Israel’s Multiple Advances into Gaza
An Operational Plan Comes into Focus
Today, cities envelop the armed forces. Armies are simply not big enough to surround whole cities. Battles for cities now take place inside cities themselves, as contracted forces converge on decisive points. Because forces have shrunk, the urban battle has coalesced into a series of localized micro-sieges in which combatants struggle over buildings, streets and districts.
Anthony King, Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century.
Over the past 48 hours or so, the IDF’s plan for Gaza – or at least this phase of the plan – has become clearer.
The plan developed by the IDF, and now being executed, appears to be to isolate Gaza City and northern Gaza in the initial phase of the advance. This isolation is a component of a wider strategy, which Charles Knight and Katja Theodorakis have described as “SLICE-ing (strategize, locate, isolate, constrict and eliminate).”
As the most recent maps from War Mapper demonstrate, the Israeli’s are conducting an advance into Gaza on three separate axes:
Axis of Advance 1 is the advance south parallel to the coast from the north of Gaza.
Axis of Advance 2 is the advance into north-eastern Gaza towards Beit Hanouh.
Axis of Advance 3 is the advance into eastern Gaza, south of Gaza city, in the direction of the coast.
To provide a sense of scale, the distance from Gaza’s northern border on Axis of Advance 1 to its meeting point with the Israeli troops on Axis of Advance 3 is approximately 18 kilometres. This might not seem far, but it is almost entirely built-up urban areas. It will neither be a fast nor an easy distance to advance across.
The Axis of Advance 3 distance is much shorter – around 7.5 kilometres, and its largely through much less densely developed areas. This can be seen from the map, which shows the Israeli’s have almost completed this thrust to the coastline.
The Southern Cordon
The southern operation is an essential part of this phase of the Israeli mission to destroy Hamas. Isolating portions of urban areas, while conducting operations in the urban environment, is a key principle for these kinds of operations. As the U.S. joint doctrine on this subject notes:
Selectively isolate key portions of the urban environment. Control the influx into the urban environment of people, materiel, and information that could help support the adversary.
While the advance to the coast may proceed rapidly, this operation only gets harder from hereon. The Israelis will need to establish southern and northern facing cordons. The southern facing troops will have to prevent Hamas fighters moving north to assist those in northern Gaza, while allowing emergency humanitarian supplies in.
At the same time, the northern facing cordon will need to facilitate the flow south of civilian refugees while seeking to stop Hamas fighters escaping in the same direction. Not only will it be a significant task to identify Hamas fighters likely to be using refugees as cover to escape, but the Israelis will also need to be prepared for Hamas attacks on check points designed to kill large numbers of IDF personnel and civilians.
This cordon, in essence, provides for a siege of northern Gaza while Israeli forces fight their way through the city. This is a topic that has recently been examined by Amos Fox in an excellent article in War on the Rocks. He notes that:
Sieges, however, are neither an anomaly of contemporary armed conflict, nor something that is the result of bad tactics or attritionalist ways of warfare. A survey of armed conflict finds that 60 sieges of various sizes and duration have accompanied conflict since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, all 60 of those sieges occurred in urban areas. Given that arc…it is not a stretch to assume that sieges will maintain a central position within the looming conflict.
While a different mission from that taking place in the north of Gaza, this southern cordon mission will not be an easy one. And it will play a crucial role in the operations further to the north, as well as the Israeli operations to follow.
The Northern Axes of Advance
While setting this southern cordon, and establishing a siege of northern Gaza, the IDF will also be seeking to find Hamas infrastructure in northern Gaza and to intercept Hamas fighters heading south. This will involve crewed and uncrewed aircraft as well as electronic recon, and HUMINT. It will also involve ground operations on, above and below ground level.
This advance and clearance of northern Gaza will take some time - possibly weeks or months. In this time, Israel will need to balance the military effectiveness of its operations to destroy Hamas (and any other hostiles), avoiding civilian casualties while also keeping an eye on the inevitable strategic clock (the patience of allies) that is ticking.
In the 2021 Israel-Gaza crisis, after nine days of war, President Biden apparently informed the Israeli Prime Minister that: “Hey, man, we are out of runway here.” After Netanyahu insisted on continuing the war, Biden then informed him, “It’s over.” A ceasefire followed two days later. As I have written in previous articles, Israel may have ‘more runway’ now because of the horrendous attacks it suffered on 7 October, but that runway is not infinite. It will need to achieve its military objectives and set the foundations for longer term political goals before the strategic clock runs out.
At this point, it is useful to consider what might be Israel’s operational measures of success for its northern Gaza operation. I would note, these are measures of success focussed on the Gaza military operation. There should also be more strategic measures of success, such as those focussed on diplomatic and informational objectives.
First, Israel will want to destroy as much of the Hamas leadership as possible. This is a key part of degrading the overall organisation, noting that the full destruction of Hamas (and the ideas it stands for) is probably impossible. But in killing Hamas leaders, Israel slows down its regeneration and punishes those responsible for 7 October.
