Ukraine and Military Adaptation

Part One: Theory, Practice and the Continuing Adaptation Battle

A recent Russian battlefield adaptation - the turtle tank. Source: Forbes

The requirements to adapt to unexpected circumstances tests both organization and system, revealing weaknesses that are partly structural and partly functional, whose full potential for disaster may not previously have been noticed.

Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes (1991), p. 162

This is a two-part piece of work that I have been working on for some time in the background of my other writing and commentary on the war in Ukraine. It provides insights into the theory of military adaptation, key publications and how adaptation is being examined in the war in Ukraine since February 2022.

Adaptation is a crucial subject in the study of this conflict in Ukraine, and war more generally. Adaptation at different levels is a core element of any strategy for success in war. If a military institution is not learning and adapting, it is essentially marking time while the enemy improves and eventually crushes the institution standing still.

Ukrainian and Russian military organisations have undertaken adaptation throughout the war, and this has improved their overall military effectiveness over time. The process of adaptation during the war provides insights for other military institutions that are preparing for war under modern conditions.

There are several key elements that need to be considered when exploring adaptation in Ukraine since February 2022.

First, that adaptation has occurred in both the Ukrainian and Russian military institutions during the war. This adaptation has changed the structure, tactics, and training of both organisations, and they are both different military institutions now if compared to the Ukrainian and Russian military institutions that existed before the large-scale Russian invasion of February 2022.

Second, that this adaptation occurs at multiple levels. Adaptation is not a singular or holistic process that takes place at one level of an institution. In any military institution, there will be multiple instances of adaptation occurring at any one time, and these will generally be occurring in different geographic areas (depending on threat) as well as at different levels within the hierarchical construct of a military force.

Third, that the effectiveness of adaptation that occurs in war relies on pre-war foundations. While adaptation that occurs in combat is a natural reaction for military personnel who wish to ‘survive the next battle’, wider scale adaptation can be more effective if there are pre-existing processes and cultures for learning and sharing lessons within and between institutions. Consequently, it is important to study pre-war adaptation processes, learning cultures and institutional transformation initiatives in Ukraine and Russia to ascertain whether these provided useful foundations for the multi-level adaptation that has occurred during the war.