The Big Five - 4 Janaury 2025
My regular update on conflict and confrontation in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific, accompanied by recommended readings on modern war and future conflict.
May 2025 be our year. The year of Ukraine. We know that peace will not be given to us as a gift. President Zelenskyy, New Year Address 31 December 2024.
Welcome to the first edition of The Big Five for 2025.
This week, I cover the normal range of conflicts, starting with Ukraine, then across the world to the Pacific Theatre. As always, I will finish with my five recommended reads on war and national security issues from the past week.
In my weekly commentary, just published here, I explore these issues and conduct a special deep dive into Russia’s political and military objectives for the war in 2025.
Ukraine
In the final weeks of the Biden administration, the U.S. government this week provided another large military assistance package for Ukraine. Two separate initiatives, one for $1.25 billion from the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package and another for $1.21 billion under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) package, were announced.
As the Trump administration nears and speculation grows about what posture it will adopt with regards to a peace settlement for the war in Ukraine, the Ukrainian president discussed NATO membership for Ukraine as part of his New Year address.
And while we don’t yet know what the Trump administration’s approach to the war will be, the Russians are already laying down the elements of their negotiating position. This week, Russia's envoy to the U.N., Vasily Nebenzya stated that U.S. President-elect Donald Trump's team has not presented anything "interesting" to Moscow regarding ending the war in Ukraine. Trump, Vance and Kellogg have their work cut out for them.
This week, military analyst Tatarigami published a detailed examination of institutional and systemic challenges that are currently afflicting the Ukrainian armed forces. While each of these challenges are hindering the ability of Ukraine to efficiently mount its defence against Ukraine, collectively they pose a strategic problem for the Ukrainian government. The key issues examined in the article were as follows:
Mobilization challenges and shortages of frontline infantry soldiers. Mobilisation has not delivered the quantity of soldiers required for the Ukrainian military, and the quality (particularly with the number with health issues) is also a problem. Additionally, recruitment and reinforcement practices remain unsatisfactory.
Organisational failures. The massive gap between brigades and the general staff is yet to be addressed. This has been an issue throughout the war and been identified by several analysts, including myself, as an area requiring redress. In short, without effective headquarters between brigades and the general staff, achieving unity of effort on the battlefield is very difficult, and there is a massive tempation for officers at strategic headquarters to reach down into tactical operations. As the author of this report notes, “Ukraine has tried to patch its command structure gaps using temporary formations: OTU (Operational-Tactical Group) and OSUV (Operational-Strategic Group). These are stopgap measures meant to replace proper divisions and corps, but they come with serious flaws.”
False reporting and lack of accountability. The author notes that this is a serious problem at present, writing that the culture of false reporting creates deadly situations on the battlefield “when a position is lost, senior officers often don’t report it. They hope they can quickly retake the ground themselves, so they see no need to admit losing it in the first place.” A similar culture is present in the Russian military, as I wrote in The War for Ukraine. That Ukraine has not been able to stamp out this practice and evolve its culture to be more transparent and accountable is a serious deficiency that must be addressed in 2025.
The West and the preception of betrayal. The early unity after the Russian large-scale invasion three years ago has declined over time. As the author notes, “delayed aid and uncertain backing have shaken Ukrainian society’s confidence in both victory and their Western allies…Ukrainians are being forced to rethink their relationship with the West.” This isn’t to say the author is blaming the West for all of Ukraine’s challenges. However, addressing the other problems within the Ukrainian military system is harder while these circumstances persist.
Failed communication and unclear goals. While strategic narratives are vital, they can also backfire on their producers. Ukrainian and Western analysts dismissed Russia’s early mobilization efforts as failures in 2022 and saying that they wouldn’t make a significant difference. As the author notes, this “fed a dangerous optimism about the upcoming counteroffensive – some even predicted it would end the war and push Russian forces out of Crimea.Reality proved very different.” One particular passage stands out: “To keep morale up, many journalists, analysts, and soldiers with large online followings often avoided uncomfortable truths. They self-censored, hoping others would resolve the issues. But the problems persisted, and Ukraine has now been jolted awake, faced with a mountain of challenges that feel overwhelming to many. The once common refrain of this isn’t the time to discuss problems has shifted in many circles to it’s so dire it might be too late.”
This is a very good analysis of the challenges Ukraine faces in 2025 to sustain its defence against a much larger and more brutal Russian force and its land and aerial assaults. The author offers several recommendations that are worthy of consideration. Overall, it is a somber but necessary read for strategic leaders in Ukraine and beyond. These kinds of issues are possible in every military institution, and there are compelling lessons for the rest of us to learn from this assessment.
Interestingly, two of the Ukrainian president’s final speeches of 2024 dealt with military personnel issues. On 29 December, Zelenskyy spoke about the creation of a new position of the Military Ombudsman. In Zelenskyy’s words, the new position aims to “effectively protect the rights of our warriors and such a systemic capacity so that the ombudsman, together with the Ministry of Defense and all the others who are needed, can really influence the situation and really help warriors and the families of our warriors.”
