You have missed option #4 in that OMG-K is in fact OMG-B (Belgorod) with the objective of swinging to the south and behind the city of Belgorod. This would be the bold effort to collapse a key Russian logistics node and seize a very valuable bargaining chip. Obviously this is a maneuver not without risk.
As a possibility, instead of the improbable drive on Moscow or Kursk consider a drive sideways, loosely north and south, coupled with stabs linking the drive in the Russian rear up with the Ukraine frontier. The objective is to pocket whatever the Russians have holding each segment of border. Each time a kessel collapses, forces that had been holding the Ukraine Frontier can replace assault forces inside Russia. As a stretch goal, pocket the Vovchansk forces.
Great article General Ryan. Your point about the western countries not facing an existential threat for multiple generations is very important. This was led to the decline of military spending and in our military industrial base being unable to cope with the demand for weapons.
Great article. I would add option 4. Push on to the Kurst nuclear power plant with enough force to destroy the electrical generating and distribution network. Kurst supplies close to 50% of iron production in Russia along with large other industries that support the war effort. Its destruction could not only cripple Russia’s war production it could also cut electricity to several million Russians. What impact could that have on Putin’s popularity and the overall economy? Withdrawal back to the border then makes sense as does the use of the significant resources expended in this effort. Withdrawal before that does not.
As usual very informed analysis of OMG-K's performance and options into the near future. I noticed that this was written at breakneck speed (akin to that of the probing units ahead of the FLOT) with the attending unavoidable typos. But hey, this is really training a bright light on the tactical situation at the tip of the Ukrainian military spear. Thank you very much for your valuable contribution to help us understand a little better what is happening.
Somehow I find it reassuring that every time Ukraine carries out an operation on its own terms, it always seems to succeed. No one to telegraph to the Russians that an offensive is about to occur, no buildup for all to see ie the failed assault of 2023. Perhaps the Ukrainians have their own reasons for Kursk incursion, who knows, but it is their decision, not the armchair experts who readily offer their opinions, but have no skin in the game.
You have missed option #4 in that OMG-K is in fact OMG-B (Belgorod) with the objective of swinging to the south and behind the city of Belgorod. This would be the bold effort to collapse a key Russian logistics node and seize a very valuable bargaining chip. Obviously this is a maneuver not without risk.
As a possibility, instead of the improbable drive on Moscow or Kursk consider a drive sideways, loosely north and south, coupled with stabs linking the drive in the Russian rear up with the Ukraine frontier. The objective is to pocket whatever the Russians have holding each segment of border. Each time a kessel collapses, forces that had been holding the Ukraine Frontier can replace assault forces inside Russia. As a stretch goal, pocket the Vovchansk forces.
To that I could add: each time you form a kessel, the east-west link shortens your supply lines into Ukraine.
Great article General Ryan. Your point about the western countries not facing an existential threat for multiple generations is very important. This was led to the decline of military spending and in our military industrial base being unable to cope with the demand for weapons.
Great article. I would add option 4. Push on to the Kurst nuclear power plant with enough force to destroy the electrical generating and distribution network. Kurst supplies close to 50% of iron production in Russia along with large other industries that support the war effort. Its destruction could not only cripple Russia’s war production it could also cut electricity to several million Russians. What impact could that have on Putin’s popularity and the overall economy? Withdrawal back to the border then makes sense as does the use of the significant resources expended in this effort. Withdrawal before that does not.
As usual very informed analysis of OMG-K's performance and options into the near future. I noticed that this was written at breakneck speed (akin to that of the probing units ahead of the FLOT) with the attending unavoidable typos. But hey, this is really training a bright light on the tactical situation at the tip of the Ukrainian military spear. Thank you very much for your valuable contribution to help us understand a little better what is happening.
Somehow I find it reassuring that every time Ukraine carries out an operation on its own terms, it always seems to succeed. No one to telegraph to the Russians that an offensive is about to occur, no buildup for all to see ie the failed assault of 2023. Perhaps the Ukrainians have their own reasons for Kursk incursion, who knows, but it is their decision, not the armchair experts who readily offer their opinions, but have no skin in the game.
I wonder if option 1 is based on a timeline aligned to the US election?