The Folly of Realism

A Q&A with Alexander Vindman on his new book, "The Folly of Realism". His book explores the lead-up to the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, U.S. policy and the implications of the war.

Ukraine is currently a proving ground for Russian aggression, but that ground can shift—to Moldova, to Latvia, to Finland, and beyond, into the Pacific, to China and Taiwan. If it does, we will need a tough- minded, clear- sighted way to respond. And to that end, we need a shared vision: a basis for thinking through our responses, well in advance of the moment when decisive action is required. Alexander Vindman, The Folly of Realism

Recently, I had the opportunity to read Alexander Vindman’s excellent new book, The Folly of Realism.

In 2019, Alexander Vindman was a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel detailed to serve on the National Security Council serving as the director for Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Russia. As he later described his responsibilities, “my role was to coordinate all diplomatic, informational, military, and economic policy for the region, across all government departments and agencies.”

In July of that year, as part of his duties Vindman was listening to a phone call between the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and the first-term President Trump. During the call, Trump demanded that Zelenskyy find incriminating evidence against the Biden family.

Vindman was faced with a tremendous moral quandary. Was maintaining the secrecy of presidential communications more important than reporting what he believed was a highly improper demand from a sitting president for a foreign government toinvestigate a U.S. citizen and political opponent? He made the morally courageous decision to report the call.

His report, and a range of other evidence, led to the House impeachment inquiry (you can read the Articles of Impeachment here), and the subsequent impeachment of Trump by the House of Representatives. Trump was subsequently found not guilty in his trial by the U.S. Senate.

Vindman’s life has been on a different trajectory since then.

Not long after retiring from the US Army, Alexander published his book, Here Right Matters. It was the story of his childhood, his US Army service and his service in the National Security Council until that July 2019 phone call.

His latest book, which is a New York Times bestseller, examines America’s policy towards Russia and Ukraine. It is also an exploration of the twists and turns of U.S. policy towards Russia since the end of the Cold War, as well as a lesson in Ukraine’s modern history.

Vindman contends that since the end of the Cold War, America has prioritised relations with Russia at the cost of relations with Ukraine. This has included an acceptance of Russia’s attacks on Ukraine, justified by a philosophy of “realism”, a theory favoured by John Mearsheimer that contents that the United States must engage in a cold-blooded pursuit of its national interests. Stable relations with large powers like Russia and China take priority over the needs of smaller nations.

In The Folly of Realism, Vindman proposes that this approach has manifestly failed with Russia and will probably fail with China too. An alternative approach that is proposed by Vindman is to adopt the policy that Ben Tallis recently described as Neo-idealism. As Tallis has written about this concept:

This is an approach that can not only defend but renew our free societies and help spread their values. The first pillar, value primacy, reflects neo-idealism’s morally based approach to geopolitics; it conceives of core liberal democratic values as ideals to strive for – and sees these values as our most fundamental interests. From this value primacy follows the need for: military readiness, effective internationalism, geo-economic realism, inclusive dynamism, ecological modernization, democratic futurism, and societal cohesion. By combining these tenets, neo-idealism offers an approach that addresses both internal and external threats to our democracies and allows us to marshal the various sources of our power.

Vindman writes in his book about this concept that:

More consonant with American values than realism, and more literally realistic about achieving long- term stability and securing vital American interests, neo-idealism is emerging as a new way of thinking about foreign relations…Neo-idealism thus departs sharply from recent approaches to foreign policy that seemingly reject the short- term, transactionalist basis of realism but have proven, in the end, merely fantastical— often with disastrous results.

To provide more insights into the book, I recently posed several questions to the author. You can read his answers below.

1. The book is very much the prequel to the February 2022 Russian full scale invasion of Ukraine. Can you explain why you decided to cover the antecedents to the war (noting it began in 2014) rather than the post Feb 2022 aspects?

I wrote this book to understand how we arrived at such a tragic and destabilizing moment in global affairs. The full-scale invasion in 2022 did not begin in a vacuum—it was the culmination of decades of decisions, miscalculations, and permissive policies. It’s impossible to grasp the dynamics of the current war without examining the intertwined histories of Ukraine and Russia and the policies pursued by the United States, its European allies, and Russia itself after the Cold War.