Second, Israel will want to destroy Hamas stocks of munitions and other materiel. Israel has estimated that Hamas has used about 50% of its missile and rocket stocks since 7 October. As such, there are still thousands of rockets being hidden around Gaza, which the Israelis will want to find and destroy. Finding these stockpiles will reduce the chances of rocket attacks on Israel (at least from Gaza) and will also provide useful material for Israel’s strategic influence campaigns.
Third, Israel will want to find and destroy Hamas supporting infrastructure. This includes the tunnel network but also includes safe houses, bunkers and other facilities used to support Hamas command and control, operations, production and dissemination of propaganda, fund raising and logistics.
Fourth, Israel will seek to minimise civilian casualties. Despite the information campaign from Hamas and others about Israel deliberately targeting civilians, the Israelis do have multiple processes for warning civilians about impending military strikes. This new piece, published by the Liber Institute at West Point, explores this issue in some detail. It is also worth noting – as Economist Defence Editor Shashank Joshi has pointed out – “warnings are just one part of the picture. Warning or not, an attack still has to be lawful in other respects.”
Fifth, given reports of talks about an international force for Gaza, a final measure of success might be activities to set the conditions for the entry and establishment of an international peacekeeping force once Israel has destroyed Hamas. As US Secretary of State has told a Senate Appropriations Committee:
We can’t have a reversion to the status quo with Hamas running Gaza. We also can’t have — and the Israelis start with this proposition themselves — Israel running or controlling Gaza.
Concurrent Operations
The current operational plan that the Israelis appear to be executing has another benefit. While most attention at the moment is being paid to Israel’s preparations for a likely assault into Gaza, this is not be the only security challenge that will be concerning Israeli leaders. As large and as capable as the IDF is, Israel will want to avoid fighting on a second or third front if it is decisively engaged in Gaza combat operations.
But, if Hezbollah and its supporters in Iran see an opportunity to open a second front against Israel, they might do so. Israel’s political and military leaders will be ensuring that they have sufficient forces in northern Israel to deter such an attack.
And the West Bank is hardly a quiet and calm area. There has been a recent surge in violence on the West Bank, from protests and settler violence. A range of other actors, including the Syrians and Iranians, also pose a threat to Israel.
Therefore, by focussing on just part of Gaza, Israel has kept a large proportion of its mobilised troops in reserve. It could use this reserve to reinforce Gaza operations or for contingencies in northern Israel or the West Bank.
What is the Next Phase?
At some point in the future, Israel will compete its operations in northern Gaza. After completing the northern Gaza operation, the IDF has options to withdraw, handover over to an international force, or continue south.
But the government of Israel also appreciates that despite its desire to destroy Hamas in all of Gaza, its allies only have limited strategic endurance for supporting this. Therefore, Israel has probably prioritized northern Gaza in case that only has time to clear part of Gaza. It will reassess its way forward once it looks like this operation is close to conclusion.
Regardless of whether there are other phases after this Battle for Gaza City, the coming days and weeks are likely to see a lot of tough, bloody fighting ahead on the ground - and under the ground. We will also continue to see a bitter information war that rages around the world, as well as multiple diplomatic initiatives, such as the one to potentially insert a peacekeeping force post-hostilities.
For now, Israel appears to be pushing ahead with its declared intent to destroy Hamas.
Mick, I have only recently become a subscriber though I’ve followed you for years. A friend who is a former brigadier-general in the British Army and former defence attaché to Israel told me that the IDF is over-rated, that it’s sold the myth of its excellence and it is nowhere near as good as a NATO army. With such a high proportion of citizen soldiers and conscripts, let’s hope this doesn’t become a three-front war for the IDF. Do you think the IDF could render the tunnels uninhabitable long term for Hamas without going down into them, by say, filling them with tear gas? Sure, Hamas could acquire gas masks but they would quickly become unbearable
I simply don't see what the IDF is trying to accomplish here. It simply doesn't seem likely has actual good intelligence on Hamas tunnel systems. Not given Hamas ability to evade detection of the movement of their troops, and Hamas ability to communicate without detection. It seems obvious that Hamas is using their tunnel system as their main logistical, movement and communication arteries. It just isn't clear to me that Shin Bet has clear enough intelligence to justify focus all their efforts on Gaza City.
It also seems like it hasn't occurred to anyone that Hamas, knowing that their radio communications are going to be intercepted, has probably learned how to fool Israeli SIGINT with spurious messaging.
Cutting Gaza City off from the rest of the Strip makes sense. A main drive into the center of Gaza City seems like the most wasteful way to go about things. I cannot fathom what they're trying to do with the thrust from the northeast. Given the noises that have been emitted from the Israeli defense ministries over the last weeks, it seems highly likely that they are concieving of this as a hardcore 'mowing the grass operation'. Given the track record this seems almost certain to fail at achieving any long term goals. Hamas expects this kind of operation, after all.
The whole thing seems like an ill-concieved revenge raid which probably will result in the deaths of large numbers of civilians without coming anywhere close to destroying Hamas.
elm
then there's the hostages