Tomahawks, NATO's "War on Russia" and Russian Gas Shortages - 28 September update
My regular update on global conflict. This week: Russia's war against NATO, Tomahawks for Ukraine(?), developments in the Pacific and my Big Five recommended war and national security reads.
The world sees that Russia has entered a stage where the war will bring more and more problems for the Russian system itself, the Russian economy, and Russian society. The critical point is not to ease the pressure on Russia for this war. President Zelenskyy, 26 September 2025.
It has been a big week in international affairs and the war in Ukraine.
President Trump hinted that he might be changing his mind about supporting Ukraine in a social media post, endorsed shooting down Russian aircraft in NATO air space, and Ukraine requested Tomahawk missiles. In Europe, Russia conducted another probe of NATO’s air defences. Russia and Ukraine continued their respective long-range strike operations.
In the Pacific, China continued its operations around Taiwan, including daily aerial incursions into Taiwan ADIZ, deployed two massive uncrewed submarines, and released a video of aircraft trials with its latest aircraft carrier. Taiwan held a major arms expo and released a report about the vulnerability of its eastern regions.
Welcome to this week’s update on war and strategic competition, and of course, The Big Five!
Ukraine
Tomahawks for Ukraine? This week saw reports emerge that the weapon that President Zelenskyy had asked President Trump for recently (and this is associated with the rumoured Ukrainian future offensives) was American Tomahawk long-range strike missiles. This is not the first time that Ukraine has asked for these weapons. And that they are doing so how is indicative of a couple of things.
First, it is a Ukrainian test to see whether Donald Trump’s social media post earlier this week about Ukraine winning back its territory was just more rhetoric or was indicative of a willingness by the Trump administration to put even more pressure on the Russians through the supply of even more sophisticated and capable long-range strike weapons.
Second, it will be indicative of whether the Trump administration has the same ‘escalation terror’ (escalation terror is explored in this piece) that characterised the Biden administration’s approach to providing military assistance to Ukraine. The hard reality is that providing Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine would not be an escalation in the war. Russia has been using long-range cruise missiles with large explosive warheads since the beginning of the war. Russian long-range cruise missiles used against Ukraine since 2022 (with hundreds of each fired) include:
The 3M14 Kalibr, a Russian land attack cruise missile with an estimated range of around 1,500 to 2,500 km and 450kg warhead.
The Kh-555 conventional air-launched cruise missile with a range of around 2000 km and a 410kg warhead.
The Kh-101, an advanced stealthy long-range subsonic cruise missile launched from a strategic bomber with a range of up to 5,000 km.
Tomahawks for Ukraine just levels the playing field with regards to long-range strike. And as we know, on a level playing field (and even on an uneven playing field), the Ukrainians out-think and out-fight the Russians every time. Putin knows this and is terrified of an even more capable Ukrainian strike force with long-range, large-warhead stealthy Tomahawks from America.
Third, it also indicates that the Ukrainians still have some issues with getting large warheads as far into Russia as they would like. While the various Ukrainian missiles and drones have been able to reach deep inside Russia, they lack the payload to cause significant damage on arrival. The Tomahawk, with a range that can extend at far as 2500 kilometres in certain conditions, packs an explosive warhead of nearly half a metric ton. That, as we would say in the army (and excuse the language), is a ‘shitload of bang”. This would put major Russian airfields, munitions depots and other significant military targets deeper inside Russia at risk.
The Tomahawk has a much longer range than the Storm Shadow, and is a much faster missile than the drones and drone-missile hybrids used by Ukraine. This puts it in a class of its own in its unique ability to get further inside Russia and cause more damage.
But importantly, providing Tomahawks to Ukraine would be a significant political statement by America about the war, and their desire to have Putin recognise that there is no pathway for him to win the war.
Will Trump provide the Tomahawks?
Who knows. If I was a betting person, I would probably say no because someone in the administration is sure to raise the two favourite arguments against their use: escalation and lack of U.S. stocks.
I have already addressed the escalation chimera above.