For over 35 years, successive U.S. administrations—both Democratic and Republican—have pursued a “Russia First” policy that effectively ceded Moscow a sphere of influence over the newly independent states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Rather than advancing a comprehensive strategy grounded in shared values and long-term strategic alignment, the West chose short-term stability and transactional diplomacy. This approach propped up Russia’s hegemonic ambitions and was justified by a combination of misplaced optimism that Russia would “normalize,” and fears of either geopolitical chaos or renewed rivalry should Russia collapse.

These Western policies lacked strategic resolve and helped entrench Ukraine in a geopolitical gray zone—kept out of NATO yet unmistakably breaking away from Moscow’s orbit. My decision to focus on the 1991–2022 period also reflects my personal and professional experiences: I served in the military during the Orange Revolution and worked at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv from 2009-2010 and the Embassy in Moscow during the Euromaidan period. I observed firsthand the political and strategic shifts that shaped Ukraine’s westward turn and Russia’s mounting belligerence.

This book is about the warning signs we missed and the policy failures we must not repeat. While the war since 2022 has rightly drawn immense attention, my aim is to help readers understand the deeper roots of Russia’s aggression, Ukraine’s enduring resistance, and the West’s repeated failure to deter Moscow.

2. You conduct a detailed, and very balanced, examination of Ukraine in the lead up to the 2022 Russian invasion. Why do you think this context is important for understanding the course of the war?

In the months before the invasion, I was privately urging the Biden administration and publicly —urging sanctions, forward posture shifts in Europe, and desperately needed military assistance to Ukraine. I saw the war coming with a clarity that, unfortunately, many in the national security establishment lacked. That foresight came not from guesswork, but from understanding Russia’s imperatives and perceptions.

Russia interpreted the tepid Western response to Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as a green light. The very territory it seized in 2014 became a launchpad for the 2022 invasion. Moscow assumed, with some justification, that the West would once again hesitate. Putin believed he had a narrow window to decisively reassert control over Ukraine before it fully consolidated its Western orientation.

Domestic factors were just as important. By late 2021, Ukraine had recovered from the political shock of 2014, stabilized its democratic institutions, and was continuing its integration with the West. For Putin, the emergence of a stable, democratic, and largely Russophone Ukraine aligned with Europe was intolerable. The considerations were not essentially derived from a security dilemma, but over the loss of a core constituent of Russia’s former empire and an integral component of Russia identity.

A stronger Western commitment between 2014 and 2021—deeper political support, military cooperation, and a credible deterrent posture—might have made the invasion unthinkable. Instead, Washington and Brussels were caught off guard and had to scramble to deliver aid and impose costs after the invasion was already underway.

3. It is clear from your book that there was a general reluctance in Europe (and elsewhere) before 2022 to accept that a large-scale war was still possible in Europe. This led to different deterrent strategies and methods of dealing with Russia. Just how much do you think this has changed now?

Since 2022, European countries have begun to rethink security in broader terms. They now more clearly recognize the role of economic coercion, energy dependence, disinformation, and sabotage in modern warfare. Yet military preparedness remains uneven, and Europe still lacks a coherent, continent-wide defense strategy.

European militaries are rearming. They’re investing in capabilities associated with high-intensity warfare—artillery, tanks, air defenses—not just counterterrorism or peacekeeping. Russia’s hybrid tactics, from cyber operations to GRU sabotage, underscore the urgency. And the involvement of other autocracies—North Korea, Iran—in support of Russia has laid bare the global dimensions of the threat.

Despite this progress, the pace of rearmament remains too slow, especially as the United States appears poised to reduce its footprint in Europe. Even a future U.S. administration committed to transatlantic solidarity will face different global priorities. Europe must prepare not only to defend itself but to contribute meaningfully to stability in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific and a world in which the United States’ primary focus is war planning and preparation in the Pacific theatre.

4. Particularly in the first year of the war, there was a reticence among US and European governments to provide weapon systems such as tanks, air defence systems and artillery to Ukraine? What impact do you think this had on the Russian strategic calculus in the first couple of years of the war, and on Ukraine's?

Western reluctance to provide advanced weapons in the first year of the war allowed Russia to recover from its early battlefield failures and shift to a strategy of attrition. The delay signaled to Moscow that the West was hesitant and risk-averse, reinforcing its belief that time was on Russia’s side.

