The Big Five - 8 June edition
My regular update on global conflict. This week, a Pacific-focus with the Trump-Xi call, Chinese spies in Taiwan and a detailed look at Taiwan’s evolving version of Ukraine’s drone wall concept.
What the Russians want is the complete destruction of life. In more than eleven years of Russia’s war against Ukraine, they have brought only one new thing to our land, the most widespread Russian “legacy”, ruins and death. We must continue resisting this. President Zelenskyy, 7 June 2025
Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five.
First, my apologies for not putting out a Big Five last week. I was on a plane, and then getting over some jet lag while getting down to work here in Hawaii (yes, it is all work).
In this edition of The Big Five, because have been spending time here exploring Pacific security issues, this will be the focus of my weekly update. I look at the Trump-Xi call, China’s carrier deployments further from China, China’s spying in Taiwan, Taiwan’s evolving defence strategy, China’s ongoing military aggression around Taiwan and beyond, and a detailed look at the slowly developing Taiwanese drone wall.
As always, I conclude with my top five war and national security reads from the week.
The Pacific
The Trump-Xi Call. This week, President Trump spoke with the Chinese leader by phone. It is the first known call between the two since Trump returned to the White House this year. The 90 minute call, in which Trump said he and Xi had “straightened out” issues related to rare earth magnets, is described in a little more detail in this post by the US Embassy in China. According to the Chinese government, Xi told Trump to back down from trade measures and warned him against threatening steps on Taiwan.
Taiwan Invasion Simulation. This week, nine retired senior military officers from Taiwan, Japan and the US participated in a tabletop exercise run by the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science Foundation, according to the Taipei Times. The exercise would examine a simulated Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2030. The report describes this as “the first operational-level military simulation on a potential cross-strait conflict organized by a civilian organization in Taiwan and the highest-level simulation to date involving participants with military backgrounds.”
Taiwan’s Drone Wall. Recently, I explored the Ukrainian development of a drone wall along its entire frontline. While there will be an array of C2 and technological issues, the Ukrainians are the most sophisticated developers and employers of drones - on land, at sea and in the air - anywhere in the world right now. Now, Taiwan is taking the first steps of its own drone wall with the likely procurement of up to 200 maritime drones.
A report in the SCMP this week notes that “the vessels – developed under the code name “Kuai Chi Project” by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), Taiwan’s top weapons developer – will undergo combat capability evaluations later this month before further tests later this year.” This builds on other recent tests of offensive maritime drones in Taiwan, as well as the forthcoming establishment of a Littoral Combat Command in 2026.
While the term Drone Wall is not used by Taiwan, and the Hellscape concept is a U.S. plan, it is apparent that Taiwan is undertaking a series of initiatives that build towards a Taiwanese version of the Ukrainian drone wall idea. The key developments and issues include:
Defence Strategy. The latest Taiwanese defence strategy, published in March this year, is replete with references to asymmetric warfare and the use of drones. This is a positive step, and a recognition of how drones are transforming the conduct of warfare. Not only are uncrewed systems mentioned as part of the Taiwanese warfighting concepts, but they are also described as an integral part of Taiwanese military training and its defence industrial base. That said, it is not clear what the overall budgetary priority is for drone development and procurement.
Source: Government of Taiwan. Drone Manufacturing. Taiwan’s government has announced its intentions to become a drone manufacturing hub. In this piece, the Taiwanese propose to become not only the hub for the world’s most advanced chips but the most advanced drones. The challenge here is that chips are used every day, which provides constant feedback for adaptation and improvement. But Taiwan will not be using drones in combat every day, unlike Ukraine or Russia.
There is much potential for Taiwan to become a significant drone design and manufacturing hub in the western Pacific, but it has some way to match Ukraine’s experience. And, because it is not suffering attrition in drones, it will not be manufacturing as many as Ukraine or Russia, thus scale will be an issue. But, these are challenges to be worked through, not reasons to not do this.
Taiwan has launched initiatives such as the Drone National Team, a drone development center in Chiayi City, and subsidizing up to 50% of research and development costs for domestic manufacturers.
Crewed versus Uncrewed Balance. The force structure of most western nations, as well as Taiwan, is biased towards large, expensive, exquisite military platforms, mainly in small numbers. These are generally supported with small stocks of munitions which, in the case of most nations, would last days or perhaps weeks.
