Please explain the failure of the Ukrainian offensive. I surmised it was structured and influenced by NATO military doctrine. It did not account for entrenched Russian defenses and a lack of air superiority which seems to anchor NATO doctrine. Therefore doomed to failure with a circus over supplying Abram's tanks as icing on the cake.

So a paucity of F 16s (someday) and other equipment will continue the bleeding by Ukraine and reinforce the "inevitable" Russian victory and force capitulation on Ukraine.

Is the pending capitulation of Ukraine avoidable with anything short of a repeat of Nixon's emptying NATOs stockpile for the Israelis in 1973?

How about the war game results of Ukraine's fall followed by multiple Baltic states? Wake up Western leaders and rid us of Trumplicanism

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On the Strategy of Corrosion: I think this is one of your keenest insights into the Ukraine situation. First, the use of corrosion as the "action" for the accomplishment of the strategic objective is loaded with the idea of time. No matter the domain of the contest, the mechanics of strategic corrosion require a sustained effort. That said, also implicit is the idea that there will be a breaking point, or decision point, where those efforts are harvested. (In other words, for this strategy to pay large dividends the proponent must be poised to take advantage of that opportunity.) Second, corrosion is environmental/inevitable. In the Ukraine context, that suggests that the corrosive actions taken by Ukraine would occur at points and places that (a) Russia has difficulty defending; or (b) Russia is overmatched. Put differently, these attacks are "dislocating" in that strengths are directed at weaknesses. This would seem to place a premium on the tactics to be utilized in each domain.

Corrosion as a strategy also appears (at least partly) case specific because corrosion assumes a certain deterioration and hollowness in Russian military/economic capabilities and political will. This assumption has been partly validated (withdrawal from Kyiv/the Kharkiv offensive/Prigozhin) and partly invalidated (Russian military and economic mobilization/no significant evidence of civilian dissent/resupply from Iran, NK, China). Regardless, Ukraine has few other attractive options given its relative disadvantages in population, manufacturing capacity, and the current balance of forces. The strategy is also likely attractive to many of Ukraine's allies, who are unwilling or unable to commit the resources that would afford Ukraine decisive personnel and material advantages on the battlefield.

Assuming this is Ukraine's strategy, we in the West should probably sequence allied efforts to (1) ensure Ukraine receives material sufficient to defend its current territorial integrity while simultaneously resourcing Ukraine's asymmetrical operational and srategic strike campaigns (including ending restrictions on where weapons can be used); (2) assist Ukraine in building the ground, air, and informational forces needed to take advantage of the opportunities created by its operational and strategic strike campaigns; and (3) immediately begin producing the quantities of war material that Ukraine will need to accelerate the number and tempo of corrosive actions and decisively defeat Russian national will. Most importantly, because the strategy of corrosion requires both patience and the ability to quickly take advantage of success, our decision makers must be primed to understand the strategy (and how to resource that strategy) in terms of timing.

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