Ukraine Peace Negotiations: Road to Nowhere
The current peace negotiations are a road to nowhere. Putin is only using them to buy time and convince the Trump administration that the sole direction for the war is negative for Ukraine.
Most current suggestions for a settlement would, if implemented, crystallize Russian territorial gains and encourage further aggression in the future. James Sherr.
The latest round of talks between Ukraine, America and the Russians have just concluded in Abu Dhabi. The talks, which had been planned for last weekend, were delayed at the request of the American party. There was speculation that this might have been because of a pending U.S. strike on Iran, but the intervening period has passed without any new American military operations in the Middle East.
The same cannot be said for Ukraine.
Since the beginning of February alone, Russia’s strategic strike campaign has unleashed 1073 drones and missiles against Ukrainian civilian buildings. While the Ukrainian air force claims a shoot down rate of 86% over these five nights, that is still 146 Russian drones and missiles that found their targets in Ukraine.
Imagine if 146 sites in Europe or America were hit by such weapons in a five-day period.
Back to the ‘peace’ talks held over the last 48 hours. At the conclusion of the talks, the American negotiator Steve Witkoff issued an update on social media. I have posted the five ‘outcomes’ described in his post below. These are exact quotes from the Witkoff statement:
The discussions were constructive and focused on how to create the conditions for a durable peace.
The delegations reached agreement whereby the Russian Federation and Ukraine will each release 157 Prisoners of War. This is the first exchange in the last five months.
The United States and Russia also agreed to establish a military-to-military dialogue to be led by General Alexus Grynkewich, commander of U.S. European Command. This channel of communication was suspended prior to the onset of this conflict and is crucial to achieving and maintaining peace.
Over the two days, the delegations had wide-ranging discussions on the remaining open issues including methods to implement a ceasefire and monitor the cessation of military activities.
The delegations agreed to report back to their respective capitals and to continue trilateral discussions in the coming weeks.
The prisoner swap is good to see but is hardly an outcome of these talks. The exchange of prisoners discussed in the Witkoff statement is the 71st swap since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of February 2022. As a Kyiv Post article notes, “one of the most noteworthy exchanges was the return of 1,000 Ukrainians in May, organized in record time under the first Istanbul agreements. The operation unfolded over three days and marked one of the largest single returns since the war began.
The Ukrainians and Russians have not needed an elderly real estate salesman to help them swap their respective prisoners of war. That said, if there is a peace agreement, a full return of prisoners of war must be one of the conditions.
The re-establishment of military-to-military dialog is interesting but is no great achievement by the negotiating team. These were severed with good reason by western powers at the start of the war. There was no reason to re-establish them now, other than to formally discuss a new START treaty and to pat Russia on the back and cajole them into returning for the next round of peace talks. They represent a reward, albeit a small one, for Putin and one more step on his return to full engagement with all the countries of the world. But why is Russia getting all the rewards here?
The topics of discussion mentioned, including ceasefire implementation and monitoring, are basic ones in these kinds of negotiations. Having them as an agenda item (which is what the Witkoff statement acknowledges) and actually making progress on them are two entirely different things. I note that no discussion on progress was mentioned.
An update from a different source, a spokesperson for National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov, provided a little more detail on the talks. According to the Kyiv Independent, the Ukrainian delegation proposed an unconditional ceasefire and Moscow rejected it, just as they did in 2025. The Ukrainian president added little to this other than to note in his evening update that:
Today, I received a report from our negotiating team following two days of meetings and talks in the Emirates — with the American side and with the Russian side. I am expecting the team in Kyiv for a full in-person report, as many aspects cannot be properly discussed over the phone.
Therefore, if it is difficult to assert that any real progress has been made in this latest round of talks. Security guarantees for Ukraine, and territorial concessions, are the two biggest issues for resolution. As well they might be. They are existential issues for Ukraine.
Security guarantees, real ones that actually commit allies to assist in the event of a future Russian attack on Ukraine, are necessary. Previous agreements, such as 1994 Budapest Memorandum, have been grossly insufficient, and have provided no deterrent against Russian military aggression. Until Ukraine receives such security guarantees against Russian aggression, a peace deal is unlikely.
