Strike Complexes and the Operational Art

Observations from my latest Ukraine visit, Part 4

Image: Radio Free Europe

During my recent visit to Ukraine, I had the opportunity to speak with a variety of government and military officials, as well as experts in various think tanks. These conversations provided many new insights which built upon knowledge I have gained in my previous trips to Ukraine.

This article is the fourth in a series of short pieces that provide my thoughts in the wake of my most recent Ukraine visit. The first part in this series explored war strategy. The second part examined strategic communications and influence. In part three of this series, I wrote about the people issues which are having an impact on the war.

In this fourth article in the series, I explore operational command and control and the issue of strike operations. I also look at how Russia has now developed the ability to conduct a large and sophisticated air, missile and drone offensive campaign.

Tactical v Operational Thinking and Action

One of the issues that was apparent in the conduct of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in 2023 was its inability to scale tactical operations to undertake integrated multi-brigade activities. While the counteroffensive employed many brigades, these were rarely employed concurrently in a way that placed the Russians in tactical or operational dilemmas.

Essentially, Ukraine was not able to undertake the application of multiple Brigade-level combat power concurrently. This, combined with the deep defensive belts, means that the Russians were rarely placed under significant pressure and that the Ukrainians did not generate uncertainty for the Russians by the conduct of multiple operations at the same time in different locations.