Ukraine's Kursk Offensive 2025
An initial assessment of Ukraine's break out from its Kursk salient, Russia's response and what Ukraine's objectives for the new offensive might be.
Today marks exactly five months since the start of our actions in the Kursk region, and we continue to maintain a buffer zone on Russian territory, actively destroying Russian military potential there. President Zelenskyy address, 5 January 2025
Over the weekend, it emerged that Ukraine has undertaken what appears to be a limited offensive in the northern reaches of its salient in the Russian province of Kursk. While the size of the attacks is yet to be definitively confirmed, the nature of these combined arms activities – armour, fires, EW, infantry, mine clearance, drones, etc – means that this would have probably involved at least one, and perhaps more, Ukrainian brigades.
Ukrainian forces currently control around 800 square kilometres of the Kursk region, down from previous claims of nearly 1,400 square kilometres in the wake of the August 2024 offensive.
Like all military operations of this kind, it will probably be a couple more days yet before we have more clarity about this operation. However, given what we know about Ukrainian and Russian operations in the area since August last year, and the likely Ukrainian and Russian strategic objectives for 2025, I wanted to offer some initial insights in this special assessment into this latest Ukrainian offensive operation.
What We Know
Ukraine Has Advanced. Imagery and geospatial assessments indicate that Ukraine has already taken some Russian territory and done so with axes of advance in the Berdin-Novosotnitsky, Leonidovo and Pushkarnoye directions. It also appears to have also secured at least three Russian villages since beginning its new offensive operations in Kursk. These advances however remain small, with around 20-25 square kilometres of ground taken so far. The Centre for Defence Strategies update for 6 January describes the situation as follows:
The "Siversk" Operational Tactical Group (OTG) conducted a series of attacks in the Berdinsko-Novosotnitskoe direction in three waves using armoured vehicles, intensified their offensive toward Leonidovo, launched an assault near Pushkarnoe, advanced southwest and south of Berdino, and entered the southern part of the village. They are consolidating positions in Cherkasskoe Porechie, Martynovka, and Mikhailovka, entered Novosotnitskoe, advanced west of Yamskaya Step, west of Novaya Sorochina, and attacked near Nikolskiy, Alexandria, Russkaya Konopelka, and in the direction of Pushkarnoe.
Ukraine Has Continued Learning. Much as they did during their initial push into Kursk in August 2024, it appears the Ukrainians have continued to learn and adapt since arriving in Kursk. They have applied these lessons in their latest assault. Key lessons include the use of EW, counter-drone operations, effective use of engineers for mobility support to ground forces, tank-infantry integration, and the integration of EW and long-range fires.
Russia Was Surprised – Again. Well, no surprise that Russia was surprised here. However, this is more of a tactical than a strategic surprise. Unlike the original thrust into Kursk in August 2024, the Russians appear to have taken this in their stride so far. But it demonstrates again the fallacy of the ‘transparent battlefield’ dogma. As I wrote when Ukraine conducted its original thrust into Kursk last year:
Ukraine has achieved surprise. This is an important theme to note given the obsession of some with describing this war as a ‘transparent battlefield’. This, again, shows that the modern battlefield is far from transparent, and that deception activities, good intelligence, and surprise are crucial elements of modern war.
Russian Responses. We know that the Russians have already executed attacks on the Kursk salient in the past 48 hours, part of their larger campaign which has secured around 35-40% of ground seized by Ukraine last year. As the Centre for Defence Strategies update today notes:
Russian forces advanced in the western and southern parts of Makhnovka, pushing Ukrainian forces back from Makhnovka and Dmitriukov. In the battles near Makhnovka, Russian and North Korean troops suffered losses amounting to an infantry battalion.
Additionally, Putin has dispatched Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov to Kursk. This indicates that he wants to be seen as swiftly responding to the Ukrainian attack and that things are under control. But it also shows that Putin might be just a little worried by the Ukrainian operation.
Pokrovsk and Kursk – Russia’s Two Priorities. The Russian military has been directed to secure Pokrovsk (which it is in the processes of enveloping) and clear the Ukrainians from Russian soil. As Putin noted in his December 2024, news conference “We will definitely drive them out…I cannot answer the question about a specific date right now.” Ukrainian offensive actions in the last few days will not change these Russian priorities.
Why Now? As I explore below, the timing of this latest Ukrainian operation is driven by tactical and operational opportunities, but also by political necessity. Ukraine will want to shape the perceptions of the incoming Trump administration, and going on the offensive is a good way to message the new adminstration that despite the Russian strengths in manpower, Putin is not fully in control of the war and can be challenged - and beaten.
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