The War in Winter 2023

The Coming Ukrainian and Russian Winter Campaigns

Image: @GlasnostGone

In a 28 August 2023 update, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy referred to preparations for the coming winter. These preparations by the Ukrainians are certain to have been underway for some time.

One thing about planning staffs in just about every military institution is that they are often involved in planning for multiple events over different time frames at once. It is likely that some initial planning for this winter was conducted in parallel to that for the ongoing Ukrainian offensives. There is a linkage between these campaigns, and therefore planning will probably have been conducted concurrently for the ongoing Ukrainian offensive and the coming winter campaign.

Forecasts for winter this year are predicting similar temperatures and precipitation levels as last winter. So, expect some cold weather, some wet weather, some overcast weather and some mud. All of these have an impact on the planning for, and execution of, military operations as well as humanitarian support to the millions of displaced Ukrainian citizens.

This will be the third winter of the war in Ukraine since the large-scale invasion by Russia in February 2022. It will be the tenth winter overall since the war began in 2014. As such, both sides have significant contemporary experience of conducting military operations during winter. This is added to their large historical experience of winter warfare.

Given the war won’t stop for winter, but will alter in tempo, what might we expect in the coming months?

A Ukrainian Winter Campaign

The Ukrainian Winter campaign will probably have three strategic objectives.

First, it will want to project a sense of progress to Ukraine’s supporters. Ukraine retains the strategic initiative, which they have wrested from the Russians through their battlefield operations and longer range strike operations this year. Therefore, diplomatic activity to retain support for Ukraine, and prevent pointless peace initiatives, and continue the flow of equipment and munitions will be an important element of the Ukrainian winter campaign.

Second, Ukraine will want to sustain at least some of the momentum they have generated with ground, air and maritime operations 2023. Clearly this will depend on the battlefield situation in a couple of months, and the levels of stockholdings for key military consumables such as artillery munitions, fuel, precision munitions, and engineer equipment. Ukraine will not want a stasis to emerge over winter that can be leveraged by Russia to negotiate a ceasefire.

Third, Ukraine will want to ensure its people are able to endure the cold, bitter winter conditions. This humanitarian imperative becomes even more stark given that Russia might again conduct strikes against civilian infrastructure this winter to make life miserable for Ukrainians and put political pressure on Zelenskyy’s government.

What does achieving these strategic objectives look like in practice?