The Putin-Trump Pact is Afghanistan All Over Again, But With Much Worse Outcomes. The Big Five, 23 November edition
My regular update on war and strategic competition, with a focus on Trump and Putin's 28-point capitulation document imposed on Ukraine, as well as my regular Big Five recommended reads.
Europe has always supported efforts for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in Ukraine. But for any plan to work, it needs Ukrainians and Europeans on board. In this war, there is one aggressor and one victim. So far, we haven’t heard of any concessions from Russia’s side. @kajakallas, 20 November 2025.
There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen is a phrase regularly misattributed to Vladimir Lenin. But the thrust of the idea is entirely apt as we peer back on the past few days. In a stunning, although true-to-form move by the Trump Whitehouse, American and Russian interlocutors collaborated on a new Russia-America pact which is ostensibly about ending the war in Ukraine, but in reality is just as much about restoring the business relationship between Russia and the USA, and walking away from European security affairs. If implemented, it will also fundamentally change global security norms.
It would be tempting, in such a tumultuous week, to focus only on events related to Ukraine. But, events in Europe are indelibly linked to the security and prosperity of the Pacific region. And as we well know, the Chinese are experts at observing and learning from European wars. Thus, despite the focus on Ukraine in the update this week, I cannot neglect events in the Pacific region.
In the Pacific, the Chinese tantrum aimed at Japan has continued in the wake of the Japanese PM’s comments linking Japanese and Taiwanese national security. And, the new annual report by U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission found that a growing divergence between China’s English-language and Chinese-language propaganda about Taiwan might suggest that the CCP is taking the initial steps to prepare its people for the possibility of war.
Welcome to my weekly update on modern war and strategic competition.
Ukraine
Not only would this plan cede territory, people, and assets to Russia; it also seems deliberately designed to weaken Ukraine, politically and militarily, so that Russia would find it easier to invade again a year from now, or 10 years from now. Anne Applebaum, 22 November.
The 28-Point Plan: Afghanistan as Prelude
Back during the first Trump administration, Trump representatives engaged in secret talks with the Taliban to end the war in Afghanistan. The outline of the deal was hashed out without any input from the Government of Afghanistan, which America and dozens of its coalition partners had been providing assistance to for nearly two decades. The final deal, known as the Doha Accord, was published by the U.S. Department of States under the title Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan. You can read the document at this link.
The aim of the accord was to end hostilities and draw down the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan. That, at least, was Trump’s objective. The Taliban’s objective was to re-seize power in Afghanistan and remove any government or military personnel and institutions that would stand in the way of that goal. In the wake of the accord being agreed, the U.S. stopped much of its air support to Afghan ground troops, which saw a huge spike in Taliban attacks.
Throughout 2020 and 2021, most western nations withdrew their residual forces, even though the in July 2020, the U.S. House Armed Services Committee voted in favour of an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act to restrict President Trump’s ability to level of 8,600 set in the accord. By the time Joe Biden became president, the Trump administration had drawn down U.S. troop levels to around 2500.
In April 2021, Biden announced that all remaining U.S. forces would withdraw by 11 September 2021. By August 2021, the Taliban was advancing rapidly and had taken over large parts of Afghanistan. The final, chaotic and deadly evacuation of troops and civilians occurred during the final days of August 2021. It was a disastrous end to Afghanistan for which Biden was blamed. But the foundations were laid by the Trump administration.
The Afghanistan debacle provides useful insights into how the Trump administration thinks about its relationships with foreign partners and its approach to war termination negotiations. We should understand these because the same mindsets are probably being applied to the ‘end the war in Ukraine’ initiatives that periodically leap forth from the Oval Office. What are the key insights from Trump’s Afghanistan accord.
First, Trump feels no compulsion to speak with all parties that are involved in a conflict if that means that involving them will slow down or complicate a resolution.
Second, those with most at stake - the citizens of the nation being supported - are allowed no agency and given no consideration or compassion by those seeking to negotiate a quick and easy end to the conflict.
Third, the most heinous acts conducted during the war are seen as irrelevant and permitted to be overlooked, thus denying any type of justice to those who were subject to warcrimes during the conflict.