When it comes to stocks, several U.S. allies already have Tomahawks and are procuring more (the U.K., Australia and Japan among them). Perhaps some could come from these stocks (Australia has been a notable laggard in new military and other material support to Ukraine in 2025) and more might be sourced from the production for these nations?
The U.S. Army has also developed the Typhon mid-range capability system, which is a ground launcher for the Tomahawk, and has operationally deployed it in the Pacific to Japan and the Philippines. Could this be an option for Ukraine?
Regardless, it will be interesting to see what the Trump administration does.
NATO ‘at war’ with Russia. This week, the Russian foreign minister stated that NATO was at war with Russia. Speaking at the United Nations, Lavrov stated that:
A clear example is the crisis in Ukraine, provoked by the collective West, through which NATO and the European Union … have already declared a real war on my country and are directly participating in it.
It is an interesting viewpoint from a country that has been undertaking a years-long sabotage and subversion campaign against European nations and has recently undertaken several aerial incursions with crewed and uncrewed vehicles into NATO countries. The interesting thing is that NATO has not engaged in any similar behaviour.
Of course, we all know that the way to tell if Lavrov is lying is that his lips are moving. So, there is no reason to take him seriously. However, his words do have strategic intentions behind them. These are:
Condition his domestic audience to constant confrontation with the West. Even if Russia is forced to withdraw from Ukraine without achieving any of its goals, Russia has reason to remain on a war footing - and keep hundreds of thousands of any war veterans out of Moscow.
Message the ‘global south’ that they should not trust America or Europe, and that they (especially BRICS members) have good reason for aligning with Russia and China.
Breed distrust among NATO members.
A New Ukrainian Offensive. Apparently, one of the issues that President Zelenskyy discussed with President Trump during their recent meeting was a request for a specific capability to enable a future Ukrainian offensive. Of course, as soon as word hit Washington DC about the possible Ukrainian offensive, it leaked!
I have no idea whether Ukraine is planning a future offensive or not but would not speculate here if they were. All I will say is that good staff officers are always planning future operations, some offensive and some defensive. These plans, most of which sit on shelves, get dusted off when there are opportunities to use them. Given Russia’s faltering ground offensive and continuing massive losses in manpower, there will definitely be opportunities for Ukraine to strike back, destroy more Russian forces and liberate Ukrainian territory.
But when that might be, I think it is worth allowing the Ukrainians to keep us guessing!
Russia’s Airborne Operations Training for China. It is hardly a surprise that Russia and China have been swapping ideas on modern war. Over the last couple of years, China has been the biggest enabler of Russia’s war, which includes buying their oil, amplifying Russian misinformation, providing dual use goods to Russia (particularly components that can be used in missiles and drones) and providing advice on more rapid and efficient industrial processes for manufacturing drones in Russia.
Separately, I have published a couple of articles that explore the interaction and collaborative learning between Russia and China, which also includes North Korea and Iran. Most recently, I explored the new Adaptation War, which features an authoritarian learning and adaptation bloc, in this paper published by the Special Competitive Studies Project.
This week, the Washington Post reported that Russia is assisting China with the ongoing development of its air mobile ground forces. As the Post reported:
The 800-page cache — obtained by hactivist group Black Moon and reviewed by The Washington Post — shows Russia agreeing in October 2024 to sell 37 BMD-4M light amphibious vehicles, 11 Sprut-SDM1 self-propelled anti-tank guns, 11 BTR-MDM airborne armored personnel carriers to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force.
Separate documents outlined training programs for Chinese paratroopers in the combat use of the weaponry — and the advanced command and control systems used to direct operations — by Russian specialists in Russia and later in China.
While this is an interesting development, there is little in this deal to get overly excited about. The Chinese already have multiple airborne brigades, which under a 2017 reorganization, were allocated directly to the joint theatre commands as early entry forces for operations against Taiwan and whatever regional nation China decides to pick a fight with in future. (The Jamestown Foundation in 2023 published a useful article on Chinese airborne capabilities, which can be read here.) The training being provided by the Russians is likely to be used by the Chinese to assess the current state of development of PLA airborne brigades, and ascertain and capability gaps.
