Ukraine Can Use U.S. Weapons in Russia

With Significant Limitations. A quick assessment on the implications?

Source: Radio Free Europe

Today, it has been revealed that the U.S. has loosened (a little) the restraints it has imposed on Ukraine throughout this war on the employment of U.S. weapons against targets on Russian territory. This is my quick assessment of the impacts of this decision.

As reported by Politico:

The Biden administration has quietly given Ukraine permission to strike inside Russia — solely near the area of Kharkiv — using U.S.-provided weapons, three U.S. officials and two other people familiar with the move said Thursday.

This comes after weeks of Ukrainian lobbying, including by President Zelensky and Defence Minister Umerov, to change the U.S. policy on the use of its weapons on (or over) Russian terriroty by the Ukrainian government. French and German leaders have also come out in support of using their weapons to attack Russian forces on Russian territory.

This is the reverse of the great tank debate of late 2022, where the UK and U.S. made commitments about provision of tanks to Ukraine to coax Germany into doing so. This represents a positive step in European thinking about strategy and the trajectory of the war.

Reports emerged that in the wake of the recent visit to Ukraine by U.S. Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, he had been advocating for loosening of U.S. rules on the use of its weapons by Ukraine.

Apparently the new direction on U.S. weapons will allow Ukraine to employ American weapons to intercept Russian missiles that are targeting Kharkiv, and to attack concentrations of Russian troops just over the border in the vicinity of the city. Permitted targets also apparently include Russian air force bombers, which launch many of the long-range missiles that attack Ukrainian civil infrastructure and civilian targets.

What might be the implications of this decision?

Given this is an important policy shift for the U.S. administration, what might be the key implications that can be drawn at this early stage?

First, it will allow for Ukraine to target Russian troops, especially high value targets such as command and control elements, artillery, logistics and air defence units that are located on Russian territory near Kharkiv and concentrating or rehearsing future operations against Ukraine. While the horse may have bolted on this particular requirement, there will be locations where reinforcements and reserve units are held, as well as logistic supply locations that might be useful targets. This is the kind of operational strike - the ability to destroy Russian military forces before they are commited to combat operations - that is essential while Ukraine reconstittues its forces in 2024.

Second, the agreement appears to allow for targeting of Russian combat aircraft - including bombers - that are targeting Kharkiv. This is important because as Ukraine has shown in the past, with the right planning it can conduct air defence ambushes to down Russian aircraft targeting Ukraine with their missiles. Importantly, this might allow Ukraine to also down Russian tactical aviation that is employing long-range glide bombs which are now being used in their dozens every day against Ukrainian ground forces. Whether the agreements restricts the interception of Russian aircraft to Kharkiv remains to be seen.

Third, much of the concentration of Russian forces employed in attacks against Ukrainian ground forces occurs on Ukrainian occupied territory. This is particularly the case in the south, as well as in the east where bitter ground combat is taking place on several axes. Therefore, this change in policy will not impact on all Russian offensives and may not be the silver bullet that some hope.

Fourth, it does cause the Russians to rethink any posturing or concentrating forces where there is a shared Russian-Ukraine border. This includes Russian regions that ajoin the Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts in Ukraine. While the new agreement does not include the use of U.S. weapons in these areas, it could concievably be extended. The Russians have to at least assume this might be the case in their planning activities.

They also have to rethink the planning and execution of their aerial operations. On at least two occasions in 2023, Ukraine undertook airdefence ambushes of Russian aircraft that resulted in losses of several aircraft in a short time. In May 2023, five Russian aircraft were lost in such an activity. It also shot down 11 Russian aircraft in 11 days this February and shot down the first Russian strategic bomber in April this year.

The Russians will have to think about what might happen if longer range weapons from Germany and the U.S. are included in this new approach. What air bases and strategic establishments might come under additional threat? And while Ukraine already has a strategic strike program using its own weapons to attack targets as deep at 1800 kilometres inside Russia, many of these weapons have smaller warheads that the U.S. and German weapons.

Fifth, it means that Russia may step up its efforts to prevent the use of these weapons against them. This not only includes attacks against targets in Ukraine where this weapons are launched from or stored. It might also mean that Russia steps up its current campaign of sabotage against Europe to include manufacturers of long-range weapons. This sabotage campaign was recently explored in this Chatham House report.

Finally, the relaxation of this U.S. direction on the employment of its weapons on Russian soil is a change to a policy that has been in place since the beginning of the Russian large-scale invasion in February 2022. To that end, the Russian President and his senior advisors might now need to ponder not just the implications of this policy, but whether it presages any other large shifts in U.S. policy about the war.

Personally, I am not sure it does. Every significant policy change or weapon provision decision in this war by Ukraine’s supporters - be it in Washington, Brussels or elsewhere - has hewed to the same pattern. This pattern is as follows:

“No, no, no, maybe, maybe, we will consult our allies, maybe, ok…”

So even if this decision by President Biden heralds other policy shifts, it is likely these other potential future shifts will take time to mull over and then occur. But the Russian President and his advisors now have just a little bit more uncertainty to consider in their strategic decision-making about their brutal invasion and occupation of eastern and southern Ukraine.

Not an Expanding Torrent for U.S. Weapons Use - Yet

This is a welcome decision by the U.S. administration. And, it will assist the Ukrainians to undertake tactical and operational strikes against Russian combat forces, their leadership elements, logistics and air defences in proximity to Kharkiv. It help to attrit Russian forces before they can be used in combat against depleted Ukrainian combat formations, and that is a good thing.

This decision will also assist in targeting Russian aircraft that launch the kinds of attacks seen against the mega-store in Kharkiv several days ago.

But, given the geographic restrictions still in place, this will not be a decisive capability. For this relaxation to have a wider impact on the war, the geographic limitations of the current decision would have to be removed. We will wait and see whether that occurs in the near future.