Fourth, as the U.S. government’s after action review of the Afghanistan withdrawal noted “during both administrations there was insufficient senior-level consideration of worst-case scenarios and how quickly those might follow.” The old military approach to hoping for the best but planning for the worst did not occur. This report also found that U.S. estimates of friendly and enemy capabilities were wrong.
How might we apply this knowledge as Ukraine navigates the extraordinarily difficult period between now and Thanksgiving on 27 November - just four short days?
First, we can finally dispense with the notion (if anyone still believed it) that the interests of Ukraine or the Ukrainian people will play any role in how Trump and Putin see this war ending. While Trump may have made some noises in the past about Russia’s nightly terror attacks using drones against Ukrainian civilian targets, such statements have all but disappeared. The Trump-Putin Pact is all about Russia and America - Ukraine is seen by both leaders as getting in the way of a return to business as normal.
Second, another crucial actor - Europe - has been conspicuously sidelined from the proposed agreement and would have little say in the execution of the agreement. This would be welcomed by Putin as well as the anti-Europe faction in the Trump government. While this might help speed along negotiations, it also ensures that many of the complexities about future Ukrainian and European security, as well as triggers for U.S. future support to Ukraine, will probably be overlooked or under-thought.
This is a point that is well made by Ruth Deyermond, a Senior Lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, in a recent social media post:
The proposed security guarantee is allegedly modelled on NATO Article 5, but that doesn’t contain any of these qualifications for action, let alone all of them.
This proposed security guarantee requires that an armed attack by Russia would have to be significant *and* deliberate *and* sustained to merit a response. In theory, Russia could drop a nuke on Kyiv and that wouldn’t meet the criteria because the attack wouldn’t be sustained.
Plus, of course, any decision-maker acting in bad faith could find grounds to claim that one of these enormously vague criteria weren’t met (when they had been). Which brings us to who gets to decide what action will be taken taken.
The proposed security guarantee is clear that *only* the US president decides what action would be taken in the event that it’s determined there’s been a Russian breach. Ukraine, NATO and “European partners” are consulted, but they aren’t given a decision-making role here.
Either deliberately or because of incompetence, the security guarantee is worded in such a way that it would allow for the U.S. president to consult with Russia before deciding whether to take action against Russia.
Monty Python could not have developed a more ludicrous solution.
Europe is apparently scrambling to intervene and produce an alternative that does not result in Putin getting exactly what he wants, but they appear to have been caught flat-footed here.
And in the latest developments, the EU has rejected key elements of the latest peace plan, stating that international borders must not be changed by force. A meeting between officials from the EU, U.S., and Ukraine to discuss revisions to the draft Trump-Putin pact will take place in Geneva in the next 24 hours. You can read the joint statement issued by EU leaders below.
A third takeaway from how the previous Trump administration negotiated over Afghanistan is that just like the agreement negotiated with the Taliban, the Trump-Putin pact would ensure that every single Russian war criminal is totally absolved of blame for any of their actions during the war. As the text of the initial draft of the 28-point plan describes:
All parties to the conflict will receive full amnesty for wartime actions and agree not to file claims or pursue grievances.
This is a repulsive solution. There must be justice for those who perpetrated the array of awful war crimes against Ukrainian civilians and soldiers. These war criminals must never be allowed to rest.
Finally, the combination of restricting Ukraine’s armed forces, restricting their foreign military alliances, giving Russia territory that it has taken by force and that it has yet to capture, the prevention of NATO forces entering Ukraine, the permitting of Russia to reintegrate into the global economy with no sanctions and the fantasy of Russia’s assurances about future military aggression can only result in the worst possible outcomes for Ukraine and Eastern Europe. The Trump administration has just not thought through all the worst possible outcomes of this agreement, just as they didn’t for Afghanistan.
The alternative is that they have anticipated all the very worst outcomes for Ukraine and Europe and just don’t care.
Zelenskyy’s Toughest Week
The period between 17 and 24 November is probably going to be the worst week that Zelenskyy has experienced during his presidency. While the realisation of Russia’s attacks in February 2022 would have been dreadful, at least then he knew he had the backing of his people and NATO in those first terrible days.
