The Big Five - 11 May edition
My regular update on global conflict. This week: Xi and Putin's are 'Friends of Steel', the back and forth of Ukraine peace negotiations, Russia's declining returns on its massive casualties.
Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five.
In this week’s edition of The Big Five, I cover the back and forth on peace negotiations including the Ukraine-European-US demand that Russia agree to a 30-day ceasefire, Putin’s offer of direct Ukraine-Russia talks in Istabul in the coming week, and the latest in Russia’s offensive operations in northeastern and eastern Ukraine.
In my examination of strategic competition and confrontation in the Pacific, I explore Taiwan’s political and security challenges, Xi and Putin’s joint declaration and a new U.S. Army publication that explores how China might fight in a large-scale conventional war.
Also this week, it was wonderful to celebrate the 205 Ukrainian soldiers who were returned home from their brutal experience in Russian captivity (see image above).
As always, I conclude with my top five war and national security reads from the week.
Ukraine
The Peace Process. While I would not exactly describe the events of the week as progress, there was quite a bit going on related to achieving a meaningful ceasefire as the prelude to achieving a longer lasting peace.
Most recently, Russia’s president invited Ukraine to engage in direct talks in Istanbul beginning on 15 May. Speaking at a press confence at the end of his Victory Day celebrations, Putin stated that "Russia is ready for negotiations without any preconditions." This would be the first direct talks between Ukraine and Russia since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
During the same conference, Putin declined to extend his unilateral truce that was put in place to cover his Victory Day celebrations. He also rejected (at this stage) Ukraine’s offer of a 30-day ceasefire.
Earlier in the week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had stated that Putin's Victory Day ceasefire proposal marked "the start of direct negotiations."
Also this week, leaders of four European nations visited Ukraine and held meetings with President Zelenskyy. At the conclusion of Zelenskyy’s meeting with Polish, British, French and German leaders, a joint statement was issued. Key points from the statement (available in full here) were as follows:
Starting Monday, May 12, there should be a full and unconditional ceasefire for at least 30 days.
An unconditional ceasefire by definition cannot be subject to any conditions. If Russia calls for such conditions, this can only be considered as an effort to prolong the war and undermine diplomacy.
The ceasefire must be comprehensive – in the air, at sea, and on land.
The ceasefire should last for at least 30 days to create room for diplomacy. During this period, diplomatic work should focus on outlining the security, political and humanitarian foundations of peace.
If Russia refuses a full and unconditional ceasefire, stronger sanctions should be applied to its banking and energy sectors, targeting fossil fuels, oil and the shadow fleet.
While the peace process was an important subject for discussion between Zelenskyy and the visiting leaders from the UK, Germany, France and Poland, their visit was also an opportunity to hold a meeting for members of the Coalition of the Willing. Those participaring did so in person or online.
As Zelenskyy noted in his speech to the delegations from this coalition of nations that support Ukraine:
Today we'll focus on how to build and guarantee real and lasting security. Key points: 30-day ceasefire backed with sanctions pressure; strengthening Ukraine's air defense and increasing international defense support for Ukraine, including the investment in Ukrainian defense production; security guarantees and contingents. And of course we'll discuss our unity with the United States and backstop.
Early in the week, with reports of a growing frustration in the Trump administration about the time taken to reach a peace deal in Ukraine, and Vice President Vance recognising that “the war is not ending anytime soon”, President Trump on 8 May called for an "unconditional" 30-day ceasefire” between Russia and Ukraine. Trump expanded on his demand by adding that "if the ceasefire is not respected, the U.S. and its partners will impose further sanctions (against Russia)."
FT journalist Chris Miller posted the full statement by Trump, from his social media account, and it can be viewed at this link.
Assessment. The comments by Trump over the last couple of weeks are probably his toughest yet on Russia’s behaviour. While he has stopped short of criticising Putin, Trump and members of his administration are demonstrating an increasing willingess to take further action against Russia to coerce them to the negotiating table.
That said, Trump has not mentioned at all the potential for a request to Congress for funds to provide additional military aid to Ukraine. While his administration might believe that further sanctions are the pathway to convincing Putin to make a deal, the current negotiating strategy does not provide the military aid and the security guarantees required to prevent future Russian aggression against Ukraine once a peace deal is done.
Maybe any threats of military aid to Ukraine are being kept private?