It is likely that the Chinese will use the Russian equipment for a similar purpose. The PLA has an array of indigenous, newer vehicles that will probably be assessed against the Russian equipment. If the Russian equipment has any capabilities that are either missing from PLA vehicles, or is superior in design, the Chinese are certain to copy it.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Russian airborne and air assault forces have probably performed better in Ukraine than most of their other ground force colleagues. That will allow them to transfer modern ground combat experience to the Chinese.
But, when was the last time the Russians executed a successful airborne or air assault operation? They did one air assault operation on the first day of the full scale invasion in February 2022 in to the Hostomel Airport north of Kyiv. Designed to secure the airfield for the air landing of more troops, the operation ultimately failed to achieve this objective. You can read more about it in the report at this link.
Therefore, the Russians might pass this experience on to their Chinese colleagues but there were no obviously new lessons from the operation that could not have been learned from previous wars.
Russian Air Strikes. As I write this, Ukraine is being attacked again by Russian long-range strike missiles. Russia has continued its aerial assault against Ukraine in the past few weeks, settling into a steady tempo of attacks that occur every night. While periodically they surge and attack with hundreds of drones, recent trends show a nightly attack force of 100-200 drones, most of which are shot down.
To enhance their strike capacity, a Russian medium-range ballistic missile system Oreshnik (Kedr) has been deployed to Belarus. The Russians, so far, have only fired one of these missiles at Ukraine since 2022. But missiles in Belarus gives Russia another direction that Ukraine has to have their sensors focused on, and adds another complication to the overall missile defence system in Ukraine.
At this stage of the war, it is hard to see what strategic impact these attacks are actually having. Unlike Ukraine’s much more effective strategic strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure, transportation hubs and defence industrial targets, Russia’s attacks appear to be hardening the resistance of Ukraine and increasing the support for Ukraine from Europe and America.
The attacks don’t appear to be getting Russia any closer to its war aims of subjugating Ukraine, and forcing it into negotiations that are favourable to Russia. Indeed, they are just pointless raids to terrorise Ukrainians now.
Ukraine’s New Unmanned Air Defence Force. Ukraine has begun establishing an organisation called the Unmanned Air Defense Force, which will be a component of the Ukrainian Air Force. The formation of the new institution was announced by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Syrskyi in an interview with the news outlet Militarnyi.
The new component of the Ukrainian Air Force is designed to complement tactical aviation and anti-aircraft missile forces, particularly in reinforcing and strengthening air defence capabilities protecting strategic facilities and heavily populated areas.
It will be interesting to see the command and control relationship that the new Unmanned Air Defense Force has with the established Unmanned Systems Force.
Ukraine’s War on Russian Oil Income. Unlike Russia’s strategically aimless long-range aerial attack campaign, Ukraine had continued its focus on a narrow range of target categories: oil infrastructure, defence industry and transportation nodes. There is increasing evidence that the Ukrainians are experiencing some success, with fuel rationing now widespread inside Russia. Even the American president acknowledged the impact of Ukraine’s strategic strikes in his recent ‘change of direction’ social media post about Ukraine (read more about that here).
Recent significant Russian targets struck by the Ukrainians include the following:
The Afipsky oil refinery” in Krasnodar Krai, about 380 km from the front line.
The Shchastia gas distribution station in occupied Luhansk.
The Sievierodonetsk gas distribution station.
UAV production facilities in the city of Valuyki, Belgorod.
The Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant.
Two linear production-dispatching stations (LPDS) on russian main oil pipelines at Bryansk and Samara.
Novokuybyshevsk and Saratov oil refineries.
Fuel shortages, which initially occurred in Russia’s far east, are beginning to impact country wide. One indication of the success of this Ukrainian campaign is that Russia has banned fuel exports until the end of the year. This is a key measure of success for the Ukrainians because it denies the Russians important sources of foreign income.
