The Oreshnik is the sign of a Fearful, Worried Putin, Not a Leader Confident of Victory: The Big Five 11 January 2026.
My first 2026 update on war and great power competition. This week: the Oreshnik attack, peace talks progress, the ground war in Ukraine, China's reaction to Venezuela & my Big Five recommended reads.
We stand ready to commit to a system of politically and legally binding guarantees that will be activated once a ceasefire enters into force, in addition to bilateral security agreements and in accordance with our respective legal and constitutional arrangements. Paris Declaration on Ukraine’s future security, 6 January 2026
The past week has seen surge in strategically important events.
The civil strife in Iran, the raid on Venezuela, the threats against Mexico, Cuba and Greenland, the desperate European diplomacy to deter a Trump administration move against Greenland, as well as a Russian IRBM attack on Ukraine and China’s efforts in the wake of the Venezuela operation to portray itself as a credible geostrategic leader. We live in interesting times.
Welcome to my first weekly update and Big Five for 2026!
Ukraine
The Oreshnik Attack. Both Ukrainian and Russian officials have now confirmed that Russia did indeed launch an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike against Lviv on the evening of 8-9 January 2026. It is only the second time the Russians have employed this missile during the war.
The Oreshnik missile has a range of up to 5,500 kilometres and can mount both single or multiple conventional and nuclear warheads. Travelling at speeds over 12,000 kilometres per hour, this is a missile which very few defence systems can intercept. The excellent Missile Matters Substack had a good feature on this missile back in November 2024, which you can read here. More recently, the United24 website also has an in-depth review of the missile and its capabilities, and that can be read at this link.
A central reason for the deployment of the Russian Oreshnik to Belarus, and its use against a civilian infrastructure target in Lviv, is to demonstrate that Russia remains a nuclear-armed, world power. In this guise, it is a psychological weapon – an instrument of Putin’s cognitive war against Ukraine and the West – rather than a weapon of mass physical destruction.
As I wrote earlier this week, Putin has had a bad couple of weeks in regard to Russia’s position in the world. The raid on Venezuela, which showed how little Russia was able help those it expressed support for, the boarding the Bella 1 in the Atlantic, the ongoing Ukrainian strikes against his oil and military infrastructure, and the gathering momentum behind a peace deal that does not favour Russia all combine to drive Putin to use the missile as a message to Washington and Europe. Whether the message is heard and heeded is another issue.
As a result of the strike, a UN Security Council meeting was called and this will be held on Monday, New York Time. Noting Russia is a member of the Security Council (and it is the UN after all), we should not hold our breaths for any significant outcome from this forum. The UN has done nothing to moderate Russia’s brutal behaviour in Ukraine for the past four years – why would it start now?
In the most recent update on this issue, President Trump finally made a comment about Russia in the wake of the Oreshnik attack. His stated the following:
Putin is not afraid of Europe. He’s afraid of the United States of America as led by me. There’s no fear of Europe.
This follows the clear messaging of the recent U.S. National Security Strategy on European defence and security and aligns with the Trump administrations’ growing library of anti-European narratives. It goes without saying, this is hardly the kind of rebuke for Putin’s use of the Oreshnik IRBM that should have been provided by Trump – or any American administration.
To wrap up this update on the Oreshnik strike against Lviv, I would like to reinforce my conclusions about the attack from my recent article on this topic:
The employment of an Oreshnik missile overnight against a target near Lviv makes enormous strategic sense to Putin. Their use is the sign of a fearful, worried leader and not one that is confident and anticipating victory. It is not the first time he has done so as part of Russia’s ongoing cognitive war against democracies. It is unlikely to be the last.
Paris Peace Negotiations. Over several days in the past week, diplomatic activity designed to achieve a war termination agreement for the war in Ukraine was focussed on meetings in Paris. In attendance were European leaders as well as Ukrainian President Zelenskyy. The Trump administration and Russia also dispatched representatives to the meetings.
One of the meetings in Paris was a gathering of the Coalition of the Willing, along with Ukraine and the United States. The outcome of this meeting was a reaffirmation of the need for a shared approach to ensuring lasting peace and security in Ukraine. Further steps were endorsed including the provision of military assistance and long-term military training, and the establishment of a US/Ukraine/Coalition coordination cell at the Coalition Operational Headquarters in Paris.
Several other core elements of the path forward were agreed at the meeting:
Coalition of the Willing members expressed their readiness to enact a range political and legal commitments once a ceasefire is achieved. This includes establishment of a monitoring and verification framework, and the formation of a body to review ceasefire violations.
Coalition of the Willing members also agreed to support Ukraine if there were future acts aggression carried out by Russia. The agreed upon measures include the same ones being employed at present: military, training, logistics, intelligence, diplomatic and economic measures.
The Coalition of the Willing agreed to continue their current support and implement a long-term military assistance program for the Ukrainian military. This will include an array of measures, which includes weapons procurement, and defensive packages.