The revelations this week about the conduct of Trump’s key negotiator in Russia, who has not used U.S. diplomats or translators in his talks with Putin and others, should give us pause about the potential for Russia sticking by whatever deal they agree to. Not only do Russia have a track record of going back on their promises, but they are negotiating with someone with no background in international diplomacy, Russian culture or language - there is huge potential for misunderstandings and subterfuge from Russia.
The Strike Campaigns. This week, a New Ukrainian Long-Range Drone, the FP-1, was unveiled. The FP-1, is a Ukrainian designed and built long-range kamikaze drone with a claimed range of up to 1,600 kilometres. It has a 120kg warhead. The drone employs a rocket booster for launch.
Ukraine has been producing new long-range strike weapons at an impressive rate. In December 2024, it unveiled the Ruta long-range cruise missile. The Ruta is reputed to have a range of between 500 and 800 kilometres. Also announced in December was the Peklo (Hell) compact cruise missile, with a range of up to 700 kilometres. In January 2025, the Unmanned Systems Force announced that it had developed a long-range drone, with a range of 2000 kilometres, that could carry a 250 kilogram weapon.
The Frontline. During the Russian three day truce, there was no significant pause in Russian combat operations or attacks against Ukrainian positions in the north-eastern, eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. On 9 May, the Centre for Defence Strategies daily update listed 193 combat engagements. On 10 May, it listed 196 combat engagements. The week before, on 2 May there were 140 combat engagements, and on 3 May there were 139.
The Russians appear to have actually stepped up the tempo of their ground combat operations during their 3-day truce. This is yet more evidence that any Russian agreements about ceasefires should be viewed very skeptically, and monitored carefully.
During the week, Ukrainian forces continued their counter attacks in eastern and north-eastern Ukraine. They made minor gains on the following axes of advance:
Toretsk.
Kursk.
Pokrovsk.
Russia meanwhile continued its offensive operations on the ground and in the air across the theatre. In particular, they made minor gains in terrain on the following axes of advance:
Kursk.
Sumy.
Kupyansk.
Lyman.
Toretsk.
Pokrovsk.
Novopavlivka.
Huliaypole.
Orikhiv
Russia’s territorial gains have remained small over the last few months. As a briefing by British military intelligence showed this week, the Russians seized about 5 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory per day in the month of April.
If we recall the casualty statistics for Russia over the same month (see graph below), this means that the Russians are suffering about 180 casualties for every square kilometre of Ukrainian territory that they illegally occupied in April 2025 and 274 casualties for every square kilometre of Ukrainian territory that they illegally occupied in March 2025.
Assessment. How long the Russian army can continue to sustain this level of casualties for such a small return remains to be seen. As of 10 May, Russian casualties since 24 February 2022 stand at just over 964,000. If current casualty trends are sustained, the Russians are likely to chalk up their millionth casualty in Ukraine sometime towards the end of May.
That is some achievement for what was claimed to be the second best army in the world in 2021. If this is the kind of ‘success’ that is celebrated at Red Square on Victory Day, I would really love to know what a Russian military disaster looks like. The reality is that no nation can sustain such losses, for such little return, indefinitely. Russia knows this, but it is hoping that it can sustain these losses for a day longer than Ukraine can.
Of course, the big unknown is the actual loss ratio between Ukraine and Russia. If Ukraine can impose an increased loss ratio on the Russians which is greater than their population ratio, it will put Ukraine on a positive trend for 2025. It will also force Putin to make some big decisions about another potential mobilisation initiaitive, particularly if his Spring and Summer offensives result in minor gains but high casualties.
Ultimately, Ukraine has to not only deny Russia the capacity to take too much territory, but it needs to continue signalling that Ukraine’s sovereignty will not be destroyed by the Russian military. It is Ukraine’s sovereignty that is Putin’s real target, not territory.
Finally, this week the Institute for the Study of War published an examination of Russia’s weaknesses and how these might be exploited by Ukraine and it partners. As the report finds:
The Kremlin relies on numerous information efforts to conceal Putin's and Russia's weaknesses. These efforts include but are not limited to grandiose military parades, demonstrative war zone visits, meetings with veterans and their families, and misrepresentation of Russia's battlefield realities. These efforts allow the Kremlin to justify its war efforts in Ukraine, legitimize its rule, and manipulate the Western perception of Russia's capabilities. The abundance and the Kremlin's prioritization of these information efforts, however, reveal that the Kremlin is plagued with military, domestic, and diplomatic weaknesses that it desperately tries to misrepresent and conceal.
You can read the full report at this link.
The Pacific
Friends to the End? During his visited to Moscow this week, the Chinese President Xi Jinping told his host, President Putin, that their two nations must be "friends of steel." The leaders promised to enhance their cooperation to a new level and that they aimed to "decisively" counter the global influence of the U.S.
