This week, in a ceremony attended by the President of Ukraine, the first Ukrainian heroes were buried with military honours at the new Ukrainian National Military Memorial Cemetery. In the words of President Zelenskyy:

Eternal memory to our heroes. Eternal glory and gratitude to each and every one who perished defending our country.

Image: @ZelenskyyUa

Ukraine News Shorts. Some other short updates on the war in Ukraine from this week:

• The U.S. has agreed to sell 3,500 extended-range cruise missiles and GPS navigation kits to Ukraine. The cost - $825 million. This has been paid for by Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, with some assistance from the Pentagon.

• After the recent shock of Russian troops infiltrating the Ukrainian front line near Dobropillia and penetrating to a depth of around 15 kilometres, it appears that the Ukrainians have now stabilised the situation, and have some Russian troops in the area surrounded.

• In this report from Euromaidan, a good account of Ukrainian tanks destroying Russian infiltrators point-blank after an attempted Russian river crossing near Lyman in eastern Ukraine. It just shows that Russia’s infiltration tactics don’t always work. Who says tanks are dead!

• This week, Trump sounded a more pessimistic note about a trilateral summit between Zelenskyy, Putin and himself. Trump said he spoke to Putin and that he believes the Russian president’s dislike of Zelenskyy is holding up a meeting between the two leaders. “He doesn’t like him,” Trump told reporters on Monday (Tuesday AEST) in the Oval Office.

The Pacific

China’s Joint Readiness Patrols - Update. The latest update from the Research Project on China's Defense Affairs was released this week, and can be seen below.

Taiwan’s Defence Budget. The Lai Ching-te administration has approved the 2026 budget proposal. This seeks to increase spending on defence from 2.08 to 3.32 percent of Taiwan’s GDP. The budget includes funds for procuring artillery, anti-tank missiles, air defence, attack drones, and other munitions. The budget is now sitting with the KMT-controlled legislature for approval.

Image: @ChingteLai

U.S. Congressional Delegation to Taiwan. As China prepares to hold its big military parade this week (see more below), two members of the U.S. Senate - Roger Wicker, chairman of the Armed Services Committee; and Senator Deb Fischer - are visiting Taiwan. In the lead up to the visit, Wicker stated that:

We come here from the United States bringing a message from the Congress of commitment, of long-term friendship and a determination that a free country like Taiwan absolutely has the right to remain free and preserve self-determination.

China, as usual, has stated its opposition to the trip.

Japan’s Long Range Missile Deployments. Japan has announced the temporary deployment of American Typhon missile systems. A spokesperson for Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force said the Typhon missiles would be deployed to the U.S. Marine Air Station Iwakuni as a part of the forthcoming Exercise Resolute Dragon. The exercises runs from 11 to 25 September.

Also this week, the Japanese government announced the deployment of indigenous long-range ‘counter-strike’ missile systems to different regions from March 2026. The Japanese Defense Ministry said late last week that it would deploy the Type-12 surface-to-ship extended-range missiles to the Ground Self-Defense Force’s Camp Kengun in Kumamoto in March 2026. In 2027, additional Type-12 systems would be deployed to Camp Fuji in Oyama, Shizuoka Prefecture.

Additionally, the Japanese Self Defence Force will deploy Hyper Velocity Glide Projectile missiles to two locations in Japan.

Image: @TaiwanMonitor

China-Russia Joint Submarine Patrol. The Russian military announced this week that it had conducted a joint submarine patrol with the PLA-Navy in early August. As reported by USNI News and @DzirhanDefence:

Two Kilo-class submarines, supported by a surface warship and submarine rescue ship each, sailed in the Sea of Japan in early August, the Russian Navy Pacific Fleet announced Wednesday. The submarine patrol indicates an expansion of the bilateral military activities between Russia and China, which already conduct joint naval patrols and joint bomber flights.

This builds on the range of military collaboration projects between Russia and China. This cooperation extends beyond military exercises, and includes industrial collaboration and large-scale Chinese support for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.

Australian Engagement in the Western Pacific. This week, Australia signed a Statement of Intent with The Philippines to develop and sign a Defence Cooperation Agreement. This agreement is designed to encapsulate the totality of the Australia-Philippines defence relationship. This will have defence infrastructure elements, and as the Australian defence minister stated this week, “Australia is pursuing eight different infrastructure projects across five different locations here in the Philippines.”

Image: Australian Department of Defence

The Australian ministerial visit took place during the conduct of the Australia-Philippines-U.S.-Canada Exercise Alon 2025. This was a major joint exercise that included naval, air, land and amphibious elements. Around 3600 military personnel participated in the different aspects of the exercise.