The Eastern Front. The situation on the ground in eastern Ukraine remains dynamic. In Kharkiv, the Russians are continuing their slow-rolling advance on a couple of fronts around Kupyansk and elsewhere. While they are slowly advancing, they are nowhere close to taking back the territory that they lost when Ukraine executed its surprise offensive in Kharkiv in September 2022. There is little prospect of them doing so.
Further south, the Russians continue their main effort of attempting to envelop and seize Pokrovsk. Again, they are making very slow progress. The Ukrainian counter attacks to the north of Pokrovsk have inflicted significant casualties on the Russians, and it appears that there are several pockets of surrounded Russian troops.
When viewing both the aerial and ground operations of the Russians in Ukraine, it remains clear to any military professional that Russia’s prospects are only getting worse. The quality of their ground forces are declining, the rate of advance is nowhere near that which would permit any kind of breakthrough, and Ukrainian drone operations are getting more lethal.
The Russians have almost no prospect of winning this war, and very limited prospect of achieving even some of their pre-war objectives for the war. The Ukrainian strategy at present - destroy Russian oil export income, degrade munitions and drone production, employ a thick drone wall to impose disproportionate casualties on Russia and use diplomacy to shift Trump away from Putin - is bearing fruit.
Despite this, we should not expect any significant breakthrough with regards to peace talks anytime soon. Putin still appears to believe he has the upper hand in this war and is willing to continue throwing away lives and resources in pursuit of this goal. Until that changes, he will not negotiate for peace.
The Pacific
Taiwan’s Vulnerable Eastern Flank. A recent tabletop simulation of a war between Taiwan and China has demonstrated that eastern Taiwan is more vulnerable to attacks by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) than has traditionally been assumed. A series of books about the simulation has just been released by the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science Foundation, which co-sponsored the war game.
The simulation found that Taiwan required additional countermeasures to protect eastern Taiwan from Chinese strikes, and that the eastern regions of Taiwan can no longer serve as a secure base of operations for the Taiwanese military. Former chief of the Taiwanese armed forces, Admiral Lee Hsi-Ming stated that:
Taiwanese armed forces’ long-held assumption that strategic assets could be sheltered in Taiwan’s eastern region is no longer correct…The PLA now possesses submarines and bombers with the capability of firing cruise missiles from the air and seas east of Taiwan, endangering the fighter jets in the underground hangars of Hualien County’s Chiashan Air Force Base.
Fujian Carrier Operations Video. This week, the PLA-Navy released a video showing the launch and recovery of a variety of aircraft from its newest aircraft carrier, the Fujian. Naval analyst Alex Luck provided an assessment of the video for Naval News, in which he wrote:
Fujian is expected to wrap up her ongoing ninth sea trial in the near future. Significantly, the carrier may commission with PLAN after this event, possibly at Sanya on Hainan. However, this step very much remains to be confirmed for the time being. Even once the ship enters service with the Chinese Navy, the carrier will not be operational in any meaningful sense for several years. Fujian will instead continue with qualifications and testing, including further flight operations.
Taiwan’s New Uncrewed Attack Vessel. A new uncrewed naval attack vessel was revealed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) at the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition this week.
According to Taiwanese reports, the Kaui-Chi uncrewed naval attack vessel has recently passed combat evaluations by successfully hitting a target ship during a sea-and-air missile-firing drill. The vessel is able to launch UAVs at targets, similar to Ukrainian uncrewed naval vessels.
H.I. Sutton has recently examined the various uncrewed naval vessel programs underway in Taiwan. You can read his update at this link.
China Tests Two Massive Uncrewed Subs in South China Sea. The PLA is testing two new uncrewed submarines around Hainan in the South China Sea. As the Naval News article on this topic notes, there is still much that we don’t know about these vessels:
The new vessels themselves remain enigmatic. From satellite images we can determine that they are around 40-42 meters (131 -138 ft) long, do not appear to have traditional submarine sails, and have X-form rudders at the stern. Strong circumstantial evidence links one of the two vessels has been developed by 705 Research Institute, part of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation.