This is a totally different and a far more dire situation. He now faces the intersection of at least seven (and potentially more) major challenges:
An ongoing corruption scandal where he has yet to assume full responsibility and accountability, and which has a significant impact on how Ukrainians view their president and how Ukraine’s supporters view Ukraine.
Allegations that a Ukrainian official may have amended one of the clauses in the draft 28-point plan to remove the possibility of audits of Ukraine’s wartime spending.
The potential for a significant military disaster as Ukrainian forces are encircled at the destroyed city of Pokrovsk and under siege from a Russian army that intends to destroy as much of the Ukrainian force there as possible while manpower shortfalls (including shortages of drone pilots) continue to plague the armed forces.
Ukrainian annual budget shortfalls that are estimated to total over $50 billion over the next three years.
A declining interest in the war in Ukraine from many citizens in western nations.
A persistent hostility towards Zelenskyy from some in the Trump administration.
Russia’s unwillingness to negotiate away its initial objectives for the war.
Assessment
The week ahead for Zelenskyy will determine the future of his nation. Even if the draft Trump-Putin pact does not succeed, and no agreement is signed, the trajectory of the war - and broader global security affairs - could be changed by several potential events or outcomes over the next few days.
Trump might finally walk away from the conflict after threatening to do so on multiple occasions. Although, Trump has also folded in his threats to invade Canada and Greenland and on many of his tariffs against both allies and adversaries like China. Predicting what Trump might do if Ukraine does not agree to the current peace deal is best described as “an inexact science”. But European nations are already examining how they might fill any shortfalls in intelligence if Trump again ‘pulls the plug’ on intelligence sharing.
Ukraine’s relationship with America will be indelibly changed. I was in Ukraine earlier this year when American intelligence was turned off for a short period and that had a profound psychological impact in Ukraine particularly when it came trust between Ukraine and America. And as I highlighted in a social media post earlier this week, if America does impose this deal on Ukraine it “will lead to an embittered nation (towards the West) and the likely growth of a ‘stab-in-the-back’ narrative that will hurt Ukraine-Europe ties and only benefit Russia.” While many of us hope that this latest proposal might just be another of the periodic storms over a peace deal and that the normal U.S.-Ukraine relationship resumes next week, it is hard to see that being the case right now.
In her excellent 22 November piece in The Atlantic, Anne Applebaum writes that “for a decade, Russia has been seeking to divide Europe and America, to undermine NATO and weaken the transatlantic alliance. This peace plan, if accepted, will achieve that goal.” In the wake of an agreed Trump-Putin pact, Europe will continue to re-cast its security calculus and its view of the U.S. relationship. However, no one in Europe is seriously proposing a break in the relationship, regardless of how exasperating some in the Trump administration might get at times. Europe still needs America, and even though he won't admit it, Trump needs a stable and prosperous Europe. But, depending on how the next few days go, we might see an acceleration of European initiatives to shore up their defences to hedge against potential Trump decisions about U.S. support to Ukraine and broader European security.
China, which will have been watching this play out with great interest, is being given a fine tutorial in how to further develop its interaction with the Trump administration. Regardless of how the next few days play out, and even if there is no agreement reached on the 28-point plan, the President of China now probably sees an opportunity to present his own version of a 28-point plan for the absorption of Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China. Xi has always preferred to take control of Taiwan by using means other than a military invasion. As such, we might expect the Chinese Communist Party to present the Trump administration with 28-point plan for Taiwan, either in secret or publicly, in the near to medium term. We even know what they will ask for - it is all contained in the CCP’s White Paper on Taiwan, which you can read here.
While American allies will be disheartened by the Trump administration’s posture towards Ukraine and its willingness to absolve Russia of all its heinous behaviour, those nations which rely on America for their security but are not treaty allies will be even more concerned. Of course, the obvious nation in this boat is Taiwan. Government officials in Taipei are sure to be wargaming the various potential outcomes of the next few days in Europe, and what each outcome might mean for the future security and prosperity of their nation. But, we all need to be doing this, just as all of us need to significantly increase defence spending, and work more closely together, in order to build a more robust collective deterrent against authoritarian aggression.