Taiwan, like every other western nation, will need to make some tough choices about its force structure to get the crewed v uncrewed balance right in its structure and budget funding. This is not an either or discussion; both are needed. But the balance between the two is evolving, clearly towards the uncrewed systems. It is not clear what this balance might look like in Taiwan.
The just-released UK Defence Strategic Review 2025 (which you can read here) has endorsed for the British Army a 20-40-40 mix of crewed and uncrewed systems as well as munitions. It notes that “Autonomous and uncrewed (land and aerial) systems are now an essential component of land warfare, integrated with core armoured platforms in a dynamic ‘high-low’ mix of capability. A ‘20-40-40’ mix is likely to be necessary: 20% crewed platforms to control 40% ‘reusable’ platforms (such as drones that survive repeated missions), and 40% ‘consumables’ such as rockets, shells, missiles, and ‘one-way effector’ drones.”
This kind of ratio of crewed:uncrewed:munitions is an excellent start point for force design and procurement but it will undoubtedly change as we use these systems more. Additionally, different missions will require different ratios. Ratios for warfighting will be different from ratios for humanitarian assistance for example.
Regardless, the kind of benchmarks set by the British Army must also be explored by the Taiwanese - and the rest of us.
Force Structure. This year, Taiwan will establish its first drone unit. But as Ukraine has found, drone units are needed everywhere from the frontline all the way back to strategically important cities and industrial areas. Taiwan will probably need many more drone units, in all of its services.
Multi-Domain Drones. Ukraine has demonstrated the application of drones at sea, on the land and in the air. Taiwan’s plans current focus on maritime and aerial drones, which is the appropriate priority. However, there is likely to be useful applications for land-based systems on offshore islands and in the battle of the beachhead in the event of an invasion.
Drone Defence. Just as Ukraine and Russia have discovered, defending against drones is a non-discretionary military (or national) mission. China will certainly use masses of drones in any attempt to invade Taiwan and defending against drone attacks on military targets, as well as critical national infrastructure, will be essential. A range of different drone defence capabilities - electronic, cyber, microwave and kinetic - will be needed and integrated into air, sea and land defence C2 regimes. Taiwan has begun this process of developing drone defences, but as Ukraine has discovered, it is an ongoing effort to keep up with evolving Russian technology and tactics.
Scale. Taiwan is procuring drones, but it is questionable whether the scale of current procurement, and likely near-term procurement, is sufficient. China can bring to bear hundreds of naval platforms and we should expect it might deploy thousands of drones with these. Taiwan has set a goal to deploy 700 military UAVs and 3,000 dual-use drones by 2028 (although some reports have the 3,000 drone milestone achieved sooner). This is a good start, but represents less than a months consumption in Ukraine, and this will be the same in any Taiwan invasion. Production and employment at greater scale must be the goal.
Command and Control. Clearly the imperative will be to harmonise drones within the Taiwanese defensive strategy to deny a strait crossing and deny landing of significant Chinese forces in Taiwan. But these plans will also need to be aligned with the USINDOPACM Hellscape concept. The forthcoming Littoral command in Taiwan will be part of this C2, but overall this must be a joint warfighting concept that integrates drones into the larger recon-strike approach of Taiwan defending itself.
China’s Monthly Operations Around Taiwan. Recently, Damian Symon released his monthly update of PLA activity around Taiwan. You can view the infographic below.
Chinese Carrier Deployment. The PLA Navy’s Liaoning carrier group has been operating southwest of Japan’ in the past week. The area it is operating in is about 3,200 km from Midway Island and 5,500 km from Hawaii. As analyst K. Tristan Tang notes, this is the first publicly recorded instance of a Chinese aircraft carrier operating beyond the second island chain.
Chinese Spies Sentenced. In the past couple of weeks, Taiwan’s High Court sentenced two brothers and eight active-duty military personnel to various prison terms for spying on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party. The two brothers had allegedly established front companies, and recruited others, for collecting military intelligence at the direction of their Chinese handler. The military personnel sentenced to various terms were from all three services.
