Thoughtful article. I join Ret'd MG Ryan in wishing the incredibly doughty Ukrainian nation well in this costly and painful war brought upon them. Large formation combined-arms warfare, all the way through exploitation phases, against a peer/near-peer opponent is challenging, let alone in a difficult OPSEC environment. Slava Ukraini - however challenging, the world should not acquiesce to naked military aggression in the name of imperial ambitions disguised as fanciful notions ("russkiy mir", and so on).
Always a great day when it starts with one of your articles. Thanks!
It will be interesting to analyze how Russian fortifications enhance and hamper their defensive capabilities. On the one hand (and as you point out) they are obstacles to be overcome, and this effort can be costly. On the other hand, they require manpower to be relevant, but that staffing restricts Russia’s ability to form the mobile reserve necessary to mount an effective defence.
Ukrainian planning is likely to focus on deceptive feints to draw the Russians out of their defensive positions (thinning the lines) followed by (1) artillery strikes against any concentrations of enemy forces and (2) penetrations of thinned out Russian positions.
In these efforts the factors of purpose / morale backed by better communications and delegated authority gives the advantage to the Ukrainians who can disperse their motivated soldiers to a greater degree than Russia which must concentrate more troops in one place to maintain control and “effectiveness”, thereby rendering them vulnerable to well placed artillery, rocket and aerial attacks.
Mick, another great piece! Thank you for keeping all us amateurs informed. What I find curious is the “how” of Ukrainian deception and misdirection on true intentions. Given the unprecedented surveillance, it is difficult as you rightly point out. However, the AFU have been quite adept at using “dummies” to simulate high value targets like M777 and HIMARS made of wood that the Russian have fallen for. Could this be a part of the scheme on a larger scale like the Allies before D-Day?
Also, what of using communications traffic? I also wonder about how to drive through physically fortified lines. Yes, the AFU now possess those tools, but what about other “daring moves” to make that easier? Partisan groups could serve the purpose of paving the way for certain pathways behind Russian lines. What is cutting off GLOC to the front line defensive networks with air strikes artillery and close support ground attack aircraft? Too bad the there are no A-10s in the kit, or at least as we know it.
Finally, if Russian morale and readiness are really as bad as they have shown, would it only take one break in the lines of defense to turn it into a rout?
Thanks for a great analysis, always insightful to read it. The main question is “when”. Asking for my mum, she wants to return to her currently occupied house 😄
Along the lines of “Shapes of Things to Come”. Forbes published an interesting article on UAF Intent to Purchase 100 Polish IFVs. https://apple.news/AKN2bm-fKRU6RB0ajoQ-HWA What really caught my attention is that these 30mm auto-cannon armed vehicles are an interesting choice that give a window into UAF longer term acquisition- and hence its appraisal of strategic requirements. The IFVs are originally of Finnish design, and the Finns helped Poland setup the entire ecosystem of feeder companies and technologies. This is a model for a rebuilding Ukraine that has a long history of arms manufacture.
Great article. Really educational to an amateur like me. The irony of all of this is that the current situation would have never arisen had the West dilly dallied on political grounds over the introduction of appropriate military equipment since the conflict began. For example the provision by the West, of appropriate combat aircraft would never have allowed the invaders to build defensive positions during the winter months. The failure by Russia to deploy from the very beginning appropriate air cover over the battlefield highlights this. The impact arising from the provision of combat aircraft by the West would, even at this stage, be enormous. A protracted conflict IMHO would not be an issue.
I really appreciate your expertise and ongoing commentary on this situation, I've learned a lot from reading your analysis.
As you note above though, the politics more than battlefield conditions could determine the conduct of the war. The Donald Trump circus will suck up most of the oxygen from the American media space, and the perception of a stalemate in Ukraine will mean attention from many will drift elsewhere. The perception Ukraine can't break Russian lines and Russian resolve will result in more and more voices calling for for first a ceasefire and then a pace agreement, which will likely be in Russia's favour, allowing it to consolidate its hold on the illegally annexed territories of Ukraine.
This is why it's imperative to ensure that this next major offensive is as big and successful as possible, because if Ukraine can't demonstrate it can prevail on the battlefield, the public perception of the war will inevitably change. Fair or not, this attitude could harden into "why are we [Western donor states] throwing endless money at this protracted stalemate?", and if there's a recession or a tight election approaching, many governments and leaders will find this hard to push back upon. What is need is another Kharkiv or Kherson-style victory, to win the global narrative as much as inflict military defeats on Russia.
Good points and a logical framework. Some commentators are insisting the Ukrainians must recover large land areas in their offensiv(s). I disagree. The best course is a limited campaign to invest Melitopol. I do not advocate a Stalingrad urban battle, but that may not be necessary. The purpose is to demonstrate competence at combined arms operations . The additional benefit is gaining a blocking position that threatens resupply to Russians on the right bank of the Dnipro.