Amongst all this, my heart goes out to the people of Ukraine. They have fought so hard to defend their country, their culture and their future over the past 11 years from a nasty, brutal and voracious predator named Putin that they deserve much better than to be treated like they are by Trump, Witkoff and others. I hope and pray we will see some kind of outcome in the coming days that recognises the courage of Ukraine, and the potential it has to be a more secure and prosperous democracy in Europe.
It is easy to anticipate the worst that might emerge this week given the behaviour of the Trump and Putin administrations. In his latest piece for the New York Times, Thomas Friedman writes the following:
If Ukraine is, indeed, forced to surrender to the specific terms of this “deal” by then, Thanksgiving will no longer be an American holiday. It will become a Russian holiday. It will become a day of thanks that victory in Putin’s savage and misbegotten war against Ukraine’s people, which has been an utter failure — morally, militarily, diplomatically and economically — was delivered to Russia not by the superiority of its arms or the virtue of its claims, but by an American administration.
The world is a vicious place at times. Putin appears to have a far better capacity to manipulate the Trump administration than Ukraine or the Europeans do. I fear for what lays ahead. But I don’t despair, because the Ukrainian people have shown us so many times what they can do in the darkest and toughest of times. The coming week, and months that follow, will again draw upon their reserves of patience, resilience, fortitude, gallantry and spirit.
The Pacific
The United States and its allies and partners can no longer assume that a Taiwan contingency is a distant possibility for which they would have ample time to prepare. 2025 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
China Raises the Temperature in its Spat with Japan. The Chinese have stepped up pressure against the government of Japan in response to the recent comments by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi where she stated that a war over Taiwan could threaten Japanese security. The CCP is attempting to have the Japanese PM retract her comments, and thus, deter other nations from linking their national security to that of the sovereignty of Taiwan.
The US has come out in support of Japan. As the Japan Times has reported:
The U.S. has signalled its support, with Ambassador George Glass saying Washington firmly stands with Tokyo, echoing U.S. President Donald Trump’s earlier offer to give Takaichi “anything.” Glass called Beijing’s reaction “outrageous” and said the U.S.-Japan alliance remains focused on ensuring peace in the region.
The Chinese issued a travel advisory for Japan on 14 November, and they reimposed bans on seafood imports from Japan on 19 November. The PLA undertook live-fire military drills near Japan over the period 17-25 November.
And in a further escalation, the Chinese have taken the dispute to the United Nations. Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN Fu Cong wrote in a letter to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres that:
If Japan dares to attempt an armed intervention in the cross-Strait situation, it would be an act of aggression. China will resolutely exercise its right of self-defense under the UN Charter and international law and firmly defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
China continues to seek to diplomatically isolate Taiwan. As such, any statement of support for Taiwanese sovereignty like the recent comment from the Japanese PM will come under sustained attack from the CCP.
Japan’s Hypersonic Strike Capability. In the past week, USNI News reported that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces had tested the deployment of their Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) Block I missiles. The test incorporated loading the vehicle-based launcher on ships and aircraft as well as launch rehearsals. The initial variant of the missile, the Block I, will be capable of striking targets hundreds of kilometres away and will enter service in 2026. Subsequent development of the missile will expand the missile’s range through the incorporation of improved glide performance technologies. These Block 2 and 2B variants of the missile are expected to have a range of between 2,000 to 3,000 kilometres.
The USNI News article notes that “the U.S. has supported the Japanese hypersonic program with testing ground access and support equipment. HVGP’s first test firing occurred in California last year. Washington also approved a $200 million sale in support of Tokyo’s hypersonic development in March. The project is set to equip two battalions of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force for potential deployments in Hokkaido and Kyushu to defend against threats from the north and south. While the composition of the upcoming units is unknown, each launcher wields two HVGP missiles.”
Below is a visualisation of the HVGP’s effective range, including both Block I and II systems, as well as Type 12 missiles, provided by the Taiwan Security Monitor.
