The Overall Defence Concept

Taiwan's Development of Comprehensive Asymmetric Warfare Capabilities

A Taiwanese Hsiung Feng II missile launches (Images: Taiwan News)

“The Taiwanese decided to pursue a more asymmetric approach to defense. Meeting Chinese invaders head-on with like-for-like capabilities would not work against a PLA that was now a more technologically advanced and joint force, and which possessed a budget 20 times the size of Taiwan’s. So, they produced what they called the Overall Defense Concept.”

Lee, looking around the room before interrupting, asked what she had thought was the obvious question. “Sir, what is the issue, then? That seems like a reasonable defense strategy given the size of the Taiwanese military and geography of the island.”

Furness nodded, acknowledging Captain Lee’s interjection with a smile. “Institutional politics, Captain Lee,” Furness answered. “Unfortunately, a change in the leadership of the Taiwanese military saw this concept shelved, left to gather dust.”

The above except from my book, White Sun War, is a conversation between two American military personnel deployed to Taiwan to assist in its defence. They are discussing the Overall Defense Concept, a recently developed strategy for defending Taiwan that was released by Admiral Lee His-Min, the Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Armed Forces between 2017 and 2019. This approach sought to shift Taiwanese defence away from conducting sea control, air superiority, and long-range strike missions towards a focus on more asymmetric warfighting concepts and capabilities that would deny China the capacity to land or occupy Taiwan with military force. 

While the Overall Defence Concept may have been developed and promulgated during Admiral Lee’s tenure, progress in its implementation has lagged.

As Ian Murphy has described, until the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, “Taiwan’s approach to national defense has remained largely inconsistent and slow-moving since the ODC’s conception in 2017. The strategic paradigm shift has so far been met with resistance from Taiwanese officials and policymakers.”  The Ministry of National Defense in Taiwan, at least until the war in Ukraine, continued acquiring conventional weapon systems that went against the proposal of the Overall Defence Concept. And as Ryan Hass wrote in November 2021, “the seemingly uneven follow-through by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense in implementing the defense concept in the years since has raised more questions than answers.”

The Russian invasion of Ukraine was a shock to the government of Taiwan. It was a topic of conversation during my recent visit to Taiwan (you can read my thoughts and analysis based on our meetings during this trip here). During the April visit, our delegation had the privilege of meeting retired Admiral Lee Hsi-Min and talking with him about the development of the Overall Defence Concept, the obstacles to its implementation after its initial release, and the reinvigoration of the concept after February 2022.

More on that shortly. First, what is the Overall Defence Concept, or ODC?

A Shift in Threat

In a 2021 article for the Hoover Institution, Admiral Lee His-Min described the imperative for a transformation in Taiwan’s defence posture quite simply. He noted that:

Taiwan faces an existential threat. Given the extreme imbalance in defense resources across the Strait, Taiwan will fail if we continue to use traditional ways to resist the threat from China. For Taiwan, it is no longer a question of whether we need to change or not. If we want to survive, and if we want to successfully defend Taiwan, we must change. This is a matter of life and death.

Taking its lead from this assessment of the situation, the Overall Defence Concept seeks to redefine how a Taiwanese government views ‘winning the war’ should China seek to absorb Taiwan by force. The core of this revised ‘theory of victory’ is that winning the war is defined as “fail the enemy’s mission to occupy Taiwan.”

Conceptually, this would demand a shift in defence and national security thinking. Seven key ideas underpin the ‘theory of victory’ to ensure the PLA’s mission to occupy Taiwan fails. These are:

1.     Abandon the traditional war of attrition, and adopt concepts of asymmetric warfare.

2.     Develop and adopt the concept of "denial" instead of "control."

3.     Shape battlespace conditions and engage PLA forces where and when they are at their weakest.

4.     Focus on preventing PLA mission successes and attacking their centre of gravity rather than concentrating on the total destruction of their forces.

5.     Prevent PLA forces from landing establishing beachheads on Taiwanese soil.

6.     Better utilize Taiwan’s geography and civilian infrastructure as part of a holistic plan of defence. 

7.     Prepare for, and conduct, insurgency and other resistance operations to ensure the PLA – if it is able to land - cannot effectively control Taiwan.

This is a significant shift from the more traditional, conventional approach taken by the armed forces of Taiwan to deter, and potentially respond to, any PLA invasion of Taiwan. It was not, however, a strategy where Taiwan would totally eschew its conventional capabilities, based on naval, air and land forces. These would still be required, particularly in peace time, to respond to hybrid threats, safeguard Taiwan’s maritime territory and air space, and to provide a visible reassurance to the government and citizens about the protection of Taiwan.

The Overall Defence Concept: Three Phases

The Overall Defence Concept divides the defence of Taiwan into three key phases.

Phase 1. The initial phase is what Lee has described as a force protection phase. It would encompass a myriad of physical hardening, deception, electronic warfare, continuous redeployment of military units, stockpiling as well as air and missile defence activities to ensure that Taiwan’s military and civilian infrastructure (and its leadership) are able to absorb and survive initial air and missile strikes by the PLA. As Lee notes, “Without proper force protection measures, most of Taiwan's military power could be destroyed or neutralized in the initial phase of war.”