Clearly the Chinese believe that complementing their crewed submarines with these uncrewed systems is the way ahead for naval operations in the Pacific.
Allied High Training Tempo. The tempo of multinational exercises remains high in the Pacific. Over the past week, major exercises conducted included Freedom Edge 2025 (U.S. Japanese and Korean air and naval forces), Orient Shield 2025 (U.S., Japanese and Australian ground forces) and Resolute Dragon 2025 (Japanese military and U.S. Marines).
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It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.
I have included a new article which explores the costs of pursuing Artificial General Intelligence as well as a report from the China Maritime Studies Institute about Chinese deception in amphibious operations. There is a terrific report on biased strategic and political thinking in the lead up to the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine as well as a good piece on learning lessons from war.
As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first one is my read of the week.
Happy reading!
1. Why the West Failed to See Russia’s Invasion Coming
In this new report, the authors explore why Western political systems failed to accept the threat posed by Russia and to adequately anticipate and prepare for the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Among the reasons the authors propose for Western failures in the lead up to the war are policymakers being unable to imagine large-scale war in Europe because they hadn’t experienced it in recent history; An inability to acknowledge the threat because it would have required rejecting core beliefs in diplomacy and economic interdependence; and, because politicians assumed Russia would act rationally by Western standards. The full report can be read here.
2. Foggy with a Chance of Surprise
The U.S. Naval War Collleg’s China Maritime Studies Institute has published a new report that explores the use of deception by the People’s Liberation Army in any amphibious operations against Taiwan. The report is quite comprehensive and notes that “Chinese military researchers envision employing robots, containerized missiles, and unmanned amphibious vehicles to confuse and unbalance Taiwan’s defenders in a future war.” The full report is available at this link.
3. Military Decision-Making with Unexplainable AI
In this article, the authors explore why proposes that explainable AI models need not be a prerequisite for their use in military decision support processes. Instead, it is proposed that trust can be built in AI not by explaining decisions, but by verifying consistent outputs from multiple, independently developed AIs. As the authors note, “the most impactful AI strategies will frequently defy human logic. The key to cultivating justified trust in these opaque oracles is rigorous calibration and confidence built on experience, not explainability.” The article can be read at this link.
4. The Pathology of Learning Lessons from War
In this excellent Modern War Institute piece, the author explores the military mindset with regards to learning versus observing lessons. He uses the case study of how lessons were either misread or ignored in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. As he writes in the article, “to avoid the pitfalls of the past and repeating another instance of lessons observed over lessons learned, force design must account for technological, cultural, and tactical biases. Furthermore, even an unbiased and non-parochial force design might fall short if it does not consider two distinct observations: first, that escalation is a tactical—not just strategic—paradigm, and second, that militaries must have the humility to anticipate ambiguity and wars of attrition.” The article is available here.
5. Pursuing the AGI Delusion
In this excellent piece published by Foreign Affairs, the authors propose that America is chasing Artificial General Intelligence at the cost of many shorter term applications for AI. As they note in their article, “Washington must ensure that the pursuit of AGI does not come at the expense of near-term adoption. Racing toward a myth is not sound policy. Instead, the country’s primary goal must be rapidly scaling practical AI applications—improvements that meet government needs and deliver real efficiencies today and tomorrow.” You can read the full article at this link.
Correct me if this is wrong, Mick, but my understanding is that any and all long-range strikes into Russia using US munitions by Ukraine still have to get individual permissions. This even applies to our allies' Storm Shadow and Scalp missiles needing US permission. Trump could put his opinions into force by simply taking off all these restrictions so that Ukraine can use them as it sees fit.
Hi! Thanks for the update. Your comment on Hostomel and air mobile ground forces got me thinking about "how do drones change operations with air mobile ground forces"? Do they favour the attacker or the defender and how do they change these kinds of operations? I would really love to read your thoughts on this.