US, Japan and Philippines Exercise Near Scarborough Shoal. Last week, the USS Nimitz Carrier Strike Group exercised with naval vessels from The Philippines and Japan in the South China Sea near Scarborough Shoal in years. This follows on the heels of multiple incidents of aggressive behaviour by Chinese naval and coast guard vessels towards America’s allies in the area over the past few years.
Chinese Military Developments. This week, the annual report to Congress by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission was released. There is lots to cover in the 700 (plus) pages of the report. It’s key findings with regards to China’s military capacity and intentions were as follows:
China has continued to rapidly advance its capabilities to launch a successful invasion of Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) intensifying military activities near Taiwan have made it so that the PLA could pivot from a routine exercise to an actual blockade or invasion with almost no advance warning.
A divergence has emerged between China’s English-language and Chinese-language propaganda about Taiwan—a split that suggests Beijing may be taking initial steps to prepare its people for the possibility of war. Whereas Chinese statements aimed at international audiences downplay the possibility of an invasion, China’s domestic propaganda has stated that Taiwan’s “provocations” could justify military action in the near future.
The United States and its allies and partners can no longer assume that a Taiwan contingency is a distant possibility for which they would have ample time to prepare.
Beijing has continued to rapidly modernise its military forces across all domains with the goal of being able to fight and defeat “strong enemies” like the United States.
China views space as a crucial warfighting domain, and the PLA is rapidly expanding space and counter-space capabilities that could be used to target U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific and incapacitate U.S. space-based assets. Beijing’s investment in counterspace systems—including direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons and co-orbital interference platforms—illustrates its strategy of blinding and disorienting U.S. forces in the opening phase of a conflict.
China’s deepening cooperation with Russia, Iran, and North Korea has enabled these pariah economies to withstand multilateral economic restrictions, undermining U.S. statecraft and providing China with a live testbed for sanctions evasion and wartime logistics.
I have included the 2025 report in my Big Five recommendations for this week (see below).
*****
This week, I published a new report at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) where I am a non-resident adjunct fellow. My report, called Seven Contemporary Insights on the State of the Ukraine War, explored many of the insights of my most recent research visit to Ukraine (in October 2025) as well as other research conducted into the war over the past two years.
As I note in the report, the war in Ukraine remains a rapidly evolving conflict. The battlefield, strategic strike, information operations, and industrial production campaigns remain crucial to both Ukraine’s and Russia’s war efforts. In all of these endeavors, there is an ongoing adaptation spiral occurring that is spinning out innovative techniques and technologies. At the same time, this is providing insights for Western strategists and force structure planners.
My new publication is designed to provide contemporary insights into the war and offers assessments on what they mean for possible conflict trajectories in the coming months. The seven key findings offer external observers not only an update on this rapidly changing war, but a view from the ground into how the character of war itself is evolving.
You can read the report in full at this link.
Also this week, I published an essay here about Russia’s performance in its war against Ukraine in 2025. While the outcomes of their 2025 war effort could shift considerably depending on the outcomes of the next week, my report offers an assessment of Russian tactical and strategic performance since January this year.
You can read it here.
Also this week, two podcasts featuring interviews with me dropped on their respective feeds.
First, on the School of War podcast, I was interviewed by Aaron Maclean about the latest from the war in Ukraine and what it means for the future of war. You can listen to our discussion at this link.
Second, on the Last Line of Defense podcast (published by CSIS), I had a conversation with Seth Jones. This discussion also focussed primarily on Ukraine, and we talked about the evolving dynamics of the war, highlighting Ukraine’s successes, Russia’s challenges, and key developments, including shifts in U.S. policy, the change in air defence posture, and the increasing use of long-range strikes and drones. You can listen to our conversation at this link.
*******
It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.
I have included a good article from Engelsberg Ideas about the impact of the new corruption scandal on President Zelenskyy, the new report just released by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission as well as articles on AI Disinformation, the military profession and an article from Modern War Institute describing a concept called Transition Period Warfare.
As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.
Happy reading!