Finally, they agreed upon the establishment of a “multinational force for Ukraine” to assist Ukraine to rebuild its military capacity and provide air, maritime, and land deterrence after a ceasefire. It will be “European-led, with the involvement also of non-European members of the Coalition, and the proposed support of the US.” In 10 January announcement, the British government has announced funding to begin preparing their ground forces for a deployment to Ukraine.
In the wake of the meeting, the British and French signed a statement of intent with the Ukrainians for the establishment and deployment of forces to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal. As the British Prime Minister stated after the Coalition of the Willing meeting:
Alongside President Zelenskyy and President Macron, we went even further today. We signed a Declaration of Intent on the deployment of forces to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal. This is a vital part of our iron-cast commitment to stand with Ukraine for the long term. It paves the way for the legal framework under which British, French and partner forces could operate on Ukrainian soil.
After the meeting on the 6th of January, a Paris Declaration was issued. The full declaration can be read at this link.
The Ground War. Against the background of all the distractions being created by the Trump administration in Venezuela, Greenland, Mexico, the high seas and elsewhere, it is easy for some to forget that hundreds of thousands of troops continue to man the trenches and other frontline positions in Ukraine, defending their homeland – and Europe – from the ravages of a new age barbarian monster from Moscow.
In the North, Ukrainian forces continue to hold ground, but the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces has made just small gains in the past week. In the eastern regions of Ukraine, Russian forces continue their offensive operations on the Lyptsi, Vovchansk and Kupiansk axes of advance: gains on these axes by the Russians in the past week have been minor.
Russian operations in the Donbas region, their operational main effort, continue to focus on the capture of Pokrovsk (still), Kostyantynivka as well as a supporting axis of advance to the west from the Slovyansk area. The Russian appear to be continuing with two double envelopment operations here. One is a small envelopment of the Kostyantynivka area. The other is an operational double envelopment with an objective of securing most of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, including the fortress belt cities still held by Ukraine.
In the south, the Russians continue to place emphasis on a supporting effort, particularly in Zaporizhia. Only minor gains have been made in the past week through small infiltration missions. Concurrently, the repulsive Russian drone safari in Kherson continues.
Russian gains of Ukrainian territory have been at their lowest in the past month for some time, and well below the monthly averages of the past 6-9 months. Clearly the weather has an impact, but with Russia now seeking to advance concurrently in the south, east and north, might their aim to gain as much ground as possible before Putin is forced into a peace deal be bigger than their resources allow.
The Russians on the ground in the past four years have generally had more success when they focus on a single main effort and undertake economy of force operations elsewhere. While Russia appears to be able to continue generating forces, it cannot sustain 1000 casualties per day forever. And an army forced to employ horse-mounted infantry in the 21st century is not one that is demonstrating high levels of military effectiveness or innovation. They are showing a high level of desperation though.
At some point in 2026, Putin may be forced into making an uncomfortable decision because his forces can no longer advance, and he cannot sustain the myth of Russian inevitable victory with his supporters in China and Washington DC.
The Pacific
China’s Continued Grasp for Global Leadership. After the American raid on Venezuela which captured former President Maduro, the Chinese Communist Party is going all out to criticise America and to posture itself as the one big reliable strategic player that everyone, especially the global south, can rely upon.
On 6 January, the spokesperson for the Chinese foreign affairs ministry noted that:
Military means are not the solution to problems, and the indiscriminate use of force will only lead to greater crises.
And on 9 January, the Chinese foreign affairs ministry stated that:
China attaches importance to its relations with Venezuela and maintains sound communication and cooperation with the Venezuelan government. China will continue to firmly support Venezuela in upholding its sovereignty, dignity, national security and lawful rights and interests. No matter what political changes may take place in Venezuela, it will not change China’s will of deepening practical cooperation in various fields with Venezuela and promoting common development.
We would all love to think that China will practice what it preaches with regards to its statement that “military means are not the solution to problems”. But the massive growth in its military, its accelerating use of military coercion and aggression against neighbours, as well as its major joint exercises around Taiwan in the past three years demonstrate just how hollow and hypocritical the Xi regime is.
Trump Talks Taiwan (Briefly). In an interview with journalists from the New York Times this week, President Trump briefly discussed the future of Taiwan. During the interview, Trump stated that:
He [Xi] considers it to be a part of China, and that’s up to him what he’s going to be doing, but I’ve expressed to him that I would be very unhappy if he did that, and I don’t think he’ll do that. I hope he doesn’t do that.
This aligns with the statement in the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy on Taiwan:
Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority. We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain.
Whether that means American military forces would be directed by Trump to intervene in the event of a Chinese blockade, invasion, fire strike or other type of attack on Taiwan remains to be seen.
Justice Mission Analysis. In the past 24 hours, an excellent analysis of the PLA’s Exercise Justic Mission at the end of 2025 was published by K. Tristian Tang in the Jamestown Foundations China Brief. The exercise, announced at short notice on 29 December in the wake of the Trump-Zelenskyy meeting at Mar-a-Lago, saw the deployment of joint forces – under the PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command – to exercises boxes that surrounded Taiwan. The air and naval activities were accompanied by live fire training as well as a surge in cyber-attacks against Taiwan by China.