Once aid did arrive, it helped level the playing field. U.S. and European systems were essential in enabling Ukraine to destroy Russian hardware and hold ground. Still, Russia retained advantages in the air and maritime domains, missile capabilities, and manpower. Ukraine responded by pioneering innovations in drone warfare and asymmetric tactics—leveraging ingenuity over brute force to neutralize Russia Black Sea Fleet, nearly eliminate Russian close air support, and neutralize Russia’s larger force of armored vehicles. Russia still maintains advantages in artillery fire, long-range strike, and tactical bombing, but these capabilities are not decisive on the operational or strategic plane.

Today, while there is near parity in many conventional domains, Ukraine still faces acute shortages in artillery, air defenses, precision strike capabilities and critically short in manpower. The war has become a test of endurance, and the West’s inconsistency has made that test far harder for Ukraine than it needed to be.

5. You lay out the case for US policy before 2022 having a Russia-first approach. Can you explain the key elements of this policy and why US administrations embraced such a policy?

“Russia First” has meant treating Moscow’s sphere of influence as legitimate and tolerating its coercion of neighboring states. It reflects a Cold War-era realpolitik that sees stability through deference rather than deterrence.

This mindset rationalizes Russian dominance in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe—regions the U.S. has often ceded as Moscow’s to manage. For many in Washington, this posture appeared to reduce confrontation and prevent escalation. But in practice, it emboldened the Kremlin and demoralized partners seeking closer ties to the West.

The 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive illustrated this pattern. After Ukraine's breakthrough, Washington slowed military aid and pivoted to a policy of “managed escalation,” ostensibly to avoid nuclear provocation. This response, shaped by Russia’s saber-rattling, was emblematic of the flawed logic underpinning Russia First—rewarding nuclear blackmail and undermining Ukrainian gains.

6. The obvious follow-up question is this: since January 2025, has the US returned to a Russia-first policy?

Yes, and with greater intensity. Previous administrations enabled Russia passively. The second Trump administration is doing so actively. Trump’s worldview reduces global affairs to a contest among great powers—Russia, China, and the U.S.—while dismissing the sovereignty and interests of smaller states.

The abandonment of Ukraine, disengagement from European allies, and withdrawal from the peace process are not just mistakes; they are choices that directly serve Russian interests. While this may seem like a break from past policy, it’s really an major acceleration of the same flawed logic that has defined U.S.-Russia relations for decades.

7. What are the prospects for a peace deal with Russia?

I remain deeply skeptical but not without hope. Any viable peace deal is unlikely before mid 2026. The Trump administration is openly sympathetic to Russia, and Moscow is understandably eager to see how far this alignment can go.

Militarily, both sides are grinding toward exhaustion. A peace process might emerge after another campaign season, when the costs become unsustainable. Politically, however, both Kyiv and Moscow remain intransigent. Zelenskyy cannot accept a deal that rewards Russian aggression––looking for a solution similar to the status quo ante February2022––and Putin shows no willingness to scale back his demands to eliminate Ukraine’s sovereignty.

The sharp reduction in U.S. aid may force Ukraine into a more defensive posture, but European support and domestic production could offset this to some degree. The critical challenge lies in air defense, long-range strike capability, and artillery resupply. And the situation doesn’t become critical for many months and mainly in a condition of frozen U.S. security assistance. Ukraine’s and Europe’s ability to keep U.S. intelligence sharing and security assistance flowing, while expanding direct purchases and domestic production for Ukraine, provide staying power that Russia does not have.

Additionally, Ukraine is looking for a meaningful agreement with Western guarantees to prevent Russia from rearming and attacking a few years down the road. Building European support for such an agreement will take the better part of a year.

Diplomacy has thus far forestalled the worst-case outcome: a complete Western abandonment of Ukraine. It’s possible that continued Ukrainian engagement and willingness to compromise as well as Putin’s intransigence might persuade the Trump administration to pivot policy away from Russia. In this scenario, framing Putin, not Zelenskyy, as the obstacle to peace will be key.

But that outcome depends on a fundamental shift in how the administration understands power, deterrence, and the costs of appeasement.

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This is a terrific book, and one I greatly enjoyed reading. It provides a very accessible, and well informed to the historical foundations of the ongoing war in Ukraine, as well as the U.S. policy settings that are currently hindering effective peace negotiations.

It is an important book that should be read by policy makers, military officers and business leaders. Vindman has provided a clear diagnosis of some of the many challenges that currently face American foreign policy as well as recommending a pathway to a more effective approach for the United States’ interactions with the world.

The Folly of Realism is published by Public Affairs (part of the Hachette Book Group) and was released on 25 February 2025.