The West’s Intellectual Deficit in Modern War

Western governments and military institutions face an array of contemporary warfighting challenges which require rapid solutions. What are they, and how might they be addressed?

Nearly 18 months ago, I explored the key intellectual challenges that had become apparent as the result of technological insertions into the Ukraine War. This includes the impact of drones and the democratisation of battlespace knowledge through digital command and control systems.

In that two-part series, I proposed that the Russo-Ukraine War had evolved into a more static ground because both sides were fighting a 21st century war with 20th century ideas. Most attention was being focussed on generating more munitions, more units, more territorial gains and more people. But I also proposed that even if Ukraine and Russia were to mobilise more people and industry, the trajectory of the war would not change significantly unless there was a mobilization of intellectual capacity to develop new warfighting ideas.

The period since those articles were published has proved this out. The ground war, with the exception of short periods of tactical energy such as the Ukrainian Kursk offensive, remains largely static in nature. Where advances have been made, they are achieved at very large costs in humans and equipment. The air, drone and missile war has more dynamism and is having an impact on the economy and warfighting capacity of both nations. However, this air and missile war is still yet to prove politically or strategically decisive.

More intellectual dynamism and innovation is necessary to develop more effective and survivable offensive military concepts for the modern technological and political environment. This is not just a military concern, however. Being able to threaten the use of offensive operations is central to a viable strategic deterrent. While nuclear weapons remain an important component of deterrents, conventional and cognitive options must also play their part. These two elements are currently a weakness in Western nations.

This article examples looks beyond the challenges facing Ukraine that were examined in the previous articles and looks more broadly at the big problems that all western nations face with modern warfighting concepts. The article proposes the key strategic challenges in contemporary warfare that require clever and affordable solutions.

However, before examining these challenges, it is important to appreciate the kinds of advantages that the global authoritarian movement now possesses, and how these magnify the problems faced by western governments and military institutions.

The Authoritarians Have Some Advantages

The warfighting challenges covered in this article are examined against the background of an alignment of authoritarian powers which currently appears to possess several strategic advantages over western nations.

The Authoritarian Learning Community. The first advantage is that in the last three years, an international collaboration and adaptation system has emerged among the authoritarian powers of Russia, Iran, China and North Korea. This has become the core of a learning culture in Russian and Iranian organisations, as well as a model for Russian sharing lessons with North Korea and China. This learning community assembles various sets of knowledge to build a much-improved knowledge base.

A key learning and adaptation grouping has developed between Russia and Iran, and by extension Iran and its proxies in the region. Coercion and precision are key subjects for this core learning community. Russia and North Korea also have a learning and adaptation system, largely based on the provision of North Korean munitions to Russia and the experiences of North Korean troops in Kursk combat operations. China has also been active in learning lessons from Russia. How much of this learning is through active sharing of lessons and how much is through vicarious learning is yet to be clarified. Chinese officers are reported to have visited Russia and have been reported behind the front lines in the Donbas region. You can read more on this authoritarian learning community here.

The Arsenal of Authoritarians. A second advantage is that the authoritarian nations appear to have collectively developed a superior military production capacity in terms of scale and speed. China’s production capacity is well documented, particularly in ship building. But it has also developed very advanced indigenous aircraft, armoured vehicle, drone and munitions capabilities. Most of these probably already operate at a scale that outstrips most western nations combined. Chinese defence industry also delivers capability much faster than western nations. As a 2024 CSIS report notes, from initiating capability requirement through to delivery is about seven years in China and 16 years in the U.S. Four of the top ten largest defence conglomerates in the world are Chinese. While not without weaknesses, Russia too has stepped up defence production in the past three years.

Xi and Putin and press briefing in Moscow. Source: Government of Russia.

Authoritarian Cognitive Warfare. The 2024 Pentagon report on Chinese military capability notes that “the PLA is exploring a range of “neurocognitive warfare” capabilities that exploit adversaries using neuroscience and psychology.” As Dima Adamsky describes in The Russian Way of Deterrence, Russia’s operations in the information sphere - cognitive-psychological (CP) and digital-technological (DT) activities have seen increasing convergence. These activities aim to achieve informational deterrence, and the achievement of cumulative coercion. The key aims of authoritarian cognitive warfare, which basically align with an approach that could be described as ‘win without fighting’ are as follows:

• A principal objective of China and Russia in particular is to convince western societies that they cannot prevail against the advantages – military, economic, national will - of authoritarian powers.

• The west is in decline. This has long been a strategic message from President Xi but is also a key message in Russian messaging, particularly with regards to religion. There is also an economic dimension to this messaging, particularly from China in the wake of the disastrous flip-flopping on tariffs from the Trump administration.

• Another objective is to convince western citizens that western values and systems are not worth defending. This can manifest in lower defence budgets and in lower recruiting for military organisations. As we have seen in recent years, it also results in breaking down the cohesion of western communities by empowering small minorities with extremist views.

Given the demonstrated willingness of the big four authoritarians to share ideas and lessons, it should be assumed that developments in cognitive warfare in one will quickly be shared with other authoritarian regimes.

Authoritarian Will. Authoritarian leaders clearly believe that their time has come. They have watched the meltdowns in western societies since COVID-19, and the shortfalls in leadership and governance, and decided now is the time to exploit western weaknesses and assert themselves. They exhibit a confidence in their upwards trajectory. Xi described the role of Russia and China last week in Moscow, noting that “it is imperative that we remain the defenders of a world order in the spirit of equality and justice… China and Russia, as great world powers and emerging markets, have a noble mission to ensure global development in a more equitable and rational vein.”

Further back in 2020, Xi used a phrase more indicative of his views during the fifth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP: "the East is rising, and the West is declining". The global authoritarian movement appears to have gained in confidence and may well have superior will to sustain their trajectory than western nations have to oppose it.

Our Intellectual Deficit is Not a New Problem

Fortunately, western nations and military institutions have deep historical familiarity with solving challenges in military affairs. Military institutions have always faced difficult problems, on the battlefield, during long campaigns and in the overall national efforts to fight wars. This has required formal and informal adaptation mechanisms, which sometimes produces transformative solutions to key battlefield and operational problems.