The two leaders issued a joint leadership statement, which you can read in full at this link. Some highlights (if that is right word for it) are as follows:
States and their associations should not seek to ensure their own security at the expense and to the detriment of the security of other States. [Comment: Unless of course you are Ukraine or Taiwan, and therefore this China-Russia world view does not apply to you].
The two Sides note with concern that against the backdrop of aggravation in the relations between nuclear-weapon States, which in some cases has escalated to the threat of a direct military clash. [Comment: From this you would never guess that the only country in the world that has threatened to use nuclear weapons in the past few years is Russia].
One of the most pressing strategic risks to be urgently addressed remains the highly destabilizing expansion of existing and newly formed military alliances and coalitions that is being carried out by some nuclear-weapon States close to the frontiers of other nuclear-weapon States. [Comment: Of course, the increasing cooperation between China and Russia is not a security risk at all].
Among the provocative actions undertaken by some nuclear-weapon States and posing a threat to the security of other nuclear-weapon States the one that stands out is the further development of schemes and means of so-called “nuclear sharing” [Comment: Russia basing its nuclear weapons in Belarus is not the same thing!!!].
The two Sides confirm that arms control is an important means for strengthening international security and stability, while actions that undermine them simultaneously undercut arms control efforts. [Comment: China’s massive military expansion in the past two decades, the largest peacetime military build-up in 200 years, isn’t included in this arms control regime].
I could go on.
This is the kind of wonderfully cynical declaration that Monty Python would write and release. Ultimately, regardless of the blatant hypocrisy that is embedded throughout the joint statement, China and Russia are going to continue collaborating on a joint effort to end the world order built and led by the United States at the end of the Second World War. China is clearly going to continue providing aid to Russia in its war against Ukraine (although it is not clear that they have provided military assistance).
What is not clear is what kind of vision for the world these two have besides presiding over 21st century versions of old Russian and Chinese empires.
I don’t imagine it is a very good vision for anyone.
But, it is yet another illustration that we now exist in a very different world from the one that existed just a few short years ago. While some nations and political leaders have accepted this and have begun the process of adapting to this new world, many other have not.
Recall Votes in Taiwan. Petitions to recall legislators from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) have continued to move forward in Taiwan. As a result, about 30 KMT legislators may face recall votes in the weeks ahead. This could potentially give the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) an opportunity to regain control of the Taiwanese legislature.
Chinese Infiltration and Subversion in Taiwan. A report released this week describes how China has stepped up its infiltration efforts in Taiwan. Recent infiltration cases indicate that the Chinese Communist Party is accelerating its efforts with non-military espionage operations. There has been a sharp rise in prosecuted espionage cases in the past couple of years, with military personnel (active and retired) comprising approximately 66 percent of those indicted on espionage charges. As the report from the Jamestown Foundation notes:
CCP infiltration operations still target the same kinds of people as they always have—mainly retired and active-duty military personnel—but their objectives have shifted from simply gatheing intelligence to engaging in cognitive warfare. By encouraging their targets to declare their support for the CCP, including in the event of a conflict, the Party seeks to undermine resilience in Taiwan.
Secure Taiwan Monthly. A new monthly publication from the Research Project on China’s Defense Affairs (RCDA), called Secure Taiwan Monthly, has been released. The publication aims to assess military trends around Taiwan and the wider Indo-Pacific region. You can read the first edition at this link.
How China Fights Big Wars. This week, the U.S. Army released a new publication that explores how the Peoples Liberation Army is expected to fight in a large-scale conventional war. It is an interesting document. As its introduction notes:
China would employ a whole-of-nation approach, integrating military and civilian capabilities to secure its national interests. This approach would feature operations characterized by joint multidomain integration, prioritization of information dominance, and preparation for potentially protracted conflicts. Central to this strategy is ‘systems confrontation,’ where the PLA will leverage its offensive capabilities to paralyze enemy systems across multiple domains.
This is a document that nicely complements the annual Pentagon assessment of China’s military power. That document is focussed on capability and strategy. This new U.S. Army publication describes how these are brought together to achieve political and operational objectives.
I highly recommend the publication, and for an army publication it is short. Just 40 pages. You can read the full document at this link.
Military Photographers. One of the most under appreciated specialities in military organisations is the military photographers and videographers. These folks go everywhere with our servicemen and women, in peace and war, and capture the images and videos that tell the stories of their service and exploits to the folks back home. They do an amazing job. In celebration of these amazing military personnel, here is a couple of images from the past week.