1. The tragedy of Zelensky’s Ukraine
In this piece by Owen Matthews, published by Engelsberg Ideas, the impact of the latest Ukrainian corruption scandal on President Zelenskyy and the war efforts of his beleaguered nation are examined. As the author notes, “it is a supreme irony – indeed, a tragedy – that Zelensky began his political career as a passionate opponent of corruption, only to become mired in serious allegations of war profiteering of the most cynical sort among his closest and most trusted associates.” You can read the full article at this link.
2. AI Disinformation
In this article in Foreign Affairs, the authors propose that “a perfect storm is brewing. U.S. adversaries are investing heavily in disinformation campaigns, AI advancements are ushering in a more dangerous form of conflict, and the second Trump administration has weakened the defenses that are meant to shield the United States and its partners from foreign malign influence.” In a world awash in authoritarian disinformation, the magnifying impact of generative AI is something that national security institutions must come to grips with. You can read the full article here.
3. U.S.-China Economic & Security Review 2025
This week, the annual report to Congress by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission was released. It is quite a volumous document, and covers a range of topics that include: China’s revisionist ambitions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea; China and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands; China’s ambitions to dominate space; Beijing’s weaponisation of supply chains; and a review of Taiwan, Hong Kong, economics, trade, security, politics, and foreign affairs development in 2025. As the report notes, “Beijing has intensified its destabilizing gray zone activities, advanced its preparations for potential military conflict, and deepened its coordination with malign actors like Russia and Iran.” The full report is available at this link.
4. Transition Period Warfare
In this article, published by Modern War Institute, the author argues that the rise of autonomous systems means that a transitional period of warfare now exists and that continuous learning and adaptation is required. Further, this learning and adaptation must embrace not only technology, but tactics, strategy, military structures and organisational culture. You can read the full article here.
5. Janowitz and the Military Profession
In this essay, the author examines the contemporary definitions of the profession of arms and the meaning of military professionalism through the lens of the work of Morris Janowitz’s seminal work, The Professional Soldier. The author notes that “professional mastery is not what you think and know but how you think, learn, and interpret the world. Good professional mastery is developed through challenging and scaffolded military education, career development that includes diverse postings, and a willingness to recognise, accept and use different world views. It is this final point that Janowitz and others believe is critical for officers during periods of great power competition and war.” You can read the essay at this link.
This is a disgraceful and disgusting capitulation to a dictator, it is wholly un-American, and invites further aggression, much as Chamberlain's capitulation to Hitler in 1938 in the Sudetenland did not create "peace for our time." If anything, it ensured that Hitler would quickly try for more, which is precisely what he did - and we got World War II. Trump is a bully, a blowhard, and at base he is a coward. We have managed to get something worse than Biden's weak, timid, and feckless support - we have got chicken-hearted boot-licking of a dictator, and a half-defeated dictator at that. How is it that these kinds of people rise to the fore in American politics today? We need a Theodore Roosevelt, someone who would do the things which command respect, someone with real moral character - instead, it's a choice between Biden Trump, and Harris. Surely we can do better. I hope the Senate puts an end to this nonsense - and that the House reins in Trump and brings him to heel. Enough is enough. More, if you want it - https://streamfortyseven.substack.com/p/donnie-and-stevie-witless-peace-plan
Thanks for this timely and welcome post.
It is painful for a European citizen who is a fervent supporter of Ukraine to read the statement released yesterday by leaders of the EU+.
Not wishing to be too pedantic, it is first of all curious that this statement should bear the letterhead “European Council “ . It is much more than that with the leaders of the UK, Canada, Norway and Japan endorsing it. The Europeans must find a way of signalling to the world that Europe is at the head of a much larger coalition than just the EU. Why not say “the EU+” from now on ?
Secondly, was it really necessary to “welcome” continued efforts by the USA… when it would have surely been enough simply to “acknowledge” these efforts?
And thirdly, why is there no mention of the fact that the 28 point plan requires Ukraine to make huge concessions while demands on Russia are non existent ?
Mealy mouthed European statements of this kind will impress neither Trump nor Putin. The EU + should be far more forceful from now on in both word and deed. Forget the risk of not angering Trump - on the basis of this “plan” he is no better than Putin and, like Putin, will only understand force !