Ukraine Dispatch: Ground-Based Air Defence
Another report based on my latest visit to Ukraine, which features information from my interviews with Ukrainian personnel about the challenges of defending Ukrainian skies from Russian aerial threats
Welcome to my Ukraine Dispatches, updates from my latest visit to Ukraine. This is my sixth dispatch.
My first dispatch, which covered Ukrainian military training as well as a certain incident with a snake, is available to read at this link. My second one is available here. My third dispatch, an interview with Nataliie Lutsenko, is available at this link. The fourth dispatch is here. My fifth dispatch, about Ukraine’s assault forces, can be read at this link.
Last night, Ukraine suffered another large-scale Russian aerial assault. The country has been under sustained aerial attack since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022. Indeed, some of the very first acts of Russia’s offensive were missile attacks against Ukrainian air defence radars and critical military infrastructure.
With the exception of some isolated attacks including those on 9/11, attack from the air is something that western nations and western military institutions have largely avoided since the end of the Second World War.
Not so Ukraine.
During my Ukraine visit this month, I had the opportunity to meet with officials to discuss the challenges currently faced by land-based air defence organisations. This is more than the nightly challenge of intercepting Shaheds and missiles in their hundreds, although this is a major problem. Land-based air defence also incorporates the defence of ground forces against aerial threats, which can include strike and ISR drones, glide bombs launched by Russian tactical fixed wing aviation, and the threat of Russian military attack helicopters.
The Shahed Challenge
In the six months since my last visit to Ukraine, the scale and technological sophistication of the challenges posed by the Russian Shahed drones has increased significantly. The average number of drones dispatched monthly increased from around 4000 in March to over 6000 now.
Another change is the sophistication of the drones. Russia has constantly changed the electronic hardening and the navigation systems of the drones in order to degrade Ukraine’s capacity to either spoof the drones or gain control of them and steer them to safe areas (or back to launch points). Russia has also introduced jet powered Shahed which travel much faster than the old propeller driven drones, making them harder to detect and intercept. Some Shaheds have been found with AI chips and others with thermal imagery cameras for navigation assistance.
There has been rapid evolution of Russian tactics that employ Shaheds. Not only have they been flying higher, making interception with .50 cal machine guns very difficult, they fly variable routes and at higher speeds. Shaheds are also being used in larger numbers, with the first 500 drone raid being conducted by the Russians in 2025.
According to a briefing from Ukrainian military intelligence personnel I received during this visit, Russia can now produce around 35,000 Shahed drones per year and that this is likely to grow to 40,000 per year by 2030.
Shaheds Not the Only Aerial Threat
If Ukraine only had the deal with the different Shahed variants, which also include decoy versions of the drone, the problem would be huge. But, most Shahed raids are accompanied by smaller numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles which are difficult to detect, and much more complex to intercept that Shaheds.
But land force air defence units need to focus on another major threat besides the challenge of Russia’s nightly deep strikes against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. That other problem is tactical air defence along the frontline.
Russia’s tactical fixed wing aviation remains a critical threat to Ukrainian ground forces. Russian tactical fighter bombers are able launch glide bombs from ranges beyond Ukrainian ground-based air defence systems. These glide bombs continue to be a serious threat to ground forces because there remains no reliable, systemic way of intercepting them. And they carry a very large warhead, much larger than any drone, which can destroy significant fortifications manned by Ukrainian troops, which provides gaps for Russian ground troops to exploit.
For a good report on just how destructive these glide bombs are in eastern Ukraine ground operations, see the report at this link.
In September 2025, 5278 glide bomb strikes were recorded along the frontline – an average of 175 per day. Russia essentially has an unlimited supply of old Soviet-era gravity bombs that it can use for this purpose.