Giving away territory, particularly the highly defensible fortress belt in the Donbas, has both political, and military dimensions.
Politically, giving away territory is against the law for Ukraine’s president and would require parliamentary assent. At the same time, a majority of Ukrainians still oppose such a measure. As the latest survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociologyfinds, 52% of respondents categorically rejected any proposal to transfer the entire Donbas to Russian control in exchange for security guarantees. Only 40% were ready to accept such a deal.
From a military perspective, the Donbas fortress belt is one of the few remaining pieces of easily defended terrain before the flatter regions of central Ukraine that lead to major cities including Kyiv. This area has been developed with manmade obstacles and defensive lines and would take Russia months if not all of 2026 and into 2027 to seize. The pathetic advance rate, and high casualties, of Russian forces in last four years indicates that Russia would probably suffer another half million casualties in trying to seize this region.
There is also no guarantee that the Russians would be successful in seizing the rest of the Donbas. Putin realises that an unsuccessful campaign here this would heavily dent his ‘inevitable victory’ narrative, and further weaken his military and his country at a time when it is already becoming a vassal state to China.
But Putin needs the Donbas so he can call the war a victory at home. He does not want a losing army to return to Russia because therein lays the seeds of political turmoil and his potential fall.
Therefore, what is Putin’s direction for this war from this point? He has a four-part strategy.
First, continuing attempting to bludgeon his way through to some kind of operational victory in the Donbas. Putin is not experiencing a manpower shortage like Ukraine is, and Russian industry is pumping out more drones. At present, as I described back last year, Russia’s ground war plan involves a multi-front strategy to disperse Ukrainian forces.
The main effort on the ground is an operational double envelopment of the territory in the Donbas held by Ukraine. One arm of this envelopment is moving north from the Pokrovsk area, and one is moving west on the Lyman axis of advance. Convergence would likely be at the town of Barvinkove.
Second, Putin will continue his strategic bombardment campaign against Ukrainian civilians and civil infrastructure. Russia has normalised sending an average of 100-150 drones per night against Ukraine, with short surges that see 500-700 drones and missiles employed on a single night. These attacks aim to cut electricity to critical defence industries and other services, degrade the morale of civilians, force more citizens to flee Ukraine and impact the legitimacy of the Zelenskyy government.
Third, Russia will sustain and probably enhance its relationship with its key backers, especially China. China has a keen interest in this war continuing given how it ‘keeps Europeans focussed on Europe’ and keeps America from fully focussing on Asia. China has been identified by NATO as Russia’s principle enabler of the war, and a recent report sees Putin and Xi meeting soon to further strengthen ties.
But Iran and North Korea also have an interest in this war continuing in order to hurt the western order (at least, what is left of it). Regardless, the only way Putin can afford to continue the war is through the support of his authoritarian partners. I explored this topic in a report last year called the The Adaptation War.
Fourth, Putin will continue Russia’s cognitive warfare against western countries. This aims to encourage those who do not think Russia is a threat (in Europe and America) and keep as many countries as possible from supporting Ukraine by describing Russia’s war as a just one. Another element of this cognitive warfare is the subversion and sabotage against European targets, which aims to up the cost of European support for Ukraine, and convince Europeans that the cost of supporting Ukraine is too high. Finally, Russia’s cognitive warfare aims to deliver a political victory in this war underpinned by support from the Trump administration.
A short-term peace agreement in the coming months only gets in the way of Putin’s strategy.
Therefore, the current round of negotiations is a road to nowhere. Putin is only using them as a tool to buy time to implement his strategy, convince the Trump administration that the only direction for the war is negative for Ukraine, and enlist Trump and his negotiations team to force Ukraine into an unfavourable war termination agreement.
At some point in the future, we will look back and deeply regret how much western politicians tolerated Putin’s delaying tactics.
very informative and yes, trump needs to provide more lr offensive weapons and pressure putin get out Ukraine. Realistically trump is on the wrong side...
the taco guy needs to stop trottling the purl scheme