There may be an Australian (and army) bias in these images. Sorry. Not sorry. And I have no idea how the Royal Australian Air Force (yes, this is really from their Twitter feed) managed to acquire a flyable Incom Corporation T-65 X-Wing fighter. Kudos.
*****
It’s time to turn to this week’s recommended readings.
This week, I have included a article that examines how Russia and North Korea have been sharing lessons about modern war and adapting. I have also included a new article by General Zaluzhnyi that examines the challenges of contemporary military command and control, as well as a report about Russia’s increased production and employment of Shahed drones. There is also an article about drones and artillery, and finally, a short piece that looks at the centrality of national will in warfare.
As always, if you only have time to read one of my recommendations, the first one is my read of the week.
Happy reading!
1. Russia-North Korea Cooperation and Mutual Adaptation
I have written at length about adaptation during the war in Ukraine. More recently, the development of a Russia-Iran-NK-China learning community has turned the Russia-Ukraine adaptation battle into an international adaptation war (which I wrote about here). To that end, the U.S. Army’s China Landpower Studies Center recently published an article that examines Russia-North Korea learning and collaboration during the war in Ukraine. You can read the full article at this link.
2. Ukrainian Military Command and Control
The Ukrainian ambassador to the United Kingdom, and former Ukrainian commander in chief, General Zaluzhnyi, has stood out for being a senior leader happy to publish his opinions since the beginning of the war. While this might have gotten him in trouble with the president at times, it is rare for someone of his seniority to write publicly on crucial military issues. His latest contribution is an article that examines the development of Ukrainian military command and control, including the recent development of more Army corps. You can read the full article here.
3. Russia Increases Shahed Production and Use
Over the past couple of years, Russia has stepped up its use of the Iranian designed and built Shahed drones. It is now building its own version of the drones in Russia, and using these in increasing quantities against Ukraine. One imagines they may also be used in future against other eastern European nations. This report from the IISS provides a useful update on these drones, Russian production of them and their accelerating use against Ukraine (which now stands at over 4000 per month). You can read the report at this link.
4. On Drones and Artillery
The attached article examines the impact of drones on ground combat, and offers the view that they are not a replacement for artillery and that “an overemphasis on these niche capabilities, often touted as revolutionary, could come at the expense of maintaining and improving the artillery that remains the cornerstone of firepower in any major engagement.” While I think uncrewed systems are probably more transformative than the author gives them credit for, this is an interesting perspective on the relative value of artillery and drones on the modern battlefield. You can read the full article here.
5. Lack of Will Prevents Wars from Being Won
In this short piece from Bing West, he explores how national will and political will are central to success in war. While this is hardly a new insight (Clausewitz wrote extensively on the topic), it is one of those old lessons that democracies appear to have to re-learn every generation. As West writes, “winning depends upon the combination of will and capability. In the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, U.S. capability was twice that of our enemies, and our will was three times less. Consequently, we lost all three wars.” You can read the full article here.
Just a brief comment on the role of interpreters in diplomatic meetings. As a former conference interpreter myself, I can confirm that there are usually two interpreters working at top level meetings, one for each side and each one working for his/her own principal. The State Department does of course have its own interpreters whom it would normally assign to diplomatic meetings. There are usually one or two senior officials present too who take notes and check them if necessary with their interpreter after the meeting.
In the meetings between Witkoff and Putin, the TV pictures indeed confirm that there was only one interpreter present, from the Kremlin, who therefore worked both into English and into Russian. This configuration puts the Russian speaker at a distinct advantage as he can ask the interpreter, in Russian, to clarify a point he may have found obscure in his interpretation from English. The English speaker, as you rightly point out, does not know what the two Russian speakers are saying and whether it is signifiant and why.
It’s also useful here to refer not only to the NBC report of the meetings but also Fiona Hill’s (Trump’s foreign policy adviser during his first term) recent interview with “Foreign Affairs” in which, on the basis of her own experience as a participant in high-level meetings, and a Russian speaker, she is less than complimentary about the the quality of interpretation provided by the Kremlin interpreters. My own discrete enquiries among the interpreting community would tend to corroborate these impressions.
All this would seem to substantiate the claim that diplomatic meetings organised by the Trump administration put the American side at a distinct disadvantage because they do not follow tried and tested practices and give the overall impression of rank amateurism.
Mick / Sir wonderful as usual! Thanks for sharing!! You Rock! 🎸