Despite the uplifting last sentence when I contemplate the difficutly of penetrating prepared defences of an enemy with plenty of activity I worry about the comng Ukrainian offensive.
What do you think about the amount of material support the allies are providing?
To me it looks like they sufficiently fill the need in crucial specialized categories, like engineering equipment, mobile air defence and a lot of small ticket stuff, but the number of delivered and promised AFVs, MBTs, artillery systems and ammunition seems small compared to existing Ukrainian and Russian inventory.
I am especially worried about the Allies' ability to replace Ukrainian attrition. It looks like for many heavy systems, current promises are all that can be reasonably spared given the current priority given to the war in Ukraine.
This post is aging horribly because you are a biased warmonger. Simplicius the Thinker has been much more accurate, which is why he has more subscribers than you. Fight til the last Ukrainian!
Thank you for this great insight. Having served with the British army and with the Russians under the PfP program, we must never underestimate Russia’s resolve to retain the Donbas region and Crimea, also let’s not forget the multiple times that NATO has reneged on it promised not to expand eastwards. The only beneficiary of the UKR conflict is the USA who misappropriates it’s NATO leadership for its own gains. As you quite rightly point out, the strategic clock is ticking with the looming US elections next year, at which point all support for UKR could be switched off.
What a complete crock of deep state bullshit. Ohhhh, “they’ll get em this time”! You mean “the American taxpayer gets fucked”. Ukraine isn’t beating Russia. Ever. America couldn’t handle
Also, for what it is worth some of the logic is hard to follow. Like the statement that deception during the buildup is more important nowadays than in previous wars. I mean...maybe (since you posit it is impossible to keep deception during the campaign, maybe the initial deception has more value). But also, maybe not. After all, the deception will not last long, per your comments. So the ongoing value might be less.
In any case, those couple paras on deception don't read like clear analysis. Read more like rah rah word salad.
Your concluding sentence is cheerleading, not analyzing:
"...the Ukrainians will continue to show the world that with their sense of purpose, adaptive mindset and pride in defending their nation, they are unbeatable."
1. Nothing is certain in war. "Unbeatable" is very silly, especially given the pretty even recent pace of the war.
2. This is allowing what you WANT to happen to affect your judgment of what WILL happen. It's called "hopium" or "wishcasting".
None of this is to contest that Ukraine may win the war. Or even to discuss if they should. But this kind of rah rah statement from you is incredibly silly. You need to be analytical, not emotional.
Thoughtful article. I join Ret'd MG Ryan in wishing the incredibly doughty Ukrainian nation well in this costly and painful war brought upon them. Large formation combined-arms warfare, all the way through exploitation phases, against a peer/near-peer opponent is challenging, let alone in a difficult OPSEC environment. Slava Ukraini - however challenging, the world should not acquiesce to naked military aggression in the name of imperial ambitions disguised as fanciful notions ("russkiy mir", and so on).
Always a great day when it starts with one of your articles. Thanks!
It will be interesting to analyze how Russian fortifications enhance and hamper their defensive capabilities. On the one hand (and as you point out) they are obstacles to be overcome, and this effort can be costly. On the other hand, they require manpower to be relevant, but that staffing restricts Russia’s ability to form the mobile reserve necessary to mount an effective defence.
Ukrainian planning is likely to focus on deceptive feints to draw the Russians out of their defensive positions (thinning the lines) followed by (1) artillery strikes against any concentrations of enemy forces and (2) penetrations of thinned out Russian positions.
In these efforts the factors of purpose / morale backed by better communications and delegated authority gives the advantage to the Ukrainians who can disperse their motivated soldiers to a greater degree than Russia which must concentrate more troops in one place to maintain control and “effectiveness”, thereby rendering them vulnerable to well placed artillery, rocket and aerial attacks.
#SlavaUkraini
Mick, another great piece! Thank you for keeping all us amateurs informed. What I find curious is the “how” of Ukrainian deception and misdirection on true intentions. Given the unprecedented surveillance, it is difficult as you rightly point out. However, the AFU have been quite adept at using “dummies” to simulate high value targets like M777 and HIMARS made of wood that the Russian have fallen for. Could this be a part of the scheme on a larger scale like the Allies before D-Day?
Also, what of using communications traffic? I also wonder about how to drive through physically fortified lines. Yes, the AFU now possess those tools, but what about other “daring moves” to make that easier? Partisan groups could serve the purpose of paving the way for certain pathways behind Russian lines. What is cutting off GLOC to the front line defensive networks with air strikes artillery and close support ground attack aircraft? Too bad the there are no A-10s in the kit, or at least as we know it.
Finally, if Russian morale and readiness are really as bad as they have shown, would it only take one break in the lines of defense to turn it into a rout?
