War in the Middle East

A new series of articles provides an exploration of the ongoing conflict and observations from my recent visit to Israel.

Northern Israel. Author photo

A month ago, Israel and many nations around the world commemorated one year since the Hamas massacres across southern Israel on 7 October 2023. On that day, after launching hundreds of rockets into Israel, thousands of Hamas fighters poured through more than two dozen breaches in Israel’s border fence around Gaza. Live-streamed, and accompanied by many Gazan civilians, Hamas terrorists murdered over a thousand Israelis in their homes, in public areas and at a music festival. Hundreds more were kidnapped and taken back into Gaza, often to rapturous receptions from the people of Gaza.

The 7^th of October also saw one of the biggest single day of casualties in the history of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). Hamas targeted IDF soldiers on their bases, killing some in their beds and massacring groups of captured soldiers. It neutralized the division and brigade commanders in southern Israel and ambushed many soldiers traveling to report for duty that day.

The slaughter rocked Israel and the world.  The attacks also led to a schism between Israeli citizens and their military. Part of the contract between Kibbutz and IDF was that Israeli citizens would live in proximity to Gaza as long as the military protected them. The IDF’s failure to do so resulted in a civil military break down in trust. Many of the actions of the IDF since then have at least partially been influenced by the IDF’s desire to win back the trust of Israeli civilians.

Beyond the shock, anger and deep sorrow in Israel, the events of 7 October caused a regional earthquake in security affairs. Hezbollah, which had helped Hamas plan the attacks but had not provided support to Hamas on 7 October, sensed weakness in Israel and began its continuing missile campaign against northern Israel. This has seen tens of thousands of Israeli citizens evacuated from the north to other parts of Israel.

Then, the inevitable Israeli response to the attacks launched from Gaza was launched. In an operation that continues one year later, the IDF began a series of ground and air campaigns within days of the 7 October attacks to destroy Hamas and rescue Israeli hostages being hidden, often in underground tunnels, throughout Gaza. Israel often found these two objectives to be in tension, with Israeli citizens prioritizing rescuing hostages while the Israeli prime minister appeared to prioritize the destruction of Hamas.

The manner in which it pursued Hamas in Gaza has caused thousands of civilian deaths, destabilized Israel’s relations with its neighbours, and led to a surge in anti-semitism around the world. But with a changed security calculus in the wake of 7 October shock, the Netanyahu government has taken the opportunity to remove senior Hezbollah and Hamas leaders and mount other attacks throughout the region to ‘restore deterrence’.

Israel upped the stakes by assassinating senior terrorist leaders in Beirut and Tehran. The Iranians were particularly incensed that a senior member of Hamas was killed at a government guest house in Tehran in July. While Israel has been responsible for killing other Iranians in Iran, particularly those associated with the nuclear program, this assassination was particularly humiliating for Iran. It led to Iran directly attacking Israel for the first time, breaking a regional norm that had held since the religious leaders seized power in Iran in 1979.

Throughout this entire period of escalating tensions, the U.S. government has sought to temper the actions of all sides, while deploying additional military forces to the region as a deterrent to further Iranian attacks, and to defend Israel against Iranian missiles and drones. But Israel continues to ignore American counsel to cease Gaza operations and not strike certain targets in Iran (that only partially worked for the Biden administration).

A year after the 7 October attacks, the Middle East regional security order has fundamentally changed.

Hamas has been largely degraded and its leadership severely attrited. The leader of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, is dead. The destruction of Gaza may produce a new generation of recruits for Hamas however, as well as other anti-Jewish terrorist organisations. It has spawned an awful surge of anti-semitism around the globe, which was characterized by the recent appalling attacks on Jewish soccer supporters in Amsterdam.

Hezbollah has been greatly weakened through the combination of attacks on its leadership as well as its command-and-control network. Israel’s pager attacks, known in some circles as Operation Grim Beeper, has demonstrated a more effective Israeli intelligence network than that which conspicuously failed in the lead up to 7 October 2023. Air strikes and the ongoing ground operation in southern Lebanon have further weakened Hezbollah.

The weakening of Hamas and Hezbollah also results in a weakened Iran. Using these two proxies has been the resort of first choice for Iran to attack Israel for many years. As the capacity of Hamas and Hezbollah is degraded, Iran either has to step up and attack Israel directly, or step back from a cycle of escalating attacks. Neither option will be attractive to the mullahs in Tehran given the ineffectiveness of their two missile attacks on Israel, Israel’s demonstrated ability to destroy Iran air defences and strike targets as will. Iran will also wish to continue to be seen leading a regional, if not global, struggle against Israel. Iranian strategy is sure to evolve.

Over the period 3-7 November 2024, I conducted a visit to Israel with a small group of experts from the Center for Strategic and international Studies in Washington DC, where I am an adjunct fellow. We were hosted by the Israeli government. The program saw us undertake visits to northern Israel, Tel Aviv, southern Israel and Gaza. We had the opportunity to speak with government officials, academics, and senior military personnel.

Over the next week or so, I will publish several articles about the visit.

The aim of these articles is to provide a snapshot of Israel’s current military campaigns and the many challenges and opportunities of them. I will also explore the many areas of learning demonstrated by Israel and its adversaries across the region. Finally, I will examine the strategic issues related to the ongoing war in the Middle East, including Israel’s strategy and that of Iran and its proxies.

A year after the appalling Hamas massacres in southern Israel, Israel’s reputation around the world has taken a beating. But at the same time, terrorist attacks and Israel’s response in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran have reshaped the security environment in the Middle East. It is a more dangerous and unpredictable environment which will absorb the attention and resources of America and other nations in Europe and beyond.

Both both Russia and China also benefit from U.S. distraction in the Middle East as well as the degraded social cohesion in many western nations.

There is much that can be learned from how Israel has acted since 7 October 2023, both its mistakes and its successes. But in a deeper sense we can also learn from the interaction between Israel and its adversaries, as well as how this has had geopolitical impacts because of influence operations conducted by all the belligerents and their respective supporters around the world.

I hope you join me as I publish this series.