Phase 2. The second phase would be the pursuit of a decisive battle in the littoral.  Extending approximately 100 kilometres from the Taiwanese shoreline, this phase would integrate capabilities such as shore-based anti-ship missiles, sea mines, naval warships and air force aircraft to target high value PLA assets. Key targets for the Taiwanese would include large amphibious ships, command and control nodes (on ships and in the air) and other PLA assets that might be considered mission critical for a successful amphibious landing.

Along with more conventional platforms, an important capability in this phase of the war would be Hsiung Feng missiles mounted on trucks. These missiles, now being mass produced by Taiwan, would be dispersed with their launch vehicles in Taiwan’s urban and mountain regions to survive initial strikes, and then launch their missiles at surface ships during any PLA invasion.

Phase 3. The third phase aims to destroy PLA forces landing on beaches in Taiwan. There are only around 12-14 beaches that are suitable for amphibious operations in Taiwan, and these have all been surveyed by the Taiwanese military. Taiwan’s navy would lay sea mines in the waters off these potential landing beaches, and a fleet of minelaying ships are being constructed and launched for this. Concurrently, swarms of small fast attack boats (crewed and uncrewed) as well as the truck-launched anti-ship missiles will engage high value targets in the PLA invasion force.

The author with retired Admiral Lee His-Min in Taipei in April 2023 (Image: author)

The War in Ukraine Delivers a Shock

In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. While this has had impacts on security affairs in Europe, it has also provided insights for Asian governments and military institutions as well. There are lessons on resilience, deterrence, military strategy and capability as well as demonstration of national resolve.

And while resolve is vital, it is not in itself sufficient to deter or respond to military aggression. In a March 2022 article, Admiral Lee and Michael Hunzeker write that:

Unfortunately, as the ongoing tragedy in Ukraine suggests, resolve is not enough. Ukraine’s willingness to provide for its own defense was not — and is not — in question. Indeed, it is offering a master class on how even the most vulnerable democracies can resist aggression. Yet Russia was undeterred, at least in part, because capability matters too. Deterrence rests on the strongest possible foundations when a people’s willingness to fight is matched by its ability to do so in a way that credibly threatens a would-be invader with unacceptable costs and pain.

The message in this article – that both resolve and capability matter, was reinforced during my April visit to Taiwan. One of the key themes of my visit to Taiwan was that the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and its attendant brutality and destruction, has refocussed defence and national security planners in Taiwan on how to deter a PLA invasion (or blockade) of Taiwan.

As the discussion with Admiral Lee revealed, the indirect approach has returned to favour with senior Taiwanese decision makers. The President of Taiwan has endorsed this strategy, and in October 2022described the modernisation of Taiwan’s military and its adoption of “comprehensive asymmetric warfare capabilities” as a priority. The U.S .is assisting with the procurement of weapon systems that might assist with the implementation of the Overall Defence Concept.

During our meeting in Taiwan, Admiral Lee also described three operational vulnerabilities of the PLA that will be targeted under the Overall Defence Concept.

The first is the PLA’s amphibious lift capacity. While this is significant, it is still well short of what would be required for first and second waves in any major amphibious lodgement. This finding is supported by a recent paper from the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. The second operational vulnerability is the limited number of landing beaches available, and the limited capacity of those beaches for across the short logistics.

A final operational vulnerability which the Taiwanese can target is the still nascent joint integration and logistics of the PLA. While the PLA has invested in ‘jointery’ in the past decade, and established joint theatre commands, it remains a reform program that is still in progress, and is ultimately vulnerable to a ‘systems destruction’ approach to warfare. Or, as Joel Wuthnow has proposed, another vulnerability of China is that it might be distracted by a conflict over Taiwan to the degree that its rivals pursue other internal or external actions against the CCP. PLA analysts describe this as ‘chain reaction warfare.’

Despite the operational vulnerabilities of the Chinese military, Taiwan still has areas it needs to address.  The training length and throughput of its annual conscription intake requires attention. In December, the Taiwanese President announced that compulsory military service would be extended from four months to one year.  Notwithstanding this, Admiral Lee is also an advocate of the development of territorial defence forces, similar to those raised and employed in Ukraine. And the full implementation of the ODC is likely to require a variety of reforms to training, education, doctrine and leadership models in the Taiwanese military

But perhaps the most important transformation in this human domain will be the demonstration of will. This issue, the demonstration of the will of the people of Taiwan to defend themselves before expecting others to assist, was a consist them in discussions with senior Taiwanese officials during my April visit.

The Overall Defence Concept embraces an asymmetric approach to defence strategy. Wisely, the Overall Defence Concept doesn’t seek a symmetrical, head-to-head competition with the much larger PLA. Instead, the resources available for Taiwan to ensure its defence are prioritised on targeting high value targets, denying a Chinese landing and ensuing the survival of the Taiwanese military – and the nation itself - until intervention by the United States, Japan or other countries begins.

It does not do this by completely ridding the armed forces of Taiwan of warships, combat brigades or fighters. However, it does readjust the balance of national investment in these conventional capabilities with increased procurement of weapon systems and munitions that permit an indirect approach to attacking any PLA invasion force.

While the Overall Defence Concept pre-dates the Ukrainian defence against Russia, many of its key proposals have been validated by the Ukrainian strategy of corrosion that has been executed over the past 16 months. Not only does it offer a model for the most effective and efficient use of Taiwanese defence resources in peace and war, but it also offers a framework for other nations in the region to potentially emulate.