Thanks for a great analysis, always insightful to read it. The main question is “when”. Asking for my mum, she wants to return to her currently occupied house 😄
Along the lines of “Shapes of Things to Come”. Forbes published an interesting article on UAF Intent to Purchase 100 Polish IFVs. https://apple.news/AKN2bm-fKRU6RB0ajoQ-HWA What really caught my attention is that these 30mm auto-cannon armed vehicles are an interesting choice that give a window into UAF longer term acquisition- and hence its appraisal of strategic requirements. The IFVs are originally of Finnish design, and the Finns helped Poland setup the entire ecosystem of feeder companies and technologies. This is a model for a rebuilding Ukraine that has a long history of arms manufacture.
Great article. Really educational to an amateur like me. The irony of all of this is that the current situation would have never arisen had the West dilly dallied on political grounds over the introduction of appropriate military equipment since the conflict began. For example the provision by the West, of appropriate combat aircraft would never have allowed the invaders to build defensive positions during the winter months. The failure by Russia to deploy from the very beginning appropriate air cover over the battlefield highlights this. The impact arising from the provision of combat aircraft by the West would, even at this stage, be enormous. A protracted conflict IMHO would not be an issue.
I really appreciate your expertise and ongoing commentary on this situation, I've learned a lot from reading your analysis.
As you note above though, the politics more than battlefield conditions could determine the conduct of the war. The Donald Trump circus will suck up most of the oxygen from the American media space, and the perception of a stalemate in Ukraine will mean attention from many will drift elsewhere. The perception Ukraine can't break Russian lines and Russian resolve will result in more and more voices calling for for first a ceasefire and then a pace agreement, which will likely be in Russia's favour, allowing it to consolidate its hold on the illegally annexed territories of Ukraine.
This is why it's imperative to ensure that this next major offensive is as big and successful as possible, because if Ukraine can't demonstrate it can prevail on the battlefield, the public perception of the war will inevitably change. Fair or not, this attitude could harden into "why are we [Western donor states] throwing endless money at this protracted stalemate?", and if there's a recession or a tight election approaching, many governments and leaders will find this hard to push back upon. What is need is another Kharkiv or Kherson-style victory, to win the global narrative as much as inflict military defeats on Russia.
Good points and a logical framework. Some commentators are insisting the Ukrainians must recover large land areas in their offensiv(s). I disagree. The best course is a limited campaign to invest Melitopol. I do not advocate a Stalingrad urban battle, but that may not be necessary. The purpose is to demonstrate competence at combined arms operations . The additional benefit is gaining a blocking position that threatens resupply to Russians on the right bank of the Dnipro.
Despite the uplifting last sentence when I contemplate the difficutly of penetrating prepared defences of an enemy with plenty of activity I worry about the comng Ukrainian offensive.
Thanks for writing this blog!
What do you think about the amount of material support the allies are providing?
To me it looks like they sufficiently fill the need in crucial specialized categories, like engineering equipment, mobile air defence and a lot of small ticket stuff, but the number of delivered and promised AFVs, MBTs, artillery systems and ammunition seems small compared to existing Ukrainian and Russian inventory.
I am especially worried about the Allies' ability to replace Ukrainian attrition. It looks like for many heavy systems, current promises are all that can be reasonably spared given the current priority given to the war in Ukraine.
This post is aging horribly because you are a biased warmonger. Simplicius the Thinker has been much more accurate, which is why he has more subscribers than you. Fight til the last Ukrainian!
Thank you for this great insight. Having served with the British army and with the Russians under the PfP program, we must never underestimate Russia’s resolve to retain the Donbas region and Crimea, also let’s not forget the multiple times that NATO has reneged on it promised not to expand eastwards. The only beneficiary of the UKR conflict is the USA who misappropriates it’s NATO leadership for its own gains. As you quite rightly point out, the strategic clock is ticking with the looming US elections next year, at which point all support for UKR could be switched off.
What a complete crock of deep state bullshit. Ohhhh, “they’ll get em this time”! You mean “the American taxpayer gets fucked”. Ukraine isn’t beating Russia. Ever. America couldn’t handle
Russia. This is complete bullshit.
Also, for what it is worth some of the logic is hard to follow. Like the statement that deception during the buildup is more important nowadays than in previous wars. I mean...maybe (since you posit it is impossible to keep deception during the campaign, maybe the initial deception has more value). But also, maybe not. After all, the deception will not last long, per your comments. So the ongoing value might be less.
In any case, those couple paras on deception don't read like clear analysis. Read more like rah rah word salad.
Your concluding sentence is cheerleading, not analyzing:
"...the Ukrainians will continue to show the world that with their sense of purpose, adaptive mindset and pride in defending their nation, they are unbeatable."
1. Nothing is certain in war. "Unbeatable" is very silly, especially given the pretty even recent pace of the war.
2. This is allowing what you WANT to happen to affect your judgment of what WILL happen. It's called "hopium" or "wishcasting".
None of this is to contest that Ukraine may win the war. Or even to discuss if they should. But this kind of rah rah statement from you is incredibly silly. You need to be analytical, not emotional.
Thank you for your thoughts on this!