The potential for a Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2024 has been openly discussed by the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as well as by the commander of the Ukrainian ground forces Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk. Zelenskyy referred to Ukrainian plans for a 2024 counteroffensive in a late February interview, noting: "We will prepare a new counteroffensive, a new operation."
The biggest hope for a Ukrainian victory most likely lies in the eventual failure and collapse of the Russian economy and its effect on the Russian population and support for Putin. Russian oil exports are falling, especially with secondary sanctions being tightened. Reports of Indian and Turkish companies refusing to ship Russian POL may lead to further reductions in Russian production levels over the 1 million barrels a day they have cut over the past six months. That, along with difficulties getting spare parts and the expertise to use them, could well lead to more problems in their oil industry. The changeover of the Russian economy from a consumer to wartime footing has to eventually significantly affect their standard of living. The fall of the Russian ruble and refusal of virtually any country to accept them as payment has exacerbated their foreign currency problems. While the probability that all this will lead to an eminent collapse is small, this will eventually pull on Putin’s internal support. Sweden’s recent joining of NATO cannot help. The Russian elite cannot be unaware that, foreign policy and military wise, Putin’s war has been a disaster. The fact that Perogsian got as close to Moscow as he did shows that there is significant disquiet already.
The biggest hope for a Ukrainian victory most likely lies in the eventual failure and collapse of the Russian economy and its effect on the Russian population and support for Putin. Russian oil exports are falling, especially with secondary sanctions being tightened. Reports of Indian and Turkish companies refusing to ship Russian POL may lead to further reductions in Russian production levels over the 1 million barrels a day they have cut over the past six months. That, along with difficulties getting spare parts and the expertise to use them, could well lead to more problems in their oil industry. The changeover of the Russian economy from a consumer to wartime footing has to eventually significantly affect their standard of living. The fall of the Russian ruble and refusal of virtually any country to accept them as payment has exacerbated their foreign currency problems. While the probability that all this will lead to an eminent collapse is small, this will eventually pull on Putin’s internal support. Sweden’s recent joining of NATO cannot help. The Russian elite cannot be unaware that, foreign policy and military wise, Putin’s war has been a disaster. The fact that Perogsian got as close to Moscow as he did shows that there is significant disquiet already.