The Big Five - 11 January edition
My regular update on conflict and confrontation in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific, accompanied by recommended readings on modern war and future conflict.
This week, I cover the normal range of conflicts, starting with Ukraine, then across the world to the Pacific Theatre. The Ukraine update is lengthy given the events of this week. As always, I will finish with my five recommended reads on war and national security issues from the past week.
In my weekly commentary, just published here, I explore these issues and conduct a special deep dive into the application of AI for friendly military adaptation and interfering with enemy learning and adaptation.
Ukraine
Strategy for 2025. At the Ramstein meeting of countries supporting Ukraine this week, Ukrainian defence minister Rustem Umerov presented Ukraine’s military strategic priorities for the coming year. These priorities are:
Stabilizing the front line
Enhancing Ukraine’s defense capabilities
Strengthening air and maritime security
Asymmetric responses to counter Russia’s numerical advantage.
Umerov also described how the meeting endorsed eight priority capability development areas where Ukraine would collaborate with its supporters and which would assist on it becoming more aligned with NATO doctrine and equipment. U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin also covered the endorsement of these roadmaps in his press conference at the conclusion of the Ramstein meeting. The eight areas, each with its own roadmap document, are:
Aviation.
Air defense.
Naval capabilities.
Artillery.
Armored vehicles.
IT and cybersecurity.
Drone warfare.
Mine clearance.
On social media, Minister Umerov noted that “these documents, jointly developed and agreed upon by Ukraine and its partners, will serve as a foundation for sustaining support and allocating aid across areas such as air defense, artillery, armored vehicles, drones, air force, maritime security, and other critical sectors.”
Support to Ukraine. The final Ukraine Contact Group or Ramstein meeting, which was established by defence officials of the Biden administration, was held in Germany this week.
At Ramstein, Ukraine's supporters announced additional military aid packages. The U.S. announced another military aid package under the Presidential Drawdown Authority valued at approximately $500 million. Germany that they will provide Ukraine with additional IRIS-T air defense missiles. The UK and Latvia jointly announced that the drone coalition, including the UK, Latvia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, will provide Ukraine with 30,000 drones over the next year. Poland announced that it is preparing a new aid package for Ukraine. Canada announced a C$440 million support package for Ukraine as well.
One of the interesting topics at Ramstein was an update from national armaments directors on the progress of expanding defence production since 2022. This group, representing more than 40 nations from NATO and the EU, is focussed on speeding up capability deliveries to Ukraine through improved synchronisation of international procurement, production, and sustainment efforts. Some key achievement since 2022 include:
U.S. 178% increase in 155mm projectile production, a 40% increase in GMLRS rounds production and a 60% increase in production of the HIMARS platform.
European defense industry is expected to increase annual ammunition shell production capacity to 2 million by the end of 2025.
France and Sweden. To double capacity of ammunition and explosives loading by 2025, double capacity of modular charges by 2026, and increase powder production capacity ten-fold by 2026.
Norway. Will invest to significantly expand artillery production for at least 15 years.
Ukraine. From 2023 to 2024, increased its total domestic production of mortar and artillery ammunition from 1 million rounds to 2.5 million rounds annually (150% increase).
A fact sheet with more details on this is available here.
A final subject at the meeting was the impending inaugruation of Donald Trump and the whether the Ukraine Contact Group meetings in Ramstein would continue under Trump's leadership. As German defence minister Pistorius asserted after the meeting, "it will need to continue in another form.”
Negotiating Peace. President Zelensky, speaking in a television interview during his visit to Italy, has said it is Ukraine's "dream" to end the war in 2025, as the country seeks to obtain security guarantees that would "prevent Russia from returning with aggression.”
Earlier this week, speaking in the wake of yet another Russian atrocity, where 13 civilians were killed in a Russian strike, Zelenskyy described how:
We must not waste a single day – we must put pressure on Moscow, we must force Russia into peace, we must continue doing everything necessary to protect lives and stop deaths. And at the same time, it is crucial to maintain the unity of all our partners, America and Europe, all our partners around the world who are helping us.
This week, incoming Trump administration special coordinator for Ukraine and Russia, retired General Keith Kellogg, delayed his trip to Ukraine and spoke about his hopes for a quick resolution to the hostilities. In one interview, Kellogg described how he would like to see a negotiated settlement occur within 100 days of the inauguration of Donald Trump this month. You can watch the interview at this link.
Setting these kinds of aiming points, while perhaps popular with a segment of the American electorate, is pointless. Putin, who has rejected any American proposal for peace out of hand so far, is likely to ensure that no matter what, the 100 day objective fails. He has no compelling reason to come to the table right now, thinking he has the momentum in this war and that the West has done nothing to prevent him from attacking Ukraine so far. Putin also knows he can drag out talks about even having negotiations in the hope that the Americans will cave into more of his demands just so they can meet their ‘100 day’ objective.
The ‘100 day’ objective is likely to prove as counter-productive as President Biden’s constant whining about wanting to prevent World War Three. Both provide excellent source material for Russian misinformation and strategic influence operations, and neither are likely to get us any closer to a just and enduring peace for the people of Ukraine.