In Tang’s report, several key conclusions are reached by the author:
The PLA military exercise in late December 2025 was conducted with force scale and deployment locations broadly similar to previous drills.
The exercise signaled an effort by the Eastern Theatre Command to sustain year-round readiness, likely in response to Xi Jinping’s directive to achieve the capability to conduct operations against Taiwan by 2027.
Compared to earlier exercises, this drill advanced invasion-related rehearsals, including scenarios involving the seizure of the Penghu Islands and parts of eastern Taiwan.
Although China displayed a degree of restraint during this exercise, it also suggested that a future operation without such restraint could carry far more serious consequences, which would likely include significant disruption to air and maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Channel.
Complementing this report, Tang this week also released an assessment of China’s 2025 military and maritime activity around Taiwan in 2025. It shows uniform increases in PLA activity around Taiwan.
The 2025 statistics above adds evidence to the case that the PLA is constantly honing its ability to plan and rapidly launch integrated joint operations in the western Pacific. While Taiwan may be the particular focus for now, the skills being developed by the Eastern Theatre Command, as well as the Southern Theatre Command, will be applicable for a wide range of other contingencies where China wishes to employ military coercion and force to achieve its geopolitical objectives.
*******
It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings, my final list for 2025.
In this week’s Big Five, I have included a good piece exploring the impact of AI-supported decision-making on the audacity and authority of military commanders. There are also good articles on the development of Chinese and Russian aerospace capabilities, the gamification of killing, and an exploration of how China is using civil shipping to augment its naval amphibious lift capacity. Finally, I have included an article on horse-mounted operations being conducted by the Russians in Ukraine.
As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.
Happy reading!
1. The End of Audacity
War is ultimately a human endeavour. It relies on perseverance, individual and group endurance, creativity and sacrifice. It also demands audacity, those high-risk decisions which – if based on the right assumptions and executed well – can lead to battle- or war-winning outcomes. In this article from the Modern War Institute, the authors pitch the idea that in the growing use of AI for decision-support, there is a risk that military commanders might lose the “willingness to make bold, high-risk decisions in the moment, especially if AI recommends otherwise.” It is a thoughtful piece, and available to read at this link.
2. Flooding the Zone
The China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College issues a stream of high quality reports on Chinese naval and maritime power. This week, a new report was released that explores how China is experimenting with a range of different civil vessels to supplement the PLA Navy’s amphibious fleet. As the authors note, “if the PLA develops the ability to coordinate and employ significant numbers of civilian LCTs to transport forces directly onto Taiwan beaches, it could significantly improve its over the-shore assault capacities and logistics capabilities.” You can read the report at this link.
3. Chinese and Russian Airpower
This article, authored by Justin Bronk and published by RUSI, explores Russian and Chinese air capabilities. It is not a first principles examination of their aerospace forces but instead, as the author notes, a review of “the ways in which the threat posed to Western air power capabilities by Russian and Chinese forces respectively has changed over the five years since 2020.” As usual, this is a well-researched and written report from RUSI, and can be read in full at this link.
4. Horse-Mounted 21st Century Infantry
This article provides an example of how not all adaptation is good adaptation. The Russians, over the course of the past four years, have demonstrated the ability to learn how to learn better. Their tactical and strategic adaptation systems have improved, and they are able to share lessons quickly across the frontline – and with their fellow authoritarians. But not all adaptation is successful, or necessarily even a good idea. These horse operations are an example of that. Not only are the horses likely to evade detection by the Ukrainians, or move at a speed to outrun drones, this is pure animal cruelty and bastardry by the Russians. You can read the article at this link.
5. Gamification of War
Over the past 18 months, the Armed Forces of Ukraine introduced a points system – ePoints - that allocates points for the destruction of Russian soldiers and weapon systems to Ukrainian combat units. They can use these points to procure different drones and other forms of equipment. But even before this, social media had allowed insights into the gory details of battlefield killing – at scale – that has been rarely available before. In this piece, the author explores the accelerating gamification of war, noting that “gamification in Ukraine is less a curiosity than a diagnostic window into how contemporary wars are organized and fought…for commanders, planners, and donors, the practical task is to test whether the behaviours rewarded by points schemes genuinely serve operational aims, and to keep sight of the labour and risk that the metrics struggle to see.” The full article is available here.
The use of a missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead does not make nuclear conflict more probable than at any moment in the past. Our focus on the threat may vary, but the reality of the threat never varies.
The folks meeting in Paris do not seem to require anything of Russia. Interesting.
The first three of the four "core elements of the path forward" listed explicitly say that they contain nothing different from what is already the case today. The fourth one describes a situation similar to before Putin attacked, where a number of countries had their soldiers in Ukraine; all of them quickly split the scene on or before 24 Feb. 2022 and have not been back since.
So the outcomes of holding these Paris Talks are exactly the same as not holding any talks.