In addition to the very valid points made in the article, the Ukrainian strikes on the two airbases could subtlety degrade Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure by providing a compelling disincentive for Russian base commanders and other decision makers to allow their bases to be used as primary launch points for further missile strikes into Ukraine. As well trained military bureaucrats, they may be loathe to expose their bases/equipment/personnel to Ukrainian retribution. My understanding is that the Russian system is asymmetrically inclined to punish failures over rewarding successes, and I doubt that any Russian senior military officer has failed to learn that lesson well. While they are unlikely to directly or obviously disobey orders, they may well be inclined to find ways to avoid highlighting their facilities for Ukrainian retribution and open themselves up for criticism from above for damage inflicted by Ukrainian counterstrikes. For example, operationally available launch aircraft counts may decline significantly in the near term. Similarly, the Ukrainian strikes may provide a further disincentive for Belarus to play too obvious a role in attacking Ukrainian infrastructure, much less more active support for the Russian military adventure going forward.
Why now? These drones have been available to Ukraine for a long time. Why not launch these months ago? Why not target a ship in port with one of these?
I have a hard time believing Russian air defense could be so lax they would permit 2 1970s era drones to pass 700km through Russian air space undetected to strike a Russian air base. I mean, these drones aren't tiny (14m x 4m) and I doubt they were designed to minimize radar cross-section. Surely these must appear on Russian radar?
I'm curious if Russians re-deployed (or back-filled destroyed air defense assets) from areas which have now proven vulnerable en route to the aforementioned strategic bomber fleet's airfields from Ukraine?
Mick, always insightful and well reasoned! What it shows is that the “vaunted” air defense capabilities were the same as the the “vaunted armor and artillery advantage”. Great on paper, but not worth the paper counting it up.
It has all the hallmarks of the Doolittle Raid in Tokyo. Send a message by bringing the war to the doorstep of the enemy, no place is safe, and oh, we do have the capability. But the strikes on the RU bases are more effective militarily. If only 1-2 bombers were damaged, how will RU fix that? How long out of service? It really reduces the available platforms to launch strikes.
The other asymmetric advantage UKR can claim is “we launched 1, and did the damage of RU launching 70, of which 60 were shot down” in the last attack.
Thank you for sharing your continuing insights into this bloody awful war. That Ukraine has hopefully developed a long distance strike capability is a relief, but I wonder if it needs discussed in relation to the Wall Street Journal report that HIMARS were altered to prevent them firing long-range missiles; Ukraine attacking military airfields in Russia is something the US did not want them to do or at least not with US weaponry.
In addition to the very valid points made in the article, the Ukrainian strikes on the two airbases could subtlety degrade Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure by providing a compelling disincentive for Russian base commanders and other decision makers to allow their bases to be used as primary launch points for further missile strikes into Ukraine. As well trained military bureaucrats, they may be loathe to expose their bases/equipment/personnel to Ukrainian retribution. My understanding is that the Russian system is asymmetrically inclined to punish failures over rewarding successes, and I doubt that any Russian senior military officer has failed to learn that lesson well. While they are unlikely to directly or obviously disobey orders, they may well be inclined to find ways to avoid highlighting their facilities for Ukrainian retribution and open themselves up for criticism from above for damage inflicted by Ukrainian counterstrikes. For example, operationally available launch aircraft counts may decline significantly in the near term. Similarly, the Ukrainian strikes may provide a further disincentive for Belarus to play too obvious a role in attacking Ukrainian infrastructure, much less more active support for the Russian military adventure going forward.
Wrong or right, I’d plant one the Kremlin's doorstep. Or better yet a Moscow power station.
Putin driving a mercedes on the bridge in Crimea the other day.
Where's a converted TU-141 when you need one?
Why now? These drones have been available to Ukraine for a long time. Why not launch these months ago? Why not target a ship in port with one of these?
I have a hard time believing Russian air defense could be so lax they would permit 2 1970s era drones to pass 700km through Russian air space undetected to strike a Russian air base. I mean, these drones aren't tiny (14m x 4m) and I doubt they were designed to minimize radar cross-section. Surely these must appear on Russian radar?
I'm curious if Russians re-deployed (or back-filled destroyed air defense assets) from areas which have now proven vulnerable en route to the aforementioned strategic bomber fleet's airfields from Ukraine?
Mick, always insightful and well reasoned! What it shows is that the “vaunted” air defense capabilities were the same as the the “vaunted armor and artillery advantage”. Great on paper, but not worth the paper counting it up.
It has all the hallmarks of the Doolittle Raid in Tokyo. Send a message by bringing the war to the doorstep of the enemy, no place is safe, and oh, we do have the capability. But the strikes on the RU bases are more effective militarily. If only 1-2 bombers were damaged, how will RU fix that? How long out of service? It really reduces the available platforms to launch strikes.
The other asymmetric advantage UKR can claim is “we launched 1, and did the damage of RU launching 70, of which 60 were shot down” in the last attack.
> where was the vaunted Russian air defense network that worried planners throughout the Cold War?
https://youtu.be/a5tzmMGSEIA
Yo General Mick ! I've just subscribe to your amazing SubStack ... I'd invite you to subscribe to mine!
Andelman Unleashed .... https://daandelman.substack.com/
Delighted to cross-promote ... and I do love quoting you in my CNN & NBC columns!!
best,
d.
Thank you for sharing your continuing insights into this bloody awful war. That Ukraine has hopefully developed a long distance strike capability is a relief, but I wonder if it needs discussed in relation to the Wall Street Journal report that HIMARS were altered to prevent them firing long-range missiles; Ukraine attacking military airfields in Russia is something the US did not want them to do or at least not with US weaponry.