Australia’s Support for Ukraine

A recently released report from the Australian Senate Inquiry into Australia’s support for Ukraine highlights strong institutional and community support for Ukraine

Image: Defence Connect

Ukraine, a sovereign nation, has been attacked without provocation by its neighbour. Australia would also hope for support from other democratic nations if it was attacked. It is therefore both principled and practical that Australia looks seriously to what else it could provide as a matter of priority. Submission to Ukraine Inquiry

Late last month, the parliament of Australia released the public report from the Senate Inquiry into Australia’s support for Ukraine. The report was initiated to examine whether the scale and types of support that Australia was providing to Ukraine was appropriate and whether additional aid might be dispatched.

The formal Terms of Reference for the inquiry were broad but simple, and were as follows:

1. Whether the support is timely, coordinated and comprehensive;

2. Whether support is appropriately coordinated on a whole-of-government
   and whole-of-country basis;

3. Efforts to hold Russia to account, including by addressing mis- and dis-
   information in Australian public debate and the region; and

4. Any related matters.

The inquiry solicited submissions from public and government institutions as well as community groups and individuals. Over 200 submissions were received by the inquiry, including one from me. You can read all of those submissions here.

The inquiry also held a number of hearings where witnesses were called to testify about their submissions and about various elements of Australian assistance to Ukraine. I was privileged to have been invited to testify before inquiry members in Canberra in August this year.

The Report

In September, the Senate released its report into Australian aid to Ukraine. It is a wide ranging report which covers matters related to humanitarian and military aid, demining, addressing Russian misinformation as well as the overall coordination of Australian aid. It also explores the issue of why the Australian embassy remains closed in Kyiv when dozens of other nations have reopened their embassies and consulates.

The introduction to the report notes that:

Australia, like its other Western partners, understands that the conflict which has been raging in Ukraine ever since represents a line in the sand. While the outcome of the war affects the Ukrainian people first and foremost, the threat Russia’s invasion poses to international stability means that the effects of the outcome will be felt globally. The conflict also has implications for the IndoPacific region where Russia remains a major military power in deepening partnerships with totalitarian governments. Supporting Ukraine to defend its territorial integrity and freedom is therefore nothing less than standing up for the rules‐based order the world has benefitted from since the end of World War II and contributing to stability in the Indo‐Pacific. 

The report describes Australia’s support for Ukraine until now, and provides a list of the military, humanitarian and other forms of aid that have been provided since 2022.

Deeper into the report, the issue of Australia’s physical remoteness from the conflict is examined. For some people, this is seen as a European issue and not one which should involve Australia. As I, and many other have made clear in our submissions as well as in the media have made clear, this is not the case for a variety of reasons. The report echoes this when it states that:

An overwhelming majority of submitters who engaged with this inquiry supported Ukraine’s position and recognised the moral imperative to act in defence of a sovereign, democratic European nation under sustained attack. All but a handful of submitters agreed that Ukraine’s geographical distance from Australia does not mean it is a conflict without consequence closer to home.

The report dealt with the quantity of assistance provided to Ukraine. The inquiry reflected the desire of many for Australia to play a larger role given it is the 12th largest economy in the world, and can afford to do more. You can read more about Australia’s support to Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian large-scale invasion in 2022 here.

The position of Australia’s aid, as a percentage of GDP, is shown in the graphic below produced by the Kiel Institute.

Source: Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker

Another part of the report dealt with the overall strategic objectives of Australia’s support for Ukraine and the coordination of that support. As many submissions (including mine) described, there is no Australian government strategy for supporting Ukraine nor is there any coordinating mechanism for the prioritization and delivery of that assistance. As the report notes:

Submissions from the three government departments coordinating Australia’s response indicate that there is not currently a consistent whole‐of‐government objective or mission statement outlining Australia’s aims in supporting Ukraine.

While there were other areas explored, I will finish my exploration of the report with the issues of Australia’s embassy in Kyiv, and the capacity of the Australian Defence Force to learn from the war in Ukraine (and Russia). Many submissions described their confusion about the inability of our diplomats to re-establish the Kyiv embassy and use the excuse of workplace health and safety legislation to avoid their responsibilities. As one group of experts noted:

While re‐opening the embassy undeniably brings about some risk, the strategic imperatives for doing so outweigh the risk – particularly in comparison to the risk faced by Australian diplomats in capitals ranging from Baghdad to Port Moresby.

And finally, Australia is yet to send any military personnel to Ukraine to learn the lessons from the war. The Ukrainian senior military personnel I have interacted with have consistently indicated their willingness to share lessons about combat, air defence, drones, defence industry and other important elements of contemporary war. Australia should be sending people to Ukraine to learn from the Ukrainians. As I noted in my testimony:

I personally find it concerning that we havenʹt. The Ukrainians are very hospitable. They look after you. They are very willing to share lessons from this war because they know this isnʹt just about them. I think having a delegation to learn particularly the lessons of air, missile and drone defence and Indigenous production, of civil military strategy, of long‐range strike and of combat in the modern era would be invaluable. Frankly, you canʹt get all your lessons by reading Janeʹs Defence Weekly. 