The following day, the Ukrainian president confirmed the appointment of Olha Reshetylova, a well-known Ukrainian human rights advocate, to draf a bill to create the position and authorities of the Military Ombudsman.
He also spoke about streamlining the commissioning process for non-commissioned officers to become officers in the Ukrainian military. As he described it, “we have simplified the process for soldiers and sergeants with combat experience to receive officer ranks. This is a proper mechanism for social advancement within the army.” Making it easier to commission accomplished NCOs is a common practice in Western armies. And provided it doesn’t drain the pool of excellent NCOs too much, can be an excellent way to generate more experienced officers quickly.
Russian Losses in 2024. Both the Ukrainian military and British intelligence posted updated estimates in the past week of Russia’s losses in the Ukraine War during 2024. The losses for the past year are the highest of the war so far, and have been boosted by Putin’s push in the past six months to seize as much territory as possible before the Trump administration arrives and potentially changes the trajectory of the war. The Russian losses in 2024, according to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, were as follows:
430,790 personnel.
3,689 tanks.
8,956 armored vehicles.
13,050 artillery systems.
407 air defense systems.
313 MLRS.
The personnel losses are the highest of any year during the war. November and December both saw record numbers of daily casualties for the Russians. And, having seized around 4200 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory in 2024, this equates to over 100 casualties per square kilometres. No nation can sustain this, politically or demographically, indefinitely.
Drone Warfare and Adaptation. The adaptation battle with autonomous and remote controlled systems has continued. Recently, we saw the Ukrainians conduct a combined air-land drone attack to successfully seize a Russian position in north eastern Ukraine. I wrote about that event, the Battle of Lyptsi, here. This week, the Ukrainians achieved another first in drone warfare with the downing of at least one, and possibly two, Russian helicopters by a Ukrainian navy uncrewed vessel firing anti-aircraft missiles. You can view a video of the downing at this link.
The event has been widely reported, and is yet another contributing factor to Ukraine pushing the Russian navy out of the western reaches of the Black Sea. For a timeline of these events in the Black Sea, see this link to Covert Shores.
We should expect to see even more sophistocated forms of autonomous warfare, featuring drones only, in all the domains in 2025.
Battlefield Situation. As we begin the new year, I thought I would include an overall map of the situation in Ukraine and Russia. The map, courtesy of @DeepState_UA, shows key Russian headquarters, the axes of attack by Russian units at present, as well as Ukrainian territory currently occupied by the Russians.
Ukrainian and Russian forces continue fighting in the Kursk salient. Since the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk commenced in August 2024, the Russians have been able to re-take about 35% of the original territory seized by the Ukrainians. However, the rate of Russian advances has slowed significantly in recent weeks. The Ukrainians continue to inflict significant casualties on the Russians, including a strike on the 810th Russian marine brigade this week.
The Centre for Defence Strategies has also reported that the "Siversk" Operational Tactical Group (OTG) units captured Kruglenkoe, capturing defensive positions previously held by North Korean and Russian troops. North Korean units have apparently been deployed by the Russian military to positions at Ulanok, Fanaseevka, and Cherkasskya Konopelka.
Russian forces overall remain able to slowly advance in what appears to be its main effort - Pokrovsk - as well as on axes of advance in Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka. As @DeepState_UA has recently pointed out, the Kurakhove axis of advance has seen particularly high intensity combat and large number of engagements. In Kurakhove, the Russians appear to be attempting to envelope Ukrainian forces in the Kurakhove salient.
The Russians are maintaining the their pressure on Ukrainian forces across the eastern front in Ukraine. While Pokrovsk remains their main effort, Russian forces continue to push on their axes of advance in Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk and Vremivka.
In the south, Russian forces continued offensive operations in Zaporizhia without any significant territorial gains. Russian forces have also sought to advance near Kozatskyi Island, which is east of Kherson City.
As Tatarigami makes clear in his assessment discussed above, the continuing Ukrainian manpower challenges, as well as C2 and morale issues (including large scale desertions from the French-trained 155th Brigade), creates ongoing weaknesses and vulnerabilities in Ukraine's defensive strategy. These must be a priority for resolution in the coming months.
The Pacific
After a relatively slow start to the new year, the Chinese have stepped up their activity around Taiwan in the past couple of days. This week, Ian Ellis Jones released a review of PLA activity around Taiwan in 2024. It shows a significant increase in maritime and aerial activity by the PLA around Taiwan. You can see the Infograph below.
The PLA’s Southern Theatre Command conducted a snap readiness exercise around the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, which lies in the Command’s area of responsibility. Media released by the PLA indicates that patrol aircraft, fighter jets and H-6 bombers flew over Scarborough during the exercise, and that a naval task force consisting of a replenishment vessel, a 052D-class destroyer and a 055-class destroyer also participated. The Chinese also recently conducted naval drills in the Miyako Strait, which separates Taiwan and Okinawa.