For those who are interested in some of the background theory related to victory, and enduring peace, I strongly recommend a 2013 piece written by Beatrice Heuser and published in the Joint Forces Quarterly publication. Called “Victory, Peace and Justice: The Neglected Trinity”, Heuser explores the dimensions of enduring and just peace, both of which will be important in the eventual peace that is negotiated for the Ukraine War. Heuser writes that:
To conclude a war, peace must be sought by all the belligerents, and, at the very least, this means that the mind of a bellicose adversary must be changed through some means—whether by violence or persuasion, even if the latter does not amount to imposing one’s will upon the enemy fully. To change an enemy’s mind, one may need to deprive him of the hope that he might achieve his own aims more easily, faster, at less cost by using violence.
You can read the full article at this link.
Late this week, the White House issued a statement that it did not believe Ukraine or Russia were ready yet for negotiations. You can read more on that here.
Finally, in the latest development, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has stated that Putin is willing to meet with President Trump after his inauguration. Willing to meet, and willing to make concessions in negotiations, are two very different things however. As Serhii Kuzan has written this week for The Atlantic Council:
On numerous other occasions, Putin and his Kremlin colleagues have reaffirmed their conditions. These include Ukraine officially giving up its pursuit of NATO membership and agreeing not to enter into any military alliances with Western powers. Kyiv is also expected to accept extensive limitations on the size of its armed forces and on the kinds of weapons systems it is allowed to possess. These proposals are not a recipe for a sustainable settlement.
Ukrainian and Russian Strike Campaigns. Both Ukraine and Russia continued their strategic strike programs this week. Ukraine hit an oil storage facility near the Engels airbase. This base, which supports the Russian long-range bombers that launch missiles against Russia, has previously been attacked. Now, the Ukrainians are going after the fuel supplies for these aircraft. It makes a lot of sense. Why try to attack a well-defended base when destroying a poorly defended oil storage facility can ground the aircraft?
It also appears that Ukraine has conducted another series of attacks on targets in Russia on the evening of 10 January. More on that should be available in the next 24 hours. Ukraine also appears to have struck a Russian military supply depot in Rostov using drones and Neptune missiles.
Ukraine in the past week has used drones, piggy-backed off uncrewed naval vessels in the Black Sea, to strike Russian air defence sites in occupied Kherson. This is the third instance of integrating different drones for strike missions over the past month. It will be an interesting trend to watch in 2025.
Russia also continued its strike operations against Ukraine this week. The most deadly was a glide bomb attack against Zaporizhzhia which saw 13 people killed. The Ukrainian Air Force has been shooting down large numbers of drones, as shown in the images below.
This week Ukraine claimed that one of its F-16 fighters shot down six Russian cruise missiles in a single combat sortie. The engagments apparently occured on December 13, 2024. The pilot employed four air-to-air missiles and the fighter’s cannon to accomplish tthe shoot downs.
Battlefield Updates. This week, War Mapper published his latest update on the changes in territorial control during the war in Ukraine. The update, which includes all of the 2024 calendar year broken down by month, shows that Russia managed to seize just over 400 square kilometres in December, the lowest monthly amount since August last year.
This decrease is likely to be the result of the combination of weather conditions, the large numbers of casualties suffered in previous months, and the ongoing willingness of the Ukrainians to trade a bit of ground for a lot of Russian casualties (see the update from British Ministry of Defence below).
In Kursk, it appears that the Ukrainian attacks in Kursk last weekend were opportunistic and small scale in nature, and not the beginning of a larger offensive. While there were some small gains for the Ukrainians, the Russians have been able to prevent any significant break out or exploitation by Ukrainian forces in their Kursk salient. Indeed, it appears that Russians may have actually gained ground in Kursk over the past week.
Elsewhere on the ground, the situaiton is quite bleak for the Ukrainians. While there is no evidence for a Russian breakthrough anywhere in eastern and southern Ukraine, they have been able to advance and seize small amounts of territory on multiple axes of advance.
Russian forces have advanced on the Kupyansk axis and in Chasiv War. A similar situation exists around Toretsk, where Russian forces have also advanced, and southwest of Pokrovsk. The Russians have also been able to advance elsewhere in eastern and southern Ukraine.
Both sides are wounded but willing to continue fighting. While the correlation of forces with respect to tactical fires, drones, and long-range strike appears to not be favouring either side to a significant extent, manpower remains the key differentiator between Russia and Ukraine.
The Pacific
It has been a busy week for news from the Pacific Theatre. First, we saw the ‘anchor dragging’ operating by a Chinese vessel to cut an underwater communications cable off the northeastern coast of Taiwan. You can read a more detailed report on this issue here. Related to this, Newsweek has covered the discovery of Chinese technology patents related to the severing of underwater communications cables. In the report, a "dragging type submarine cable cutting device" is described as having been developed in 2020 by a team of engineers at Lishui University in Zhejiang province, which just happens to be located opposite Taiwan.