There is much Australia can learn about modern war from Ukraine. Images: Covert Shores, 53rd Separate Brigade, @DefenceU

Report Recommendations

The final Senate Inquiry report included 22 recommendations about Australia’s support to Ukraine. While you can read these in detail here, in summary the recommendations for the Australian Government are as follows:

• Recommendation 1. Develop and commit to a consistent objective and mission statement in our support for Ukraine across all departments…commit to a comprehensive package which reflects Australia’s ongoing commitment to Ukraine’s defence, humanitarian needs and support, including multi‐year sustainable Australian support; and…develop an integrated National Security Strategy spanning foreign affairs, defence, and national resilience, noting that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is one of a number of threats to global security and stability, and the stability of the Indo‐Pacific region. 

• Recommendation 2. Appoint a Coordinator‐General to lead coordination of Australia’s assistance and support to Ukraine across all agencies.

• Recommendation 3. Re‐open the Australian Embassy in Ukraine, and ensure Australia is represented at the highest levels at future global meetings that discuss Ukraine’s defence, peace, and reconstruction. 

• Recommendation 4. Support the lifting of restrictions on the ability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to strike military targets in Russia.

• Recommendation 5. Any future requests from the Ukrainian Government for Australian coal shipments be responded to with high priority.

• Recommendation 6. Australia become a Participant or Associate Member of the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation Against Ukraine (Register of Damage for Ukraine) as a matter of priority. 

• Recommendation 7. Identify as a matter of priority all Russian assets in Australia that are subject to sanctions, and assess what legislative changes are required to enable the transfer of these assets or associated income to Ukraine. 

• Recommendation 8. Improve tracking of petroleum‐based products made with refined Russian oil, and apply autonomous sanctions as required.

• Recommendation 9. Ensure relevant agencies are appropriately resourced to identify and address foreign interference and disinformation activities in Australia. 

• Recommendation 10. Publicly attribute the role that the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) are playing in supporting Russia in its invasion of Ukraine.

• Recommendation 11. Ensure Australia keeps pace with international partners in sanctioning entities and individuals providing support to Russia.

• Recommendation 12. Expediently respond to requests from the Ukrainian Government for specific military and defence equipment and materiel, acknowledging that the Ukrainian authorities are best placed to decide whether the equipment can be used effectively in the defence of Ukraine. 

• Recommendation 13. The Australian Government adopts a default position that Defence materiel being retired or otherwise disposed of will be gifted to Ukraine. 

• Recommendation 14. Urgently direct the Department of Defence to develop plans to provide Ukraine with additional armoured vehicles and other materiel.

• Recommendation 15. Commit to replenish, via new orders from manufacturers or through enhanced acquisition plans, all new Australian Defence Force commitments to Ukraine.  

• Recommendation 16. Australia join the Demining Coalition for Ukraine. 

• Recommendation 17. Australia deepen cooperation and liaison between Australia and NATO partners, as well as the Australian Defence Force and the Armed Forces of Ukraine to ensure Australia learn from Ukraine’s defence.

• Recommendation 18. Strengthen support for Australia’s defence industry to provide equipment to Ukraine, and to develop innovative technologies. 

• Recommendation 19. Urgently develop a central point of contact for Australian aid and medical organisations seeking to provide assistance and aid to Ukraine. 

• Recommendation 20. Make new commitments for humanitarian assistance for Ukraine as part of a comprehensive, multi‐year strategy. 

• Recommendation 21. Prioritise using Australian non‐government organisations and businesses to deliver Australian Government‐funded aid. 

• Recommendation 22. Provide longterm certainty to Ukrainians already in Australia on temporary visas who wish to stay in Australia or are unable to safely return to Ukraine due to the ongoing war.

Australian Bushmaster in Ukraine. Image: The West Australian

Conclusion

Overall, the report was a positive outcome and reflects a broader understanding among Australian institutions and the public that Australia cannot step aside from its obligations to assist a fellow democracy, regardless of its geography. This is reinforced by the 2024 Lowy Poll which found that:

Australian public support for assisting Ukraine remains high. The vast majority of Australians (86%) continue to support ‘keeping strict sanctions on Russia’, steady from 2023. Eight in ten (80%) support ‘admitting Ukrainian refugees into Australia’, down four points from last year. Three-quarters (74%) support ‘providing military aid to Ukraine’, steady on last year.

It is now up to the Australian government to respond to the report. To their credit, they have already acted on one recommendation (number 22). Just after the Senate report was released, the Australian government announced that it was providing more certainty to Ukrainians displaced by the war, and a pathway to Australian citizenship. You can read more about this announcement here.  

I hope that the Australian government will act on the other 21 recommendations.

I will conclude with quoting a section from my submission to the inquiry, where I wrote that:

Over the past 27 months, the sacrifices of Ukrainian soldiers and citizens have been buying time for Western democracies to rediscover the significance of democracy and the importance of defending it. This has also provided Australia with time to reconsider its national security and defence production strategies. Ukraine has provided us with the lessons to correct a generation’s worth of bad strategic assumptions, and military planning, related to the threat posed by Russia, China, and other authoritarians.

The least Australia can do now is to enhance its support in what will be a very difficult and deadly year for the Ukrainian people. To do that, Australia requires a whole of government strategy for its support to Ukraine with a dedicated appointee to lead it. In confronting the challenge of connected, predatory authoritarians in the global security environment, it is in Australia’s national interest to increase the amount of aid provided to Ukraine, broaden the kinds of assistance provided, and clearly explain the rationale of our nation’s support for Ukraine to the Australian people.

You can read the full report from the Senate Inquiry into Australia’s support for Ukraine here.