This week, a Chinese submarine surveillance drone was discovered in Masbate, inside the Philippines territorial waters. The submersible vehicle, which is yellow and thought to be a Chinese Sea Wing UUV, was discovered on 30 December by local fishermen. The source said a local fisherman first spotted the Chinese underwater communications system in the area. The uncrewed submersible vehicle, has the capacity to transmit and receive data and other information. According to The War Zone, this submersible vessel is identical to ones found by fishermen in Indonesia between 2019 and 2020.
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Recently I have published several articles.
I examined the Battle of Lyptsi, which was the first recorded all drone attack against a Russian defended position. Ukrainian remotely operated and autonomous drones, on the land and in the air, were able to successfully push Russian defenders out of their position near Lypstki just before Christmas. You can read my analysis of the battle, and the implications for other military institutions, at this link.
I also published an article that reviewed the war in Ukraine in 2024, and looked at its possible trajectory in 2025. In this piece, which you read here, I explored seven key trends from the war last year: Leadership; Autonomous systems; Victory; Adaptation; Failure; Surprise; and, Mobilisation.
I also published an article this week about Hal Brands’ forthcoming book, The Eurasian Century. It is a superb book, and I had the opportunity to also conduct a Q&A with Hal. You can read that article here.
Finally, at the end of the week I published an article with the Sydney Morning Herald. This explored how Putin had accelerated his military campaign on the ground and in the air against Ukraine in the last few months of 2024. I proposed that there were multiple reasons for this, but the principal rationale was political: he wants to project the idea of an inevitable Russian victory in the minds of the incoming Trump administration, and he wants Trump and his advisors to think they are doing Ukraine a favour by coercing them into a ceasefire in 2025. You can read it here.
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So, to the recommended readings…
This week, there is a interesting piece from Foreign Affairs that explores the state of Chinese Artificial Intelligence (AI) research, its application in military operations and the contemporary challenges that the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) faces with the effective use of AI. There are also two articles related to aerial warfare; one on adaptation in the skies over Ukraine, and one about new Chinese stealth aircraft.
I have included an excellent report from the American Enterprise Institute about demography in east Asia and the long-term impacts of depopulation, as well as a new article on the dawning era of precise mass.
As always, if you only have time to read one article, the first one is my pick of the week.
Happy reading!
1. China as an AI Power - Not So Fast
In this article published in Foreign Affairs, the author argues that while China has made significant advances in AI, it still faces several obstacles to the effective application of this technology for military operations. As the author notes, “there is, for instance, a looming tension between relying on AI to guide battlefield operations and decision-making, on the one hand, and the PLA’s highly hierarchical, centralized bureaucratic processes, on the other. Xi’s ongoing consolidation of power might also limit the effective application of AI-enabled tools”. You can read the article at this link.
2. The Power of Demography and East Asia
In a newly published paper from the American Enterprise Institute, Nicholas Eberstadt explores the strategic impacts of sustained depopulation in east Asian nations in the 21st century. As the author notes, “the fate of East Asia stands to be recast in the coming decades by negativecompound interest—that is, by sustained depopulation. International prospects for the region promise to shift all the more rapidly because negative population growth in East Asia will juxtapose with continuing positive population growth in the USA.” The full report is available here.
3. The Adaptation Battle in the Skies Over Ukraine
Usually, when we read about adaptation in the skies over Ukraine, the focus is the accelerating application of uncrewed autonomous systems. However, this article focusses on the use of crewed fighter aircraft by the Ukrainian Air Force and their evolving roles and capabilities. As the pilot interviewed for the article notes, “Even when you go on leave for 15 days, you come back and you don’t quite understand why already everything has changed: we are working in a new way, in new areas, the enemy has come up with a countermeasure, and we have come up with some kind of countermeasure ourselves.” The full piece published by The Warzone and is available to read here.
4. The Era of Precise Mass
In this recent article published at War on the Rocks, the authors propose that “we now live in an era of “precise mass,” where comparatively cheap uncrewed systems — that can be deployed at scale — are also highly advanced and deadly accurate.” There is much evidence for this. At the same time, the authors do not believe that all legacy systems are doomed, but that a clever “mix of capabilities, emphasizing mass at the lower end and stealthy capabilities at the higher end that can survive in this era of warfare.” You can read the full piece here.
5. New Chinese Stealth Fighters
In the past week, aviation enthusiasts have all had their hearts aflutter with sitings of new Chinese stealth aircraft. Two aircraft, the large, tri-engine J-36 and a small aircraft from the Shenyang corporation, have appeared in social media. China military expert Andrew Erickson has provided an analysis of these aircraft and the technological journey of the Chinese aircraft industry over the past couple of decades that has led to this point. You can read the full article at this link.