Late this week, it was revealted that China is constructing several large vessels which could act as transport vessels and floating piers capable of offloading large numbers of armoured vehicles as well as heavy logistic vehicles, across beaches in Taiwan that may not have previously been considered locations for Chinese amphibious assaults. In a post by AllSource Analysis on 11 January, at least two of these vessels were shown in a Chinese shipyard (image below).
As China expert Tom Shugart has written, “if you wanted to be ready to have the option to invade Taiwan in 2027 per Xi’s direction, this is the sort of thing that you’d do.” H.I. Sutton has written an excellent article on this subject for Naval News, where he describes how “China is building at least five new special purpose barges which appear tailor made for amphibious assault. The barges may provide…a unique way to offload large numbers of tanks directly onto Taiwanese roads.”
Multiple Chinese warships have tracked the Canadian warship HMCS Ottawa this week as it conducts a transit through the South China Sea. HMCS Ottawa has passed near the Scarborough Shoal, which is within the Philippines exclusive economic zone, but currently occupied by China.
Recently, the respected National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan released its annual report on China. These are excellent reports, and provide a useful complement to the reports produced by American think tanks and the Pentagon. The report notes that “China justifies its unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in East Asia as defending its core interests, and is escalating its actions backed by military force. The Global South’s growing support for China’s rhetoric and actions could further encourage China’s attempts to change the status quo and destabilize the regional situation.” You can read the report at the link in my recommended readings below.
Finally, naval analyst Alex Luck has recently published a two-part review of the PLA Navy developments in 2024. You can read the two parts of his excellent analysis here and here.
*****
This week, I examined the Kursk operation by the Ukrainians, and whether this was just a small attack to take advantage of an emerging opportunity, or something else. Even as a small-scale battle, it gained the attention of media around the world. You can read the article at this link.
Also this week, my book The War for Ukraine, featured in a book review for the U.S. Naval Insitutute’s publication, Proceedings. The review by Commander Ryan Hilger, from the U.S. Navy, includes the following comments:
Ryan’s accessible style and lucid explanations make this book suitable for a wide audience, from junior officers to senior leaders. He brings clarity to complex military concepts and uses illustrative examples from the battlefield, making it easy for readers to grasp the nuances of adaptation in combat. The book is well-researched and backed by extensive sources, including firsthand accounts and after-action reports, lending credibility to his observations and arguments.
The War for Ukraine is a significant addition to contemporary military literature, and its insights are relevant for military leaders seeking to prepare their forces for the demands of modern warfare. Ryan’s thorough analysis of doctrinal adaptation under the pressures of real conflict makes this book a vital resource for all military professionals.
Thank you Commander Hilger and Proceedings!
*****
So, to the recommended readings…
This week, there is a interesting piece from the U.S. Army’s War Room that explores technological literacy for military officers and how military education programs should be reformed to improve their performance in delivery this important contemporary knowledge. I have included an excellent report from the American Enterprise Institute about the costs of the Ukraine War for America, and the costs of America not supporting Ukraine in the future.
There is a report on lessons about drones in Ukraine as well as a recent report from the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) on China. Finally, I have included an article on what the incoming Trump administration might learn from the Reagan years.
As always, if you only have time to read one article, the first one is my pick of the week.
Happy reading!
1. Tech Literacy for Modern Military Leaders
One of the challenges in contemporary military training and education is ensuring that military personnel are kept up to date with the latest technologies. Indeed, technological literacy is vital at all levels, from the battlefield all the way up to those developming defence policies for the rapidly changing 21st century security and technology environment. In this article, the author proposes solutions to how modern military institutions can evolve their professional military education systems to address this challenge. You can read the article here.
2. NIDS China Security Report 2025
The annual report on China published by NIDS is a must read for those interested in tracking Chinese national security policy and defence issues. As I noted above, these reports are a good complement to the reports produced by American think tanks and the Pentagon. This year, there is a particular focus on Chinese efforts to build relationships with nations in the Global South, but it also covers relations with Africa and South Asia as well. You can read the report here.
3. The Cost to America of Ukraine
This week, the American Enterprise Institute released a new report on Ukraine in which the authors conduct an examination of the cost of a world in which America stops providing aid and Russia defeats Ukraine. As the authors find that the cost of Ukraine failing would be much larger for America than providing ongoing support. You can read the full report at this link.
4. Lessons About Drones in Ukraine
In this report, author Ulrike Franke proposes four key lessons that can be taken from the operations of drones during the war in Ukraine. As she notes, “any lessons taken from a war that is still ongoing should be considered with care. But it can reveal vulnerabilities and larger changes in warfare tactics.” I agree. Ulrike’s article is a short but very worthwhile read, and is available at this link.
5. Winning the New Cold War
This article by Niall Ferguson published by Foreign Affairs during the week examines how the incoming Trump administration might be able to learn from the Reagan administration’s policies during the Cold War. He notes that “in 1980, many would have scoffed at any prediction that Reagan would end the Cold War—that he really would deliver peace through strength. Today, the argument that Trump might pull off a similar feat will strike many as absurd. But historical wisdom consists partly of remembering how unlikely epochal events seemed, even just a few years before they happened.” The full article is available at this link.