Also this week, the Australian defence minister held talks with his Indonesian counterpart. The meeting saw the endorsement of the new Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Peace and Stability (Partnership).

China’s Big Parade. In the coming week, China will hold a large parade in Beijing that, in the words of the Chinese Communist Party news release, will “mark the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.” The big day is 3 September, and the parade will feature many different contributions from all the services of the PLA.

Rehearsal for the PLA’s 3 September parade. Image: @DragonChainNews

The parade will also be attended by foreign leaders. Two of the most notable are the leaders of Russia and North Korea. For Putin, the parade will probably highlight just how much the Chinese have advanced recently, and how much he should be worried about Russia’s capacity to defend the eastern regions of its territory against any future Chinese aggression.

The Chinese are sure to show off some new equipment and weapons. And the 1000-person military band is sure to impress. So far, based on sightings reported on social media and speculation from experts on the Chinese military, we might expect sightings of the following:

• At least one new cruise missile a subsonic anti-ship cruise missile with the designation YJ-18C.

• Another large cruise missile, the CJ-1000.

• At least one and perhaps two very large torpedo / unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV).

• New unmanned aerial vehicles and combat drones.

• A new light tank and next-generation infantry fighting vehicles.

• The commissioning of the new aircraft carrier ‘Fujian’.

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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.

I have included a new article from Peter Caddick-Adams that examines Russia’s military and economic difficulties, and a good piece from Mykola Bielieskov that looks at why Putin wants the Ukrainian fortress belt in the Donbas. There is a long read about the application of American Air Power in the Pacific and an article on NATO and strategic thinking.

Finally, I have included a recent report that examines the key drivers behind China’s massive expansion of its nuclear arsenal.

As always, if you only have time to read one of my recommendations, the first one is my read of the week.

Happy reading!

1. The Purpose of China’s Rapid Nuclear Weapon Expansion

Lavina and John Lee are two of my favourite strategic analysts. In this recent report, they explore the political and strategic drivers that lie behind China’s ongoing expansion of its nuclear arsenal. They argue that the Chinese Communist Party has embarked on this journey “not primarily because China wants to “win” a nuclear exchange against the US. Rather, Beijing wants to create political and psychological effects that lead to enormously important strategic and military effects.” This is a detailed and highly readable examination of China’s expanding nuclear capability, and can be read at this link.

2. Why Putin Wants the ‘Fortress Belt’

In his latest piece for The Atlantic Council, Ukrainian analyst Mykola Bielieskov explores the rationale for Putin’s demands for the entirety of the Donbas, including its fortress belt. As Mykola notes, “the region currently serves as a bastion against Russia’s invasion. While there is no guarantee that fortified areas will be able to hold out indefinitely against Russian attacks, Putin would almost certainly be forced to sacrifice huge numbers of troops before achieving his goal. In this sense, the Donbas fortress belt is one of Ukraine’s trump cards in its war of attrition against Russia.” You can read the full article at this link.

3. Access Denied: Airpower in a Pacific Conflict

In this article, the authors examine the application of land-based AirPower in a future conflict against China. It explores a range of issues, and models the defending of Taiwan’s airspace, survivability of U.S. military aircraft and sustainment of military operations in the Pacific. As a result, the authors find that “trends have shifted the military balance significantly toward China. Across a wide range of model assumptions about, for example, U.S. deployment strategy, missile defense capabilities, PLA missile effectiveness, and dozens of other variables, a major PLA attack on regional air bases would destroy hundreds of U.S. aircraft on the ground.” The full, very detailed article, is available here.

4. Russia’s Coming Reckoning

There is mounting evidence that Ukraine’s increasingly capable long-range strike capability is compounding the pressure that the Ukraine War and foreign economic sanctions has placed on the Russian economy. In this piece for Engelsberg Ideas, Peter Caddick-Adams explores the current Russian position and how its increasingly weak military and economic positions may not permit it to achieve the objectives that Putin has laid down for his war against Ukraine. You can read the full article at this link.

5. Building a Wartime Mindset

In this article, the authors examine NATO’s approach to strategy and strategic thinking, and find that the drive towards efficiency and busyness is impacting on the organisation’s ability to think clearly and develop a mindset that embraces the uncertainty inherent in war. As they write in the article, “NATO’s organizational culture increasingly mirrors a civilian caricature of military life. To reassure voters asked to make sacrifices, and to meet US expectations of return on investment, the Alliance adopts the language of military precision, but without embracing its underlying tolerance for friction, uncertainty, and adaptation.” The full article is at this link.