China Warns EU. This week, China demanded that the European Union stop “provoking trouble” in the South China Sea. This came after the head of EU foreign policy, Kaja Kallas, described EU concerns about Beijing’s aggressive activities in the region. The Chinese embassy in Manila said this week that “We urge the EU to genuinely respect China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea and to stop provoking trouble.” This is a little like Russia demanding that Ukraine stop provoking trouble in eastern Ukraine.
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Since my last edition of The Big Five, I have published several articles here. First, a special assessment of what the summer and autumn campaign seasons portend for the war in Ukraine, which you read at this link. Next, I published an interview with Alexander Vindman, who is the author of The Folly of Realism. You can read that piece here. Finally, I published an article that explored the Ukrainian massed attack on Russian airbases, what is means for the trajectory of the war in Ukraine and the future of war in general, which you can read here.
I also published a short piece at the Lowy Institute which provided insights into the attack on the Russian bomber bases, which is available at this link. I also published an op-ed in the Sydney Morning Herald about the lessons of autonomous systems from the war in Ukraine, and how the Australian Department of Defence has missed the offensive and defensive lessons from this. You can read that here.
I did an interview this week with David Spears, from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Insiders program. We discussed whether the Australian Department of Defence is learning the lessons of Ukraine. That interview can be viewed at this link.
I published an article at Defense One this week, co-written with Peter Singer, about military deception, which you can read here.
Finally, this week was the big launch of the report on the future of military deception that I co-wrote with Peter Singer (author of Wired for War, Ghost Fleet and Like War). We examined the lessons from the war in Ukraine, the key technologies that are enabling (or foiling) deception operations, and what action western military institutions need to take in order to address what we describe as a ‘deception gap’ between authoritarian nations and the west.
That report, published by New America, is available to read or download at this link.
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It’s time to turn to this week’s recommended readings.
This week, I have included an article by Lawrence Freedman that examines the relationship between the just released UK Defence Review and the big Ukrainian attack on the Russian bomber bases of a week ago. There is also a good report from CSIS on Russian ground operations in Ukraine and one from CSIS on the Russian war economy.
There is an article that explores preparing for war through deception, adaptation and regeneration and a good piece on deterrence.
As always, if you only have time to read one of my recommendations, the first one is my read of the week.
Happy reading!
1. Ukraine and the UK Defence Review
This week, Lawrence Freedman published another terrific essay that reviews the lessons of the war in Ukraine against the findings and recommendations of the just-released UK defence review. Freedman notes in his article that, “Ukraine is turning out, unwittingly, to be a test zone for new technologies and tactics. It is also, and even more importantly, accepting the sacrifices caused by being in the front-line against Russia in a conflict that will get so much worse for us if they cannot hold. Everything discussed in this review depends on them holding and so the first priority for security policy is to make sure that they do.” You can read the full article at this link.
2. Russian Performance in Ukraine
In this new report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the authors examine the performance of Russian ground forces over the past three years, and the prospects for future gains by the Russians this summer and autumn. Full of useful data, the report provides a useful reference for those who are interested in measuring Russian and Ukrainian ground force performance during the war. You can read the report at this link.
3. Preparing for War
The Military Strategy Magazine is one of my favourite professional journals exploring war and the theories associated with the conduct of warfare. In this piece, the author examines the priorities for military institutions for peacetime preparation for future warfare. He boils down the priorities to deception, adaptation and regeneration. You can read the full piece here.
4. Deterrence and Communication
This new report from The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies explores the concept of deterrence, and how ideas related to deterrence have been communicated in the past. The report examines historical examples of failed and successful deterrence regimes, and offers a series of lessons for the NATO alliance. The report is available for download at this link.
5. Russia’s Wartime Economic Performance
This report examines the Russian wartime economy and how it has weathered various crises since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine commenced in February 2022. As the report notes, “Russia’s domestic economic position remains constrained but not overwhelmed. In this context, the Kremlin, while eager for sanctions relief, is unlikely to make major concessions to Ukraine and its partners at the negotiating table based on economic considerations alone.” You can read the full report here.
Love your work Mick. I’m in Bellingen at the Writers festival and was awe struck by Richard Flanagans talk on war and its traumatisation of all the players, innocent or not
Very interesting review. A minor point--it says "China will certainly use masses of drones in any attempt to invade Ukraine...." I presume it should say Taiwan.